## TOWN OF HEBRON PUBLIC SAFETY TASK FORCE TOWN OFFICE BUILDING ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING

Wednesday, May 1, 2019

**AGENDA** 

7:00 p.m.

- Call to Order
- 2. Pledge of Allegiance

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- Swearing In Ceremony
- A. Member Introductions
- 5. Discuss Mission, Charge and Schedule
- 8. Overview of Crime and Law Enforcement in Hebron

Crime Rates in Hebron: Historical and Current Trends.

Police Staffing: Historical and Current.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Resident Trooper and town constables

Proposed Police Staffing Alternatives

Presenters: Andy Tierney, Hebron Town Manager

Dan Greenwood, Resident Trooper, Hebron

- 7. Next Meeting Wednesday, May 8, 2019
- 8. **Public Comment.** This section of the agenda is reserved for persons in attendance who wish to briefly address the Task Force. The Task Force requests that comments be limited to three minutes or less.
- 9. Meeting Adjournment

MISSION STATEMENT: The mission of The Public Safety Task Force is to gather relevant data to advise the Board of Selectmen on decisions concerning:

- 1. How do we best staff our police department in the Town of Hebron?
- 2. What are cost-effective ways to reduce crime in Hebron?
- 3. What are the best ways to protect our schools?

### **Public Safety Task Force**

The mission of The Public Safety Task Force is to gather relevant data to advise the Board of Selectmen on decisions concerning:

- 1. How do we best staff our police department in the town of Hebron?
- 2. What are cost-effective ways to reduce crime in Hebron?
- 3. What are the best ways to protect our schools?

### Proposed Members (all Hebron residents):

Fran Carino, Supervisory Juvenile Prosecutor, Office of the Chief State's Attorney Erica Bromley, current BOE Chair

Kathy Shea, Former BOE Chair, former BOF member, extensive background in school safety issues

Robert Stanford, BOE-recommended, Lt., Manchester Police, SRO Supervisor

David Luke, Retired State Police Sgt, Currently Head Safety Officer, East Hampton High School

Ally Nadeau, BOE recommended Hebron parent, may rotate with another parent as approved by the Task Force Chairman

John Miller, Hartford Police Sgt., Background in Community Policing

Dan Huppe, Hebron Fire Department, Retired Fire/Rescue/EMS Battalion Chief, Manchester Fire Department

John Collins, BOS, Chair of Task Force

Daniel Larson, BOS, alternate

Heather Petit, BOE, alternate

Andy Tierney, Hebron Town Manager, will be an ex-officio member of the Task Force.

### Schedule

### May 1. Overview of Crime and Law Enforcement in Hebron

Crime Rates in Hebron: Historical and Current Trends.

Police Staffing: Historical and Current.

Roles and Responsibilities of the Resident Trooper and town constables

**Proposed Police Staffing Alternatives** 

Presenters: Andy Tierney, Hebron Town Manager

Dan Greenwood, Resident Trooper, Hebron

### May 8. Community Policing in Hebron

Other Communities Experiences Community coverage Police Response Times

Invited guest: Marshall Porter, Glastonbury Chief of Police

### May 15. Strategies to Protect the Schools.

Presenters

- Marc Rubera, Police Sgt, Hebron, and RHAM High School SRO
- Experts Provided by the Hebron Board of Education

### May 22. Crime Prevention Strategies and Community Communication.

Presenter: TBD.

May 29. Police Deployment Strategies in Hebron. Analysis of Alternatives and Recommendations

### **Other Dates**

June 14. Report Due to the Board of Selectmen.

**June 20.** Results of the Report Presented to the Board of Selectmen by the Task Force Chairman and Town Manager

| Row Labels                     | Count of Offense Desciption |
|--------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| ANDOVER                        | 35                          |
| Aggravated Assault             | 1                           |
| All other Larceny              | 16                          |
| Burglary/Breaking and Entering | ng 9                        |
| Counterfeiting/Forgery         | 1                           |
| Credit Card/Automatic Teller   | Machine Fraud 2             |
| Fraud-Insufficient Funds Chec  | k 2                         |
| Identity Theft                 | 1                           |
| Motor Vehicle Theft            | 1                           |
| Theft From Building            | 1                           |
| Theft of MV Parts or Accessor  | ies 1                       |
| Bolton                         | 45                          |
| Aggravated Assault             | 1                           |
| All other Larceny              | 21                          |
| Burglary/Breaking and Entering |                             |
| Forcible Rape                  | 1                           |
| Motor Vehicle Theft            | 9                           |
| Robbery                        | 1                           |
| Sexual Assault with an Object  | 1                           |
| Theft From Building            | 2                           |
| COLCHESTER                     | 181                         |
| Aggravated Assault             | 6                           |
| All other Larceny              | 72                          |
| Arson                          | 1                           |
| Burglary/Breaking and Enterir  |                             |
| Counterfeiting/Forgery         | 2                           |
| Credit Card/Automatic Teller   |                             |
| False Pretenses/Swindle/Con    |                             |
| Forcible Rape                  | 6                           |
| Forcible Sodomy                | 1                           |
| Identity Theft                 | 1                           |
| Motor Vehicle Theft            | 20                          |
| Murder and Non-negligent M     |                             |
| Robbery                        | 4                           |
| Shoplifting                    | 7                           |
| Statutory Rape                 | 1                           |
| Stolen Property Offenses       | 1                           |
| Theft From Building            | 7                           |
| Theft From Vehicle             | 4                           |
| COLUMBIA                       | 72                          |
| Aggravated Assault             | 5                           |
| All other Larceny              | 17                          |

| Burglary/Breaking and Entering                  | 17   |
|---|------|
| Credit Card/Automatic Teller Machine Fraud      | 2    |
| Embezzlement                                    | 1    |
| False Pretenses/Swindle/Confidence Game         | 1    |
| Forcible Rape                                   | 1    |
| Fraud-Insufficient Funds Check                  | 2    |
| Identity Theft                                  | 2    |
| Motor Vehicle Theft                             | 6    |
| Robbery   | 3    |
| Stolen Property Offenses                        | 2    |
| Theft From Building                             | 6    |
| Theft From Vehicle                              | 6    |
| Theft of MV Parts or Accessories                | 1    |
| Glastonbury                                     | 1204 |
| Aggravated Assault                              |      |
| All other Larceny                               | 23   |
| Arson   | 114  |
|   | 2    |
| Burglary/Breaking & Entering                    | 137  |
| Counterfeiting/Forgery                          | 40   |
| Credit Card/Automatic Teller Fraud Embezzlement | 41   |
|   | 7    |
| Extortion/Blackmail                             | 2    |
| False Pretenses/Swindle/Confidence Game         | 62   |
| Forcible Rape                                   | 6    |
| Forcible Sodomy                                 | 2    |
| Identity Theft<br>Motor Vehicle Theft           | 19   |
|   | 99   |
| Robbery   | 10   |
| Sexual Assault with an Object                   | 2    |
| Shoplifting                                     | 116  |
| Stolen Property Offenses                        | 6    |
| Theft From Building                             | 85   |
| Theft of Mater Vehicle                          | 362  |
| Theft of Motor Vehicle Parts/Accessories        | 69   |
| HEBRON  | 85   |
| Aggravated Assault                              | 5    |
| All other Larceny                               | 33   |
| Burglary/Breaking and Entering                  | 14   |
| Counterfeiting/Forgery                          | 1    |
| Credit Card/Automatic Teller Machine Fraud      | 2    |
| Forcible Rape                                   | 2    |
| Motor Vehicle Theft                             | 10   |
| Theft From Building                             | 12   |
| Theft From Vehicle                              | 6    |
| LEBANON   | 58   |
| Aggravated Assault                              | 3    |
| All other Larceny                               | 18   |


| Burglary/Breaking and Entering             | 17   |
|--|------|
| Forcible Rape                              | 2    |
| Identity Theft                             | 1    |
| Motor Vehicle Theft                        | 5    |
| Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter      | 1    |
| Robbery                                    | 1    |
| Statutory Rape                             | 3    |
| Theft From Building                        | 7    |
| MARLBOROUGH                                | 101  |
| Aggravated Assault                         | 1    |
| All other Larceny                          | 36   |
| Arson                                      | 1    |
| Burglary/Breaking and Entering             | 29   |
| Credit Card/Automatic Teller Machine Fraud | 2    |
| Forcible Sodomy                            | 1    |
| Identity Theft                             | 2    |
| Motor Vehicle Theft                        | 10   |
| Murder and Non-negligent Manslaughter      | 1    |
| Theft From Building                        | 11   |
| Theft From Vehicle                         | 7    |
| (blank)                                    |      |
| (blank)                                    |      |
| Grand Total                                | 1781 |

### **Law Enforcement Personnel**

|   |   |                         | Employee Rate  |         | Swo     | orn                               | Civi             | lian   |
|---|---|-------------------------|--|---------|---------|-----------------------------------|------------------|--|
| Department  | County  | Population <sup>1</sup> | Per 1,000 Pop.   | Total   | Male    | Female                            | Male             | Female   |
| STATE POLICE                                      |   | 508,195                 | 2.34   | 1197    | 883     | 83                                | 92               | 139  |
| ANSONIA   | New Haven   | 18,647                  | 2.68   | 50      | 40      | 3                                 | 2                | _  |
| AVON  | Hartford  | 18,397                  | 2.12   | 39      | 27      | 3                                 | 1                | 8  |
| BERLIN  | Hartford  | 20,601                  | 2.62   | 54      | 38      | 3                                 | 6                | Martin Control of State of Sta |
| BETHEL  | Fairfield   | 19,796                  | 2.53   | 50      | 32      | 5                                 | 7                | 6  |
| BLOOMFIELD  | Hartford  | 20,667                  | 2.81   | 58      | 37      | 9                                 | 4                | 3  |
| BRANFORD  | New Haven   | 28,027                  | 2.35   | 66      | 47      | 4                                 | 8                | NULL SERVICE AND PARTY.  |
| BRIDGEPORT  | Fairfield   | 146,110                 | 3.02   | 441     | 355     | 33                                | 24               | 29   |
| BRISTOL   | Hartford  | 60,090                  |  | 145     | 117     | 3                                 | 13               | 12   |
| BROOKFIELD  | Fairfield   | 17,203                  |  | 44      | 32      | 2                                 | 5                |  |
| CANTON  | Hartford  | 10,285                  |  | 20      | 15      | 0                                 | 4                |  |
| CHESHIRE  | New Haven   | 29,282                  |  | 57      | 39      | 6                                 | 6                | (  |
| CLINTON   | Middlesex   | 12,915                  |  | 37      | 26      | 1                                 | 5                | SEASOUR CAPE   |
| COVENTRY  | Tolland   | 12,431                  |  | 21      | 13      | 3                                 | 4                |  |
| CROMWELL  | Middlesex   | 13,953                  |  | 35      | 23      | 4                                 | 2                | (  |
| DANBURY   | Fairfield   | 85,614                  |  | 144     | 126     | 13                                | 0                |  |
| DARIEN  | Fairfield   | 21,910                  | Medition and an introduction of the state of | 57      | 42      | 7                                 | 4                |  |
| DERBY   | New Haven   | 12,586                  |  | 36      | 31      | 3                                 | 1                |  |
| EAST HAMPTON                                      | Middlesex   | 12,855                  |  | 18      | 16      | 0                                 | 0                | MMULL sour Ferroggai   |
| EAST HARTFORD                                     | Hartford  | 50,067                  |  | 159     | 108     | 17                                | 12               | 22   |
| EAST HAVEN  | New Haven   | 28,739                  |  | 56      | 48      | 4                                 | 12               | - 24   |
| EAST LYME   | New London  | 18,849                  |  | 29      | 20      | 3                                 | 3                |  |
| EAST WINDSOR                                      | Hartford  | 11,383                  |  | 34      | 23      | 3                                 | 1                |  |
| EASTON  | Fairfield   | 7,570                   |  |         |         | esternomentum terminalises (fe-si | economic monomid | and the state of t |
| ENFIELD   | Hartford  | 44,321                  | 2.25<br>2.55   | 17      | 14      | 1                                 | 0                |  |
| FAIRFIELD   | Fairfield   |                         |  | 113     | 82      | 10                                | 10               | 1  |
| FARMINGTON  | Hartford  | 61,402                  |  | 108     | 96      | 6                                 | 1                |  |
| GLASTONBURY                                       | Hartford  | 25,551                  | 2.35   | 60      | 40      | 4                                 | 7                | 9  |
| Engineerin communication to the research with the | nama (incomendamenta a propieta e e e e e e e e e | 34,606                  |  | 77      | 48      | 8                                 | 11               | 10   |
| GRANBY<br>GREENWICH                               | Hartford<br>Fairfield                             | 11,241                  | 1.87   | 21      | 13      | 3                                 | 1                | 4  |
| GROTON CITY                                       | New London  | 62,531                  | 2.88   | 180     | 139     | 14                                | 14               | 13   |
| GROTON LONG PT.                                   | New London  | 9,093<br>506            | 3.85<br>9.88   | 35      | 24      | 4                                 | 3                |  |
| GROTON TOWN                                       | New London  | 29,524                  |  | 5<br>68 | 5<br>53 | 10                                | 0<br>1           | (  |
| GUILFORD  | New Haven   | 22,259                  | 2.02   | 45      | 30      | 7                                 | 1                |  |
| HAMDEN  | New Haven   | 61,042                  |  | 133     | 99      | 8                                 | 11               | 15   |
| HARTFORD  | Hartford  | 122,891                 | 3.54   | 435     | 345     | 45                                | 22               | 23   |
| LEDYARD   | New London  | 14,889                  |  | 28      | 21      | 0                                 | 4                |  |
| MADISON   | New Haven   | 18,130                  |  | 40      | 23      | 4                                 | 6                |  |
| MANCHESTER  | Hartford  | 57,808                  |  | 140     | 96      | 13                                | 15               | 16   |
| MERIDEN   | New Haven   | 59,417                  |  | 123     | 99      | 12                                | 5                |  |
| MIDDLEBURY  | New Haven   | 7,651                   | 1.70   | 13      | 10      | 1                                 | 0                | V-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1-1  |
| MIDDLETOWN  | Middlesex   | 46,363                  |  | 128     | 105     | 9                                 | 2                | 12   |
| MILFORD   | New Haven   | 54,265                  |  | 133     | 100     | 15                                | 4                | 14   |
| MONROE  | Fairfield   | 19,682                  |  | 55      | 36      | 7                                 | 6                | -  |
| NAUGATUCK   | New Haven   | 31,310                  |  | 71      | 54      | 6                                 | 5                | (  |
| NEW BRITAIN                                       | Hartford  | 72,442                  |  | 166     | 141     | 17                                | 1                | -  |
| NEW CANAAN  | Fairfield   | 20,364                  |  | 52      | 43      | 3                                 | 1                |  |
| NEW HAVEN   | New Haven   | 129,953                 |  | 476     | 359     | 68                                | 11               | 38   |
| NEW LONDON  | New London  | 26,880                  |  | 83      | 62      | 6                                 | 3                | 12   |
| NEW MILFORD                                       | Litchfield  | 26,993                  |  | 53      | 37      | 5                                 | 4                |  |
| NEWINGTON   | Hartford  | 30,402                  |  | 61      | 44      | 6                                 | 6                |  |
| NEWTOWN   | Fairfield   | 27,908                  |  | 49      | 38      | 7                                 | 0                | 4  |
| NORTH BRANFORD                                    | New Haven   | 14,163                  |  | 27      | 21      | 1                                 | 3                |  |
| NORTH HAVEN                                       | New Haven   | 23,646                  | 2.45   | 58      | 46      | 3                                 | 3                | (  |

|                  |               |  | Employee Rate  |                                 | Swo   | orn    | Civil  | ian  |
|------------------|---------------|--|--|---------------------------------|-------|--------|--------|--|
| Department       | County        | Population <sup>1</sup>  | Per 1,000 Pop.   | Total                           | Male  | Female | Male   | Female   |
| NORWALK          | Fairfield     | 88,849   | 2.45   | 218                             | 162   | 17     | 23     | 10   |
| NORWICH          | New London    | 39,393   | 2.56   | 101                             | 77    | 7      | 5      | 12   |
| OLD SAYBROOK     | Middlesex     | 10,070   | 2.48   | 25                              | 14    | 3      | 5      |  |
| ORANGE           | New Haven     | 13,904   |  | 56                              | 42    | 4      | 3      |  |
| PLAINFIELD       | Windham       | 15,011   |  | 22                              | 17    | 1      | 2      |  |
| PLAINVILLE       | Hartford      | 17,669   |  | 45                              | 35    | 2      | 1      |  |
| PLYMOUTH         | Litchfield    | 11,671   |  | 29                              | 22    | 1      | 4      |  |
| PORTLAND         | Middlesex     | 9,324  |  | 13                              | 12    | 0      | 1      | (  |
| PUTNAM MUNICIPAL | Windham       | 6,970  |  | 19                              | 14    | 1      | 3      |  |
| REDDING          | Fairfield     | 9,223  |  | 23                              | 13    | 4      | 6      | (  |
| RIDGEFIELD       | Fairfield     | 25,127   |  | 47                              | 38    | 2      | 3      |  |
| ROCKY HILL       | Hartford      | 20,189   |  | 50                              | 31    | 4      | 7      |  |
| SEYMOUR          | New Haven     | 16,555   |  | 41                              | 35    | 4      | 0      |  |
| SHELTON          | Fairfield     | 41,625   |  | 58                              | 47    | 3      | 3      |  |
| SIMSBURY         | Hartford      | 24,559   |  | 48                              | 33    | 4      | 3      |  |
| SOUTH WINDSOR    | Hartford      | 25,740   |  | 54                              | 36    | 5      | 6      | *******************************  |
| SOUTHINGTON      | Hartford      | 43,769   |  | 85                              | 59    | 5      | 11     | 10   |
| STAMFORD         | Fairfield     | 130,189  |  | 333                             | 254   | 29     | 23     | 2  |
| STONINGTON       | New London    | 18,666   |  | 49                              | 34    | 4      | - IIII | and another than here to be only   |
| STRATFORD        | Fairfield     | 52,263   |  | see the sale of the sale of the |       |        | 5      | and the same of th |
| SUFFIELD         | Hartford      | 15,602   |  | 111<br>26                       | 91    | 13     | 2      |  |
| THOMASTON        | Litchfield    | 7,548  |  |                                 |       |        | 1      |  |
| TORRINGTON       | Litchfield    |  |  | 28                              | 17    | 1      | 6      |  |
|                  |               | 34,372   |  | 90                              | 76    | 4      | 2      |  |
| TRUMBULL         | Fairfield     | 36,265   |  | 89                              | 73    | 5      | 4      |  |
| VERNON           | Tolland       | 29,142   |  | 62                              | 45    | 4      | 6      | un meriena ann ac  |
| WALLINGFORD      | New Haven     | 44,577   |  | 87                              | 58    | 8      | 6      | 1  |
| WATERBURY        | New Haven     | 107,924  |  | 321                             | 254   | 23     | 19     | 2.   |
| WATERFORD        | New London    | 19,034   |  | 50                              | 39    | 6      | 0      | and the state of the state of  |
| WATERTOWN        | Litchfield    | 21,672   |  | 46                              | 33    | 4      | 2      |  |
| WEST HARTFORD    | Hartford      | 62,812   |  | 141                             | 110   | 12     | 6      | 1.   |
| WEST HAVEN       | New Haven     | 54,342   |  | 133                             | 106   | 12     | 1      | 1.   |
| WESTON           | Fairfield     | 10,320   |  | 17                              | 16    | 0      | 0      |  |
| WESTPORT         | Fairfield     | 28,079   |  | 77                              | 54    | 10     | 6      | W. 1981 W. 1984 W. 1984  |
| WETHERSFIELD     | Hartford      | 26,116   |  | 64                              | 44    | 4      | 7      |  |
| WILLIMANTIC      | Windham       | 17,768   |  | 48                              | 40    | 3      | 1      | and the state of t |
| WILTON           | Fairfield     | 18,643   |  | 48                              | 39    | 5      | 3      | lovija nesovenova i r  |
| WINCHESTER       | Litchfield    | 10,677   |  | 26                              | 19    | 2      | 2      |  |
| WINDSOR          | Hartford      | 28,836   |  | 65                              | 39    | 13     | 0      | 1  |
| WINDSOR LOCKS    | Hartford      | 12,513   |  | 33                              | 25    | 1      | 4      |  |
| WOLCOTT          | New Haven     | 16,632   |  | 31                              | 21    | 1      | 1      |  |
| WOODBRIDGE       | New Haven     | 8,816  | 3.63   | 32                              | 24    | 0      | 3      |  |
| C.C.S.U.         | Hartford      |  |  | 25                              | 16    | 2      | 3      |  |
| E.C.S.U.         | Windham       |  |  | 22                              | 9     | 5      | 5      |  |
| S.C.S.U.         | New Haven     | I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I  |  | 29                              | 19    | 4      | 3      | O DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY  |
| W.C.S.U.         | Fairfield     |  |  | 18                              | 12    | 0      | 4      |  |
| DMV              |               | 1  |  | 56                              | 47    | 4      | 1      |  |
| UCONN-STORRS     | Tolland       |  |  | 97                              | 66    | 11     | 9      | 1  |
| UCONN HEALTH CTR | Hartford      | A THE THIRD BOTH THE THE THE THE THE THE THE THE THE T   |  | 40                              | 15    | 2      | 16     | Time to the second   |
| YALE             | New Haven     |  |  | 106                             | 70    | 19     | 6      | 1  |
| STATE CAPITOL    | Hartford      |  | Committee of the commit | 44                              | 32    | 1      | 8      |  |
| METROPOLITAN TA  |               | and the state of t |  | 38                              | 31    | 6      | 0      | OF THE PERSON  |
| MASHANTUCKET PEQ | New London    | -  |  | 35                              | 23    | 2      | 6      | POSSESSE OF THE PARTY OF THE PA |
| MOHEGAN TRIBAL   | New London    | The second second second   |  | 29                              | 26    | 2      | 0      |  |
| TOTAL            | Little London | 3,585,861  | 2.62   | 9,380                           | 7,046 | 804    | 623    | 90   |

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### A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation

Jeremy M. Wilson Alexander Weiss

The COPS Office presents this *Essentials for Leaders*, which provides summaries of existing and new COPS Office publications and resources, tailored for executives. *Essentials for Leaders: A Performance-Based Approach to Staffing and Allocation* summarizes the research conducted by the Michigan State University team on the current staffing allocation landscape for law enforcement agencies and provides a practical step-by-step approach for any agency to assess its own patrol staffing needs based upon its workload and performance objectives. Additionally, it identifies some ways beyond the use of sworn staff that workload demand can be managed, and discusses how an agency's approach to community policing implementation can affect staffing allocation and deployment.





### A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation

This project was supported by Grant Number 2009-CK-WX-K005 awarded by the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. The opinions contained herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. References to specific agencies, companies, products, or services should not be considered an endorsement by the author(s) or the U.S. Department of Justice. Rather, the references are illustrations to supplement discussion of the issues.

The Internet references cited in this publication were valid as of the date of this publication. Given that URLs and websites are in constant flux, neither the author(s) nor the COPS Office can vouch for their current validity.

### **Preface**

Much attention has been given to police recruitment, retention, and how to maintain police budgets and existing staffing positions. Less has centered on adequately assessing the demand for police service and alternative ways of managing that demand. To provide some practical guidance in these areas, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office) provided support to the Michigan State University (MSU) School of Criminal Justice to review current law enforcement staffing allocation experiences and existing approaches to estimating the number of sworn staff a given agency requires.

This document provides an executive summary of the research conducted by the MSU team. It highlights the current staffing allocation landscape and a practical approach for any law enforcement agency to assess its staffing needs based upon its workload and performance objectives. It also highlights some ways beyond the use of sworn staff that workload demand can be managed, and discusses how an agency's approach to community policing implementation can affect staffing allocation and deployment. This work illustrates the issues police practitioners and planners must consider in conducting an assessment of their agency's staffing need. It should also be of particular interest to police executives and policymakers who are concerned about both policestaffing allocation and efficiently providing quality police services in their communities.

This research is more fully documented in *A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and Allocation*. In addition to the above audiences, that work should be of interest to researchers interested in police staffing experiences and assessment methods.

### The Current Context for Police Staffing

Staffing police departments is a continuous challenge that has become more complex in recent years. For some time, agencies have struggled to balance their efforts in recruiting and retaining their officers. These challenges were exacerbated by the recession of late 2008 and early 2009, which caused police agencies to implement hiring freezes, furloughs, lay-offs, salary and benefit cut-backs, and retirement incentives.

Such challenges have made it more imperative to answer the fundamental question of staffing analysis: How many police officers does an agency need? Answering this question is essential to any discussion about managing workforce levels, regardless of whether there is a shortage of qualified officers or an inability to support previous staffing levels.

Ultimately, police decision-makers have few resources to guide them in determining the number of officers they need. To be sure, there are multiple approaches to answering this question, but these generally have not been described and synthesized in a way that most practitioners could immediately understand and implement. This work outlines one approach to determining workforce need.

Several sources of information and expertise guide this approach. First is literature on police staffing analyses, including staffing tools and manuals, case studies, consultant assessments, and academic studies. Second are results from interviews with representatives from 20 different agencies of varying size, region, and jurisdiction. Third are results from a focus group with 21 police executives and planners, researchers, consultants, and members of the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS Office). Fourth is the practical and academic experience the research team for this project has in working with police agencies across the United States in assessing staffing needs, identifying areas for improved efficiency, and developing evidence-based personnel planning lessons. Fifth is the continual solicitation of feedback from police and staffing experts.

The research comprised four parts: the current staffing landscape, approaches to determining staffing need and developing and applying a workload-based approach, how alternative ways of providing service could affect workforce planning, and the relationship between police staffing and community policing.

### **The Staffing Landscape**

Police agencies face a three-fold challenge in meeting their staffing needs. First, there is a decreasing number of qualified applicants. This is attributable to changing generational work preferences, differences in workforce attributes, and decreasing resources available for hiring officers. Second, attrition is expanding through retirements, military call-ups, and other sources. Third, the scope of police work is expanding to encompass new areas such as homeland security and community policing,

obligating fewer officers to do more work. Interviews with representatives of police agencies suggest that the recession of late 2008 and early 2009 exacerbated these trends, with resources becoming so scarce that agencies often cannot apply innovative solutions learned elsewhere because they are struggling to maintain even basic levels and forms of service.

Interviewees reported a wide range of internal and external determinants of staffing need, including efficiency and productivity, crime rates, job tasks and calls, officer-to-population ratios, and established minimum staffing levels. Most agencies perform staffing analyses, but their level of sophistication varies. Agencies cite many different reasons for conducting analyses, including organizational and leadership change and for budgeting and negotiation purposes. Many staffing benchmarks reflect determinants of staffing need.

Budgeting for staffing is precarious. Not all agencies keep their actual staff levels close to their budgeted levels. Some deliberately keep fewer staff than authorized so that budget cuts do not debilitate the agency. Most see a gap between budgeted and actual staffing levels as inevitable due to fluctuations in staff resulting from military call-ups, layoffs, or furloughs.

To be sure, agencies feel they are understaffed, but few are able to conclusively demonstrate through workload analysis that they are. For many agencies, understaffing is a feeling that traditional workplace efforts appear disrupted. Agencies may feel understaffed because of a decline in officer proactivity, an increase in administrative tasks, a lack of staffing flexibility, or an inability to reduce overtime, among other reasons. A common claim is that agencies could accomplish more with additional officers. Like understaffing, the notion of a "full staff" appears to be subjective. Nevertheless, as one focus-group participant said, "If the answer to our problems is more staffing, we'll always be understaffed."

When asked to provide department-specific contexts for their staffing experiences, respondents listed circumstances that were remarkably similar across agencies. Almost all said budget constraints were important. Most also said their relationships with state and local governments were strained because of recent budget negotiations. Such strains have led them to share knowledge and strategy. Nevertheless, many agencies feel their environment is unique, leading them to believe comparisons with other departments would yield few practical solutions.



Perceived understaffing may compromise community-policing and problem-solving efforts. Increased duties arising from fiscal constraints reduce officer-initiated time normally spent in the community. While many of the duties officers no longer have time to perform could be transferred, one respondent suggested such transfer of duties might lead to public perceptions that the agency is isolated and does not care about residents. Such changes might, a respondent claimed, also lead to slippage in clearance rates, which eventually may lead to negative public perceptions of the agency.

Altogether, agencies believe they have had to adjust to a "new normal" in which opportunities to expand staff are restricted by many of the same economic conditions that magnify the need for innovative policing. Agencies seek efficient ways to do business, but staffing analysis remain a mystery to many, or are thought to be useful but out of reach for most agencies due to budget constraints. As a result, staffing is seen as an intuitive process in many agencies.

### Approaches to Determining Staffing Needs

Traditionally, there have been four basic approaches to determining workforce levels. These have evolved to reflect models of policing. The earliest models reflected approaches to addressing rising crime and the number of personnel necessary to do so. Later models aimed to improve efficiency, but did not give much attention to discretionary time required for community policing. More recent models address community-policing needs, but can require difficult decisions, such as those on defining response intervals. Altogether, these models differ in their assumptions, ease of calculation, usefulness, validity, and efficiency.

Many police agencies have used a per capita approach to estimate the number of officers an agency needs (Adams 1994; Orrick 2008). This requires determining an optimum number of officers per person, then calculating the number of officers needed for the population of a jurisdiction. To determine such an optimum rate, an agency may compare its rate to that of other jurisdictions in its region or of its size. Advantages of this method include its simplicity and ease of interpretation. Disadvantages include its failure to address how officers spend their time, the quality of their efforts, and community conditions, needs, and expectations. Given these disadvantages and others, experts strongly advise against using population rates for determining police-staffing needs.

The minimum staffing approach requires police supervisors and command staff to estimate a sufficient number of patrol officers that must be deployed at any one time to maintain officer safety and provide an adequate level of protection to the public (Demers, Palmer, and Griffiths 2007; Orrick 2008). This is a fairly common approach and generally reinforced through organizational policy and practice as well as collective-bargaining agreements (Kotsur 2006; National Sheriffs' Association 2007). Policymakers who believe that a minimum number of officers are needed to ensure public safety may choose this approach. Police officers themselves may insist for reasons of safety that a minimum number of officers are on duty at all times. There are, however, no objective standards for setting the minimum staffing level. Many agencies may determine the minimum staff level by perceived need without any factual basis in workload, presence of officers, response time, immediate availability, distance to travel, shift schedule, or other performance criteria (New Jersey Division of Local Government Services 2009; Shane 2007; Demers et al. 2007; Orrick 2008). This may result in deploying too few officers when workload is high and too many when it is low.


The authorized-level approach uses budget allocations to specify a number of officers that may be allocated (Wilson, Dalton, Scheer, and Grammich 2011). The authorized level does not typically reflect any identifiable criteria such as demand for service, community expectation, or efficiency analyses, but may instead reflect an incremental budgeting or other political decision-making process. The authorized level can become an artificial benchmark for need, creating the misperception that the agency is understaffed and overworked if the actual number of officers does not meet the authorized level (Baker and Harmon 2006). Focusgroup participants also noted that unless an agency staffs above its authorized level fluctuations in recruitment, selection, training, and attrition may lead to actual staffing levels below authorized levels. Because the authorized level is often derived independently of workload consideration, an agency may be able to meet workforce demand with fewer officers than authorized. Still, the perception of being understaffed can diminish morale and productivity (Shane 2010) and make it appear that the community is not adequately funding public safety.

A more comprehensive attempt to determining appropriate workforce levels considers actual police workload. Workload-based approaches derive staffing indicators from demand for service (Lumb 1996). This approach is the only one to systematically analyze and determine staffing needs based upon actual workload demand while accounting for service-style preferences and other agency features and characteristics. It estimates

future staffing needs by modeling current levels of activity (Orrick 2008; Wilson and McLaren 1972; Keycare Strategy Operations Technology 2010). Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted method for conducting a workload-based assessment. Defining and measuring "work" varies by agency. Knowing that staff decisions are based upon calls for service and the time required to respond to them, officers may not have an incentive to be efficient in their response to calls or even to help reduce calls (Orrick 2008; Shane 2007). Learning how to conduct a workload-based assessment can be challenging. Still, staffing models based on actual workload and performance objectives are preferable to other methods that might not account for environmental and agency-specific variables.

A step-by-step approach for conducting a workload-based assessment should include the following:

- Examining the distribution of calls for service by hour of day, day of week, and month. Calls for service can differ by hour of the day, day of the week, and month of the year. Peak call times can also differ by agency. Knowing when peak call times occur can help agencies determine when they must have their highest levels of staff on duty.
- Examining the nature of calls for service. Reviewing
  the nature of calls can help in better understanding
  the work that an agency's officers are doing. Types of
  police work required can vary by area within a single
  jurisdiction, and require agencies to staff differing
  areas accordingly.
- 3. Estimating time consumed on calls for service. Determining how long a call takes, from initial response to final paper work, is key to determining the minimum number of officers needed for a shift. This is most straightforward when a single officer handles the call and completes resulting administrative demands (e.g., reports, arrests) prior to clearing it.



- 4. Calculation of agency shift-relief factor. The shift-relief factor shows the relationship between the maximum number of days that an officer can work and actually works. Knowing the relief factor is necessary to estimating the number of officers that should be assigned to a shift in order to ensure that the appropriate number is working each day. The shift-relief factor is calculated through division of the total number of hours needed to be staffed in a shift by the number of off-hours to which an officer is entitled. For example, in an agency which works 8-hour shifts, and in which each officer is entitled to a combined 151 days off—regular (104), vacation (15), holiday (12), sick (10), training (8), and personal (2)—the shift-factor would be (365/(365-151)), or approximately 1.7.
- 5. Establishing performance objectives. This encompasses determining what fraction of an officer's shift should be devoted to calls for service and what portion to other activities. For example, an agency might build a staffing model in which officers spend 50 percent of their shift on citizen-generated calls and 50 percent on discretionary activities.
- 6. Providing staffing estimates. Staffing needs will, as noted earlier, vary by time of day, day of week, and month of year, among other variables. Agencies should distribute their officers accordingly. For example, a shift with only half the number of ealls than another shift will require half the number of officers. These numbers may also vary by the type of ealls, and the time and officers they require, in each shift. For example, one large urban agency assigns two officers to each unit in its evening shift, affecting the number of officers needed for units to respond to ealls. Another responds to the same type of ealls in different ways in different shifts (e.g., sending a unit in some shifts, but requesting citizens file a report in person at a station during others).

The workload-based approach does have some limitations. It relies heavily on averages in producing estimates. It does not differentiate job junctions of police units. Acceptable response times to calls for service will vary by community, and can be lengthier than desired in large jurisdictions. Finally, the model works best for communities with at least 15,000 citizen-generated calls per year. One approach to coverage in communities with lesser numbers of calls for service is to make a subjective judgment about the appropriate level of policing required for deterrence, rapid response, and officer safety, and adjust numbers of officers accordingly.



### **Alternative Delivery Systems**

Agencies may also consider alternative delivery systems for police services to better manage the demand for police services. These can include alternative methods for managing non-emergency calls for service, different ways citizens can report crimes and traffic accidents, and use of non-sworn personnel to handle calls.

Emergency calls for service are typically placed over a 911 system. This system has provided an easy and effective method for citizens to contact police. Police agencies have marketed 911 systems heavily; it is quite common, for example, to see "call 911" emblazoned on a police vehicle. In some communities, it can be difficult to find a non-emergency number to call the police. This poses a dilemma for police agencies: while 911 was designed for obtaining emergency services and rapid response, most calls for police service are not emergencies and do not require a rapid response. Citizen use of 911 to request all types of police service aggravates additional difficulties in managing such systems, including high turnover rates for public-safety communication personnel. Such difficulties have led many communities to adopt a 311 system for nonemergency calls. One urban agency implementing a 311 experienced a 25-percent reduction in 911 calls, including a 99.7 percent reduction in calls in the lowestpriority category (National Institute of Justice 2005). Other agencies have supplemented a 311 system with a website where many answers sought by phone can be viewed online (City of Evanston 2011). Jurisdictions may also carefully define some group of calls to which police will not typically respond, instructing citizens to visit a police station or use other means for submitting a report.

Providing different ways for citizens to report crime and accidents can alleviate demand on sworn staff. When citizens call police they often do so to file a report about an offense or traffic accident. In most communities, police officers are dispatched to the scene of the incident to gather information for the report. For many incidents, there is little likelihood that the case will be solved. Nonetheless, citizens often need some evidence that a report was filed (typically for insurance purposes), and police to want to know about all offenses so as to better understand patterns and hot spots. Many police departments have found ways to satisfy these needs while avoiding the dispatching of sworn staff for filing reports. A National Institute of Justice project in three cities showed overwhelming citizen support for alternative ways of reports such as walk-in, mail-in, officer response by appointment, and telephone reporting units (McEwen, Connors, and Cohen 1986). Evidence indicates that such

approaches could reduce patrol workload by as much as one-fifth, in part because police could take nearly half the report over the phone (Kennedy 1993). One telephone reporting unit handles calls such as those for identity theft, missing persons, additional information on previously reported crimes, vandalism, and other calls totaling about 11 percent of the call load (City of Portland 2011). Another department allows citizens to use its website to submit reports of accidents, financial crimes, vandalism, and suspicious activity (City of Sacramento 2011).

Agencies can further alleviate the demands on sworn personnel by assigning more duties to non-sworn staff. Until recently, law enforcement agencies were organized so that nearly all functions were performed by sworn officers. Many departments now employ a significant number of non-sworn staff to support police operations. In 2007, the number of full-time, non-sworn employees in local police departments was about 138,000 (Reaves 2010). The use of non-sworn staff can free sworn officers to do community policing and other tasks. Non-sworn staff may in some circumstances have skills more appropriate for a given agency task. Non-sworn staff also typically cost less than sworn personnel. One of the most common uses for non-sworn staff is as community service officers. In one jurisdiction, these personnel assist patrol officers in non-enforcement activities, respond to citizen requests for service, identify and report criminal activities, assist citizens in identifying crime-prevention techniques, and assist in traffic control of special events, among other activities (City of Minneapolis 2011).

### **Staffing for Community Policing**

The evolution of community policing duties has tremendous implications for police staffing. As of 2007, 14 percent of all agencies, including 60 percent of agencies serving populations between 50,000 and one million, had a specialized community-policing unit (Reaves 2010). Nearly half of all agencies and more than two-thirds of agencies serving populations of at least 25,000 had dedicated community-policing officers. Agencies adopt specialized approaches to community policing for many reasons, including a perception that there is not enough time to conduct community policing while responding to calls for service; a belief that funders prefer specialized approaches; and to visibly demonstrate a commitment to it (Maguire and Gantley 2009). Other agencies adopt community policing in a way that mixes generalized and specialized approaches.





For example, an agency might have a dedicated problemsolving unit, but still fully train all officers and expect them to engage the community and attempt to address underlying crime problems as part of their normal work routine.

There is no standard benchmark to assess appropriate levels for community policing. Rather, levels tend to be determined locally based on qualitative assessments, performance objectives, and practical considerations (e.g., resource availability, demand for staff throughout the organization). Agencies that implement community policing throughout the organization will typically see patrol officers, who are most closely tied to community interaction, bear most of the effort. This will require agencies to increase the discretionary amount of time for these officers and the number of officers assigned to a shift. Agencies developing a specialized unit have less need to increase the discretionary time for patrol officers to devote to community policing. In one case, an urban jurisdiction passed a referendum to hire and deploy 57 problem-solving officers to cover the whole city, with one assigned to each community-policing beat (Wilson, Cox, Smith, Bos, and Fain 2007; Wilson and Cox 2008).

Future research might consider developing workloadbased models to assess staffing needs for community policing. Unlike patrol, which can be fairly well predicted based on easily measurable time to respond to calls for service, an approach to determining staffing needs for community policing would need to account for fluctuations in the definition and operationalization of community policing; the opportunity and need to engage the community and solve problems over time; and the difficulty of measuring the time to complete the typical community-policing activity. Until such resources exist, it is likely that agencies will continue to staff for community policing based on general expectations of time commitment required or that can be afforded.

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### An analysis of police department staffing: How many officers do you really need?

A Review of 62 Police Agencies Analyzed by the ICMA / CPSM

By
Professor James McCabe, Ph.D.
Senior Associate
ICMA Center for Public Safety Management

### International City/County Management Association (ICMA)

The International City/County Management Association (ICMA) is a 100 year old, non-profit professional association of local government administrators and managers, with approximately 9,000 members located in 32 countries.

Since its inception in 1914, ICMA has been dedicated to assisting local governments in providing services to its citizens in an efficient and effective manner. Our work spans all of the activities of local government – parks, libraries, recreation, public works, economic development, code enforcement, Brownfield's, public safety, etc.

ICMA advances the knowledge of local government best practices across a wide range of platforms including publications, research, training, and technical assistance. Our work includes both domestic and international activities in partnership with local, state and federal governments as well as private foundations. For example, we are involved in a major library research project funded by the Bill and Linda Gates Foundation and we are providing community policing training in Panama working with the U.S. State Department. We have personnel in Afghanistan assisting with building wastewater treatment plants and have teams in Central America providing training in disaster relief working with SOUTHCOM.

### The ICMA Center for Public Safety Management (ICMA/CPSM)

One of four Centers within the US Programs Division of ICMA it provide support to local governments in the areas of police, fire, EMS, Emergency Management and Homeland Security. In addition to providing technical assistance in these areas we also represent local governments at the federal level and are involved in numerous projects with the Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security.

ICMA/CPSM is also involved in police and fire chief selection; assisting local governments in identifying these critical managers thru original research we have conducted identifying the core competencies of police and fire managers and providing assessment center resources.

Our local government technical assistance includes workload and deployment analysis, using Operations Research techniques and credentialed experts to identify workload and staffing needs as well as best practices. We have conducted approximately 190 such studies in 32 states and 91 communities ranging in size from 8,000 population Boone, IA to 800,000 population Indianapolis, IN.

### Ph.D. Professor James McCabe, Senior Associate, ICMA Center for Public Safety Management

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### Police Allocation and Deployment

### I. Introduction

It is the middle of the afternoon on an exceptionally busy day, and your attention is broken by the sound of a police siren from a patrol car passing by. You stop for a moment and wonder "Gee, I hope everything is alright," and then your thoughts drift to more pragmatic issues, like "I wonder what kind of call that was; what was the need for a 'Code-3' response?"

A minute or two passes and you decide to call the Chief. Ordinarily, you resist making this type of call, but something tells you that you need to get to the bottom of this incident. He picks up on the first ring and you ask him about the "lights-and-sirens" response, and he is not aware of any emergencies in Town, but will check and get back to you. The Chief calls a few minutes later and informs you that there was a traffic accident reported up on Main Street. It turns out no one was injured, and there was just minor damage to both vehicles.

For months (if not years), the Chief has been a strong advocate for increasing the size of the department. He has made a fairly convincing argument that the department is short-staffed and that continued operation at the current personnel headcount is jeopardizing public safety. The population of the Town is growing and it seems there are more and more sirens heard every day. But you're just not sure. You live and work in Town, and it just doesn't seem unsafe. You're not getting an inordinate number of complaints from the community or the Council about public safety, and the call for more resources in the police department does not seem to be at a critical stage.... yet, you hope. The Chief, after all, is the expert and you need to rely on his judgment.

With these thoughts rattling around your head, and the wail of police sirens still fresh in your ears, you start to ask more pointed questions. "Was there really a need to respond 'Code-3' to a reported traffic accident?" "Do we really even need to dispatch an officer to a traffic accident?" "What other types of calls are we dispatching officers to that might not be a police emergency?" "How many officers do we have working right now?" "Are there too many officers assigned to handle too many assignments that are not police emergencies?"

The Chief's response is quick and convincing. He reassuringly advises that "Our community expects a rapid response to calls for service. We respond to all forms of emergencies and consider traffic accidents one type of emergency." The Chief continues, "And while I don't know specifically how many officers are working this very moment, I can assure you that we need more of them to provide the level of service our community expects."

You end the conversation with the Chief in order to get back to your busy day, and thank him for his prompt response and patience in handling your bothersome call. You're not convinced,

however, that the department needs more sworn officers. In your mind, there needs to be an objective and empirical way of understanding police staffing. Although you trust the Chief's judgment, his opinion, combined with accurate data, would give you the information you need to make this important, expensive, and irrevocable decision.

Fortunately, you are not alone. City and Town Managers/Administrators around the country wrestle with this very scenario on a daily basis. How many officers does my police department really need? Communities faced with difficult budgetary decisions often look at public safety agencies for potential cut-backs. To be sure, no one wants to cut public safety resources and risk harm to the community. On the other hand, some communities are growing at a rapid pace and are finding it difficult to provide sufficient services to the growing populace. And in the middle, there are numerous communities looking to make the "right" decisions in the interest of "good government." Collectively, the decisions to be made are critical ones, and providing the "right" level of police staffing is probably the most difficult and important one a City Manager can make.

With these issues in mind, you begin to ask the harder question: Is there an objective standard for making this determination? Should my Chief be using some form of performance metrics to make the request for additional staffing in addition to his or her professional opinion? And the answer is a resounding "YES!"

The size and style of a police department and the types of services that it provides are a reflection of the character and demands of that community. The challenge is to determine the appropriate allocation and deployment of officers to meet that demand. Once the personnel are allocated properly, the next questions focus on how they are "deployed." The analysis that is necessary should attempt to build upon this discussion and answer the "how many" and "how to deploy" questions that are the essence of police operational and personnel resource decisions.

### II. Staffing Models

Police staffing models in the U.S. are generally determined by one of five common methods. Departments traditionally have used crime trends, a per-capita approach, minimum-manning levels, authorized/budgeted levels, and least-commonly, workload-based models to make staffing decisions.

As the police professionalized in the early 20th century, the primary goal of police operations became crime reduction. Crime levels and trends became the benchmark for police staffing. The more crime, the more police officers hired to combat this crime. On face value this approach seems appropriate, but in actuality it is an inefficient approach to staffing. When the police are ineffective at combating crime, this approach calls for adding more police. When the police are

effective at combating crime, fewer officers are needed. Therefore, using this model essentially provides incentives for poor performance and disincentives for good performance. Additionally, crime rates are influenced by many other factors than just the response by the police. In fact, many criminologists discount the role of the police entirely when it comes to crime rates in a community. So, using crime rates to staff a police department is not the recommended approach. Fortunately, this model of staffing is rarely used anymore.

Another very popular approach to staffing is one based upon predetermined minimum-manning levels. Generally determined by past practice, policy, supervisory judgment, or a combination of the three, personnel staffing is set at a certain level. Typically, this approach is also used to determine the number of officers required to work each shift. Departments establish "hard" and "soft" minimums, wherein hard minimums cannot be breached without calling other officers in to work on overtime, and soft minimums occur where supervisors can use discretion to maintain staffing below a predetermined level. However, departments often memorialize these staffing levels in collective bargaining agreements and the staffing becomes part of the labor-management context and thus difficult to modify.

Equally popular is the per-capita approach to staffing. Departments across the country look to officer-to-population ratios as an easy method to determine appropriate staffing. Although the International Association of Chiefs of Police does not recommend this method, IACP nonetheless published a directorate on just this very topic. A recent IACP "Perspectives" article presents Bureau of Justice Statistics data on local police department officer-to-population ratios. The source is a 2003 BJS study that reports the average ratio of full time officers per 1,000 residents. Departments are categorized by size of population served, ranging from 250,000 or more, to communities of 1,000 to 2,499 residents. According to the article the ratio of full-time officers per 1,000 residents ranges from 2.6 per 1,000 to 1.8 per 1,000, with an average ratio of 2.5 full-time officers per 1,000 residents. Many communities rely on this model to make staffing decisions. As easy as it is to comprehend and apply, this model is equally inefficient and unreliable.

The authorized/budgeted approach to staffing is a variant of the minimum-manning model. In this approach the city or town predetermines a specific level of staffing that fits within the budget of the community. Essentially, this is a "What can I afford?" model as opposed to one that is based on actual community needs. Again, this is a fairly common approach to police staffing, and it places the determination of personnel levels on the community's budgeting process. It is also a fairly simple approach wherein the previous year's budget is examined in context with the current financial situation and staffing decisions are made. The danger here is that staffing decisions can become politicized or predicated on an artificial figure. The ability of a community to pay for services in previous years, or a change in political administrations, is not necessarily a sound foundation on which to make police staffing decisions.

Lastly, and least common, are staffing decisions made on actual workload. ICMA is a strong advocate of this approach, as it relies on actual levels of demand for police services and matches that demand with the supply of police resources. Typically, this approach relies on an examination of calls for service received by a department, and these calls are modeled to understand demand and supply. This approach also has shortcomings in that it relies almost exclusively on demand through 911 calls and ignores other elements of community demands placed on a department. In order to overcome these shortcomings, and consistent with the approach used by ICMA, workload demands should be modeled and then placed in context with other operational demands facing the department. The result is a comprehensive assessment of workload through both calls for service and other sustained operational commitments placed on the department. This approach, however, requires a complex data analysis that is beyond the capacity of many police departments, but it nonetheless offers the most accurate and reliable predictor of police staffing levels.

### III. ICMA Research on Police Staffing

Over the past five years, the ICMA Center for Public Safety Management (CPSM) has been engaged in providing consulting services to numerous communities across the country. Since 2008, ICMA has conducted police operational and data analyses in 61 cities and towns located in 26 states in all regions of the U.S.; populations of communities studied range from 8,000 to more than 800,000. These studies have allowed communities to understand the public demands placed upon the police and undoubtedly helped the communities make difficult staffing decisions. The data collected by CPSM also provides valuable insight into police operations around the country. Albeit a sample of convenience, the data derived from these 61 studies and discussed here provide interesting insight into staffing decisions made by the communities represented.

The ICMA data analysis<sup>1</sup> relies on information captured in a department's computer-aided dispatch (CAD) system. ICMA extracts one year's worth of CAD calls for service and dispatch data in order to explore demand for police services. The analysis focuses on three main areas: workload, deployment, and response times. These three areas are related almost exclusively to patrol operations, which constitute the most significant portion of nearly any police department's personnel and financial commitment.

For the detailed workload analysis, ICMA uses two four-week sample periods. Typically, the first period is August, or summer, and the second period is February, or winter. Each and every call dispatched through 911 is identified for these two periods. The calls are isolated and a total amount of time spent handling the call is calculated. Once these calculations are made, the data is converted into tables and charts that display the demand for police services in hourly increments

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> A comprehensive discussion on workload analysis is presented in Section IV of this paper. The presentation of the information here is simply to describe some of the variables used in the ICMA research on staffing.

across the 24-hour day for both weekdays and weekends. This gives us four distinct time periods to examine

In addition to the workload, ICMA collects information about the number of officers assigned to patrol during these four time periods. Instead of using the number of officers scheduled, ICMA relies on the "actual" number of officers present and working on any given shift/day.

This collection of information provides a more accurate and thorough picture of the actual demands placed on the workforce and allows ICMA to calculate "workload" as a percentage of available resources. During times when all available resources are committed to calls for service, workload would equal 100 percent. When there are no calls for service being handled in a given hour, workload would equal 0 percent.

The product of the workload analysis is essentially four graphic figures that display the workload (demand/available staffing) encountered by the police department across the average day during the four periods (weekdays and weekends in both summer and winter). We believe strongly that workload is the critical determinant of police staffing. Ensuring the proper amount of police resources available throughout the day is the goal of staffing a police department efficiently. When the workload is low, there is a surplus of personnel, and officers are underutilized. When workload is too high, there is a shortage of personnel, and officers are overtaxed and services suffer.

The statistics created by the ICMA-CPSM approach provide valuable tools to examine police staffing decisions. In addition to these data, the ICMA approach looks at population, crime, patrol staffing, total number of calls for service, response times, total service time for calls for service, and the 90th percentile response time for calls for service to evaluate department staffing decisions. Table 1 presents all the variables collected by ICMA for the 61 communities in the sample.

Table 1: ICMA Police Staffing Data Analysis

| Variable Descriptives                        | Mean     | Minimum | Maximum   |
|--|----------|---------|-----------|
| Population                                   | 67,745.7 | 5,417.0 | 83,3024.0 |
| Officers per 100,000 Population              | 201.2    | 35.3    | 465.1     |
| Patrol Percent                               | 66.1     | 32.4    | 96.8      |
| Index Crime Rate, per 100,000                | 3,235.1  | 405.0   | 9,418.8   |
| VCR (Violent crime rate, per 100,000)        | 349.3    | 12.5    | 1,415.4   |
| PCR (Property crime rate, per 100,000)       | 2,885.9  | 379.7   | 8,111.6   |
| CFS Rate                                     | 1,004.8  | 2.2     | 6,894.2   |
| Avg. Service Time Police CFS                 | 17.7     | 8.1     | 47.3      |
| Avg. Service Time Public CFS                 | 28.7     | 16.0    | 42.9      |
| Avg. # of Responding Units Police CFS        | 1.2      | 1.0     | 1.6       |
| Avg. # of Responding Units Public CFS        | 1.6      | 1.2     | 2.2       |
| Total Service Time Police CFS (officer min.) | 22.1     | 9.7     | 75.7      |
| Total Service Time Public CFS (officer-min.) | 48.0     | 23.6    | 84.0      |
| Workload Percent Weekdays Winter             | 26.6     | 5.0     | 48.0      |
| Workload Percent Weekends Winter             | 28.4     | 4.0     | 52.0      |
| Workload Percent Weekdays Summer             | 28.7     | 6.0     | 50.0      |
| Workload Percent Weekends Summer             | 31.8     | 5.0     | 53.0      |
| Average Response Time Winter                 | 11.0     | 3.1     | 26.9      |
| Average Response Time Summer                 | 11.2     | 2.4     | 26.0      |

While Table 1 provides a list of all the variables that might be examined by ICMA, different studies call for different data, and some data are not available in every community. Population is the first variable, which ranges from more than 800,000 to under 6,000, with a mean of 67,746. The staffing figures were transformed into number of officers per 100,000 population, and while not a useful tool for staffing decisions, it is a useful conversion for analysis. Population influences many variables in this data set; therefore, it is important to control for population size by transforming variables into rates to improve the analysis. For example, the table shows the number of officers per 100,000 and the percentage of offices on patrol compared to the total number of officers in the department.

Other variables used in the analysis are the FBI's Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) index crime rates, and the rate of 911 calls for service (CFS) per 1,000 population. Workload and CFS processing data are key elements as well. *Service time* represents the number of minutes required to handle the average CFS, *Responding units* is the average number of police units assigned to a CFS, and *Total Service Time* is the total number of officer-minutes needed to handle a CFS (number of officers multiplied by the number of minutes). These variables are categorized separately by CFS received directly from the public (labeled "public"), and CFS initiated by the

police themselves (labeled "police"). Additionally, the workload figures discussed earlier (winter-summer, weekday-weekend) are incorporated into the analysis, as well as the average response time to CFS.

The data presented above offer extremely useful—but unfortunately rarely used—pieces of information to understand police staffing and deployment.

#### Rule of 60 Guidelines

As a general guideline, ICMA applies a "Rule of 60" to evaluate police department staffing allocation and deployment. This Rule of 60 applies to three critical variables:

- 1. There should be approximately 60 percent of the total number of sworn officers in a department assigned to the patrol function. According to the table the mean patrol percentage is 66.1 percent. In other words the average department in this study assigns about two-thirds of its officers to patrol.
- 2. The average workload for patrol staffing should not exceed 60 percent. The mean workloads presented above for winter weekdays and weekends and summer weekdays and weekends are 26.6 percent, 28.4 percent, 28.7 percent, and 31.8 percent, respectively. This indicates that less than one-third of the available patrol resources are committed to demands from the community in the average department.
  - The highest reported means in the sample of communities studied does not exceed the 60 percent threshold. In other words, the busiest communities in the ICMA analysis do not dedicate more than 60 percent of their patrol resources towards workload (which includes public initiated CFS, police-initiated CFS, administrative and out-of-service time, as well as directed patrol time).
- 3. The Total Service Time (officer-minutes) should not exceed a factor of 60. The mean service times presented above are 22.1 officer-minutes for a police initiated CFS, and 48.0 officer-minutes for a CFS received from the public through 911.

Collectively, these three "Rule of 60" calculations represent much more comprehensive and robust variables to use in making police staffing allocation and deployment decisions. These variables are the foundation of ICMA's assessment of an agency's staffing decisions and the starting point for evaluating the staffing model used by a particular organization. These items permit the exploration of the questions "Are there enough officers?" "Are they assigned in the right units?" "Are we responding to the demand from the community in an appropriate fashion?"

### **Key Variables in Making Staffing Decisions**

Armed with all the information developed in a typical study, a further examination of staffing is possible. With these data in mind, which variable, if any of them, are influential to a department in making staffing decisions? Table-2 presents the correlation coefficients that compare the number of officers per 100,000 in a police department with all of the variables included in Table 1.

Table 2: Correlation Analysis – Officers per 100,000 Population

|                                       | Officers per 100,000 |
|---------------------------------------|----------------------|
| Officers per 100,000 Population       | 1                    |
| Patrol Percent                        | 0.049                |
| Index Crime Rate                      | 0.144                |
| VCR                                   | 0.141                |
| PCR                                   | 0.14                 |
| CFS Rate                              | .638**               |
| Avg. Service Time Police CFS          | 279 <sup>*</sup>     |
| Avg. Service Time Public CFS          | 635**                |
| Avg. # of Responding Units Police CFS | -0.155               |
| Avg. # of Responding Units Public CFS | -0.008               |
| Total Service Time Police CFS         | -0.25                |
| Total Service Time Public CFS         | 514**                |
| Workload Percent Weekdays Winter      | -0.255               |
| Workload Percent Weekends Winter      | -0.278               |
| Workload Percent Weekdays Summer      | 316 <sup>*</sup>     |
| Workload Percent Weekends Summer      | 337*                 |
| Response Time Winter                  | 630 <sup>**</sup>    |
| Response Time Summer                  | 639 <sup>**</sup>    |

<sup>\*</sup>Significant at the p<0.05 level

As can be seen in Table 2, there are six variables from the initial analysis that are significantly correlated with the number of officers per 100,000 population in a department.

The CFS rate, or the number of calls through 911, is very strongly correlated with department staffing. With an r=0.638, police staffing is significantly correlated with 911 CFS rate. In other words, the more 911 calls in a community, the larger the police department. The other significantly correlated measures show an inverse relationship with overall staffing rate. Average service time for both police and public CFS is inversely correlated with staffing levels, which means as officer staffing increases, total service time decreases. This makes sense because the more officers a department has on staff the faster they will be able to handle CFS. Similarly,

<sup>\*\*</sup>Significant at the p<0.01 level

summer workload and response time are also inversely correlated. The more officers a department has, the lower the workload in the summer, and the lower the response time the department will experience. Again, this finding is intuitively obvious. Workload (work/staffing) will decrease with a greater number of officers and more officers will be available to respond to CFS faster. Interestingly, however, is that winter workload and crime rate do not factor into staffing decisions.

In common-sense terms, these statistics indicate two important factors associate with police staffing decisions. The departments in the ICMA analyses increase staffing to meet 911 CFS volume. The more CFS a community accepts (controlling for population), the larger its police department will be. Also, it appears that departments make staffing decisions to accommodate peak workload demands.

ICMA selects weekends in the summer to understand peak CFS volume contrasted with the lowest available staffing. It is no secret that officers look to take days off during the summer, and particularly weekends in the summer, and this is usually when departments face staffing shortages. This analysis supports the conclusions that departments make staffing decisions with this in mind. According to these statistics, the number of officers in a department is predicted by weekend summer demand: the more officers, the lower the demand. Clearly, this must be considered one of the most important variables that factor into department staffing decisions.

There are many shortcomings with this analysis, and caution must be exercised interpreting these results too aggressively. However, there is ample information here to provide police executives and researchers to pause and think about the factors associated with police staffing decisions. It does appear, albeit from this limited sample, that crime is not a factor, response time is not a factor, and service demands are not a factor, but CFS rate and peak-demand staffing are factors. This finding presents a very important point for discussion for police chiefs and City/Town Managers about exactly what are they paying for when it comes to staffing a police department. CFS and summer vacations are manageable. Perhaps when it comes to increasing or decreasing the size of a police department, the mangers responsible for these decisions should look first at the quantity and quality of CFS actually being handled by the department, as well as how the officers are allocated and deployed in order to meet peak service demands.

### IV. The Preferred Approach to Determining Police Staffing

Our discussion will now focus on a sample demand analysis conducted by the ICMA-CPSM. This is not a hypothetical example, but an actual case study in which the data from the department's CAD system were extracted to conduct the analysis. We'll call the department the "Victory" Police Department; the VPD is representative of many police departments in the U.S. and is perhaps the most representative department from the 61 departments that we have studied.

### **Patrol Staffing and Deployment**

Uniformed patrol is considered the backbone of policing. Bureau of Justice Statistics indicate that more than 95 percent of U. S. police departments roughly equal in size to the VPD provide uniformed patrol. Officers assigned to this important function are the most visible members of the department and command the largest share of departmental resources. Proper allocation of these resources is critical to having officers readily available to respond to calls for service and to provide law enforcement services to the public.

Understanding actual workload requires reviewing total reported events within the context of how the events originated, such as through directed patrol, administrative tasks, officer-initiated activities, and citizen-initiated activities. Performing this analysis allows the activities that are really "calls" to be differentiated from other types of activities. Understanding the difference between the various types of events and the resulting staffing implications are critical to determining deployment needs. In our sample department, we'll look at the total deployed hours of the police department with a comparison to the time being spent to currently provide services.

From an organizational standpoint, it is important to have uniformed patrol resources available at all times of the day to deal with issues such as proactive enforcement and community policing. Patrol is generally the most visible and most available resource in policing and the ability to harness this resource is critical for successful operations.

From an officer's standpoint, once a certain level of CFS activity is reached the officer's focus shifts to a CFS-based reactionary mode. Once a threshold, or saturation point, is reached, the patrol officer's mindset begins to shift from a proactive approach in which he or she looks for ways to deal with crime and quality-of-life conditions in the community to a mindset in which he or she continually prepares for the next CFS. After saturation, officers cease proactive policing and engage in a reactionary style of policing. Uncommitted time is spent waiting for the next call. The saturation threshold for patrol officers is believed to be 60 percent.

Earlier, we discussed the "Rule of 60," which can be applied to evaluate patrol staffing. The first part of the Rule of 60 maintains that 60 percent of the sworn officers in a department should be dedicated to the patrol function, and the second part maintains that no more than 60 percent of patrol time should be "saturated" by workload demands from the community.

#### Rule of 60 – Part 1

The first part of the Rule of 60 is an assessment of the ratio of personnel between patrol and total sworn staffing. ICMA recommends that approximately 60 percent of all sworn officers should be assigned to patrol in a CFS response function. This benchmark will be different for different communities and will likely increase as the department (and community) gets larger. In general, however, this is a useful benchmark to evaluate the personnel allocation in the department. Departments with patrol allocations much greater than 60 percent might indicate an over-investment in patrol (or under-investment in other areas of the organization).

#### Rule of 60 - Part 2

The second part of the Rule of 60 examines workload and discretionary time and suggests that no more than 60 percent of patrol time should be committed to calls for service. In other words, ICMA suggests that no more than 60 percent of available patrol officer time be spent responding to the service demands of the community. The remaining 40 percent of the time is discretionary time for officers to be available to address community problems and be available for serious emergencies. This Rule of 60 for patrol deployment does not mean the remaining 40 percent of time is downtime or break time. It is simply a reflection of the point at which patrol officer time is saturated by CFS.

This ratio of dedicated time compared to discretionary time is referred to as the saturation index (SI). It is ICMA's contention that patrol staffing is optimally deployed when the SI is slightly less than 60 percent. An SI greater than 60 percent indicates that the patrol manpower is largely reactive, and overburdened with CFS and workload demands. An SI of somewhat less than 60 percent indicates that patrol manpower is optimally staffed. SI levels much lower than 60 percent, however, indicate patrol resources that are underutilized and signal an opportunity for a reduction in patrol resources or reallocation of police personnel.

Departments must be cautious in interpreting the SI too narrowly. For example, one should not conclude that SI can never exceed 60 percent at any time during the day, or that in any given hour no more than 60 percent of any officer's time be committed to CFS. The SI at 60 percent is intended to be a benchmark to evaluate service demands on patrol staffing. If SI levels are near or exceed 60 percent for substantial periods of a given shift, or at isolated and specific times during the day, decisions should be made to reallocate or realign personnel to reduce the SI to levels below 60. Lastly, this is not a hard-and-fast rule, but a benchmark to be used in evaluating staffing decisions.

As noted earlier, a typical ICMA workload analysis involves the examination of weekdays and weekends (1800 Friday to 1800 Sunday) in the months of February and August. These

periods are representative of times of low and high demand. Figures 1 and 2 present the patrol workload demands and SI for weekdays in February 2012 for the Victory Police Department.

Figure 1: VPD Deployment and Main Workload, Weekdays, February 2012





FIGURE 2: VPD Workload Percentage by Hour, Weekdays, February2012



### Workload vs. Deployment: Weekdays, February 2012

Average workload:

6.3 officers per hour

Average % deployed (SI): Peak SI:

46 percent

Peak SI time:

63 percent 7:30 p.m.

As these figures indicate, the SI in the VPD exceeds the 60 percent threshold several times during the day. The SI ranges from a low of approximately 18 percent at 6:00 a.m. to a high of 61 percent at 7:30 p.m., with a daily average of 43 percent.

Figures 1 and 2 indicate that patrol resources in the VPD during winter weekdays are under stress. From about 7:00 a.m. until after midnight, the patrol saturation index hovers just below the 60 percent threshold. This demonstrates that patrol resources in Victory are largely reactive. While there is a large body of traffic enforcement taking place, the overall saturation of patrol resources is very close to unacceptable levels. The 60 percent threshold is considered the point at which discretionary patrol time changes from potentially productive time that can be directed at community conditions, to unproductive time where patrol units wait for the next CFS to be dispatched. Essentially, for the bulk of the day in Victory, patrol resources operate very close to this "unproductive" threshold, and measures should be taken to support patrol staffing.

Reaching this level during any period under observation also has the adverse impact of tainting all other periods under observation. In other words, once officers experience high, and sustained, levels of patrol saturation, they are likely to conclude that patrol saturation is high always, or that they always need to be prepared to respond to high CFS demands. This effectively ends proactive police response. In the context of high violent and property crime rates in the community, this is a situation that needs to be reexamined. Victory's best defense against high crime is an active and productive patrol force. The data from Figures 1 and 2 indicate that the VPD patrol staffing is almost entirely reactive and not positioned well to respond to crime occurrences in the community. Additional resources committed to patrol, in conjunction with focused and directed patrol aimed at crime, disorder, and quality-of-life issues, would be strongly recommended.

In our studies, this process is repeated for the other three time periods (winter weekends, summer weekdays and weekends) in order to fully explore workload, manpower, and the saturation index. The goal for a police department is to keep the saturation index below the 60 percent threshold, which we believe is the optimal deployment for patrol staffing.

Looking at the comparisons of the green, red, and black lines in the SI figures, and comparing workload to available staffing, the data indicate that more officers are required to properly staff the patrol function in Victory.

### Workload and Staffing Example

Drawing on the information from the data analysis it is possible to construct a patrol work schedule in Victory that meets the demand for police services. Table 3 shows the peak demand for police services in terms of total workload during weekends and weekdays in February and

August. These peak workload demands are listed in the left portion of the table and are presented for each hour of the day. For example, at midnight during the week in February, total workload demand for police service in the VPD was 4.17 police-hours. In other words, through citizen-initiated CFS, self-initiated activities by VPD officers, and out-of-service requirements, 4.17 hours of time were expended at that hour.

Inspection of the table indicates that demand for services, or total workload, decreases as the night progresses and hits a low point around 6:00 a.m. The workload then increases throughout the day. The second through fifth columns of the table represent workload demands for weekdays and weekends in February and weekdays and weekends in August, respectively. Workload patterns are slightly different on weekends in August, but the general peak load pattern appears in each column.

To staff appropriately, ICMA recommends that the peak workload at each individual hour during the day be considered. The column in Table 3 labeled "Peak Workload," represents the highest workload observed during that hour in any one of the four periods (weekends/weekdays in February/August). For example, looking at the 12:00 a.m. hour, the peak workload was 7.52 police-hours in weekends in August. The "Peak Workload" column, therefore, is constructed by selecting the highest workload figure from any of the four 24-hour time periods in the table.

Table 3: Patrol Division: Peak Workload Staffing

| ,     |         | Peak    | *************************************** |         |       |         |            |
|-------|---------|---------|---|---------|-------|---------|------------|
|       | Febr    | uary    | Au                                      | gust    | Work- | Require | d Staffing |
| Time  | Weekday | Weekend | Weekday                                 | Weekend | Load  | 60% SI  | Staffing   |
| 12 AM | 4.17    | 5.43    | 5.81                                    | 7.52    | 7.52  | 12.5    | 17         |
| 1 AM  | 3.94    | 4.33    | 4.60                                    | 7.12    | 7.12  | 11.9    | 16         |
| 2 AM  | 3.88    | 4.94    | 5.12                                    | 7.57    | 7.57  | 12.6    | 17         |
| 3 AM  | 3.24    | 3.88    | 4.21                                    | 5.67    | 5.67  | 9.5     | 13         |
| 4 AM  | 2.27    | 4.12    | 3.35                                    | 4.71    | 4.71  | 7.9     | 11         |
| 5 AM  | 1.99    | 2.76    | 2.56                                    | 4.82    | 4.82  | 8.0     | 11         |
| 6 AM  | 1.75    | 2.27    | 2.51                                    | 3.94    | 3.94  | 6.6     | 9          |
| 7 AM  | 3.79    | 2.49    | 7.59                                    | 4.03    | 7.59  | 12.7    | 17         |
| 8 AM  | 4.23    | 2.59    | 6.75                                    | 5.24    | 6.75  | 11.3    | 15         |
| 9 AM  | 4.34    | 2.57    | 6.65                                    | 6.29    | 6.65  | 11.1    | 15         |
| 10 AM | 5.15    | 2.95    | 7.03                                    | 6.67    | 7.03  | 11.7    | 16         |
| 11 AM | 4.86    | 3.58    | 7.75                                    | 7.10    | 7.75  | 12.9    | 18         |
| 12 PM | 5.01    | 4.00    | 8.38                                    | 5.71    | 8.38  | 14.0    | 19         |
| 1 PM  | 5.46    | 3.93    | 8.28                                    | 6.50    | 8.28  | 13.8    | 19         |
| 2 PM  | 4.64    | 3.83    | 8.45                                    | 5.81    | 8.45  | 14.1    | 19         |
| 3 PM  | 4.75    | 3.75    | 8.97                                    | 5.79    | 8.97  | 15.0    | 20         |
| 4 PM  | 4.53    | 3.26    | 7.78                                    | 6.11    | 7.78  | 13.0    | 18         |
| 5 PM  | 4.42    | 3.12    | 6.02                                    | 5.45    | 6.02  | 10.0    | 14         |
| 6 PM  | 3.69    | 2.88    | 5.61                                    | 5.02    | 5.61  | 9.4     | 13         |
| 7 PM  | 4.69    | 3.74    | 7.40                                    | 6.43    | 7.40  | 12.3    | 17         |
| 8 PM  | 4.81    | 4.01    | 7.17                                    | 5.43    | 7.17  | 11.9    | 16         |
| 9 PM  | 5.06    | 4.72    | 6.52                                    | 6.07    | 6.52  | 10.9    | 15         |
| 10 PM | 4.50    | 4.88    | 6.32                                    | 6.54    | 6.54  | 10.9    | 15         |
| 11 PM | 5.01    | 4.83    | 6.76                                    | 6.59    | 6.76  | 11.3    | 15         |

The column labeled "60% SI" represents the number of police officers required to maintain staffing levels at the 60 percent saturation index for that given hour, based on the peak workload. Thus, with 7.52 hours of workload during the 12:00 a.m. hour, 12.5 police officers are required to meet that workload while maintaining the 60 percent saturation threshold (7.52/.60 = 12.5). The same calculation is made for each hour of the 24-hour period and the result is the number of police officers that are required to be available to meet peak workload and maintain the 60 percent saturation threshold.

We then have to go one step further. Staffing patrol coverage is a challenging task. In order to have a certain number of officers available during any given hour, additional officers must be assigned. Training, sick time, court, vacations, and a myriad of other responsibilities take

personnel away from their primary patrol assignments. On a typical shift it is common that 25 percent of the officers assigned will be unavailable for patrol because of another competing responsibility. Therefore, in order to ensure that 12.5 officers are available to meet peak workload demands and adhere to the 60 percent saturation index threshold, a staffing adjustment must be made so as to assign additional officers to work with the expectation that a certain complement will be unavailable because of other demands. The right-most column in Table 3 presents the number of officers that need to be assigned in order to meet appropriate levels of workload in Victory. At 12:00 a.m., in order to meet the peak workload demand of 7.52 officer-hours, the 60 percent threshold dictates that 12.5 officers need to be working. This means that 17 officers need to be scheduled for that time (12.5/.75 = 17, rounding up to the nearest whole number).

Inspection of the next row of Table 3 shows the workload and required staffing for the 1:00 a.m. hour. In this case the peak workload is 7.12 police-hours, and 16 officers must be scheduled to work in order for 11.9 of them to be available to meet that peak workload within the 60 percent threshold. Using the same calculation for each hour of the day results in a 24-hour staffing distribution. As shown in the table, required hourly staffing for peak workload ranges from a high of 20 officers at to a low of 9 officers. The table also shows that the staffing requirement is not uniform; it fluctuates throughout the day. During our study, patrol officers reported anecdotally of being very busy handling calls and managing the workload. Examination on Table 3 illustrates that peak staffing that is needed almost always is greater than the staffing levels currently deployed in the VPD. The ordinary staffing levels of 10 to 12 officers on each platoon explains why officers report being very busy, as the VPD's current staffing plan is inadequate to meet peak demand staffing.

The challenge of managing patrol operations is to ensure that sufficient resources are available to meet demand through appropriate staffing and scheduling. The VPD employs two 12-hour shifts with essentially fixed personnel assignments. The fixed nature of the staffing, combined with the variable nature of workload demands, will naturally create periods of personnel surplus and shortage throughout the day. The goal is to minimize these surpluses and shortages and create a work schedule that reduces the variance between demand and supply.

In an ideal world, the VPD would be able to carve out the right number of people working at the precise hour to meet both supply and demand. Unfortunately, the rigid nature of the deployment schedule makes this impossible. Thus, the perfect state can only be approximated by creating the "best fit" of patrol staffing and workload demand. The best fit occurs when the variation between workload demand and police officer supply is the lowest. This best fit is

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The Police Executive Research Forum recognizes 75 percent as the appropriate factor for determining patrol availability staffing.

created by modeling or manipulating various combinations of officers and 12-hour blocks to reduce the variance between supply and demand to its lowest possible level.

Table 4 shows the culmination of these factors working together. The far-left column, labeled "Time," is the hour of the day. The "Needed" columns represent the number of police officers needed in that given hour as defined in Table 3. The "Sample Schedule" column represents the optimal shift and personnel combination based upon the shift/demand modeling. The figures in the "Current" column show the current staffing on patrol in the VPD. Finally, the numbers in the "Deviation" columns represent the difference between the number of officers needed and the number of officers required. Where the deviation is negative, there are fewer officers assigned than needed to meet the 60 percent threshold; where the number is positive there are more officers assigned than required.

**Table 4: Staffing Deviation** 

| Time                                    | Needed         | Sample<br>Schedule             | Deviation | Needed       | Cumant                                 | Deviation |
|---|----------------|--------------------------------|-----------|--------------|--|-----------|
| *************************************** |                |                                |           |              | Current                                |           |
| 12 AM                                   | 17             | 15                             | -2        | 17           | 12                                     | -5        |
| 1 AM                                    | 16             | 15                             | -1        | 16           | 12                                     | -4        |
| 2 AM                                    | 17             | 15                             | -2        | 17           | 12                                     | -5        |
| 3 AM                                    | 13             | 15                             | 2         | 13           | 12                                     | -1        |
| 4 AM                                    | 11             | 15                             | 4         | 11           | 12                                     | 1         |
| 5 AM                                    | 11             | 15                             | 4         | 11           | 12                                     | 1         |
| 6 AM                                    | 9              | 18                             | 9         | 9            | 12                                     | 3         |
| 7 AM                                    | 17             | 18                             | 1         | 17           | 12                                     | -5        |
| 8 AM                                    | 15             | 18                             | 3         | 15           | 12                                     | -3        |
| 9 AM                                    | 15             | 18                             | 3         | 15           | 12                                     | -3        |
| 10 AM                                   | 16             | 18                             | 2         | 16           | 12                                     | -4        |
| 11 AM                                   | 18             | 18                             | 0         | 18           | 12                                     | -6        |
| 12 PM                                   | 19             | 18                             | -1        | 19           | 12                                     | -7        |
| 1 PM                                    | 19             | 18                             | -1        | 19           | 12                                     | -7        |
| 2 PM                                    | 19             | 18                             | -1        | 19           | 12                                     | -7        |
| 3 PM                                    | 20             | 18                             | -2        | 20           | 12                                     | -8        |
| 4 PM                                    | 18             | 18                             | 0         | 18           | 12                                     | -6        |
| 5 PM                                    | 14             | 18                             | 4         | 14           | 12                                     | -2        |
| 6 PM                                    | 13             | 15                             | 2         | 13           | 12                                     | -1        |
| 7 PM                                    | 17             | 15                             | -2        | 17           | 12                                     | -5        |
| 8 PM                                    | 16             | 15                             | -1        | 16           | 12                                     | -4        |
| 9 PM                                    | 15             | 15                             | 0         | 15           | 12                                     | -3        |
| 10 PM                                   | 15             | 15                             | 0         | 15           | 12                                     | -3        |
| 11 PM                                   | 15             | 15                             | 0         | 15           | 12                                     | -3        |
| T                                       | otal Deviation | on                             | 21        |              | ************************************** | -87       |
| **************************************  | Variance       | TOTAL CONTRACTOR OF THE STREET | 7.1       | <del> </del> |  | 7.7       |

In a perfect system, the deviations would all be zeros, and demand would be met perfectly by appropriate staffing. Since this is impossible to achieve, best fit is the desired state. Adding up the deviations over the 24-hour day results in the surplus/deficit of staff on patrol. The term "variance" is simply a calculation that portrays the amount of variability in the deviation between demand and supply, or workload and staffing. The best fit seeks to minimize the variability to the greatest extent possible. Large differences between workload and available staff would indicate a poor fit and this would be captured by the level of variance.

Taking all these factors together permits a comparison of the current staffing with the proposed staffing of 33 officers assigned to two 12-hour shifts. The total number of deviations

(difference between demand and available staff) is -87, or -3.3 per hour. This indicates that over the course of the 24-hour period there are 87 officer/hours too few to meet peak demand within the 60 percent threshold. Similarly, the variance in the proposed model is lower than the current staffing model (7.1 compared to 7.7). This indicates that the proposed two 12-hour shift plan meets the workload demands better than the current staffing model because the variability between the workload and the staffing is lower.

#### Revisiting the Rule of 60

Based upon the above discussion it is necessary to revisit Rule of 60 to demonstrate the impact this staffing model will have on workload, and to determine the foundation for staffing the department.

Table 5 illustrates the analysis in reverse. Based upon a proposed the 66-officer, 15/18 shift distribution, with 6:00 a.m./6:00 p.m. start and end times, and the observed peak workload demands, we can calculate the expected saturation index. The column labeled "Assigned" represents the 15/18 shift assignments. With the assumption that only 75 percent of the officers assigned will be available for patrol (25 percent absent due to court, sick, training, vacation, etc.) the column "Assigned" is reduced by 25 percent to reach the "On-Duty" column, which provides an estimate of the number of officers who will actually be assigned to patrol. The peak demand is taken from Table 3; the far-right column is the saturation index based upon the peak demand data combined with the proposed staffing and schedule.

According to this analysis, the average peak saturation would be approximately 50.2 percent. During the 24-hour day, the 60 percent threshold is breached during four of the hourly periods. Furthermore, considering that these values represent peak demand, this appears to be an appropriate deployment plan to meet workload demands in Victory.

Table 5: Projected Saturation Index at Peak Demand with 15/18 Shift Staffing

| Time  | Assigned | On-Duty | Peak    | SI   |
|-------|----------|---------|---------|------|
| 12 AM | 15       | 12      | 7.52    | 62.7 |
| 1 AM  | 15       | 12      | 7.12    | 59.3 |
| 2 AM  | 15       | 12      | 7.57    | 63.1 |
| 3 AM  | 15       | 12      | 5.67    | 47.3 |
| 4 AM  | 15       | 12      | 4.71    | 39.3 |
| 5 AM  | 15       | 12      | 4.82    | 40.2 |
| 6 AM  | 18       | 14      | 3.94    | 28.1 |
| 7 AM  | 18       | 14      | 7.59    | 54.2 |
| 8 AM  | 18       | 14      | 6.75    | 48.2 |
| 9 AM  | 18       | 14      | 6.65    | 47.5 |
| 10 AM | 18       | 14      | 7.03    | 50.2 |
| 11 AM | 18       | 14      | 7.75    | 55.4 |
| 12 PM | 18       | 14      | 8.38    | 59.9 |
| 1 PM  | 18       | 14      | 8.28    | 59.2 |
| 2 PM  | 18       | 14      | 8.45    | 60.3 |
| 3 PM  | 18       | 14      | 8.97    | 64.1 |
| 4 PM  | 18       | 14      | 7.78    | 55.6 |
| 5 PM  | 18       | 14      | 6.02    | 43.0 |
| 6 PM  | 15       | 15      | 5.61    | 37.4 |
| 7 PM  | 15       | 15      | 7.40    | 49.3 |
| 8 PM  | 15       | 15      | 7.17    | 47.8 |
| 9 PM  | 15       | 15      | 6.52    | 43.5 |
| 10 PM | 15       | 15      | 6.54    | 43.6 |
| 11 PM | 15       | 15      | 6.76    | 45.1 |
|       |          |         | Average | 50.2 |

No schedule is perfect, and the sample schedule provided is no exception. Pulling all of these factors together, it is possible to reconfigure the patrol staffing for the patrol division. In this example, the patrol division in the VPD would be staffed with one captain, four lieutenants, eight sergeants, and sixty-six police officers (Table 6).

**Table 6: Recommended VPD Patrol Division Staffing** 

| Captain | Shift      | Squad | Lieutenant | Sergeant | Patrol Officer |  |
|---------|------------|-------|------------|----------|----------------|--|
|         | Operations | NA    | 1          |          |                |  |
|         | 0600x1800  | А     | 1          | 2        | 18             |  |
|         | 0600x1800  | В     | 1          | 2        | 18             |  |
|         | 1800x0600  | Α     | 1          | 2        | 15             |  |
|         | 1800x0600  | В     | 1          | 2        | 15             |  |
| 1       |            |       | 5          | 8        | 66             |  |

This staffing example increases the number of officers assigned to patrol from 46 to 66, and maintains the same level of supervision. Additionally, this sample schedule adheres to steady shifts (without rotating day and night) with 18 officers on the day shift and 15 officers on the night shift. While the VPD had an interest in rotating officers from day shift to night shift, we strongly recommended that the three-set rotation be abandoned to one of greater duration. Departments of similar size with similar shift alignments rotate schedules at an annual or semiannual basis. We urged the VPD to consider a greater length of time between shift rotations to minimize the adverse impact such rotations have on officers.

The second part of the Rule of 60 suggests that 60 percent of the department should be in patrol operations. With one captain, four lieutenants, eight sergeants, and sixty-six police officers, the patrol division in the VPD would be staffed with 79 sworn officers. According to the Rule of 60, this should represent 60 percent of all sworn personnel in the department. Under these conditions, therefore, the appropriate staffing levels for sworn personnel in the VPD should be approximately 132 officers (79/.60=132).

The end result of this analysis is that the VPD Patrol Division could be staffed with a minimum of 66 officers assigned to four 12-hour shifts under the model proposed. This would provide a better fit of coverage to meet service demands. Also, the proposed schedule calls for one lieutenant and two sergeants to supervise each platoon, which is consistent with the current model.

#### V. Conclusion

Communities need to consider many important issues when determining appropriate police staffing levels. The data presented here are rarely used in contemporary police management, but are far better than the staffing allocation and deployment approaches currently in use. City, town, and department officials need to use reliable data to make these important staffing decisions. Relying on antiquated and unreliable methods to make one of the most financially important and critical decisions with respect to the quality of life and safety of a community is ill-advised.

Looking at other approaches is a good start. However, police departments must embrace the use of more sophisticated data analysis and must identify benchmarks to evaluate staffing decisions. The argument made here is that at least three benchmarks could be identified easily and then be used to evaluate staffing allocation and deployment. How many officers are assigned to patrol? What is the workload level of those officers on patrol? How much time is expended handling a CFS? Looking at these three measures will shed important light on how many officers a community needs and whether or not they are being deployed efficiently.

| POLICING | /S | PROPOSALS |
|----------|----|-----------|

Current 2018-1: cal year expense - \$60,201 consisting of part time payroll, training, uniforms, gas and equipment - Resident Trooper Cost -\$212,506.

TOTAL COST FOR PROPOSAL #3- \$130,297.00

| PROPOSAL #1 AS PRESENTED BY DEPT HEADS  | FINANCIALS AS REQUESTED   | INC/DECR. TO CURRENT YEAR BUDGET   | NOTES TO CONSIDER  |
|---|---|--|--|
| BOE REQ - 4 Part Time Officers covering 7 hours, five days weekly for 91 Total Days. Includes a clothing allowance of \$600, weapons - \$4,000, Salaries - \$76,440-@\$30 per hr. and Medicare expense of \$1108.38  TROOPER REQ - Additional Patrol hours from 12 hours per Officer (3) to 20 hours per Officer - \$87,422 | Total - \$82,148.38<br>Total - \$ 87,422<br>Total Combined - \$169,570.38 | BOE budget is actually showing an overall bottom line reduction but this a new initiative  Inc. to Current FY - \$114,462.38 | This proposal does<br>not include FICA<br>amt needed of<br>\$5,093 or add'l equip.<br>as indicated by Trpr.<br>Greenwood |
| Additional FICA Needed - \$5,093  TOTAL COST FOR PROPOSAL #1 - \$174,663.38   | 3 W   |  | Total is inclusive of everything needed.   |
| PROPOSAL #2 AS PRESENTED AT BUDGET MTG 3/19/19  2 Additional Part Time Police Officers for a total of 4 part time Officers @\$28.00 per hr and 1 Full Time RHAM SRO.  1 Officer allocated for 5 hrs daily (25 hrs) weekly between   | Total - \$115,911.00  | \$55,710.00  |  |
| Elementary schools. Additional 20 patrol hours per week   | 10tai - \$113,911.00  | -82,148.38   | BOE RECOMMENDATION   |
| for a total of 56 hours versus current 36 hours weekly Salary expense - \$94,276, Additional weaponry, uniforms and training expense - \$9,400, gas for vehicles \$423, and FICA expense - \$7,212, additional radio - \$4,600.00*  |   | (\$26,438.38)  |  |
| TOTAL COST FOR PROPOSAL #2 - \$115,911.00   |   |  |  |
| PROPOSAL #3  3 Additional Part Time Police Officers for a total of 5 part time Officers @\$28.00 per hr and 1 Full Time RHAM SRO.  1 Officer allocated for 7 hrs daily (35 hrs) weekly between  |   |  |  |
| Elementary schools. Additional 20 patrol hours per week   | Total \$130,297.00  | \$70,096.00  | BOE RECOMMENDATION   |
| for a total of 56 hours versus current 36 hours weekly. Salary expense - \$99,372, Additional weaponry,   |   | -82,148.38   | DOE RECOIVIIVIENDATION   |
| uniforms, training and gas -\$14,123, additional FICA expense - \$7,602, 2 additional radios - \$9,200.00*  |   | (\$12,052.38)  |  |
|   |   |  |  |

Current 2018-1 cal year expense - \$60,201 consisting of part time payroll, training, uniforms, gas and equipment - Resident Trooper Cost -\$212,506.

Pg. 2

| PROPOSAL #4  | FINANCIALS AS REQUESTED | INC/DEC TO     | CURRENT YEAR BUDGET | NOTES TO CONSIDER         |
|--|-------------------------|----------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| 1 NEW Full Time SRO Officer for the BOE @ 36 hrs. per week           |                         |                |                     |                           |
| between schools for 52 weeks @ \$28.00 per hr\$52,416.               |                         |                |                     |                           |
| 10 months in schools, 2 months patrol.                               |                         |                |                     |                           |
| 20 Additional patrol hours for a total of 56 versus                  | Total \$180,791.00      |                | \$120,590.00        |                           |
| 36 current hours - expense - \$81,536. Additional                    |                         |                | -82,148.38          | <b>BOE RECOMMENDATION</b> |
| weaponry, uniforms and training expense of \$9,400.                  |                         |                |                     |                           |
| Additional FICA - \$10,247, Pension - \$3,669 and gas - \$423.00     |                         |                | \$38,441.62         |                           |
| Medical Ins \$18,500, 1 additional radio-\$4,600*                    |                         |                |                     |                           |
| *  |                         |                |                     |                           |
| TOTAL COST FOR PROPOSAL #4 - \$180,791.00                            |                         |                |                     |                           |
|  |                         |                |                     |                           |
| PROPOSAL #5  |                         |                |                     |                           |
| 1 NEW Full Time SRO Officer for the BOE @ 36 hrs. per week           |                         |                |                     |                           |
| between schools for 52 weeks @ \$28.00 per hr\$52,416.               |                         |                | \$236,584.00        |                           |
| Return of 1 Resident Trooper - No additional patrol hours            | Total \$296,785.00      |                | -82,148.38          | BOE RECOMMENDATION        |
| \$212,560.00. Pension for SRO - \$3,669, Additional FICA -           |                         |                |                     |                           |
| \$4,009, Additional weaponry, uniforms and training expense          |                         | Net Increase - | \$154,435.62        |                           |
| \$4,700, 1 additional radio - \$4,600*, medical insurance - \$18,500 |                         |                |                     |                           |
|  |                         |                |                     |                           |
| TOTAL COST FOR PROPOSAL #5- \$296,785.00                             |                         |                |                     |                           |

## **CURRENTLY IN TOWN MANAGER'S BUDGET PROPOSAL**

3 Part Time Officers split rates @ \$27.81 & \$28.44 for **52** patrol hours weekly - Salary Expense - \$70,939 & BOE REQ of 4 Part Time Officers covering 7 hours, five days weekly for 91 Total days. Includes a clothing allowance of \$600, weapons-\$4,000, Salaries - \$76,440 @ \$30 per hour and Medicare Expense of \$1108.38

Total \$153,087.38

\$92,886.38

TOTAL CURRENT BUDGET REQ. COST - \$153,087.38

POLICING/ PROPOSALS

## FINANCIAL SUMMARY AT A GLANCE - EXPENSE OVER CURRENT FISCAL YR

| Proposal #1   | Proposal #2                      |                                     | Proposal #3                  |                                      | Proposal #4   |                                 |
|---------------|----------------------------------|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|
| \$174,663.38  | \$115,911.00                     |                                     | \$130,297.00                 |                                      | \$180,791.00  |                                 |
| (\$60,201.00) | Current FY Expense (\$60,201.00) | _Current FY Expense                 | (\$60,201.00)                | _Current FY Expense                  | (\$60,201.00) | Current FY Expense              |
| \$114,462.38  | \$55,710.00                      |                                     | \$70,096.00                  |                                      | \$120,590.00  |                                 |
|               | (\$82,148.38)                    | _(If BOE request amt<br>removed net | (\$82,148.38)                | _(If BOE request amt<br>_removed net | (\$82,148.38) | (If BOE request amt removed net |
|               | (\$26,438.38)                    | increase/decrease)                  | (\$12,052.38)                | increase/decrease)                   | \$38,441.62   | increase                        |
|               |                                  |                                     | Currently in<br>Town Manager |                                      |               |                                 |
|               | Proposal #5                      |                                     | Proposal                     | <del>-</del>                         |               |                                 |
| 1             | \$296,785.00                     |                                     | \$153,087.38                 |                                      |               |                                 |
|               | (\$60,201.00)                    |                                     | (\$60,201.00)                |                                      |               |                                 |
|               | \$236,584.00                     |                                     | \$92,886.38                  |                                      |               |                                 |
|               | (\$82,148.38)                    | BOE request amt.                    |                              |                                      |               |                                 |

\$154,435.62 Net increase

### **Offense and Arrest Data**

| Offense St                             | tatistics f            | or <u>Y</u> e | ear 2017        | Agence<br>or Area  |  | <u>n</u>         |          | Po       | ор:   | 9,062            |
|--|------------------------|---------------|-----------------|--|--|------------------|----------|----------|---|------------------|
|  |                        |               | Offense         | s  | Cleara   | nces             |          | Value    | e Stolen  |                  |
| <b>Index Offer</b>                     | ıse                    |               | Number          | Rate   | Number   | Pct.             |          |          |   | verage           |
| Murder                                 |                        |               | 0               | 0.0  | 0  |                  |          |          | \$0   |                  |
| Rape                                   |                        |               | 1               | 11.0   | 0  | 0.0%             |          |          | \$0   | \$0              |
| Robbery                                |                        |               | Ô               | 0.0  | 0  | 0.070            |          |          | \$0   | Ψ0               |
|  | \ccault                |               | 2               | 22.1   | 2  | 100.0%           |          |          | <b>Ф</b> О  |                  |
| Aggravated A                           | ASSault                |               |                 |  |  |                  |          |          |   |                  |
| Burglary                               |                        |               | 6               | 66.2   | 1  | 16.7%            |          | \$228,6  |   | 38,114           |
| Larceny                                |                        |               | 26              | 286.9  | 4  | 15.4%            |          | \$68,7   |   | \$2,645          |
| Motor Vehicle                          | e Theft                |               | 3               | 33.1   | 1  | 33.3%            |          | \$63,0   |   | \$21,000         |
| Arson                                  |                        |               | 0               | 0.0  | 0  |                  |          |          | \$0   |                  |
| Crime Inde                             | x Total <sup>1</sup> : |               | 38              | 419.3  | 8  | 21.1%            |          | \$360,45 | 51 5  | \$9,486          |
| <sup>1</sup> Arson not in              | cluded                 |               |                 |  |  | Value Re         | covered: |          | \$.   | 33,379           |
| Murder                                 |                        |               |                 |  | Robbery  |                  |          | n (clr)  | Total Loss  | Avg. Loss        |
| Victim-Offende                         | er Relations           | hip           | Circums         | tance  | Highway/S  | treet            | L        | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
|  | female                 | male          |                 | (  | economic I   |                  |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Spouse                                 | 0                      | 0             | LEOKA           | (  | Convenien  | ce Store         |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Live-In                                |                        | 0             | Drug Dealing    |  | ) Bank   |                  |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Ex-spouse                              | 0                      | 0             | Gangland        | (  | Other Busi   | ness             |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Ex-live-in                             |                        | 0             | Juvenile Gang   |  | Residence  |                  |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Co-procreator                          |                        | 0             | 2652            |  | Miscellane   | DUS              |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Parent                                 |                        | 0             | Lover's Quarrel | - /  | ) Firearm  |                  |          | 0 (0)    | Name and the second  |                  |
| Stepparent                             |                        | 0             | Mercy Killing   |  | 1 1  | rp Instrument    |          | 0 (0)    |   |                  |
| In-law                                 | 0                      | 0             | Other Felony    |  |  | gerous Weapor    | 7        | 0 (0)    |   |                  |
| Grandparent                            |                        | 0             | Other           | (  | 1 1  | (hands, feet, e  |          | 0 (0)    |   |                  |
| ************************************** |                        |               | Unknown         | (  | - Investment of the last of th |                  |          |          | Western State of the Control of the |                  |
| Child                                  | D                      | 0             |                 |  | Burglary   |                  | $\neg$   | n (clr)  | <b>Total Loss</b>   | Avg. Loss        |
| Stepchild                              | 0                      | 0             | Weap            | on   | accounted to the contract of t | ice Night        | -        | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Grandchild                             |                        | 0             | Handgun         | CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF THE  | Residen  |                  |          | 4        | \$116,228   | \$29,057         |
| Sibling                                |                        | 0             | Rifle           | (  | 1 1  | ice Unknown      |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Other Family                           | 0                      | 0             | Shotgun         |  | Non-res  | idence Night     |          | 1        | \$112,360   | \$112,360        |
| Boy/Girlfriend                         |                        | 0             | Other Gun       |  | Company of the control of the contro | idence Day       |          | 1        | \$94  | \$94             |
| Homosexual                             |                        | 0             | Unspec. Firearm |  | Non-res  | sidencė Unknov   | VIT      | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Friend                                 |                        | 0             | Knife           |  | Forcible   | Entry            |          | 4 (0)    |   |                  |
| Child of Partner                       | 0                      | 0             | Blunt Object    |  | 1 1  | I Entry-No Ford  | re       | 2 (1)    |   |                  |
| Crina or rartirer                      |                        |               | Motor Vehicle   |  |  | t Forcible Entry |          | 0 (0)    |   |                  |
| Neighbor                               |                        | 0             | Strongarm       |  | I home many many many many many many many many   | TOTCHOIC LITERY  |          | 0 (0)    |   |                  |
| Employee                               |                        | 0             | Poison          |  | Larceny  |                  | $\neg$   | n        | Total Loss  | Avg. Loss        |
| Employer                               | (7                     | 0             | Explosives      |  | Pocket-  | nickina          | L        | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Babysittee                             | 0                      | 0             | Fire            |  |  | natching         |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Acquaintance                           | 0                      | 0             | Narcotics       |  | Shoplift.  |                  |          | 0        | 50  | \$0              |
| Other Known                            | 0                      | 0             | Asphyxiation    |  |  | om Motor Vehi    | icles    | 4        | \$13,070  | \$3,268          |
| Stranger                               |                        | 0             | Other           |  |  | 's & Accessorie. |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Unknown                                | D                      | 0             | Unknown         |  | ) Bicycles   |                  |          | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
|  |                        |               |                 |  |  | om Buildings     |          | 9        | \$36,325  | \$4,036          |
| Rape                                   |                        |               | n (cir)*        |  |  | oin-op Machine   | 25       | 0        | \$0   | \$0              |
| Completed                              | L                      |               | 1 (0)           | Company of the Compan | All Othe   |                  |          | 13       | \$19,374  | \$1,490          |
| Attempted                              |                        |               | 0 (0)           |  | \$200 an   |                  |          | 21       | \$68,584  | \$3,266          |
| nuculpicu                              |                        | -             | U (U)           |  | \$50 to 9  |                  |          | 1        | \$175   | \$3,200<br>\$175 |
| Aggravated Assau                       | ult                    |               | n (clr)         |  | Under \$   |                  |          | 4        | \$175   | \$175            |
| Firearm                                | u                      |               | 0 (0)           |  | T Londer \$  | 30               |          | Т        | \$10  | <b>3</b> 3       |
| Knife, Cutting Inst                    | rument                 |               | 0 (0)           |  | Motor Ve   | hicle Theft      |          | n (clr)  |   |                  |
| Other Dangerous \                      |                        |               | 1 (1)           |  | Auto   | more rivert      | L        | 3 (1)    |   |                  |
| Strongarm (hands                       |                        |               | 1 (1)           |  | 1 1  | & Buses          |          | 0 (0)    |   |                  |
|  |                        |               |                 |  | Other V  |                  |          | 0 (0)    |   |                  |
| Other Offenses                         |                        |               | n (clr)         |  | 1 [6:  |                  |          |          | Tabelli   | A 1 -            |
| Negligent Mansla                       | aughter                |               | 0 (0)           |  | Arson  | l                | n (clr)  |          | Total Loss  | Avg. Loss        |
| Simple Assault                         |                        |               | 13 (9)          |  | Structui   | al               | 0 (0)    |          | 50  | \$0              |
| Officer Killed                         |                        |               | 0 nc            |  | Mobile   |                  | 0 (0)    |          | \$0   | \$0              |
| Officer Assaulted                      | 4                      |               | 0 (0)           |  | Other  |                  | 0 (0)    |          | 50  | 50               |

### **Offense and Arrest Data**

| Offense Sta                             | atistics f  | or <u>Ye</u> | ear 2016           | Agency<br>or Area | Henro  | <u>n</u>   |  | Po             | op:                | 9,049                    |
|---|-------------|--------------|--------------------|-------------------|--|--|--|----------------|--------------------|--------------------------|
| Index Offen                             | se          |              | Offenses<br>Number | Rate              | Clearar<br>Number  | nces<br>Pct.   |  |                | e Stolen<br>otal A | Average                  |
| Murder                                  | 3C          |              | 0                  | 0.0               |  | PCL.   |  |                |                    | iverage                  |
|   |             |              |                    |                   | 0  |  |  |                | \$0<br>*0          |                          |
| Rape                                    |             |              | 0                  | 0.0               | 0  |  |  |                | \$0                |                          |
| Robbery                                 |             |              | 0                  | 0.0               | 0  |  |  | 9              | \$0                | 200 Mar 200 Ann 200      |
| Aggravated As                           | ssault      |              | 0                  | 0.0               | 0  | The said that may have   |  |                | 1000000            | AND 100 AND 100          |
| Burglary                                |             |              | 9                  | 99.5              | 1  | 11.1%  |  | \$58,0         | 12                 | \$6,446                  |
| Larceny                                 |             |              | 10                 | 110.5             | 3  | 30.0%  |  | \$7,4          | 13                 | \$741                    |
| Motor Vehicle                           | Theft       |              | 5                  | 55.3              | 0  | 0.0%   |  | \$101,4        | 00 \$              | 20,280                   |
| Arson                                   |             |              | 1                  | 11.1              | 0  | 0.0%   |  | \$35,0         | 50 \$              | 35,050                   |
| Crime Index                             | Total1:     |              | 24                 | 265.2             | 4  | 16.7%  |  | \$166,82       |                    | \$6,951                  |
| <sup>1</sup> Arson not inc              | cluded      |              |                    |                   |  | Value Re   | covered:   | į              | \$7                | 75,070                   |
| Murder                                  |             |              |                    |                   | Robbery  | Mark states of the process of the party of the states of t |  | n (clr)        | Total Loss         | Avg. Loss                |
| Victim-Offender                         | Relations   | hip          | Circumsta          | nce               | Highway/S  | treet  |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
|   | female      | male         | Argument           | 0                 | _  |  |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Spouse                                  | 0           | 0            | LEOKA              | 0                 |  |  |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Live-In                                 | 0           | 0            | Drug Dealing       | 0                 | Bank   |  |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Ex-spouse                               | 0           | 0            | Gangland           | 0                 | Other Busin  | ness   |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Ex-live-in                              | 0           | 0            | Juvenile Gang      | 0                 | Residence  |  |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Co-procreator                           |             | 0            |                    |                   | Miscellaneo  | DUS  |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Parent                                  | 0           | 0            | Lover's Quarrel    | - 0               | Firearm  |  |  | 0 (0)          |                    |                          |
| Stepparent                              | 0           | 0            | Mercy Killing      | 0                 |  | rp Instrument  |  | 0 (0)          |                    |                          |
| In-law                                  | 0           | 0            | Other Felony       | 0                 |  | gerous Weapor  | 7  | 0 (0)          |                    |                          |
| Grandparent                             |             | 0            | Other              | 0                 | 1 1  | (hands, feet, e  |  | 0 (0)          |                    |                          |
|   |             |              | Unknown            | 0                 | Lancing and the same of the sa |  |  |                |                    |                          |
| Child                                   |             | 0            |                    |                   | Burglary   | ***************************************  |  | n (clr)        | <b>Total Loss</b>  | Avg. Loss                |
| Stepchild                               | 0           | 0            | Weapo              | n                 |  | ce Night   |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Grandchild                              | 0           | 0            | Handgun            | C                 |  |  |  | 6              | \$55,011           | \$9,169                  |
| Sibling                                 |             | 0            | Rifte              | 0                 | n Residen  | ce Unknown   |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Other Family                            | 0           | 0            | Shotgun            | 6                 |  | idence Night   |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Boy/Girlfriend                          |             | 0            | Other Gun          | C                 | Non-res  | idence Day   |  | 3              | \$3,001            | \$1,000                  |
| Homosexual                              | 0           | 0            | Unspec. Firearm    | 6                 | Non-res  | idence Unknow  | In   | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Friend                                  |             | 0            | Knife              | 0                 | Forcible   | Entry  |  | 2 (0)          | ****               | -                        |
| Child of Partner                        |             | 0            | Blunt Object       | (                 | Unlawfu  | I Entry-No Ford  | ce   | 7 (1)          |                    |                          |
|   |             | 1            | Motor Vehicle      | 0                 | ) Attempt  | Forcible Entry   | 5  | 0 (0)          |                    |                          |
| Neighbor                                |             | 0            | Strongarm          | 0                 | )  |  |  |                |                    |                          |
| Employee                                | 0           | 0            | Poison             | 0                 | Larceny  |  |  | n              | <b>Total Loss</b>  | Avg. Loss                |
| Employer                                |             | 0            | Explosives         | 6                 | Pocket-  | picking  | Name and Address of the Owner, when the Owner, which the Owner, w | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Babysittee                              | 0           | 0            | Fire               | 6                 | Purse-si   | natching   |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Acquaintance                            | 0           | 0            | Narcotics          | 6                 | 1 1 '  | 2  |  | 1              | \$10               | \$10                     |
| Other Known                             |             | 0            | Asphyxiation       | 6                 | Items fi   | rom Motor Vehi   | cles   | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Stranger                                | 0           | 0            | Other              |                   | MV Part  | s & Accessories  | 5  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Unknown                                 | 0           | O            | Unknown            | - 6               | Bicycles   |  |  | 1              | \$563              | \$563                    |
|   |             | Oct          |                    |                   |  | rom Buildings  |  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Rape                                    |             |              | n (clr)*           |                   |  | oin-op Machine.  | S  | 0              | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Completed                               |             |              | 0 (0)              |                   | All Othe   | r  |  | 8              | \$6,840            | \$855                    |
| Attempted                               |             |              | 0 (0)              |                   | \$200 an   | d Over   |  | 7              | \$7,253            | \$1,036                  |
| *************************************** |             |              |                    |                   | \$50 to \$   | 200  |  | 1              | \$140              | \$140                    |
| Aggravated Assaul                       | lt          |              | n (clr)            |                   | Under \$   | 50   |  | 2              | \$20               | \$10                     |
| Firearm                                 |             |              | 0 (0)              |                   |  |  |  |                |                    |                          |
| Knife, Cutting Instru                   |             |              | 0 (0)              |                   | Motor Ve   | hicle Theft  |  | n (clr)        |                    |                          |
| Other Dangerous W                       | Veapon      |              | 0 (0)              |                   | Auto   |  |  | 3 (0)          |                    | POLYMEN THE WALL SEE THE |
| Strongarm (hands,                       | feet, etc.) |              | 0 (0)              |                   | Other V  | & Buses<br>ehicles   |  | 0 (0)<br>2 (0) |                    |                          |
| Other Offenses                          |             |              | n (clr)            |                   |  | arricies   |  | ۷ (۵)          |                    |                          |
| Negligent Manslau                       | ighter      |              | 0 (0)              |                   | Arson  | L  | n (clr)  |                | Total Loss         | Avg. Loss                |
| Simple Assault Officer Killed           |             | ,            | 11 (11)            |                   | Structur<br>Mobile   | di   | 1 (0)  |                | \$35,050           | \$35,050                 |
| Ullicel Killea                          |             |              | 0 nc               |                   | 1 1  |  | 0 (0)  |                | \$0                | \$0                      |
| Officer Assaulted                       |             |              | 0 (0)              |                   | Other  |  | 0 (0)  |                | 50                 | \$0                      |

### **Offense and Arrest Data**

| Offense Stat   | istics 1             | for Ye    | ear 2015               | Agency<br>or Area:  | Hebro                    | <u>n</u>             |                | P                  | op:               | 9,070                    |
|--|----------------------|-----------|------------------------|---------------------|--------------------------|----------------------|----------------|--------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|
| Index Offense  | e                    |           | Offenses<br>Number     | Rate                | Cleara:<br>Number        | nces<br>Pct.         |                |                    | e Stolen          | Average                  |
| Murder   |                      |           | 0                      | 0.0                 | 0                        |                      |                |                    | \$0               |                          |
| Rape   |                      |           | 0                      | 0.0                 | 0                        |                      |                |                    | \$0               | AND THE THE THE          |
| Robbery  |                      |           | 1                      | 11.0                | 0                        | 0.0%                 |                |                    | \$1               | \$1                      |
| Aggravated Ass   | ault                 |           | 2                      | 22.1                | 2                        | 100.0%               |                |                    |                   |                          |
| Burglary   |                      |           | 6                      | 66.2                | 0                        | 0.0%                 |                | \$11,4             |                   | \$1,912                  |
| Larceny  | -1 0                 |           | 14                     | 154.4               | 1                        | 7.1%                 |                | \$22,6             |                   | \$1,617                  |
| Motor Vehicle T  | nert                 |           | 2                      | 22.1                | 1                        | 50.0%                |                | \$16,0             |                   | \$8,000                  |
| Arson Crime Index 1  | Fahal <sup>1</sup> . |           | 0<br><b>25</b>         | 0.0<br><b>275.6</b> | 0<br><b>4</b>            | 16.0%                |                | \$50,10            | \$0<br>02         | \$2,004                  |
| <sup>1</sup> Arson not inclu   |                      |           | 23                     | 2/3.0               | -                        | Value Rec            | overed:        | \$30,10            |                   |                          |
| Alson not mot  | aucu                 |           |                        |                     |                          | value Rec            | overea:        |                    | Þ                 | 17,412                   |
| Murder   |                      |           | 6' 1                   |                     | Robbery                  |                      | $\neg$         | n (clr)            | Total Loss        | Avg. Loss                |
| Victim-Offender R  | female               | male      | Circumstar<br>Argument | ice                 | Highway/S<br>Gas Station |                      |                | 0                  | \$0<br>\$0        | \$0                      |
| Spouse   | 0                    | 0         | LEOKA                  | 0                   | Convenience              |                      |                | 1                  | \$0<br><b>\$1</b> | <i>\$0</i><br><b>\$1</b> |
| Live-In  | 0                    | 0         | Drug Dealing           | 0                   | Bank                     |                      |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Ex-spouse  | 0                    | 0         | Gangland               | 0                   | Other Busi               | ness                 |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Ex-live-in   | 0                    | 0         | Juvenile Gang          | 0                   | Residence                |                      |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Co-procreator  | 0                    | 0         |                        |                     | Miscellane               | OUS                  |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Parent   | 0                    | 0         | Lover's Quarrel        | 0                   | Firearm                  |                      |                | 1 (0)              |                   |                          |
| Stepparent   | 0                    | 0         | Mercy Killing          | 0                   | Knife, Shar              | p Instrument         |                | 0 (0)              |                   |                          |
| In-law   | 0                    | 0         | Other Felony           | 0                   | Other Dang               | gerous Weapon        |                | 0 (0)              |                   |                          |
| Grandparent  | 0                    | 0         | Other                  | 0                   | Strongarm                | (hands, feet, e      | tc)            | 0 (0)              |                   |                          |
| Comprise of Compri |                      |           | Unknown                | 0                   | -                        |                      |                |                    |                   |                          |
| Child  | 0                    | 0         |                        |                     | Burglary                 | ***                  |                | n (clr)            | Total Loss        | Avg. Loss                |
| Stepchild  | 0                    | 0         | Weapon                 | 0                   | -1 1                     | ce Night             |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Grandchild<br>Sibling  |                      | 0         | Handgun<br>Rifle       | 0                   | Residen                  | ce Day<br>ce Unknown |                | <b>3</b><br>0      | \$10,869<br>\$0   | \$3,623<br>\$0           |
| Other Family   | 0                    | 0         | Shotgun                | 0                   | 1 1                      | idence Night         |                | 0                  | \$0               | <i>\$0</i>               |
| Boy/Girlfriend   | 0                    | 0         | Other Gun              | 0                   | 1 1                      | idence Day           |                | 3                  | \$600             | \$200                    |
| Homosexual   | 0                    | 0         | Unspec. Firearm        | 0                   | 1 1                      | idence Unknow.       | 7              | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Friend   | 19                   | 0         | Knife                  | 0                   | Forcible                 |                      |                | 4 (0)              |                   |                          |
| Child of Partner   | 0                    | 0         | Blunt Object           | 0                   |                          | Entry-No Force       |                | 2 (0)              |                   |                          |
| Ciliu di Fartifei  |                      |           | Motor Vehicle          | 0                   | 1 1                      | Forcible Entry       | =              | 0 (0)              |                   |                          |
| Neighbor   |                      | 0         | Strongarm              | 0                   | Accomp                   | TOTCHOL LINEY        |                | 0 (0)              |                   |                          |
| Employee   | 0                    | 0         | Poison                 | 0                   | Larceny                  |                      |                | n                  | Total Loss        | Avg. Loss                |
| Employer   | 0                    | 0         | Explosives             | 0                   | Pocket-                  | picking              | L              | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Babysittee   |                      | 0         | Fire                   | 0                   | 1 1                      | natching             |                | 0                  | 50                | \$0                      |
| Acquaintance   |                      | 0         | Narcotics              | 0                   | Shoplift                 | ing                  |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Other Known  |                      | 0         | Asphyxiation           | 0                   | Items fr                 | om Motor Vehic       | les            | 1                  | \$50              | \$50                     |
| Stranger   | 0                    | 0         | Other                  | 0                   | MV Part                  | s & Accessories      |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Unknown  | 0                    | 0         | Unknown                | 0                   | Bicycles                 |                      |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| And the second s |                      |           |                        |                     |                          | rom Buildings        |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Rape   |                      |           | n (clr)*               |                     |                          | oin-op Machines      |                | 0                  | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Completed  |                      |           | 0 (0)                  |                     | All Othe                 | r                    |                | 13                 | \$22,582          | \$1,737                  |
| Attempted  |                      |           | 0 (0)                  |                     | \$200 an                 | d Over               |                | 11                 | \$22,562          | \$2,051                  |
|  |                      |           |                        |                     | \$50 to \$               |                      |                | 1                  | \$50              | \$50                     |
| Aggravated Assault   | <u> </u>             |           | n (clr)                |                     | Under \$                 | 50                   |                | 2                  | \$20              | \$10                     |
| Firearm  |                      |           | 0 (0)                  |                     | [Nanta - Val             | Lists The C          |                | - (-l-)            |                   |                          |
| Knife, Cutting Instrum   |                      |           | 0 (0)                  |                     | 1 1                      | hicle Theft          | L              | n (clr)            |                   |                          |
| Other Dangerous Wea<br>Strongarm (hands, fee   |                      |           | 0 (0)<br>2 (2)         |                     | Auto                     | & Buses              |                | <b>2 (1)</b> 0 (0) |                   |                          |
| Scongarii (Hanus, Tee  | er, ecc.)            |           | ۷ (۵)                  |                     | Other V                  |                      |                | 0 (0)              |                   |                          |
| Other Offenses   |                      |           | n (clr)                |                     |                          |                      |                |                    |                   |                          |
| Negligent Manslaugi  | hter                 |           | 0 (0)                  |                     | Arson                    | ,                    | n (clr)        |                    | Total Loss        | Avg. Loss                |
| Simple Assault   |                      |           | 19 (4)                 |                     | Structui                 | al .                 | 0 (0)          |                    | \$0               | \$0                      |
| Officer Killed<br>Officer Assaulted  |                      |           | 0 nc<br>0 (0)          |                     | Mobile<br>Other          |                      | 0 (0)<br>0 (0) |                    | \$0<br>\$0        | \$0<br>\$0               |
| *n: offense; clr: clearar  | nce: nc: r           | oot colle |                        |                     | Utiler                   |                      | U (U)          |                    | 30                | \$0                      |

<sup>\*</sup>n: offense; clr: clearance; nc: not collected.

# **Offense and Arrest Data**

| Offense Stat                 | tistics 1 | for <u>Y</u> e | ear 2014           | Agency or Area: | Hebror  | 1                   | Pe             | op:              | 9,080            |
|------------------------------|-----------|----------------|--------------------|-----------------|---|---------------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|
| Index Offens                 | e         |                | Offenses<br>Number | Rate            | Clearan<br>Number   | ces<br>Pct.         |                | Stolen<br>tal    | Average          |
| Murder                       |           |                | 0                  | 0.0             | 0   |                     |                | \$0              |                  |
| Rape                         |           |                | 2                  | 22.0            | 0   | 0.0%                |                | \$0              | \$0              |
| Robbery                      |           |                | 0                  | 0.0             | 0   |                     |                | \$0              |                  |
| Aggravated Ass               | sault     |                | 0                  | 0.0             | 0   |                     |                |                  |                  |
| Burglary                     |           |                | 13                 | 143.2           | 2   | 15.4%               | \$13,2         | 95               | \$1,023          |
| Larceny                      |           |                | 15                 | 165.2           | 4   | 26.7%               | \$5,9          |                  | \$395            |
| Motor Vehicle T              | Theft     |                | 2                  | 22.0            | 0   | 0.0%                | \$1,0          |                  | \$501            |
| Arson                        |           |                | 2                  | 22.0            | 0   | 0.0%                | \$5,0          |                  | \$2,501          |
| Crime Index                  | Total1:   |                | 32                 | 352.4           | 6   | 18.8%               | \$20,22        |                  | \$632            |
| <sup>1</sup> Arson not inclu | uded      |                |                    |                 |   | Value Recover       | ed:            |                  | \$40             |
| Murder                       |           |                |                    |                 | Robbery   |                     | n (clr)        | Total Loss       | Avg. Loss        |
| Victim-Offender I            | Relations | ship           | Circumsta          | nce             | Highway/St  | reet                | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
|                              | female    | male           | Argument           | 0               | Gas Station   |                     | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Spouse                       | 0         | 0              | LEOKA              | 0               | Convenienc  | e Store             | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Live-In                      | 0         | 0              | Drug Dealing       | 0               | Bank  |                     | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Ex-spouse                    | 0         | 0              | Gangland           | 0               | Other Busin   | 1055                | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Ex-live-in                   | 0         | 0              | Juvenile Gang      | 0               | Residence   |                     | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Co-procreator                | 0         | 0              |                    |                 | Miscellaneo   | US                  | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Parent                       | 0         | 0              | Lover's Quarrel    | 0               | Firearm   |                     | 0 (0)          |                  |                  |
| Stepparent                   | 0         | 0              | Mercy Killing      | 0               | Knife, Shar   | o Instrument        | 0 (0)          |                  |                  |
| In-law                       | 0         | 0              | Other Felony       | 0               | Other Dang  | erous Weapon        | 0 (0)          |                  |                  |
| Grandparent                  | 0         | 0              | Other<br>Unknown   | 0               | Strongarm   | (hands, feet, etc.) | 0 (0)          |                  |                  |
| Child                        | 0         | 0              | UTKHOWH            | U               | Burglary  |                     | n (clr)        | Total Loss       | Aug Laga         |
| Stepchild                    | 0         | 0              | Weapor             |                 | Residence   | . Night             | n (clr)        | Total Loss       |                  |
| Grandchild                   | 0         | 0              | Handgun            | 0               | Residence   |                     | 6              | \$350<br>\$6,570 | \$175<br>\$1,095 |
| Sibling                      |           | 0              | Rifle              | 0               | 1 1   | e Unknown           | 0              | \$0,370<br>\$0   | \$1,095          |
| Other Family                 | 0         | 0              | Shotgun            | 0               | A. 20.200 Million (Co. 20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.20.2 | dence Night         | 2              | \$0              | \$ <b>0</b>      |
| Boy/Girlfriend               | 0         | 0              | Other Gun          | 0               | 1 1   | dence Day           | 3              | \$6,375          | \$2,125          |
| Homosexual                   | 0         | 0              | Unspec. Firearm    | 0               | 100000000000000000000000000000000000000                         | dence Unknown       | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Friend                       | 0         | 0              | Knife              | 0               | 1   |                     | F (0)          |                  |                  |
| Child of Partner             | 0         | 0              | Blunt Object       | 0               | Forcible  | Entry-No Force      | 5 (0)          |                  |                  |
| Cilila di Partifei           |           | (20)           | Motor Vehicle      | 0               | 1 1   | Forcible Entry      | 7 (1)<br>1 (1) |                  |                  |
| Neighbor                     |           | 0              | Strongarm          | 0               | Accempt   | rorcible Liftry     | 1 (1)          |                  |                  |
| Employee                     |           | 0              | Poison             | 0               | Larceny   |                     | n              | Total Loss       | Avg. Loss        |
| Employer                     | 0         | 0              | Explosives         | 0               | Pocket-p  | ickina              | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Babysittee                   | 0         | 0              | Fire               | 0               | Purse-sn  |                     | 0              | \$0              | \$0              |
| Acquaintance                 | 0         | 0              | Narcotics          | 0               | Shopliftin  |                     | 2              | \$19             | \$10             |
| Other Known                  |           | 0              | Asphyxiation       | 0               |   | m Motor Vehicles    | 2              | \$276            | \$138            |
| Stranger                     | 0         | 0              | Other              | 0               | 1 1   | & Accessories       | 0              | \$0              | \$15G            |
| Unknown                      |           | 0              | Unknown            | 0               | Bicycles  |                     | 1              | \$149            | \$149            |
|                              |           |                |                    |                 | 1 1   | om Buildings        | 1              | \$66             | \$66             |
| Rape                         |           |                | n (clr)*           |                 |   | in-op Machines      | 0              | \$0              | 50               |
| Completed                    |           | *************  | 2 (0)              |                 | All Other   |                     | 9              | \$5,414          | \$602            |
| Attempted                    |           |                | 0 (0)              |                 | \$200 and   | 1 Over              | 6              | \$5,294          | \$882            |
| recempted                    |           |                | 0 (0)              |                 | \$50 to \$  |                     | 5              | \$565            | \$113            |
| Aggravated Assault           |           |                | n (clr)            |                 | Under \$5   |                     | 4              | \$65             | \$16             |
| Firearm                      | 1         |                | 0 (0)              |                 | 1   |                     |                | 7.0              | 720              |
| Knife, Cutting Instrur       | ment      |                | 0 (0)              |                 | Motor Veh   | icle Theft          | n (clr)        |                  |                  |
| Other Dangerous We           |           |                | 0 (0)              |                 | Auto  |                     | 2 (0)          |                  |                  |
| Strongarm (hands, fe         |           |                | 0 (0)              |                 | Trucks 8  |                     | 0 (0)          |                  |                  |
| Other Offenses               |           |                | n (clr)            |                 | Other Ve  | enicles             | 0 (0)          |                  |                  |
| Negligent Manslaug           | nhter     |                | 0 (0)              |                 | Arson   | n (c                | lr)            | Total Loss       | Avg. Loss        |
| Simple Assault               |           |                | 35 (15)            |                 | Structura   |                     | •              | \$5,000          | \$5,000          |
| Officer Killed               |           |                | 0 nc               |                 | Mobile  | 0 (0                |                | \$0              | \$0              |
| Officer Assaulted            |           |                | 0 (0)              |                 | Other   | 1 (0                | )              | \$1              | \$1              |

Officer Killed 0 nc
Officer Assaulted 0 (0)
\*n: offense; clr: clearance; nc: not collected.

#### **Offense and Arrest Data**

**Agency** Offense Statistics for Year 2013 Hebron Pop: 9,087 or Area: Offenses Clearances Value Stolen Rate<sup>2</sup> **Index Offense** Number Total Number Pct. Average Murder 0 0.0 0 \$0 Rape 0 0.0 0 \$0 Robbery 1 11.0 1 100.0% \$100 \$100 Aggravated Assault 0 0.0 0 2 15 165.1 13.3% \$69,297 \$4,620 Burglary 20 2 Larceny 220.1 10.0% \$26,386 \$1,319 Motor Vehicle Theft 3 33.0 3 100.0% \$5,800 \$1,933 1 11.0 0 0.0% \$500 \$500 Arson 8 39 429.2 20.5% \$101,583 \$2,605 Crime Index Total1: Arson not included Value Recovered: \$12,475 <sup>2</sup> All rates per 100,000 persons; crime rate of rape per 100,000 females is 0.0 Robbery n (clr) **Total Loss** Avg. Loss Victim-Offender Relationship Circumstance Highway/Street female male 0 \$0 LEOKA 0 \$0 \$100 \$100 Drug Dealing Bank 1 Gangland Ex-spouse Other Business 50 Juvenile Gang 0 Residence 0 50 Fx-live-in 50 Miscellaneous Lover's Quarrel Firearm 0 (0) Parent Mercy Killing Knife, Sharp Instrument 0 (0) Other Felony In-law Other Dangerous Weapon 1(1) Grandparent Strongarm (hands, feet, etc.) 0 (0) Burglary n (clr) **Total Loss** Avg. Loss Weapon Residence Night \$27,395 \$3,914 Grandchild 6 \$6,017 Residence Day \$36,102 Sibling Residence Unknown Rifle \$0 50 Non-residence Night 1 \$5,000 \$5,000 Boy/Girlfriend Other Gun 0 Non-residence Day 1 \$800 \$800 Homosexual Unspec. Firearm 0 Non-residence Unknown 50 0 Knife Forcible Entry 6 (1) Child of Partner Blunt Object 0 Unlawful Entry-No Force 9 (1) Motor Vehicle Attempt Forcible Entry Strongarm Neighbor Employee Poison 0 Larceny **Total Loss** Avg. Loss n Explosives 0 Employer Pocket-picking \$0 \$0 0 0 \$0 Purse-snatching 50 Babysittee Acquaintance Narcotics 0 Shoplifting 0 \$0 \$0 \$1,737 Asphyxiation Items from Motor Vehicles 5 \$8,686 Other Known 0 Stranger MV Parts & Accessories 0 50 \$0 Unknown 50 \$0 2 \$6,952 Items from Buildings \$13,903 Rape n (clr)\* From Coin-op Machines 0 \$0 \$0 All Other 13 \$292 0 (0) \$3,797 \$200 and Over 13 \$26,175 \$2,013 \$50 to \$200 2 \$180 \$90 n (clr) Under \$50 Aggravated Assault 5 \$31 \$6 Firearm 0 (0) 0 (0) **Motor Vehicle Theft** n (clr) Knife, Cutting Instrument Other Dangerous Weapon 0 (0) Auto 3 (3) Strongarm (hands, feet, etc.) Trucks & Buses 0 (0) Other Vehicles Other Offenses n (clr) **Total Loss** Negligent Manslaughter Arson n (clr) Avg. Loss 1 (0) Simple Assault 12 (6) Structural \$500 \$500

0 nc

Officer Killed

Officer Assaulten

Mobile

0 (0)

\$0

\$0

<sup>\*</sup>n: offense; clr: clearance; nc: not collected.

Agency 9,076 Offense Statistics for Year 2012 **Hebron** Pop: or Area: Offenses Clearances **Value Stolen Index Offense** Number Rate<sup>2</sup> Number Total Pct. Average Murder 0 0.0 0 \$0 Rape 11.0 0 0.0% \$0 1 \$0 Robbery 1 11.0 0 0.0% \$6,990 \$6,990 Aggravated Assault 3 33.1 0 0.0% \$2,541 Burglary 16 176.3 3 18.8% \$40,661 Larceny 36 396.7 8 22.2% \$72,998 \$2,028 Motor Vehicle Theft 3 33.1 3 100.0% \$10,100 \$3,367 Arson 0 0.0 0 \$0 23.3% 60 14 \$130,749 \$2,179 661.1 Crime Index Total<sup>1</sup>: Arson not included Value Recovered: \$13,362

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> All rates per 100,000 persons; crime rate of rape per 100,000 females is 21.4

| Victim-Offende   | er Relations | ship | Circumstance    | :   |
|------------------|--------------|------|-----------------|-----|
|                  | female       | male | Argument        | (   |
| Spouse           | 0            | 0    | LEOKA           | - ( |
| Live-In          | 0            | 0    | Drug Dealing    | l   |
| Ex-spouse        | 0            | 0    | Gangland        | l   |
| Ex-live-in       | 0            | 0    | Juvenile Gang   | (   |
| Co-procreator    | 0            | 0    |                 |     |
| Parent           | 0            | 0    | Lover's Quarrel | (   |
| Stepparent       |              | 0    | Mercy Killing   | ì   |
| In-law           | 0            | 0    | Other Felony    |     |
| Grandparent      | 0            | 0    | Other           |     |
|                  |              |      | Unknown         |     |
| Child            | Ũ            | 0    |                 |     |
| Stepchild        |              | 0    | Weapon          |     |
| Grandchild       | 0            | 0    | Handgun         |     |
| Sibling          | 0            | 0    | Rifle           |     |
| Other Family     |              | 0    | Shotgun         |     |
| Boy/Girlfriend   | 0            | 0    | Other Gun       |     |
| Homosexual       | 0            | 0    | Unspec. Firearm |     |
| Friend           |              | 0    | Knife           |     |
| Child of Partner |              | 0    | Blunt Object    |     |
|                  |              |      | Motor Vehicle   |     |
| Neighbor         | 0            | 0    | Strongarm       |     |
| Employee         | 0            | Ð    | Poison          |     |
| Employer         | 0            | 0    | Explosives      |     |
| Babysittee       |              | 0    | Fire            |     |
| Acquaintance     |              | 0    | Narcotics       |     |
| Other Known      | 0            | 0    | Asphyxiation    |     |
| Stranger         | 0            | 0    | Other           |     |
| Unknown          | 0            | 0    | Unknown         | i   |

| Rape      | n (clr)* |  |
|-----------|----------|--|
| Completed | 1 (0)    |  |
| Attempted | 0 (0)    |  |

| Aggravated Assault            | n (clr) |  |
|-------------------------------|---------|--|
| Firearm                       | 0 (0)   |  |
| Knife, Cutting Instrument     | 0 (0)   |  |
| Other Dangerous Weapon        | 0 (0)   |  |
| Strongarm (hands, feet, etc.) | 3 (0)   |  |

| Other Offenses         | n (clr) |  |
|------------------------|---------|--|
| Negligent Manslaughter | 0 (0)   |  |
| Simple Assault         | 36 (29) |  |
| Officer Killed         | 0 nc    |  |
| Officer Assaulted      | 0 (0)   |  |

<sup>\*</sup>n: offense; clr: clearance; nc: not collected.

| Robbery  | n (clr)                      | Total Loss  | Avg. Loss  |                         |       |  |  |
|--|------------------------------|---|--|-------------------------|-------|--|--|
| Highway/Street                                       | 0<br>0<br>0<br><b>1</b><br>0 | \$0<br>\$0<br>\$0<br>\$6,990<br>\$0<br>\$0<br>\$0 | \$0<br>\$0<br>\$0<br>\$6,990<br>\$0<br>\$0<br>\$0<br>\$0 |                         |       |  |  |
| Gas Station  |                              |   |  |                         |       |  |  |
| Convenience Store                                    |                              |   |  |                         |       |  |  |
| Bank<br>Other Business<br>Residence<br>Miscellaneous |                              |   |  |                         |       |  |  |
|  |                              |   |  | Firearm                 | 0 (0) |  |  |
|  |                              |   |  | Knife, Sharp Instrument | 1 (0) |  |  |
|  |                              |   |  | Other Dangerous Weapon  | 0 (0) |  |  |
| Strongarm (hands, feet, etc.)                        | 0 (0)                        |   |  |                         |       |  |  |

| Burglary                | n (cir) | <b>Total Loss</b> | Avg. Loss |
|-------------------------|---------|-------------------|-----------|
| Residence Night         | 6       | \$19,723          | \$3,287   |
| Residence Day           | 7       | \$20,772          | \$2,967   |
| Residence Unknown       | 0       | \$0               | \$0       |
| Non-residence Night     | 1       | \$26              | \$26      |
| Non-residence Day       | 2       | \$140             | \$70      |
| Non-residence Unknown   | 0       | \$0               | \$0       |
| Forcible Entry          | 8 (1)   |                   |           |
| Unlawful Entry-No Force | 8 (2)   |                   |           |
| Attempt Forcible Entry  | 0 (0)   |                   |           |

| Larceny   | n                      | <b>Total Loss</b>                                 | Avg. Loss                                      |                       |   |          |          |
|---|------------------------|---|--|-----------------------|---|----------|----------|
| Pocket-picking  | 0<br>0<br>1<br>15<br>2 | \$0<br>\$0<br>\$183<br>\$14,841<br>\$305<br>\$300 | \$0<br>\$0<br>\$183<br>\$989<br>\$153<br>\$300 |                       |   |          |          |
| Purse-snatching   |                        |   |  |                       |   |          |          |
| Shoplifting   |                        |   |  |                       |   |          |          |
| Items from Motor Vehicles<br>MV Parts & Accessories<br>Bicycles |                        |   |  |                       |   |          |          |
|   |                        |   |  | Items from Buildings  | 2 | \$30,412 | \$15,206 |
|   |                        |   |  | From Coin-op Machines | 0 | \$0      | \$0      |
| All Other   | 15                     | \$26,957  | \$1,797  |                       |   |          |          |
| \$200 and Over  | 24                     | \$72,208  | \$3,009  |                       |   |          |          |
| \$50 to \$200   | 7                      | \$762   | \$109  |                       |   |          |          |
| Under \$50  | 5                      | \$28  | \$6  |                       |   |          |          |

| Motor Vehicle Theft | n (clr) |  |
|---------------------|---------|--|
| Auto                | 3 (3)   |  |
| Trucks & Buses      | 0 (0)   |  |
| Other Vehicles      | 0 (0)   |  |

| Arson      | n (clr) | Total Loss | Avg. Loss |
|------------|---------|------------|-----------|
| Structural | 0 (0)   | \$0        | \$0       |
| Mobile     | 0 (0)   | \$0        | \$0       |
| Other      | 0 (0)   | \$0        | \$0       |