

Emerging Models for Police Presence in Schools

Background

The rise of police officers in schools, often referred to as School Resource Officers (SROs), can be [traced back](#) to the 1990's. An increase in reported juvenile crimes and several high-profile school shootings [sparked interest](#) in assigning sworn police officers to work inside public schools. Most research and policy officially describes SROs as sworn police officers working inside public schools, and this document will address officers matching that definition. While SROs were once viewed as a critical resource in reducing deadly violence in public schools, many advocates for school discipline reform and community members have expressed concern over their presence in recent years. These advocates cite [racial and ethnic disproportionality](#) in school arrests, the [criminalization of school misbehavior](#), and the possibility that the presence of SROs contributes to the [School-to-Prison Pipeline](#) as particular causes for concern. As a result, several communities have developed progressive models around school policing.

This document first looks at existing research on the effects of SROs in schools, including impacts on racial and ethnic disproportionality, criminalization of misbehavior, and school violence. In the next section, it compiles recommendations for progressive models, as well as examines existing models in three school districts around the country. Where possible, the document looks at outcomes of these progressive models. In the final section, it provides a guide to help you think critically about SROs in your context.

Research Summary

Because larger-scale pushback over the role of police officers in schools is a recent development, most progressive models are in their infant stages. Therefore, research on their efficacy is limited. As one [systematic review](#) explains, “[a] report published by the [US Department of Justice’s] [COPS Office](#) notes that there is a lack of research on SRO programs, so it is not possible to identify a ‘one-size-fits-all’ series of recommendations for implementing a maximally successful SRO program.” However, early data are included below.

The [American Civil Liberties Union](#) (ACLU), the [Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing](#) (DOJ), and the [National Juvenile Justice Network](#) (NJJN) have compiled recommendations regarding policing in schools.¹ This document employs those recommendations in describing three newer, progressive models for school resource officers in Clayton County, Georgia; Broward County, Florida; and Denver, Colorado.

The Impact of School Resource Officers

This section breaks down information from several studies conducted over the past seven years to identify key trends in outcomes associated with SRO presence in schools.

School Crime Rates

A [2011 study](#) out of the University of Maryland notes that “as schools increase their use of police, they record more crimes involving weapons and drugs and report a higher percentage of other non-serious

¹ The Council of State Governments also produced a comprehensive guide to school discipline which includes recommendations for police partnerships and holistic strategies.

violent crimes² to law enforcement.” Specifically, schools with SROs have 12.3% more non-serious violent crime³ referrals to police. The study shows that schools with SROs report a “significantly higher percentage of all crimes (except serious violent crimes)” than schools without police.

The 2009 study [School Resource Officers and the Criminalization of Student Behavior](#) found that the largest number of law enforcement referrals from SROs were for “disorderly conduct,” and there was a significant disparity between the number of “disorderly conduct” referrals between schools with SROs and schools without.

Rates of Disciplinary Incidents

The study from the University of Maryland found no decrease in the number of disciplinary incidents with the addition of school resource officers, and in some cases the presence of police officers was correlated with an increase in reported crime.

A 2015 study, [School Resource Officers and Exclusionary Discipline in U.S. High Schools: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis](#), found that the presence of an SRO is associated with an increase of approximately one disciplinary incident per week.

Impact of Race/Ethnicity, Disability, and Poverty on the Presence of SROs and Law Enforcement Referrals

[Several studies](#) have found that students of color and students with disabilities are disproportionately referred to law enforcement for school-based incidences, though there do not appear to be any data linking this trend directly to the presence of SROs. However, the Justice Policy Institute’s 2011 [report](#) on the impact of school resource officers notes that, at the time of publication, there were no data to explicitly examine the correlation between race and SROs, but that data from Florida, South Carolina, Colorado, and Connecticut show vastly disproportionate rates of law enforcement referrals for students of color. The extent to which these referrals are related to the increased presence of SROs at schools with high minority enrollment is unknown. However, a [recent study](#) reported “74 percent of black high school students attend a school with at least one on-site law enforcement officer, compared with 71 percent of both Hispanic and multiracial high school students, and 65 percent of both Asian and white high school students.” Also, *School Resource Officers and the Criminalization of Student Behavior* points to a much higher number of SROs assigned to schools in high poverty areas, compared to low poverty areas, and a 2009 study points to higher minority enrollment at schools with SRO’s

Impact of SROs on School Climate

There is little research on the relationship between school climate and SROs, however, one study was released in 2016: [The Impact of School Resource Officer Interaction on Students’ Feelings About School and School Police](#). It found that students’ feelings of safety and positivity increased as they had more interactions with SROs, especially for students who had multiple interactions with SROs; however, these students also often felt less connected to the school community itself. These seemingly contradictory

² In this study, “[S]erious violent crime includes rape, sexual battery other than rape, robbery with or without a weapon, physical attack or fight with a weapon, and threat of physical attack with a weapon. Non-serious violent crime includes physical attack or fight without a weapon and threat of physical attack without a weapon. Property crime includes theft and vandalism. Weapon/drug crimes include possession of a firearm or explosive device; possession of a knife or sharp object; and distribution, possession, or use of illegal drugs or alcohol.”

data points may be explained by the fact that the study does not appear to distinguish between “positive” and “negative” interactions between students and SROs.

Trends in School Violence

The [Congressional Research Service](#) and the National Association of School Resource Officers point out the inverse correlation between the national trend increases in SROs and the decreases in crime rates in schools, suggesting that more SROs are associated with reduced crime rates.

Progressive Models for Policing in Schools: Best Practices and Emerging Examples

The Model Elements below are collected from ACLU’s [Policing in Schools: Developing a Governance Document for School Resource Officers in K12 Schools](#), the US Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing’s [Assigning Police to Schools](#), and the [National Juvenile Justice Network’s School Discipline and Security Personnel Tip Sheet](#).

Model Elements	Recommendations	Clayton County, Georgia	Broward County, Florida	Denver, Colorado
Governance Documents	<p>Formal governance document that demonstrates shared understanding of goals of SRO program, including support and training. Define roles and responsibilities of SROs. [ACLU]</p> <p>Establish protocol and/or Memorandum of Understanding. [DOJ]</p> <p>Enter into Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) or intergovernmental agreement to clarify respective roles. [NJJN]</p>	Developed cooperative agreement aimed at limiting the overall number of school referrals to juvenile court and reducing disproportionality.	Developed collaborative agreement on school discipline in 2013. Agreement is not exclusive to SROs, but the SRO relationship is an element of the larger-scale agreement.	Developed 2013 Intergovernmental Agreement between Denver Public Schools and Denver Police Department.
Distinguish disciplinary misconduct and criminal offenses	<p>Children should not be subject to formal law enforcement intervention for ordinary school discipline issues. [ACLU]</p> <p>Specify that citations, court referrals, and arrests should not be used against children</p>	<p>“[M]isdemeanor delinquent acts” (fighting, disrupting public school, disorderly conduct, etc.) do not result in filing of a complaint except in repeated circumstances. Elementary students cannot be referred at all.</p>	Initial incidents of non-violent misdemeanors do not result in the filing of criminal complaints or arrests.	Middle/High School SROs must “[d]ifferentiate between disciplinary issues and crime problems and respond appropriately.”

	<p>for most behavioral infractions, particularly normal adolescent behavior and nonviolent infractions (trespassing, loitering, defiance, profanity, failure to follow classroom rules, etc.). Security personnel should only cite, refer, or arrest students when there is no other alternative, and only when there is a serious threat to school safety. [NJNJ]</p>			
<p>Ensure transparency and accountability</p>	<p>Provide mechanisms for transparency and accountability, including mandatory public reporting on SRO activities and meaningful complaint resolution system. [ACLU]</p>	<p>School resource officers wear body cameras.</p>	<p>Data on “all school-based arrests, referrals to law enforcement, and filing of criminal complaints and disaggregated by location of arrest/school, charge, arresting agency, gender, age, race/ethnicity, disability and ESL status” collected by school district and Department of Juvenile Justice. Each month data are delivered to Juvenile Justice Advisory Board and the Eliminating the Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Committee. Data are also reported publicly at the end of each semester. All parties meet twice per year to provide oversight and offer recommendations.</p>	<p>N/A</p>

<p>Define SROs within context of educational missions of schools</p>	<p>Make clear that the primary role of the SRO is to improve school safety and the educational climate of schools, and not to discipline or punish students. Set forth lines of communication and authority between the SRO and building-level administrators. [ACLU]</p> <p>Clearly define all roles and responsibilities of SROs, considering potential philosophical differences between parties. [DOJ]</p> <p>Strictly limit law enforcement involvement in student behavior. [NJNJ]</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Principal and designees are the first stop for intervention and disciplinary issues. Principals must consult discipline matrix before engaging or consulting SROs.</p>	<p>SRO role defined as positive partner with Police Department and other agencies. Clearly defined as direct agents of the Police Department and not employees of the school district.</p>
<p>Provide minimum training requirements</p>	<p>Require minimum training parameters for SROs assigned to K-12 public schools, recognizing that police training is geared toward adult citizens and may be developmentally inappropriate for children and adolescents. [ACLU]</p> <p>Provide training in: community policing in schools, legal issues, cultural fluency, problem solving, safe</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Training required within three months of signing onto agreement, training is unspecified.</p>	<p>Principals and SROs attend three two-hour citywide trainings per year on topics such as child and adolescent development and psychology; age-appropriate responses; cultural competence; restorative justice techniques; special accommodations for students with disabilities; practices proven to improve school climate; and the creation of safe spaces for</p>

	<p>school preparation, child development, mental health intervention, teaching and classroom management strategies. [DOJ]</p> <p>Train officers in adolescent development, conflict resolution and de-escalation techniques, identification and appropriate service of students with special needs, and restorative practices. [NJNJ]</p>			<p>lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and questioning students.</p>
<p>Promote non-punitive approaches to student behavior</p>	<p>Integrate research-based practices to improve school climate and student behavior. [ACLU]</p> <p>SROs should engage in “problem-solving policing rather than simply responding to incidents as they occur.” [DOJ]</p>	<p>A “commission of focused act by student” should be determined using a system of graduated sanctions, disciplinary methods, and/or educational programming before complaints filed with Juvenile Court.</p>	<p>Guidelines ask parties to consider alternative accountability programs, such as the Collaborative Problem Solving Team, PROMISE program, or community-based program.</p>	<p>Emphasizes restorative practices and agreement requires SROs to understand the policy.</p>
<p>Partners Enlisted</p>		<p>Juvenile Court of Clayton County, Clayton County Public School System, Clayton County Police Department, Riverdale Police Department, Jonesboro Police Department, Forest Park Police Department, Clayton County Department of Family & Children Services, Clayton</p>	<p>School Board of Broward County, Chief Judge of Seventeenth Judicial Circuit, Office of the State Attorney, Law Office of the Public Defender, Sheriff of Broward County, City of Fort Lauderdale/Fort Lauderdale Police Department, Florida Department of Juvenile</p>	<p>Denver Police Department</p>

		Center for Behavioral Health Services, District Attorney Robert E. Keller, Georgia Department of Juvenile Justice	Justice, Fort Lauderdale/Broward Branch NAACP, Juvenile Justice Advisory Board	
Outcomes		Dangerous weapons on campuses decreased 70%; fighting offenses decreased 87%; 36% decrease in acts such as disorderly conduct; 86% decrease in African American student referrals for fighting; 64% decrease in African American student referrals for disruption of public schools; and graduation rates have increased by 20% since protocol was implemented.	Within one school quarter , suspensions were down 66 percent and expulsions down by 55 percent. There was a 42% drop in school-based arrests within one year.	Total suspensions down 60 percent, suspensions of youth of color down 58 percent; expulsions for all youth and youth of color down 54 percent; and referrals to law enforcement for all youth and youth of color dropped 57 percent.

Member Guide

Understanding information about SROs is critical to determining what's best for your community. Use the questions below to identify your gaps in knowledge and the resources to learn more.

Questions

- What are positive and negative consequences of having SROs in your community's schools?
- What are barriers to success in engaging affected stakeholder groups, such as students, teachers, principals, parents, local law enforcement, and the juvenile judicial system?
- Have similar districts successfully integrated SROs into their schools?

If your school district currently employs sworn police officers to work inside its schools, does it:

- have an up-to-date Memorandum of Understanding with the police department?
- clearly define the role of SROs, including differentiating student misbehavior and criminal offenses?
- include diverse stakeholders as part of its policies on SROs, such as representatives from the legal and judicial communities?
- collect data on the interactions between students and SROs?
 - If yes, are these data broken down by demographics?
 - If yes, do these data differentiate between positive and punitive interactions?
- require SROs to undergo pre-service training? If so, does this include training on child and adolescent psychology, de-escalation techniques, positive behavior reinforcements, special education interventions, equity and race discussions?

If your school district is looking to bring sworn police officers into its schools, has it considered:

- investing in positive behavioral programs?
- how SROs will fit into the educational mission of the school?
- developing relationships or creating coalitions to create a plan for SROs?
- the potential impacts, both positive and negative, on school climate?
- managing racial and ethnic disproportionality in law enforcement referrals?

Additional Resources

- To learn more about your community context, look at your:
 - school district web page
 - municipal/local department of juvenile justice web page
- American Civil Liberties Union's model language for governance documents on [School Resource Officers](#)
- U.S. Department of Education resources on [appropriate use of school resource officers](#)
- U.S. Department of Justice [Community Oriented Policing](#) initiatives

Improving School Resource Officer Programs to Address Issues Posed
by School-to-Prison Pipeline Research

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ABSTRACT

In response to mass shooting incidents and the perception that overall school crime and violence was increasing, many schools in the United States felt compelled to respond with strategies designed to improve school safety and climate. One strategy that has experienced a significant increase in popularity since the 1990s is the presence of sworn law enforcement officers on school campuses through school resource officer (SRO) programs. While SROs enjoy broad support among stakeholder groups and are credited with improving school safety and climate, school-to-prison pipeline research has asserted that SROs may unnecessarily criminalize acts of student misconduct which should be handled only as school disciplinary matters. This paper will discuss research regarding SRO programs and the school-to-prison pipeline with the goal of identifying methods to improve SRO programs in order to mediate any negative impacts that SROs may have on the students with whom they interact.

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INTRODUCTION

The position of School Resource Officer (SRO) has become an important fixture in many American educational settings. In many cases, SROs are brought into schools as a remedy to real or anticipated safety concerns. While the presence of police officers in educational environments is hardly a new development, the growth in the popularity of full-time SRO programs over the past quarter-century has been exponential. SROs provide a variety of important services at their assigned schools, many of which are intended to increase school safety by addressing and preventing incidents of student misconduct. However, some researchers have indicated that the presence of an SRO in a school may lead to the unnecessary criminalization of some acts of student misbehavior. These researchers assert that the increase in the number of SROs in American schools has resulted in students being referred to the juvenile justice system for actions which previously would have been handled only as school disciplinary matters. Often referred to as the school-to-prison pipeline, this practice is believed to have multiple negative, long-term consequences for justice-involved students. In response, some school-to-prison pipeline research has called for the discontinuation of most police-school partnerships, including the removal of SROs from American schools.

Research regarding SRO programs and the school-to-prison pipeline has identified potential improvements to SRO programs which could alleviate some of the issues proposed by school-to-prison pipeline research, including the possible criminalization of student misconduct by SROs. These program improvements have the potential to provide a more formalized structure for SRO programs, codify intergovernmental agreements between school districts and law enforcement agencies, ensure that SROs are well-suited and properly-trained for their unique duties, and allow for both SROs and SRO programs to be evaluated in an appropriate manner. In addition, these improvements can enhance the transparency of SRO programs by allowing more stakeholders to be involved in the implementation and evaluation of SRO programs. If properly implemented, these improvements could forestall efforts to remove SROs from

American schools and allow SROs to continue their efforts to enhance school safety and improve opinions about the police among school-aged youth.

This paper will seek to address the concerns raised by school-to-prison pipeline research through improvements to SRO programs in American schools. First, SRO programs will be discussed by exploring the history of SRO programs, the various roles played by SROs, the growth of SRO programs in the United States, the many different definitions applied to SROs, and data regarding the value and effectiveness of SRO programs. Next, school-to-prison pipeline research will be explored, including the definition and history of the school-to-prison pipeline, the role of zero tolerance discipline policies, the impact of enhanced school security measures, the role of SROs and the police, criticism of school-to-prison pipeline research, and the potential adverse impacts that the school-to-prison pipeline can have on students who are referred to the justice system for school-based offenses. Criminological theories relevant to SRO programs and the school-to-prison pipeline will also be discussed. Lastly, research-based recommendations for improving SRO programs in response to school-to-prison pipeline concerns will be offered.

LITERATURE REVIEW

SRO programs have become important parts of schools' overall approaches to enhancing school safety and improving school climate. Thousands of SROs are currently assigned to work in schools in United States and around the world. There are many different definitions for the SRO position, reflecting the numerous and varied roles that are performed by SROs. Research has demonstrated broad support for SROs' abilities to prevent and reduce delinquency, improve feelings of safety at schools, and build positive relationships with students and staff members. However, some research has demonstrated that SRO programs may not be as effective as believed and that the implementation of SRO programs may have been haphazard, leading to role confusion and conflict.

School-to-prison pipeline research has expressed concerns that the combination of zero tolerance discipline policies, enhanced school security measures, and increased police involvement in matters of student misconduct may have long-term negative consequences for students who are excluded from school attendance and referred to law enforcement for school-based incidents. These consequences are believed to impact poor, minority, and disabled students both adversely and disproportionately. Some research has asserted that the increased popularity of SRO programs was directly responsible for the school-to-prison pipeline because SROs criminalized acts of student misconduct which otherwise would have been handled only as school discipline matters. Other research has disputed these claims.

SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS

Defining School Resource Officers

Among the biggest challenges when discussing SROs was locating a common definition for the position. Due to the lack of a nationwide framework, SRO programs have a variety of different definitions. Coon and Travis (2012) and Girouard (2001) noted that definitions often varied from one jurisdiction to the next and Robles-Piña and Denham (2012) added that the many different ways that SROs were contracted have led to the lack of a common definition for the SRO position. For example, the National Association

of School Resource Officers (NASRO) limited its definition to commissioned or sworn law enforcement officers who worked under the title of SRO, campus police officer, or school safety liaison (Canady, James, & Nease, 2012). President Obama's administration defined SROs as specially-trained police officers whose actions should supplement evidence-based school discipline policies (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). The most commonly cited definition (Carroll, Ben-Zadok, & McCue, 2010; Girouard, 2001; May, Fessel, & Means, 2004; Merkwae, 2015; Theriot & Cuellar, 2016) came from the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act which classified an SRO as "a career law enforcement officer, with sworn authority, deployed in community-oriented policing, and assigned by the employing police department or agency to work in collaboration with school and community-based organizations." This definition reflected that most SROs worked in educational settings on a full-time basis, but were employed by, and subject to the requirements of, their employing law enforcement agencies. Most SROs were employed by municipal or county law enforcement agencies, but assigned to work with one or more schools following models that ranged from crime prevention approaches to traditional reactive enforcement (May et al., 2004). The purposes assigned to SRO programs also varied. According to Brown and Benedict (2005), the main purpose of SRO programs was to increase the amount of communication, contact, and cooperation between juveniles and the police. From a social control perspective, the presence of police in schools was viewed in terms of using an educational setting to identify and address delinquency (Burton, 2017). NASRO stated that the goal of SRO programs was:

to provide safe learning environments in our nation's schools, provide valuable resources to school staff, foster a positive relationship with our nation's youth, and develop strategies to resolve problems affecting our youth with the objective of protecting every child so they can reach their fullest potential. (Canady et al., 2012, p. 3)

SRO programs were often viewed as an extension of the community policing efforts which have dominated the American law enforcement community for over two decades. SROs were employed as resources to not only the school itself, but to the entire school community as an important part of many

community policing programs (Denham, Robles-Piña, Polnick, & Webb, 2016; Lamont, Macleod, & Wilkin, 2011) and have been implemented by school districts to reduce crime and the fear of crime on their campuses (Maskaly, Donner, Lanterman, & Jennings, 2011). Canady et al. (2012) stated that SRO programs were part of a collaborative effort between police departments, schools, and the community to provide safe learning environments and ensure that the needs of all students were addressed. According to Carroll et al. (2010) and Coon and Travis (2012), SRO programs were often considered a part of agencies' crime prevention approach to juvenile problems encountered by communities. Under this rationale, SROs were part of a long-term crime reduction plan which started with efforts to change attitudes within the community, then moved on to strategies to prevent and reduce juvenile delinquency, and concluded with the outcome of producing productive, law-abiding adults (Carroll et al, 2010). However, Myrstol (2011) found that the majority of the public continued to view SRO programs primarily as a crime control strategy.

History of School Resource Officer Programs

Although SRO programs may still be viewed by some as a fairly recent development in American policing, there was a long and extensive history of partnerships between law enforcement agencies and educational institutions. According to Burton (2017), the first documented police-school partnership occurred in California during the Progressive Era of policing in the late 1910s and early 1920s. Referred to as Coordinating Councils, law enforcement and educators worked collaboratively to detect delinquency, obtain information to assist street-level policing, and control juvenile behavior through legal judgments. Led by well-known police reformer August Vollmer, Coordinating Councils focused on behaviors such as truancy, untruthfulness, and theft, leading to a peak of 253 delinquency referrals to the police from Berkeley schools in 1926. Although the main function of these initial police-school partnerships was for educators to provide intelligence about delinquent behavior to the police, it also led to beneficial delinquency prevention initiatives such as police-organized youth sports leagues and rehabilitation-focused juvenile justice efforts.

The popularity of Coordinating Councils waned in the 1950's, but the concept of police-school partnerships had gotten its start. The San Francisco Police Department began regularly assigning officers to work in schools in 1942 and the Los Angeles School Police Department was established in 1948 (Watkins & Maume, 2012). In comparison, the United Kingdom did not begin assigning officers to work full-time in schools until 2002 (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). The first SRO-style program was initiated in Flint, Michigan in 1958 and was followed by a similar program in Fresno, California in 1968 (Canady et al., 2012). However, the term SRO was first employed by the Miami Police Department sometime in the 1960's (Coon & Travis, 2012). Other early-adopting agencies of SRO programs were located in Tucson, Minneapolis, and Cincinnati (Watkins & Maume, 2012). Student rights movements in the 1960's and 1970's brought the police into schools more frequently as school administrators sought to maintain their legitimacy through delinquency-control techniques which viewed juvenile delinquents as future criminals as opposed to youths in need of rehabilitation (Burton, 2017). The Charlotte Police Department created the Officer Friendly Program in 1971 to place officers in classrooms with the intent of reducing racial tensions and promoting a positive image of the police with the city's youth population (Coon & Travis, 2012). The number of SRO programs grew in the 1960's and 1970's, especially in Florida, but stagnated in the 1980's (Girouard, 2001). However, an emphasis on police-school partnerships continued. For example, in 1984, Congress passed the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act which mandated that schools receiving federal funding create multidisciplinary teams which included law enforcement representation to combat crimes against youthful victims (Canady et al., 2012). Police Foundation (2016) added that the advent of programs such as Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) and Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) also increased the involvement of police officers in schools.

Despite these developments, the full-time presence of sworn law enforcement officers in schools was not predominant prior to the 1990's. The number of SROs increased throughout that decade based on several factors. First, the public began to view schools as unsafe due, in part, to a media-driven perception that violent crime in schools was rampant, but mostly due to 15 active-shooter incidents which occurred on

American school campuses between 1993 and 1999 (Canady et al., 2012). Among these acts of school violence were shootings which occurred at schools in West Paducah, Kentucky in 1997, Springfield, Oregon and Jonesboro, Arkansas in 1998, and the well-publicized incident at Columbine High School in Littleton, Colorado in 1999 (Myrstol, 2011). These incidents damaged the perception that schools were sanctuaries of safety and learning which were immune to the violence present in surrounding communities and students' homes (Jennings, Khey, Maskaly, & Donner, 2011) and impacted students, staff members, and parents both physically and emotionally (May & Higgins, 2011). Price (2009) stated that increased school violence caused crises at many school districts and negatively impacted teachers' morale. As a result, "the SRO is becoming a vital agent into accomplishing increased safety from violence" (Shuler-Ivey, 2012). Swartz, Osborne, Dawson-Edwards, & Higgins (2016) concluded that the influence of school violence continued to play an important role as mass shooting incidents, such as the 2013 attack at Sandy Hook Elementary School, persisted in occurring.

Second, in 1998, the federal Office of Community Oriented Policing Services began offering grants of up to \$125,000 to departments that deployed officers to work in schools. The grant program had awarded over \$400 million by 2000 through the Cops in Schools program (Briers & Dickmann, 2009), was extended in that year with another \$68 million in funding (Girouard, 2001), had awarded over \$420 million to 1,800 law enforcement agencies to place 3,800 SROs by 2001 (May, Hart, & Ruddell, 2011), and was credited with placing over 6,500 SROs in schools by 2005 (Coon & Travis, 2012) at a total cost of over \$750 million (Merkwae, 2015). Myrstol (2011) stated that the primary objectives of Cops in Schools programs were increasing student and campus safety and encouraging collaboration between schools and the police on issues of school safety.

Third, the increase in SRO programs was part of the wave of community policing programs that were instituted at departments across the country in the 1990s and driven by the over \$8.8 billion in community policing grants that were issued by the federal government starting in 1994 (Carroll et al., 2010). Denham et al. (2016) stated that crime prevention may have been the initial intent of school-based policing

programs, but concluded that community policing made SROs a permanent presence in America's schools. Today, the popularity of SRO programs has led many state legislatures to include SROs in school-safety legislation and mandate the reporting of specified offenses on school properties to law enforcement (Canady et al., 2012). Finally, according to Theriot and Cuellar (2016), President Barack Obama's 2013 plan for increased school safety proposed funding for an additional 1,000 SROs nationwide.

Growth of School Resource Officer Programs

The many different variations of SRO programs made it somewhat difficult to conduct an exact count of the number of SROs in the United States. According to Girouard (2001), "the concept of what constitutes an SRO varies from one State or local jurisdiction to another, making counting of the number of SRO's difficult" (p. 1). However, some data existed to document the growth in the number of SROs, beginning with the inception of such programs several decades ago. According to Brown and Benedict (2005), the number of police officers assigned to work in schools in the United States far exceeded the number in any other country. As of 1975, only 1% of schools had SROs, but that number grew to 36% by 2004 and 40% by 2008 (Merkwae, 2015). Data from the US Department of Education (USDOE) report, *Indicators of School Crime and Safety, 2017*, showed that, in 2016, 42% of schools reported having an SRO, which was a 10% increase over the 32% who reported having an SRO 10 years prior (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018). Canady et al. (2012) stated that school-based policing was the fastest growing area of law enforcement.

The first attempt to quantify the number of SROs occurred in the late 1970s. At that time, there were approximately 100 SROs in the United States, but that number grew to about 2,000 by the mid-1990s (Coon & Travis, 2012; Jennings et al., 2011). From 1997 to 2003, the number of SROs in the United States increased from 9,400 to 14,337 (Shuler-Ivey, 2012). In 2000, over one-third of sheriff's departments and nearly half of local law enforcement agencies had at least one full-time SRO, totaling over 17,000 SROs nationwide (Brown & Benedict, 2005). NASRO placed its total membership at around 10,000 SROs

(Theriot, 2009) and it was estimated that there were currently about 20,000 SROs in the United States (Maskaly et al., 2011); Swartz et al. (2016); Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). In 2003, approximately 47% of sheriff's departments and 43% of local police departments had SRO programs (Myrstol, 2011). In 2007, 38% of local police departments surveyed reported having full-time SROs working in their schools (Police Foundation, 2016). The number of law enforcement agencies whose sole purpose was policing K-12 school campuses had also grown significantly. In 1996, there were 117 such agencies, but this number grew to 162 in 2000, 183 in 2004, and 250 in 2008 (Watkins & Maume, 2012). Theriot and Cuellar (2016) noted that the number of SROs had continued to grow even though school violence, a purported justification for SRO programs, had been declining steadily since 1993.

Data reported by Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) indicated that most SROs were assigned to work in high schools, although the number of SROs working in elementary and middle schools was growing. In fact, the number of SROs serving elementary and middle schools had grown more quickly than the number serving in high schools during the past decade. In 2006, just 18% of elementary and middle schools reported having an SRO, but that number increased to 30% by 2016. In comparison, the percentage of high schools with SROs grew by only 6% - from 52% to 58% - during the same time period. The majority of SROs were stationed at schools with larger enrollments. In 2016, 84% of high schools with student populations in excess of 1,000 reported having an SRO present compared to 65% of high schools with enrollments between 500 and 999 students, 51% of schools having between 300 and 499 students, and 30% of schools with fewer than 300 students. 86% of elementary and middle school SROs and 93% of high school SROs were armed while on-duty and on-campus. Data also showed that SROs were most commonly found in larger jurisdictions. According to Myrstol (2011), 80% of police departments and 73% of sheriff's departments serving populations exceeding 100,000 had SRO programs and 90% of agencies serving between 250,000 and 499,999 residents had SRO programs. Of schools that reported having an SRO, the most common reason reported by school administrators for this decision, according to Coon and Travis (2012), was assistance in addressing issues of student disorder. In contrast, school administrators whose schools did

not have an SRO stated that this decision was based on either a lack of funding or a belief that an SRO was unnecessary.

Roles of School Resource Officers

Some of the confusion regarding the value and necessity of SROs came from the many different ways that SRO programs were implemented and the resulting variances in the roles that SROs played in their assigned schools. According to Schlosser (2014), SROs' multiple roles had a high potential of conflicting with each other. Disagreement between the police and school systems about what an SRO's role should be was commonplace and led to problems when SROs were deployed prior to a consensus being reached (Coon & Travis, 2012). A major reason for role confusion and conflict in SRO programs resulted from the fact that SROs often remained employees of the local police or sheriff's department despite working full-time in educational settings (Theriot, 2009). Integrating an outside police officer into a school setting was difficult because law enforcement agencies tended to be closed organizations while educational organizations trended toward openness and transparency (Coon & Travis, 2012; Denham et al., 2016). Brown and Benedict (2005) stated that the duties of SROs employed by law enforcement agencies differed greatly from those of SROs employed directly by school districts and that having to contend with the influences of different political forces impacted how SROs performed their functions. Shuler-Ivey (2012) stated that, while police departments viewed law enforcement as a last resort in response to school-based problems, school administrators often sought to utilize SROs with a policing-first mentality.

Another source of role confusion and conflict for SROs resulted from resistance to their presence by school administrators. Many school administrators believed that agreeing to having a police officer assigned to their schools equated to an admission that their campuses were unsafe and were concerned that SROs might usurp some of their leadership authority (Brown & Benedict, 2005; Coon & Travis, 2012). Theriot and Cuellar (2016) concluded "the heterogeneity of schools, school districts, law enforcement agencies, training standards, and funding sources for SRO programs across the United States makes it

unlikely that uniform and universally applicable definitions of SROs and their responsibilities will be created” (p. 375). Jennings et al. (2011) and Shuler-Ivey (2012) described the SRO position as a hybrid of policing, corrections, and education. While concurring that SROs had diverse roles which were dependent on numerous factors, Police Foundation (2016) stated that most SROs performed five common functions: mentoring, relationship-building, establishing partnerships, teaching, and ensuring safe school environments.

Because SROs’ roles varied so greatly, it was challenging to articulate the functions that they performed on a day-to-day basis. Lamont et al. (2011) stated that there was no single model, or even group of similar models, to quantify how SROs performed their work in schools and Schlosser (2014) added that, unlike DARE or GREAT instructors, the primary purpose of SRO programs was school safety and not classroom instruction. The most commonly cited framework (Canady et al., 2012; Coon & Travis, 2012; Denham et al., 2016; May et al., 2004; May & Higgins, 2011; Merkwae, 2015; Police Foundation, 2016; Robles-Piña & Denham, 2012; Shuler-Ivey, 2012; Swartz et al., 2016) of SRO roles was NASRO’s Triad Model of SRO Responsibility. According to Canady et al. (2012), “the Triad model divides the SRO’s responsibilities into three areas: Educator, Informal Counselor, and Law Enforcement Officer” (p. 3) with the goals of providing a safe and secure learning environment, mentoring students, and educating on law-related topics. This model was also reflected in Britain’s School Liaison Officer program which listed their roles as law enforcement, resource development, and teaching youth about the consequences of criminal behavior (Briers & Dickmann, 2009) through increased cooperation, contact, and communication between police and juveniles (Brown & Benedict, 2005). Some researchers, such as Girouard (2001) and May et al. (2004), have added a fourth SRO role of acting as liaison between the school, police, and community, but the three prongs of the Triad model dominated most discussions of SROs’ roles.

The SRO’s law enforcement role has expanded from simply preparing for and responding to incidents of school violence to becoming an integral part of their schools’ safety teams by partnering with educators, parents, students, and the community to address a wide range of challenges facing education

today. SROs' knowledge of the law, specialized training, experience with the local juvenile justice system, and increased awareness of the surrounding community's population and safety concerns made them invaluable resources to schools, especially in the areas of crisis planning and school-safety policymaking. Denham et al. (2016) found that SROs nationwide divided their time between the three prongs of the Triad model as follows: 50% engaging in law enforcement, 25% acting as informal counselors, and 13% in teaching roles. The remaining 13% was spent in unspecified meetings. In comparison, SROs in North Carolina stated that they divided their time at rates of 50% law enforcement, 30% counseling, and 20% teaching and SROs in Kentucky reported spending 55.6% of their time on law enforcement, 26.1% on counseling, and 17.3% on teaching. A case study by Schlosser (2014) found that the SRO shadowed by the author spent 70% of his time on law enforcement, 16% of his time teaching, and 14% of his time counseling.

Data reported by Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) indicated that 42% of schools in the United States had an SRO present and that the five most common activities performed by those SROs were coordinating with local first responders (73% of schools), patrolling school campuses (67% of schools), identifying problems in order to address them proactively (64% of schools), traffic control (59% of schools), and mentoring students (59% of schools). High schools reported that their SROs engaged in each of these activities at a higher rate than middle- and elementary-school SROs and included providing legal advice and reporting school code infractions as additional functions commonly provided by high school SROs. The least common activity performed by SROs at all grade levels was classroom teaching.

Although SROs were not deployed in a manner consistent with the public's typical view of the police role, law enforcement activity continued to play an important part in the day-to-day work of SROs in the United States. On a fundamental level, an SRO was a highly-visible presence which reassured students, staff members, and parents that the school environment was safe and secure (Lamont et al., 2011). The primary goal of most SRO programs was to reduce delinquent behaviors by students while also attempting to improve students' attitudes about the police (Watkins & Maume, 2012). The Chicago Police

Department's SRO program focused primarily on traditional law enforcement goals by listing SROs' priorities as ensuring student safety, preventing disruptions to the educational environment, and addressing trespassing incidents (Lipari, 2018). According to Canady et al. (2012), many authors have found that law enforcement activities dominated most SROs' workdays. Often, this involved responding to criminal incidents on campus in which students and staff members were either offenders or victims (Lamont et al., 2011). Coon and Travis (2012) found that law enforcement occupied approximately 50% of SROs' time, but added that this varied depending upon the grade levels at the schools to which SROs were assigned.

However, the range of these policing activities often differed from those performed by police officers in more traditional positions. In addition to enforcing criminal laws in relation to on-campus incidents, SROs also engaged in school-safety planning, monitored hallways and parking lots, scheduled emergency drills (Canady et al., 2012), conducted security assessments, provided assistance at special events such as athletic events, enforced truancy laws (Coon & Travis, 2012), acted as a liaison between the school and other law enforcement agencies, developed crime prevention programs for students and staff members (Lipari, 2018), transported students, broke-up student altercations (May & Higgins, 2011), provided information to students and faculty about police matters (Police Foundation, 2016), addressed bullying incidents (Robles-Piña & Denham, 2012), and trained security staff members (Swartz, 2016). The area of school safety planning has become a crucial part of SROs' law enforcement function in response to mass school shooting incidents. According to Coon and Travis (2012), over half of school administrators reported working directly with SROs to establish school-safety plans and 86% stated that they had an emergency plan in place with their local policing agency. SROs also acted as trainers for school staff members and police personnel regarding how best to respond or react to active shooter incidents.

The second part of the Triad model – teaching – was also an important factor to consider when discussing the roles that SROs played in their assigned schools. May & Higgins (2011) found that SROs performed some type of classroom instruction at least once per week. While police officers have been acting as classroom teachers for several decades under programs such as Officer Friendly, DARE, and

GREAT, the concept of having an SRO instruct on a topic which correlated directly with the school's regular curriculum was a totally different construct. SROs regularly created classroom lessons and initiated opportunities to engage in classroom instruction as a way to build relationships with school staff members (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). Canady et al. (2012) described the value of classroom teaching by SROs by stating that "through regular teaching, the SRO imparts valuable, specialized knowledge to students and staff, builds relationships with students as they come to understand and respect the officer's knowledge and commitment, and improves students' perceptions of law enforcement in general" (p. 26). Areas of instruction commonly covered by SROs included: bullying, drug and alcohol use, careers in law enforcement, driving safety, dating violence, Constitutional law, internet safety (Canady et al., 2012), victimization prevention, students' legal rights and responsibilities, firearm safety (Denham et al., 2016), the consequences of criminal activity (Lamont et al., 2011), and criminal investigation (Police Foundation, 2016). Some states have encouraged SROs to become active classroom instructors through legislation. For example, Arizona required its state's SROs to log at least 90 teaching hours each semester (Denham et al., 2016). Briers and Dickmann (2009) stated that American SROs engaged in substantially more classroom instruction activity than their British counterparts.

Counseling, the third section of the Triad model, was perhaps the SRO role least associated with traditional law enforcement, but also the most important because it facilitated the relationship-building that made an SRO's job unique from others in policing. In some cases, SROs' counseling role was downplayed even though the rapport-building that it facilitated was an important SRO function (Schlosser, 2014). Police Foundation (2016) stated that SROs were in a unique position to recognize students in vulnerable or at-risk situations. Shuler-Ivey (2012) described counseling as "the most dynamic aspect of the SRO's assignment" (p. 553), asserted that law enforcement should be an SRO's secondary responsibility behind counseling, and concluded that an SRO's counseling role had the potential for a more positive impact on at-risk students than the law enforcement role. SROs regularly engaged in meetings with school and community resources in an effort to develop and provide options to keep at-risk youth out of the criminal justice system. Such

options included restorative justice programs, youth courts, peer mediation, and similar diversionary programs (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). Employing these diversionary programs allowed SROs to mediate disputes between students, encouraged the use of conflict resolution techniques, and potentially prevented school-based crimes (Lamont et al., 2011). By developing relationships with students, SROs proactively identified safety threats, prevented acts of on-campus criminal activity from occurring, and coordinated the appropriate community resources to address the issues which led to the threat. Counseling ranged from more formal discussions about academic performance or ongoing disciplinary issues to informal talks about extra-curricular activities or interests that the SRO and the student had in common (Canady et al., 2012). By acting as counselors, SROs also addressed issues of ongoing bullying through empathy reinforcement, friendship circles, collaborative problem-solving, and teaching assertiveness to bullying victims (Robles-Piña & Denham, 2012). Denham et al. (2016) found that 65% of SROs engaged in some type of counseling activity on a daily basis and that this included assisting students who were bullying victims, pregnant, suicidal, experiencing some form of emotional, physical, or sexual abuse, or in need of enhanced conflict resolution or problem-solving skills.

An area of the SRO function that often became controversial was the SRO's role in the school disciplinary process. Denham et al. (2016) described this conflict by stating:

Reacting to behavior of students that is clearly a violation of law in [a] school setting is a relatively clear matter. However, it becomes increasingly more difficult for the SRO to separate the role of educator from police officer when responding in good faith to students who are in violation of school board regulations that do not rise to the level of violation of law. (p. 7)

While SROs often embraced their teaching and counseling roles, some school administrators wanted SROs' more active assistance with school disciplinary matters and were resistant to SROs who sought to expand their efforts beyond law enforcement (Denham et al., 2016). Shuler-Ivey (2012) stated that SROs played an important part in all stages of the discipline process, but according to Coon & Travis (2012), many SROs

believed that it was simply not their responsibility to enforce parts of school disciplinary codes that had no relation to criminal law violations. This led to disagreements between SROs and school administrators who often viewed SROs as added muscle to their own code enforcement efforts. Research has found that a primary cause of this disagreement came from the differing views of SROs and school administrators on the purpose of SRO programs generally. This led school staff to sometimes make unrealistic demands on SROs, such as providing classroom support or acting as a security guard as opposed to a sworn police officer (Lamont et al., 2011). Coon and Travis (2012) added that, while SROs viewed their role from a broader perspective of long-term crime prevention and community engagement, school administrators tended to be more focused on short-term school safety concerns.

Confusion about SROs' roles in school discipline existed not only in the educational and law enforcement communities, but also in America's courts of law. While some courts viewed SROs as school employees, thus lessening their legal burden of proof in areas such as questioning and searching students, other courts viewed SROs in the same light as other police officers without any special consideration of their educational roles (Price, 2009). Other courts have recognized SROs' hybrid roles of police officer and school authority and allowed SROs to take police actions under modified legal standards when working at the behest of, or in direct partnership with, school authorities (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). Merkwae (2015) stated that, when SROs were involved in school disciplinary matters, it was unclear where an SRO's role as school disciplinarian stopped and an SRO's responsibilities as a law enforcement agent began. It was this intersection of school disciplinarian and law enforcement official where some researchers have indicated that SRO programs have run afoul of students' rights and best interests, leading to a school-to-prison pipeline, which will be discussed later.

Data Supportive of School Resource Officer Programs

In general terms, there was abundant research in favor of SROs and their efforts to improve school safety and overall school climates. Merkwae (2015) reported that an overwhelming majority of adults

considered SRO programs to be effective at improving school safety. Parents studied by Myrstol (2011) reported believing that SROs reduced juvenile delinquency, improved police-community relations and school climate, enhanced quality of life in the community, helped students better understand the law, and helped the police department by exposing police personnel to a different part of the community. In addition, assigning SROs to schools gave parents the perception that school safety was a priority in their community (Watkins & Maume, 2012). May et al. (2004) found that 87.5% of school administrators in Kentucky believed strongly that their SROs had been effective at reducing student misbehavior, especially in the areas of marijuana use, theft, bomb threats, weapons possession, and fighting. Over 57% of those school administrators could not identify anything negative about their schools' SRO programs. The same school administrators supported SRO programs with 98.4% stating that all high schools should have SROs, 93.5% stating that all middle schools should have SROs, and 92.7% stating that all alternative schools should have SROs. Lamont et al. (2011) stated that evidence dating back to the 1990's demonstrated that SROs were effective at addressing and reducing problems associated with juvenile delinquency due to their ability to engage in early intervention techniques with at-risk students.

Support for SRO programs was not limited to school administrators. Coon and Travis (2012) found that both teachers and administrators favored a police presence at their schools and rated their schools' SROs highly. Teachers studied by Denham et al. (2016) rated their SROs' impact on school climate positively. 82% of teachers in Virginia believed that fighting incidents had been reduced after an SRO was assigned to their school and 99% of school staff members were supportive of their schools' SRO programs (Maskaly et al., 2011). Students were also supportive of SRO programs. Students had positive views about SROs and regularly used them as a resource to report problems or obtain counseling about personal and legal matters (Myrstol, 2011). According to Watkins and Maume (2012), a majority of students viewed SROs favorably and often regarded them more like school administrators than police officers. Two-thirds of students in Jennings et al.'s (2011) study reported that their SROs were effective at improving school safety. 91% of students in Virginia were supportive of their schools' SRO programs (Maskaly et al., 2011).

Surveyed students also considered their SROs to be fair, respectful, sincere, and approachable (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). From a different perspective, a study of SRO programs by Carroll et al. (2010) found that SRO programs were cost effective based upon their ability to reduce the short-term costs associated with juvenile crime and because they were successful at preventing at-risk students from dropping out of school and becoming career criminals, which could cost taxpayers between \$1.7 and \$2.3 million per non-graduating student.

As an advocate for SRO programs, NASRO – in research authored by Canady et al. (2012) - argued forcefully in favor of SRO programs, stating that “SROs experience a distinctive and welcomed role in the campus community and enjoy an effective relationship with the school officials with whom they serve” (p. 6) and added that “collaboration between school officials and school resource officers is an effective component to preserving the right of boys and girls to attend schools that are secure and peaceful” (p. 19). The authors continued by stating that SROs were effective at reducing disruptions at their schools, increasing feelings of safety by students, parents, and staff members, reducing victimization of students and staff members, increasing school attendance rates, and generally improving learning environments through enhanced teacher and student morale and promoting an atmosphere of trust, caring, and respect. They added that SROs and school administrators used a professional, collaborative approach to balance the priorities of education, students’ rights, and school safety. Parents were also supportive of SRO programs with 75% agreeing that SROs improved police-community relations, 70.4% believing that SROs improved students’ attitudes about the police, and 80% agreeing that SROs improved the educational environments at their children’s schools. Calling school safety a human rights issue, the authors opined that eliminating SRO programs could have negative consequences on student welfare through a perception of indifference toward victims of school-based crimes, encouraging selective enforcement of school rules, increasing disruptions that impeded students’ rights to an education, and encouraging school administrators to cover-up incidents which occurred on their campuses (Canady et al., 2012). From a police management perspective, SROs had a positive impact on their employing agencies’ effectiveness by reducing the number

of calls-for-service on school campuses that regular patrol units were required to respond to, allowing those units to concentrate on other departmental priorities (Canady et al., 2012; May et al., 2011; Watkins & Maume, 2012). Not surprisingly, 99% of SROs surveyed at an annual NASRO conference by May et al. (2004) felt that SROs improved school safety. Two-thirds of SROs stated that they had prevented an attack on a staff member and about 50% stated that they had prevented at least 11 violent crimes during the previous school year.

School crime statistics were also supportive of SROs' efforts to improve school safety. Empirical evidence has demonstrated that SROs were effective at increasing school safety and preventing school-based crimes (Maskaly et al., 2011), possibly because increased monitoring by SROs had a deterrent and preventative effect (Swartz et al., 2016). Theriot (2009) stated that this deterrent effect had the greatest impact on incidents which occurred in locations that had previously lacked consistent monitoring, such as parking lots and hallways and on incidents involving weapon possession or physical aggression. Since data regarding school-based offenses was first collected in 1992, overall school crime as well as the number of school-based arrests and student disciplinary violations have persisted on a steady downward trend, coinciding with the increased deployment of SROs at schools in the United States. These included incidents involving deaths at schools, violent crimes, non-fatal victimizations, and thefts. In addition, juvenile arrests decreased by 50% from 1994 to 2009, a period when the number of SROs was rising steeply (Canady et al., 2012). Studies cited by Canady et al. (2012) which were based on school crime and discipline data from both pre- and post-SRO deployment found that the presence of an SRO coincided with reductions in expulsions, suspensions, office disciplinary referrals, disruptions to the educational environment, and arrests of students. Watkins and Maume (2012) also found that total student suspensions declined following the implementation of SRO programs. Theriot (2009) found that the presence of an SRO reduced arrests for assaults by 52.3% and arrests for possessing a weapon on school property by 72.9%. Jennings et al. (2011) found that the presence of an SRO had a significant negative effect on the prevalence of school-based violent crime, indicating that SROs provided a valuable deterrent effect to violent criminal activity.

In a study comparing schools with and without an SRO, Lamont et al. (2011) found that SROs prevented about 45 crimes annually at each school, a reduction of 24%. Swartz et al. (2016) stated that SROs had decreased criminal offenses by 17% at 27 studied middle and high schools and added that, while crime was often more prevalent at schools with larger enrollments, SROs appeared to moderate the impact of school size on crime rates.

However, school crime statistics alone were likely insufficient for quantifying the many intangible positive impacts that SROs had on their schools. For example, Denham et al. (2016) found that increased counseling activity by SROs led to improved student and staff morale, enhanced communication between students and adults, the enforcement of clear rules and expectations, and promoted a positive school climate. Similar positive impacts were found to result from SROs' participation in extracurricular events, school safety planning, and classroom teaching. Briers and Dickmann (2009) stated that SROs were focused on students' welfare and recounted the story of a student who credited the interventions of his school's SRO with redirecting him from a delinquent lifestyle. The deployment of SROs also increased the number of positive, non-confrontational contacts that juveniles had with the police. Such positive contacts have been found to improve opinions about the law enforcement community (Shuler-Ivey, 2012; Watkins & Maume, 2012). Regular contact with an SRO was found by Jennings et al. (2011) to reverse the negative views toward police held by most juveniles due to a better understanding of the law and the police's role in enforcing laws. These improved relationships benefited both the police and students. Students became more trusting of the police and more willing to utilize the police as a helpful resource in times of need or crisis. The police benefited because students became sources of intelligence about their peers' delinquent behavior, which allowed the police to engage in more proactive and preventative activities (Lamont et al., 2011). In addition, Lamont et al. (2011) found that the presence of an SRO resulted in increased accessibility and improved relationships between the police, school staff, and students, which led to better attendance rates and improved academic achievement.

A common intangible result of SRO programs was an increased sense of safety among students and faculty members. Having an SRO assigned to their school reassured teachers that a police officer would already be present in the event that a mass shooting incident were to occur at their workplace (Watkins & Maume, 2012). This was important because research has found that feelings of unsafety were a key factor in low teacher morale and high staff turnover (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018). Student evaluations of SROs found that students considered their SROs to be polite, treated students fairly, helped to keep their schools safe, and increased students' feelings of safety through their presence. 69% of students stated that their SRO's presence made them feel safer at school, especially by mitigating the impact of gang activity (Brown & Benedict, 2005). Theriot (2009) found that an SRO's presence led to an increased feeling of safety which caused students to feel better about school generally, feel more connected to their school, and have a more positive opinion about their school environment, leading to decreased aggression and fewer physical altercations among students. Theriot and Cuellar (2016) stated that these factors, especially school connectedness, were crucial for preventing school-based violence. 73% of surveyed students stated that the presence of an SRO caused them to be less concerned about bullying, thefts, violence, and intruders while at school (Lamont et al., 2011). Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) found that, from 1995 to 2015, a period during which the popularity of SRO programs increased significantly, the percentage of students who reported being afraid of being physically attacked while at school decreased from 12% to 3%, including decreases across all races, genders, and grade levels.

Data Unsupportive of School Resource Officer Programs

Not all research has been supportive of the value of SRO programs. Some studies have resulted in negative findings or mixed results. One argument against the increased deployment of SRO programs was that their necessity was not supported by school crime statistics. Maskaly et al. (2011) stated that there was limited empirical evidence indicating that SROs were effective at improving campus safety or reducing school crime. Most studies on SROs focused on stakeholder satisfaction with SRO programs as opposed to objectively determining whether SROs actually reduced school crime rates (Merkwae, 2015). According

to Bracey et al. (2013), school violence in the United States was currently at its lowest level since the early 1990s, thus contradicting the need to increase the number of SROs. May et al. (2004), asserted that the types of offenses with which SROs were credited with reducing were already on the decline prior to the popularity of SRO programs, so SROs' impact on those offenses was negligible. Instead, the growth of SRO programs was driven primarily by a questionable perception that school violence was increasing in the 1990's, causing parents and school administrators to demand additional protection (May & Higgins, 2011). Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) opined that this perception was often based on the large amount of attention given to isolated incidents of mass violence, which complicated efforts to accurately determine the scope and nature of school crime.

Some research has asserted that the presence of an SRO may actually make a school less safe. According to Schlosser (2014), schools with a regular police presence were 18% more likely to experience a violent incident and 13% more likely to experience a serious violent incident than schools without a regular police presence. Swartz et al. (2016) stated that schools with a regular police presence reported more violent crimes, more drug offenses, and more incidents involving weapons possession than schools without a regular police presence. The authors added that schools with SROs had double the rate of assaults when compared to schools without SROs and that SROs facilitated more efficient reporting of school crime, but were ineffective at reducing or preventing crimes on school campuses.

The manner in which SROs' time was allocated was also questioned. At schools with SROs, the SROs' perceptions of their involvement in activities covered by all three prongs of NASRO's Triad was almost always higher than administrators' perceptions of SROs' involvement (Coon & Travis, 2012). Other administrators complained that their SROs spent too much time away from school for other police duties to be effective (May et al., 2004). SROs also placed a higher value on their involvement in teaching and counseling activities than school staff members while educators placed more value on SROs' involvement in law enforcement matters and did not endorse the Triad model as a good framework to conceptualize SROs' roles (Denham et al., 2016). In addition, Brown and Benedict (2005) found that SROs failed to

deter school crime because students' opinions about the consequences of offending or the likelihood of being caught were unchanged by the assignment of an SRO to their school. This was especially true of students who had been the victims of a violent crime while at school or had observed other students using drugs on school property. Students who reported having previously been in trouble with the police (Merkwae, 2015) or had a negative interaction with their SRO (Shuler-Ivey, 2012) also expressed negative opinions about SROs at higher rates than other students. Jennings et al. (2011) and Maskaly et al. (2011) also stated that SROs failed to impact students' opinions about delinquent behavior and added that SROs were ineffective at reducing students' fear of crime or victimization while at school.

Another argument was that the lack of clearly defined roles for SROs and goals for SRO programs made their implementation haphazard. Unlike the United Kingdom, where SRO program goals have been established through legislation, SRO programs in the United States suffered from a lack of such clarity, which had a side-effect of hindering innovation by individual SROs (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). Unclear SRO role definitions caused confusion, concerns about SRO autonomy, and either a lack of accountability or excessive restrictions on SROs' actions (Lamont et al., 2011). This lack of role clarity led to distrust between SROs and school administrators, causing administrators to not fully utilize SROs as a resource in the day-to-day operation of the school. Educators were also concerned that SROs represented an additional authority figure whose imposing presence hindered the environment of openness desired on school campuses (Coon & Travis, 2012). Denham et al. (2016) concurred by stating that "external agents of law enforcement would experience a cultural clash when confronted with the humanistic, open, and informal public school settings" (p. 6). Swartz et al. (2016) described SROs as superfluous, symbolic figures whose authority was redundant to that of teachers and administrators.

Other research has found that contact with SROs does not actually improve youths' opinions about the police. Instead, students tended to differentiate between SROs and other police officers. Students often viewed SROs positively; however, they equated SROs as similar to school administrators such as deans or principals. As a result, youths' positive opinions about SROs did not carry over to the remainder of the

police force, whom they continued to view as oppressive and overly authoritative (Brown & Benedict, 2005; Lamont et al., 2011; Watkins & Maume, 2012). Some students also complained that their SROs were overly authoritative, aggressive, and often treated students like criminals (Myrstol, 2011). Other students only viewed SROs as police officers in a traditional law enforcement role and not as teachers or counselors (Shuler-Ivey, 2012). Theriot and Cuellar (2016) reported that some students complained that their SROs were rarely visible, that they did not understand why their school had an SRO, that they did not support the adding of more SROs to their schools, and that some SROs caused additional anxiety and misbehavior through their aggressive demeanor. Employing excessively strict measures has been shown to cause an adversarial relationship between students and school authority figures and led to disruptions to education (Theriot, 2009). Price (2009) stated that a consistent police presence in students' lives had been shown to lower their respect for the police.

Parental opinions about SRO programs were also not unanimously positive. Myrstol (2011) found that adults' confidence in SROs' abilities to improve school safety, reduce delinquent behavior, enhance police-community relations, and enhance overall quality of life in the larger school community was mixed and that confidence was markedly lower in disadvantaged communities. School administrators also expressed concerns about the presence of SROs in their schools. Watkins and Maume (2012) stated that some administrators were concerned that having a police officer in the building could undermine their disciplinary authority, give students the incorrect impression that the SRO had the final say on disciplinary matters, and cause students to become unresponsive to other school authority figures.

Researchers were also concerned about a lack of data to support the continued, or increased, use of SROs in American schools. Most SRO programs were implemented without any plan for evaluation or even a process for collecting data which would make a useful evaluation possible (Myrstol, 2011). Merkwae (2015) also stated that law enforcement agencies rarely collected data about SROs' activities and Swartz et al. (2016) added that there was minimal data available showing how SROs performed their duties on a day-to-day basis. SRO programs were rarely evaluated (Coon & Travis, 2012; May et al., 2011) and,

when they were, they were evaluated using standard law enforcement measures such as citations and arrests instead of SRO-based measures such as interventions or preventative actions (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). There was also a lack of data showing that SROs were effective at reducing school crime (Maskaly et al., 2011), improving students' and staff members' feelings of safety while at school (May et al., 2004), or positively altering student behavior (Myrstol, 2011). Data assessing SROs' teaching and counseling functions was almost nonexistent (Robles-Piña & Denham, 2012). Quantifying the many intangible things that occupied an SRO's workday was considered to be difficult (Lamont et al., 2011) due to the complex nature of the SRO function (Merkwae, 2015). Furthermore, the perception of imminent danger at American schools – an oft-cited reason for increasing the number of SROs - may not be supported by school crime data. According to Jennings (2011), a student's chance of being murdered at school was 1 in 2,000,000, representing less than 1% of homicides in which school-aged children were victims. In addition, almost two-thirds of violent crimes against middle- and high-school students and nearly half of all crimes against middle- and high-school students occurred away from school.

THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE

Defining the School-to-Prison Pipeline

In order to understand the school-to-prison pipeline and the potential impacts of SRO programs, it was necessary to define the school-to-prison pipeline and understand the history behind school-to-prison pipeline research. The school-to-prison pipeline was a problem created by the combination of zero-tolerance disciplinary policies, increased school security measures through physical changes to school structures and the use of surveillance technologies, and the prevalence of police-school partnerships including the increased presence of armed police officers at American schools (Burton, 2017). These elements combined to cause acts of student misconduct which previously resulted only in school consequences to also result in students being referred to law enforcement for punishment via the juvenile justice system. This trend was commonly referred to as the criminalization of student misconduct (Denham

et al., 2016). The criminalization of student misbehavior has resulted in numerous students, especially poor, disabled, and minority students, being referred to the juvenile justice system for school-based incidents, resulting in a school-to-prison pipeline (Merkwae, 2015). Theriot (2009) stated that studies regarding the school-to-prison pipeline had consistently shown that poverty was a significant predictor of exclusionary discipline practices and that poor and minority juveniles were referred to the juvenile justice system at higher rates than their White peers.

Initiatives to place more SROs in American schools were often blamed for the increased criminalization of student misconduct. This has occurred even though SRO programs were never intended to be used as a part of the normal school disciplinary process and despite the well-documented negative consequences associated with a juvenile criminal record (Denham et al., 2016). According to Theriot and Cuellar (2016), “as SROs become more prevalent at schools, discipline problems traditionally handled by school principals and teachers now are more likely to be handled by SROs with law enforcement interventions” (p. 369). For example, fights between students were turned into incidents of assault and classroom disruptions were translated into disorderly conducts (Theriot, 2009). Swartz et al. (2016) referred to this as a net-widening effect in which the placement of SROs in schools had created a direct link between school discipline and the juvenile justice system and led to an increase in school arrests. Theriot and Cuellar (2016) connected the growth in the number of SROs to the increased use of punitive school discipline practices and added that the presence of an SRO in a school inhibited educators’ ability to use discretion in disciplinary matters. This fostered an environment dominated by formal responses even in cases where there was no threat to school, staff, or student safety. School-to-prison pipeline research often supported the discontinuation of SRO programs and the removal of any regular police presence from school environments. Instead, according to Lamont et al. (2011), it suggested that funding currently directed toward SRO programs should be directed toward restorative justice programs to avoid criminalizing student misbehavior.

School-to-prison pipeline research has traced the history of the school-to-prison pipeline as far back as the first police-school partnerships. The educational system was always an agent of social control, but it accomplished that goal utilizing less punitive measures than those associated with policing (Burton, 2017). Today, the social control methods employed in schools were similar to those used in correctional settings (Merkwae, 2015) and were based primarily on theories of deterrence and incapacitation (Swartz et al., 2016). Instead of education being schools' primary goal, Price (2009) asserted that the education system had prioritized keeping students under control, especially those considered to be dangerous. According to Burton (2017), beginning with the Coordinating Councils in the Berkeley School District in the 1920s, public schools became avenues for delinquent students to be referred to law enforcement for school-based incidents. The main function of the Coordinating Councils was to rehabilitate delinquents, but as the 20th century progressed, juvenile delinquents have increasingly been treated like future criminals in need of punishment.

The broken windows model of policing, which became popular in the 1980s, contributed to the increased use of law enforcement and zero tolerance policies to address student misbehavior. As educators prioritized combating minor disciplinary matters in an effort to prevent more serious problems in the future, schools adopted stricter student discipline policies, incorporated the use of additional security technologies such as cameras and metal detectors, and increased the number of sworn law enforcement personnel assigned to schools (Coon & Travis, 2012). The 1980s were also a decade when school crime and illicit drug use was high and teacher morale was low, causing school systems to react with strategies intended to show that they would not tolerate student misconduct (Price, 2009). This continued into the 1990s as the get-tough-on-crime philosophy of the preceding decade became codified through three strikes laws and mandatory minimum sentences. Subsequently, the same types of policies and practices trickled down into school discipline codes (Schlosser, 2014). Watkins and Maume (2012) stated that the first academic study regarding possible negative impacts of police-school partnerships was published in the early 1970s, but the term school-to-prison pipeline was not coined until much later.

School-to-prison pipeline research cited a variety of statistics to demonstrate that the presence of SROs had led to the increased criminalization of student misconduct, especially for minor, non-violent offenses. Most of these statistics illustrated that the number of school-based arrests increased at roughly the same time as the number SROs also increased. This was based upon practical reasoning indicating that an increased police presence at schools led to increased police awareness of incidents occurring on school campuses and, consequently, an increase in police responses to those incidents (Theriot, 2009). Denham et al. (2016) cited statistics from three different states. In South Carolina, the most common offenses charged in juvenile court referrals were Disorderly Conduct, Class Disruption, and Misconduct during the 2007-2008 school year; in Colorado, juvenile court referrals for Misconduct increased 71% from 2000 to 2004; and in Texas, Disorderly Conduct was the most common charge listed on juvenile citations or delinquency petitions during the 2006-2007 school year. In the 1996-1997 school year, 61 of the 158 arrests made at a single Chicago high school were for pager possession and 21 other arrests resulted only in Disorderly Conduct charges (Theriot, 2009). Merkwae (2015) referred to statistics from three different locations in an effort to demonstrate the existence of a school-to-prison pipeline. In Chicago, school arrests increased from 7,851 to 8,539 between 2001 and 2003; in a Georgia county, juvenile court referrals for school-based incidents increased from 46 in 1996 to 1,147 in 2003; and in Denver, referrals to the police for incidents that occurred in the city's schools rose from 818 in 2000 to 1,401 in 2004. Theriot and Cuellar (2016) discussed information from two studies. In Miami-Dade County, school arrests tripled from 1999 to 2001 and in an Ohio county, school arrests increased by almost 500 from 2000 to 2002. However, none of the above-cited authors provided information showing that those jurisdictions started new SRO programs or increased the number of SROs during the time periods referenced.

The Role of Zero Tolerance Disciplinary Policies

One factor pointed to by school-to-prison pipeline research was the increased implementation of zero tolerance discipline policies and the negative consequences associated with their application. Under zero tolerance disciplinary policies, school administrators were often required to exact harsh punishments

against students who engaged in certain violations of school rules. In many cases, zero tolerance policies mandated the use of exclusionary discipline such as suspensions or expulsions. Administrators had little or no discretion under zero tolerance policies regardless of the circumstances surrounding the rule violation. Zero tolerance policies provided just one example of harsh discipline practices introduced by schools during the past few decades in an effort to better control students. Merkwae (2015) defined a zero tolerance policy as one “mandat[ing] the application of predetermined consequences, most often severe and punitive in nature, that are intended to be applied regardless of the gravity of the behavior, mitigating circumstances, or situational context” (pp. 153-4). The first zero tolerance policies were implemented in California, New York, and Kentucky in 1989 and became nearly universal nationwide within 4 years (Price, 2009). Similar to the increased deployment of SROs, the increased use of exclusionary discipline was also related to the Gun Free Schools Act of 1994. Zero tolerance policies were originally intended to be applied only to rule violations involving illicit drugs, weapons, fighting, or gangs (Price, 2009). However, they were quickly expanded to include non-violent infractions related to theft, dress codes, vandalism (Merkwae, 2015), tobacco use, alcohol consumption, verbal threats, profanity (Price, 2009), or any disruptive behavior demonstrating a potential for violence (Schlosser, 2014). Watkins and Maume (2012) and Theriot and Cuellar (2016) posited that a factor in the increased popularity of zero tolerance policies was federal education laws which placed a strong emphasis on the results of standardized testing and graduation rates. The authors asserted that zero tolerance policies provided school administrators with an expedited avenue to expel students who were likely to perform poorly on such tests or fail to graduate.

If the purpose of zero tolerance policies was to increase the number of students excluded from school attendance for violating school rules, then they were rather successful. As a result of zero tolerance policies, over 3 million students were suspended and over 106,000 students were expelled in the United States in 2004, which was double the number of suspensions and expulsions issued in the 1970s (Price, 2009; Schlosser, 2014). During the 1998-1999 school year, Black children represented only 17% of total national enrollment, but 32% of total suspensions (Schlosser, 2014). Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) stated that,

in the 2015-2016 school year, over 31,000 schools in the United States issued at least one suspension lasting 5 days or more, constituting 72% of all serious disciplinary actions taken during that school year. The authors added that 78% of high schools, 61% of middle schools, and 18% of elementary schools took at least one serious disciplinary action during the 2015-2016 school year.

These policies were widely utilized despite well-documented negative consequences related to exclusionary discipline. Examples of these negative consequences included poor academic performance, stunted social and emotional development (Bracey et al., 2013), and an increased risk of dropout or delinquency, marginalization, alienation (Denham et al., 2016), and incarceration (Swartz et al., 2016). Studies have shown that poor, minority, and disabled students were subjected to exclusionary discipline under zero tolerance policies more often than their White peers. For example, Black students were suspended at a rate triple that of White students and disabled students were suspended at rates double that of non-disabled students (Merkwae, 2015). Schlosser (2014) added that homeless students, those in foster care, and those with learning disabilities were the most likely to receive harsh discipline. Burton (2017) cited zero tolerance policies as an example of the increasingly punitive and controlling nature of American education.

Zero tolerance policies have been of questionable effectiveness in halting the types of school rule violations that they were intended to combat, such as student drug use. According to Price (2009), youth drug use was declining before zero tolerance policies were implemented, but has alternately either remained steady or even increased since zero tolerance policies became popular. Instead of zero tolerance policies, research has suggested utilizing restorative justice programs, delinquency prevention programs, and assessment-based interventions (Denham et al., 2016). When discussing the school-to-prison pipeline, researchers often tried to draw a connection between the negative impact of zero tolerance policies and the presence of SROs in schools. However, Canady et al. (2012) noted that zero tolerance policies required certain penalties for certain rule violations regardless of who investigated the incident, so the involvement of an SRO had no bearing on the implementation of zero tolerance discipline.

The Role of School Resource Officers

A second factor in the school-to-prison pipeline was the increased law enforcement involvement in daily school operations associated with the popularity of SRO programs. One common belief among school-to-prison pipeline researchers was that SROs played a crucial role in facilitating the increased number of students being referred to the juvenile justice system for school-based incidents. Summarizing this assertion, Canady et al. (2012) wrote, “the SRO has been impugned for being ill-suited to the education environment, a source of confusion and intimidation on campus, and responsible for an increase in the number of referrals from schools to the juvenile justice system” (p. 11). They added that SROs were easy to blame for the school-to-prison pipeline because they were highly visible and actively involved in investigating incidents of student misconduct. Price (2009) stated that the intentions behind SRO programs were admirable, but that the practical result was to eliminate barriers which previously separated school discipline from the juvenile justice system. Schlosser (2014) noted that, despite the unique nature of their assignment, SROs retained the same authority and discretion as patrol officers and were free to arrest students for any criminal violation without seeking permission or guidance.

While studies regarding SROs’ effectiveness at reducing school-based crimes have achieved mixed results, many studies have shown that the involvement of an SRO increased the likeliness of a student being formally referred to law enforcement. In 2012 alone, 260,000 American students were referred to law enforcement for school-based incidents, resulting in 92,000 student arrests (Merkwae, 2015). Coon and Travis (2012) found that schools with SROs experienced more frequent law enforcement involvement than those without SROs. As SROs became more involved in day-to-day school operations, the likelihood of incidents being resolved through intervention by law enforcement, and related criminal charges, had increased (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). Theriot (2009) found that the presence of an SRO resulted in a 197.7% increase in arrest rates per 100 students, a 122.1% increase in arrests on any charge, and a 402.3% increase in arrests for Disorderly Conduct prior to controlling for economic disadvantage. Even after controlling for school-level poverty, student arrests for Disorderly Conduct at schools with SROs still increased by

122.1%. Bracey et al. (2013) stated that the increase in school-based arrests was not caused by worsening student misconduct, but by how adults, including SROs, were reacting to student misbehavior and that juvenile court referrals had wrongly become a default response to students' behavioral issues. Adding to criminalization concerns, Small (2014) wrote that the increased deployment of SROs had caused school safety concerns to take priority over students' rights. As a hybrid police officer/school official, SROs were often free to conduct searches and interviews under less rigorous standards than other law enforcement personnel, making it easier for SROs to justify criminal charges against students (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). SROs often overstepped their intended roles and involved themselves unnecessarily in school matters beyond their expertise as a result of a lack of consensus between law enforcement and educators about SROs' exact roles and purposes (Coon & Travis, 2012). Denham et al. (2016) wrote that, even though SROs were never intended to be school disciplinarians, the presence of an SRO caused educators to become reliant on the police to handle problems that they previously handled informally.

Consequently, many school districts came to recognize SROs as quasi-employees of the school district by granting them full disciplinary authority, which encouraged SROs to criminalize student misbehavior and led to the school-to-prison pipeline. While such a designation might be legally allowable, SROs should only take the lead on disciplinary matters in which they were better trained than school administrators (Small, 2014). An SRO's decisions about how to address student misbehavior were often based on conscious or unconscious biases and had long-term effects ranging from a verbal warning, to exclusionary discipline, to criminal charges (Merkwae, 2015). May et al (2011) and Theriot (2009) stated that inserting SROs into schools intuitively led to the criminalization of certain student behaviors that should have been handled informally. Denham et al. (2016) posited that this was because SROs had a professional predisposition to translate student misbehavior into criminal activity and reacted with enforcement instead of education. SROs were prone to employing a more punitive response than the minor offenses which occupied most of their time required, pushing students into the juvenile justice system unnecessarily (Lamont et al., 2011). Price (2009) asserted that SROs were pressured to justify their

positions through measurable acts, leading them to criminalize student misconduct in order to generate arrest statistics to show their supervisors. Merkwae (2015) reported that one study found that SROs' arrest decisions were based primarily on the nature of a student's violation, but were also discretionary and rarely considered the long-term impacts of the arrest on the arrestee's future. 68% of SROs stated that they had arrested a student to teach them that actions had consequences; 77% had made an arrest in an effort to calm the student down; and 55% had made an arrest solely because a staff member requested that the student be arrested.

Improper implementation of SRO programs may also be responsible for a connection between SROs and the school-to-prison pipeline. Myrstol (2011) found that citizens were often concerned about the negative consequences of SRO programs on police-community relations and community quality of life. A report by the City of Chicago's Office of the Inspector General found that the Chicago Police Department's "lack of guidance and structure for SROs amplifies community concerns and underscores the high probability that students are unnecessarily becoming involved in the criminal justice system, despite the availability of alternate solutions" (Lipari, 2018, p. 2). Before implementing SRO programs, little consideration was given to concerns that an SROs' actions could facilitate a division between students and the police or undermine the authority of school officials (Myrstol, 2011). According to Canady et al. (2012), many school-to-prison pipeline researchers have supported education policy changes in which SROs were removed from schools and school administrators only contacted the police for serious offenses.

The Role of Increased Security Measures

The third element of the school-to-prison pipeline was the increased use of security technologies and practices on school campuses. While this element had received less research attention than SROs and zero tolerance policies, it was still often cited in school-to-prison pipeline research. Enhanced security measures included security cameras inside and outside of school buildings, limited ingress and egress to schools through locked doors, requiring students and staff members to wear identification badges, metal

detector screenings, dress codes or school uniforms, policies requiring clear-sided backpacks, random searches of students' possessions and lockers, sweeps by police canine units, and the employment of non-sworn security guards. Theriot (2009) described many schools as prison-like settings based on a proliferation of secured doors, metal detectors, security cameras, and armed authority figures. According to Myrstol (2011), enhanced security measures were initially used only at schools in high-crime, urban neighborhoods, but these security measures have spread rapidly to suburban and rural schools.

The process of target hardening became a trend at school campuses over the past two decades, primarily in response to mass school shooting incidents. 90% of schools surveyed by Jennings et al. (2011) used security cameras, 82% had a closed-circuit surveillance system, 50% had security guards, 60% had student dress codes, 30% conducted random backpack or locker searches, and 23% utilized metal detectors. Data reported by Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) from the 2015-2016 school year showed that enhanced security measures were most prevalent at schools with enrollments over 1,000 students. Of all public schools in the United States, over 99% of middle and high school students reported seeing at least one security measure in use at their school, 81% of schools had security cameras, 94% of schools controlled access to school buildings, 96% required visitors to sign in/out during the school day, 68% required students and staff members to wear ID badges, 53% enforced a dress code, 25% conducted sweeps by police canine units, 78% kept exterior doors locked or monitored during the school day, 12% had metal detectors, and 70% had either security guards or SROs.

This has occurred despite hesitation among educators that the utilization of enhanced security measures could negatively affect school climate. Theriot (2009) stated that increased security measures had caused schools to have a prison-like atmosphere and multiple authors (Merkwae ,2015; Shuler-Ivey, 2012; Theriot & Cuellar, 2016) added that enhanced security was especially prevalent at schools with high minority populations. Research has found mixed results about the effectiveness of enhanced security measures (Theriot, 2009) and Price (2009) added that, out of all the above-mentioned security measures, the only one empirically proven to be effective was the implementation of school uniforms. In contrast,

studies of New York City’s public schools, which spent over \$28 million to install metal detectors, found that they intercepted over 2,000 weapons in 2001 and were effective at reducing both the number of weapons in schools and students’ fear of violence while at school (Jennings et al., 2011). Canady et al. (2012) supported the focused use of surveillance technologies because they enhanced safety by facilitating the observation and documentation of incidents, especially in difficult-to-monitor areas like hallways, cafeterias, and parking lots.

Adverse Impacts of the School-to-Prison Pipeline

The reason that much attention was paid to the school-to-prison pipeline was because the combination of increased SRO deployment, enhanced security measures, and more punitive discipline policies was believed to have long-term negative consequences for students, especially for students who were poor, disabled, or minority. These consequences included the loss of educational rights, difficulty in gaining admission to college, denial of employment opportunities, eviction from public housing (Merkwae, 2015), poor academic performance (Schlosser, 2014), quitting school, future incarceration (Swartz et al., 2016), and other obstacles to a student’s future potential. Of special concern was that the school-to-prison pipeline negatively impacted students and families who were least-equipped to challenge harsh school discipline or law enforcement action and were ill-situated to weather the school-to-prison pipeline’s long-term consequences.

SRO programs were often considered responsible for many of the school-to-prison pipeline’s adverse impacts on poor, minority, and disabled students. Critics asserted that SRO programs had failed at their intended purposes, referred an excessive number of youths to the juvenile justice system, and created an environment of fear in American schools (Canady et al., 2012). Merkwae (2015) stated that minority and disabled students were subjected to a disproportionate number of school-based arrests as a result of an increased police presence in schools. After finding that schools with high minority populations were mostly likely to have SROs and enhanced security measures, Theriot and Cuellar (2016) wrote that “the

deployment of SROs or other school security personnel in school settings with a large percentage of minority students might condone the targeting of minority populations and lead to disproportionate arrest rates” (p. 371). Schools with high minority populations were reluctant to request an SRO due to perceptions in the community that the police were racist (Lamont et al., 2011). According to Bracey et al. (2013), about 65-70% of youth detained in juvenile correctional facilities had a mental health condition and Merkwae (2015) added that Black youth constituted 29% of juvenile court referrals, 27% of students referred to the police, and 31% of students arrested at schools despite only representing 16% of the total youth population. Statistics from Chicago’s public schools were more concerning because 75% of arrested students were Black during the 2011-2012 school year even though they only represented 42% of the city’s total enrollment. Regarding students with disabilities, they accounted for only 12% of the total American student population, but 25% of students referred to law enforcement or arrested. Furthermore, youth in juvenile correctional facilities were 4 times more likely to require special education services and, in some facilities, almost 100% of the detained juveniles had a diagnosed mental health issue (Merkwae, 2015).

However, SROs were not receptive to accounting for a student’s special education status in their decision-making process. 55% of SROs believed that special education students were responsible for a disproportionate amount of student misconduct; 79% of SROs disagreed with the idea that special education students should be treated differently than regular education students with regard to discipline; and almost 85% believed that special education students intentionally used their status to avoid accountability for misbehavior (Merkwae, 2015). Impoverished students were also impacted by the school-to-prison pipeline. Theriot (2009) found that schools in disadvantaged neighborhoods experienced an increase in the criminalization of student misbehavior and Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) reported that enhanced security measures were most common at schools where over three-quarters of the student population qualified for government subsidized school meals.

In addition, the implementation of zero tolerance policies caused the use of exclusionary discipline, such as suspensions and expulsions, to increase dramatically. In 1974, 1.7 million students were suspended,

representing 3.7% of students nationwide. As a result of zero tolerance policies, 3.2 million students, 6.8% of the national enrollment, were suspended in 1998 (Schlosser, 2014). Consistent with school-to-prison pipeline research, the increased use of exclusionary discipline adversely impacted poor, minority, and disabled students. Minority students, especially Black and Hispanic males, often received more severe school discipline than their White peers, even for the same offenses (Bracey et al., 2013). Black students were suspended at a rate triple that of their White peers and students with disabilities were twice as likely to be suspended when compared to their non-disabled classmates (Merkwae, 2015). The percentage of Black students who were suspended in the 1998-1999 school year was nearly double the percentage of Black students enrolled nationwide, but White students represented just 50% of suspensions despite constituting 63% of nationwide student enrollment (Schlosser, 2014). Theriot (2009) stated that poverty was a significant predictor of student suspensions and expulsions and that there was a clear connection between race and poverty in the United States. This led the author to conclude that exclusionary discipline which disproportionately impacted minorities also disproportionately impacted low socioeconomic status students.

Criticism of School-to-Prison Pipeline Research

While some authors asserted that the existence of a school-to-prison pipeline was undeniable and that the connection between SROs and the school-to-prison pipeline was clearly established, other researchers were skeptical. Authors such as Canady et al. (2012) and Theriot and Cuellar (2016) have criticized school-to-prison pipeline researchers' methodology. Denham et al. (2016) wrote that they were only able to locate one methodologically sound SRO/school-to-prison pipeline study and stated that study found that SROs did not criminalize student misbehavior and concluded that SROs had a positive impact on schools. Burton (2017) stated that any connection between the educational system and incarceration was indirect. Regarding SROs specifically, Denham et al. (2016) stated that "empirical support to the direct impact of SROs on the school-to-prison pipeline remains scant" (p. 9). Canady et al. (2012) stated that studies had failed to establish any clear relationship between SROs and increased student arrests, including

any racial disparity in student arrest rates, and that most arrests made by SROs were for serious offenses which would have resulted in an arrest even without an SRO being present. The authors added that claims about the school-to-prison pipeline confused policymaking and that efforts to remove SROs placed schools at an increased risk of liability from students and staff members when untrained educators attempted to address dangerous incidents instead of utilizing an SRO. Furthermore, attempts to connect SROs to a school-to-prison pipeline were considered superficial and demonstrated a fundamental misunderstanding of SRO programs and interagency partnerships.

In addition, confidentiality rules often limited researchers' ability to access to juvenile court records and determine an exact number of school arrests made by SROs as opposed to non-SROs. As a result, most articles purporting to connect SROs to the criminalization of student misconduct were based on speculation and anecdotal evidence (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). Anecdotal accounts were common in articles about the school-to-prison pipeline. For example, Price's (2009) article shared the story of a kindergartener who was handcuffed for a three-hour period following a temper tantrum; Merkwae's (2015) article began with 3 tales of elementary school students with mental health issues who were handcuffed or arrested for disruptive behaviors; and Theriot (2009) described incidents in which one student was arrested for a dress code violation and another for allegedly stealing \$3. While concerning, these stories were more indicative of poor discretion on the part of individual SROs and not necessarily evidence of a widespread endeavor to criminalize student misbehavior.

Regarding school arrests, Theriot (2009) found that school-to-prison pipeline studies often comingled data on school arrests without making an effort to separate which arrests were made by SROs and which were not, rarely focused on theories of criminalization, and concluded that SROs did not engage in discriminatory enforcement practices. The author's study showed that SROs did not discriminate against poor students and that SROs' arrest rates were actually lower at schools with higher percentages of economically disadvantaged students. Lastly, Swartz et al. (2016) questioned studies asserting that the presence of an SRO caused an increase in school-based violent crime. Instead, they postulated that SROs

merely facilitated more reporting of crimes on school campuses and that any increase represented a more accurate depiction of school-based crime.

The popularity of SRO programs has grown significantly in the past two decades. SROs enjoy broad support from school administrators, teachers, students, and parents and research has demonstrated that SROs can reduce school crime and student misconduct while strengthening police-community relations and improving opinions about the police by youth. Perhaps due to rushed efforts to implement SRO programs, implementation has occurred without giving proper consideration to how inserting law enforcement personnel into educational settings could negatively impact school climate, especially in the area of student discipline. As a result, research has suggested that SROs - in concert with zero tolerance discipline policies and enhanced school security measures - have created prison-like school atmospheres, facilitated the excessive use of exclusionary discipline practices, and permitted the criminalization of student misconduct. Referred to as the school-to-prison pipeline, this condition has been shown to have long-term negative consequences, especially for at-risk student populations such as economically disadvantaged, minority, and disabled youth.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Two criminological theories can be applied to SRO programs and the school-to-prison pipeline. Differential association theory can be applied to SRO programs because a primary objective of SRO programs is to build positive relationships with students. Through these relationships, SROs are able to transmit anti-crime information to students with the goal of tipping the balance against pro-crime information that students may be receiving from other sources. Labeling theory applies to the school-to-prison pipeline. Students who are suspended, expelled, or arrested for school-based incidents are often stigmatized and subjected to increased scrutiny by SROs, school administrators and staff members, and classmates. As a result, these students may feel that they have been irreparably labeled as delinquent and engage in behavior verifying that status.

Differential Association Theory

Regarding SRO programs, an applicable criminological theory describing how relationship-building between SROs and students can positively affect students' lives is differential association theory. SRO programs place police officers in schools on a daily basis to provide increased opportunities for police officers to interact with youths in an informal, non-confrontational manner. This is done not only with the intent of encouraging positive opinions of the police among juveniles, but also with the goal of having SROs establish positive relationships with students, especially those at a higher risk of delinquency, and act as mentors and role models for those students. Differential association theory applies to these SRO-student relationships because differential association theory draws a connection between personal relationships and criminal activity. According to Tibbetts and Hemmens (2015), differential association theory was developed in the 1930s by Edwin Sutherland, who proposed that criminal behavior was learned primarily through one's interactions with others. The basic idea of his theory was that an individual was more likely to engage in criminal activity if they associated with persons who exposed them to more information that was in favor of crime than opposed to crime. In contrast, if an individual associated with

persons who provided information that was predominantly anti-crime, they were less likely to engage in criminal behavior. While Sutherland focused primarily on an individual's intimate relationships, such as family members and close friends, differential association theory research has been expanded to include a broader scope of relationships. A positive relationship with an SRO, and the associated anti-crime information, can have the beneficial result of redirecting an at-risk student away from delinquency. The counseling prong of the Triad model provides bountiful opportunities for SROs to act as mentors and role models for students.

Research has supported the positive benefits of relationship-building between SROs and students. Schlosser (2014) described counseling, mentoring, and acting as a role model as some of the primary goals of SRO programs. Jennings et al. (2011) found that SROs provided an opportunity for students to communicate with an authority figure other than their parents, which reduced their likelihood of engaging in delinquent behavior. Through their daily presence at schools, SROs were accessible to students on a long-term basis. This provided opportunities for SROs to give advice to students, target programs to the specific needs of a school's students and families, and work with at-risk students over a period of several years instead of through a short-term initiative (Lamont et al., 2011). By acting as mentors and counselors, "SROs, by their environmental proximity and consistent, prolonged exposure to school populations, may contribute to protective mechanisms and resilience of youth... through fostering attachment relationships and providing structure and control" (Denham, et al., 2016, p. 11). This was important because many at-risk students lacked structure or stability in their home lives, so an SRO was in a position to fill some of that void. Many principals surveyed by May et al. (2004) indicated that the most positive impact of the SRO programs at their schools was either positive interactions between SROs and students or SROs' ability to act as positive role models for students. Similarly, Merkwae (2015) stated that almost 62% of school administrators reported that SROs engaged in mentoring activities with students and Musu-Gillette et al. (2018) reported that 59% of American middle schools indicated that SRO-student mentoring was a common

activity. By mentoring and acting as positive role models for at-risk students in an effort to reduce their future delinquency, SRO programs illustrated an application of differential association theory.

Labeling Theory

The criminological theory with the most obvious correlation to the school-to-prison pipeline is labeling theory. School-to-prison pipeline research is especially concerned with the long-term negative impacts of school arrests and exclusionary discipline practices on students as they progress into adulthood. Of special concern to school-to-prison pipeline researchers is that students who are arrested, suspended, or expelled will have difficulty later in life because of the stigma associated with those punishments. Such students may decide that society has labeled them as delinquent and subsequently engage in behavior which makes that label a self-fulfilling prophecy. According to Tibbetts and Hemmens (2015), labeling theory was based on work by George Mead and Charles Cooley in the 1930s. They proposed that individuals' self-identities were influenced greatly by how society categorized them. When an individual, especially a juvenile, finds themselves categorized as an offender, they tend to confirm that status by engaging in more frequent and more serious criminal activity. Consistent with school-to-prison pipeline research, studies regarding labeling theory have found that minorities and lower-class individuals were more likely to find themselves labeled as criminals than their White or more affluent peers. Applying labeling theory to the school-to-prison pipeline demonstrates how students who are defined as delinquent by SROs and school administrators become likely to identify with that label and continue to engage in misconduct despite any potential consequences.

Research has also supported the negative impacts associated with the elements of the school-to-prison pipeline on students. Theriot (2009) discussed labeling theory and stated that arresting students for minor offenses could create a delinquent where one previously did not exist. Apprehension about labeling students was one of the concerns that many school administrators had in common when discussing SRO programs (Coon & Travis, 2012). According to Theriot and Cuellar (2016), the stigma and humiliation that

students who were arrested at school faced from classmates and teachers often led to increased surveillance and scrutiny from school staff members and caused many arrested students to drop-out of school to avoid constant suspicion and harassment. Zero tolerance policies were criticized for being too punitive, failing to address the causes of student misbehavior, and leading to student marginalization and labeling (Denham et al., 2016). Theriot (2009) stated that discrepancies in student discipline could be attributed to cultural differences between educational systems dominated by the middle-class and students who resided in lower-class communities. Canady et al. (2012) acknowledged the negative impact of labeling students as delinquent and noted that properly-functioning SRO programs focused not only on remediating student misbehavior but also on protecting juveniles and changing their behavior for the better. By demonstrating how the stigma associated with school-based arrests and exclusionary discipline caused long-term negative consequences, school-to-prison pipeline research was an illustration of labeling theory.

Differential association theory posits that criminal behavior is learned through an individual's relationships with others. On a daily basis, SROs attempt to build constructive relationships with students on their assigned campuses. Labeling theory postulates that an individual's self-identity is greatly influenced by how society categorizes them. When powerful forces in a student's life - such as school authorities or the police - label them as an offender, a student may resign themselves to that status and engage in continued and escalating delinquent behavior. By examining differential association theory and labeling theory as they relate to SRO programs and the school-to-prison pipeline, it has been shown how a positive relationship with an SRO can be a preventative factor against delinquency and how the stigma associated with exclusionary discipline and school-based arrests can have long-term negative consequences for at-risk students.

SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER PROGRAMS

By exploring research about SRO programs and the school-to-prison pipeline, methods for improving SRO programs can be identified. Four such improvements are proposed here: implementing memoranda of understanding, improving the SRO selection process, training enhancements for SROs, and improved SRO evaluation procedures. These suggestions are supported by research and designed to bring SRO programs into compliance with best practices from the fields of education and law enforcement. The successful implementation of these suggestions may mediate concerns about SRO programs presented in school-to-prison pipeline research.

Implementing Memoranda of Understanding

As was discussed previously, role conflict is a common problem with SRO programs and often a cause of disagreements between SROs, school administrators, and school-to-prison pipeline researchers. For example, while some SROs are eager to engage in all aspects of school discipline and numerous school administrators often seek SROs' assistance with disciplinary matters, many school-to-prison pipeline researchers view this as an unacceptable invasion of law enforcement into rule violations which rarely pose a danger to school, student, or staff safety. In contrast, many other SROs believe that day-to-day school discipline is not a part of the SRO function and that SROs should only be involved in rule violations which also constitute violations of criminal statutes. In an effort to more clearly define SROs' roles and responsibilities, define what disciplinary situations they should and should not be involved with, and mitigate the risk of criminalizing student misbehavior, school districts and police departments have turned to memorandums of understanding. Also referred to as an intergovernmental agreement, a memorandum of understanding (MOU) establishes ground rules to govern the police-school relationship, outlines the duties and responsibilities of school administrators and SROs regarding school discipline, and clarifies areas of common disagreement between SROs, police agencies, school administrators, and education systems. Writing for the Illinois Association of School Boards, Small (2014) stated that MOUs should, at

minimum, delineate the goals, structure, mission, and procedures of SRO programs and may also address funding sources, proper locations for SROs' offices, recordkeeping responsibilities, and issues pertaining to the selection, training, and supervision of SROs.

MOUs have broad support from both the law enforcement and educational communities including NASRO, USDOE, and the US Department of Justice. NASRO describes MOUs as being essential to all SRO programs and as a type of hybrid insurance policy and policy document which provides consistency regardless of personnel changes, compliance with applicable statutes, a method for on-going program evaluations, and an overall sense of balance in the police-school partnership (Canady et al., 2012). USDOE (2017) stated that an MOU should be in-place prior to the placement of an SRO in any school, that all MOUs should be based on an approved framework, that a process for periodic review and updating of MOUs should be established, that MOUs should create a process to collect data to be used in the evaluation of SRO programs, and that MOUs should allow for school authorities to request the removal or reassignment of individual SROs. MOUs should be developed with input from the police, schools, and community to ensure that they provide SROs with guidelines allowing them to foster safe schools without violating students' rights (Lipari, 2018; USDOE; 2017). MOUs should also ensure that students' due process rights are ensured throughout any disciplinary or law enforcement process (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). Some states have mandated MOUs or similar agreements in legislation governing SRO programs within their jurisdictions (May et al., 2004; Merkwae, 2015; USDOE, 2017). In the 2015-2016 school year, 70% of high schools and 51% of middle and elementary schools with SRO programs had MOUs or similar agreements (Musu-Gillette et al., 2018). While the content of MOUs varies greatly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, several common elements are believed to be necessary for an MOU to be effective at addressing school-to-prison pipeline concerns without unnecessarily handcuffing SROs in the performance of their duties.

The first area of police-school relations that MOUs should attempt to address is student arrests for school-based incidents, especially for minor, non-violent offenses which pose little or limited danger to

school safety. By appropriately restraining SROs' arrest powers without stripping them away entirely, MOUs can mitigate some of the negative consequences associated with the school-to-prison pipeline. Some authors (Bracey et al., 2013; Theriot & Cuellar, 2016; USDOE, 2017) strongly suggested that arrest should be the option of last resort for school-based offenses. Instead, MOUs should encourage SROs and school administrators to develop in-school strategies and progressive disciplinary processes to address student misconduct and only turn to formal law enforcement intervention when all school- and community-based options have been exhausted and proven ineffective (Bracey et al., 2013). Theriot and Cuellar (2016) stated that trained educators were better prepared to address routine student misbehavior and that an SRO's authority should only override that of school officials when a criminal law has been violated or there is an immediate danger to school safety. Lipari (2018) suggested that school administrators should only request SRO involvement in emergency situations or when criminal activity has occurred. The author added that administrators should also consider a student's age, whether any injuries occurred, and the seriousness of the offense before contacting an SRO because, in some cases, an SRO might be required by police department policy to make an arrest. Small (2014) proposed that school administrators should be given limited supervisory authority over SROs in their schools to ensure that SROs do not take law enforcement action in situations better handled with school-based discipline. However, Lamont et al. (2011) cautioned against placing excessive restraints on SROs' arrest powers. They stated that SROs should be able to exercise the same discretion that they would utilize in other law enforcement duties with the added option of employing school-based restorative interventions as alternatives. Bracey et al. (2013) found that schools whose SRO programs included MOUs addressing alternatives to in-school arrests experienced a 50-59% decrease in student arrests and an 8% reduction in suspensions. Overall, a well-worded MOU can ensure that SROs can still perform their vital school safety and law enforcement duties while minimizing student arrests and avoiding the negative consequences associated with the criminalization of student misconduct proposed in school-to-prison pipeline research.

A second element of SRO programs that can be improved through the use of MOUs is an agreement on how SROs spend their time. MOUs can clarify how SROs are expected to divide their day-to-day activities between each of the three prongs of the Triad model. An MOU can ensure that SROs are not entirely consumed with law enforcement duties so that they can spend an adequate amount of time teaching and counseling while still allowing the flexibility to adapt when an unexpected incident occurs. MOUs' should establish clear protocols and expectations that have been collaboratively developed, but also include flexibility (Lamont et al., 2011). Denham et al. (2016) suggested that MOUs should specifically acknowledge the value of SROs' counseling role. A common complaint of school administrators was that SROs were often called-away for law enforcement duties which were not school-related, which limited their ability to be effective in the SRO function (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). MOUs can mitigate this concern by delineating what types of duties, such as court appearances or serious incidents, will cause the SRO to be absent from the schools while ensuring that they are not pulled from the schools to handle routine calls for service or relieve manpower shortages.

A third component of SRO programs that MOUs can better define and improve is SRO involvement in school disciplinary matters. School administrators will often seek SRO assistance in matters which constitute clear violations of a school's student code of conduct, but which do not violate any criminal statute. This is an area where MOUs can clarify how involved, if at all, SROs should be in such matters. As sworn law enforcement personnel, it would seem that their involvement should be very limited, but SROs are often considered by students and staff to be similar to school administrators, leading to expectations that they will actively enforce all school rules, not just those which also constitute criminal offenses. This is a common area of conflict because school administrators often became upset when they sought SROs' assistance in non-criminal disciplinary matters and SROs declined to get involved (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). A common reason that SROs declined to become involved in school discipline was a concern that a disciplinary matter would turn into an undesired arrest if the student became aggressive or otherwise responded inappropriately to the SRO's presence (Coon & Travis, 2012). Police Foundation

(2016) encouraged MOUs which moved SROs away from a rule enforcement role toward a role focused on acting as resources for students, parents, and staff members. Going a step further, Lipari (2018), Price (2009), and USDOE (2017) proposed a bright-line rule in which SROs would not be involved in routine school discipline matters in any way. NASRO suggested the following compromise position:

A best practice for discipline issues has emerged nationally over the past decade and has been endorsed by the courts: an SRO who observes a violation of the school code of conduct, preserves a safe and orderly environment by taking the student(s) to where school discipline can be determined solely by school officials. (Canady et al., 2012, p. 23)

In this manner, an SRO can help maintain a safe school where all rules are followed equally and retain student and staff respect by demonstrating that they are concerned with all forms of student misconduct without becoming directly involved in determining discipline in matters outside the scope of their expertise.

Improving School Resource Officer Selection Processes

Another area where SRO programs can be improved is the process for selecting SROs. In many cases, these processes are conducted internally by the SRO's employing law enforcement agency and without substantive input from the community or any personnel from the school or schools to which the SRO will be assigned, including the school administrators with whom the SRO will collaborate on a daily basis. This type of closed process may lead to the types of conflicts between SROs and school administrators that are common to many SRO programs. In addition, failing to utilize SRO-specific selection criteria may reduce the likelihood that the process will result in the selection of an SRO with the appropriate personality, attitude, and mentality required to work full-time in an educational environment. Inadequate SRO selection processes were identified by Briers and Dickmann (2009) as an obstacle to SRO program effectiveness. Three suggestions for improving SRO selection processes are: developing SRO-specific selection criteria, allowing school personnel to participate in selection processes, and obtaining input from the school community.

One way to improve SRO selection processes is to develop criteria to ensure that the right police officer is selected for this important position. Working as an SRO is unique within the law enforcement profession. Instead of having a geographical area as one's beat, an SRO's beat consists of one or more school campuses. Instead of collaborating with other law enforcement personnel, SROs must work in concert with educators and adjust their demeanor and decision-making to an educational environment. Isolation from other police officers was identified as a common complaint from many SROs (Briers & Dickmann, 2009; Lamont et al., 2011). Police supervisors were also concerned about isolation because, in their opinions, some SROs spent so much time in school settings that their perspective became unbalanced and they began to react more as an educator instead of as a police officer (Lamont et al., 2011). SROs must enjoy working and interacting with juveniles on a daily basis and must be able to work autonomously because police agencies depend on SROs to address school-related issues and incidents with minimal support or assistance. Coon and Travis (2012) stated that SRO selection was an area of importance because not all police officers were well-suited for the position. Traits believed to be essential for a good SRO were identified as a desire to work with youth, an ability to adapt to working in an educational setting, good communication skills (Coon & Travis, 2012), openness, honesty, a proactive mentality, a demonstrated ability to interact appropriately with juveniles (Lamont et al., 2011), a willingness to work cooperatively with school administrators, specialized SRO training, and a professional appearance (May et al., 2004). Other desirable attributes for SROs were prior experience working with youth such as coaching or mentoring, a positive attitude, an ability to work autonomously, a willingness to develop partnerships with all parts of the school community, knowledge of local social service resources, an understanding of child development and psychology, and competency in the areas of crime prevention strategies and technologies (Police Foundation, 2016). It may be unlikely that any one officer will possess all of these characteristics, but this list can be used as a foundation for the creation of SRO-specific selection criteria and standards to ensure that officers who are well-suited to the position are assigned to work in schools.

Second, school personnel should be given an opportunity to actively participate and provide input into the selection of SROs. It is unlikely that a law enforcement agency would allow an outside entity to place an individual into their workplace without having any input, yet this is what many police organizations do when selecting and assigning SROs. At minimum, the school administrators with whom the SRO will collaborate on a daily basis should be allowed to partake in the selection process. Theriot and Cuellar (2016) suggested that school administrators be included in all steps of the recruitment and selection of SROs at their schools. According to Coon and Travis (2012), participation by school administrators reduced the likelihood of conflicts and increased the chances that the SRO-administrator partnership would be successful. Allowing school-level personnel to have input increased the likelihood that the SRO would be compatible with a school's staff, students, and mission (Lamont et al., 2011). School administrators also provided context for SRO selection processes because of their intimate knowledge of the school, its students, and its families (Police Foundation, 2016). Although their employers may be different, SROs and school staff members share the same workplace and essentially become co-workers. This is especially true in the case of the SRO-administrator partnership. To ensure that this partnership is effective and conflict-free, school administrators- and possibly other school personnel - should be involved in SRO selection processes.

In addition to school personnel, obtaining input from the wider school community should also be part of SRO selection processes. Parents send their children to school each day expecting that they will be educated, nurtured, and kept safe. Through the Triad model, SROs play an integral role in each of these areas, but especially in the area of student safety. Because student safety is of paramount concern to SROs, parents and other concerned stakeholders from the community should be allowed to partake in SRO selection processes. Examples of stakeholders included students, parents, other community members, and experts in youth development (Lipari, 2018). Involving members of the community increased transparency, built trust, and encouraged community support of SRO programs (Police Foundation, 2016). Outside input will also provide an element of oversight for SRO selection processes. Some individual officers apply for

SRO positions solely because they desire the more normal work schedule associated with the position or because they want a break from traditional police work. In addition, some departments used SRO positions as a sort of dumping ground for officers in their final years before retirement (May & Higgins, 2011). The job of an SRO requires an officer who is willing to be active and engaged with students and staff members every school day. Community input and oversight can help safeguard against the selection of SROs based on dubious motivations.

Summarizing the importance of having a good SRO selection process, Coon and Travis (2012) wrote, “school resource officers may become invaluable to the larger school community, but this seems most likely when the officer and school are well matched...and there is both input and support from a wide variety of sources” (p. 28). Developing an SRO selection process which includes SRO-specific selection criteria, allows for input from all stakeholders in the school community, and encourages active participation and input from school personnel – especially administrators – will help police agencies ensure that their SRO programs will be successful police-school partnerships and reduce the likelihood of assigning an SRO whose approach to the position could contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline.

Training Enhancements for School Resource Officers

Another area where SRO programs can be improved is training. SRO training ranges from well-organized courses offered by NASRO and similar organizations to piecemeal on-the-job training provided to new SROs by experienced SROs. Some states mandate that SROs receive certain training prior to beginning their assignment or within a period of being appointed, but others have no training requirements. Working as a law enforcement officer in an educational setting is a unique experience that is not covered by traditional police training courses. Girouard (2001) wrote, “the SRO’s multifaceted role—as law enforcement officer, counselor, teacher, and liaison between law enforcement, schools, families, and the community—requires training beyond that traditionally offered in police academies” (p. 1). To ensure that SROs understand and can perform their myriad roles effectively, they should receive comprehensive

training on topics germane to the SRO function. Comprehensive training is essential to protecting students' rights and is vital to successful SRO program implementation (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). Several authors (Briers & Dickmann, 2009; Denham et al., 2016; Lamont et al., 2011; Merkwae, 2015; Robles-Piña & Denham, 2012) identified a lack of comprehensive, standardized SRO training as a weakness in the implementation of SRO programs in the United States. It was also noted that, while police agencies were readily willing to provide specialized training for other positions within their organizations, SRO positions failed to receive the same respect or attention (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). The importance of SRO training should not be discounted because May et al. (2004) found that school administrators ranked specialized training as the second-most important trait of a good SRO. A primary obstacle to SRO training is funding for SROs to attend training courses. When funds for SRO training are cut, SROs are forced to rely on their background of traditional law enforcement training, making the success of the SRO program dependent on individual officers' personalities and level of experience (May et al., 2011). Regardless of these challenges, it is important for SROs to be properly trained for their positions and that SRO training be both continuous and developed collaboratively.

To be properly prepared for their jobs, SROs should be trained in a number of areas which are specific to the SRO function and untypical of most law enforcement work. As experienced police officers, SROs are likely already trained in some school-related areas, such as responding to active shooter incidents, crisis intervention, and appropriate reporting of sexual- and child-abuse cases. While understanding that no training course can be all-inclusive, SRO training should cover as many youth- and school-related topics as possible. Training for SROs should cover topics including: youth development and psychology, working with youth, building relationships and partnerships with educators (Briers & Dickmann, 2009), the distinct nature of educational settings, identifying students' needs, balancing the priorities of safety and education (Canady et al., 2012), classroom instruction (Coon & Travis, 2012), diversionary options such as restorative justice practices, students' rights, issues regarding disabled and special education students, de-escalation techniques, bias-free policing (Lipari, 2018), anti-bullying interventions, school districts' policies and

student codes of conduct (Robles-Piña & Denham, 2012), cultural competence, and community-based resources (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). Merkwae (2015) stated that concerns pertaining to disabled and special education students should be emphasized in SRO training courses because their behaviors could be caused by their conditions, they were more susceptible to SROs' authority, and because they were entitled to special protections under federal education laws. By providing comprehensive training to SROs, police departments can increase the effectiveness of their SRO programs and reduce the possibility that an SRO will contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline.

Similar to SRO selection processes, the development of training curricula for SROs should also be conducted collaboratively with input from a variety of stakeholders. In Florida, where the first week-long SRO training course was developed in 1985, the curriculum was established with input from the Florida Association of SROs, Department of Education, Department of Law Enforcement, and Attorney General's Office with the intent of providing SROs with the baseline skills needed to work in school settings (Canady et al., 2012). Coon and Travis (2012) advocated for the inclusion of school administrators in the development of SRO training courses because doing so gave them a better understanding of what training SROs received and allowed them to adapt the training as schools' needs changed. Input from parents, students, teachers, and other members of the school community can also assist in the development of an effective SRO training program.

Lastly, SRO training should be an ongoing process consisting not only of initial, basic SRO training courses, but regular updates and refreshers to ensure that SROs are aware of relevant changes in statutes, court decisions, and best practices. Lipari (2018) advocated for annual refresher trainings for SROs in addition to any initial specialized training. SROs should receive 40 hours of training before beginning their assignments and at least 10 hours of annual refresher training (Theriot & Cuellar, 2016). According to Small (2014), ongoing training requirements provided important protections against litigation by ensuring that SROs were equipped with the most up-to-date information. Both Small (2014) and USDOE (2017) recommended that basic and ongoing training requirements should be included in MOUs. Through ongoing

training programs, SROs will be better prepared to perform their roles effectively and can avoid school-to-prison pipeline concerns.

Improved Evaluations of School Resource Officers

Evaluation processes for SROs are another area which can be improved. In most cases, SROs are employed by a local policing agency, such as a police or sheriff's department, and assigned to work full-time as an SRO in one or more schools. This leaves SROs in a type of supervisory limbo where they are officially within their agency's chain-of-command, but lack regular contact or observation by their police supervisor. In contrast, school administrators have daily interactions with the SROs at their schools and are well-situated to provide valuable input during the evaluation process. The lack of a targeted and consistent methodology for SRO evaluations has been identified as a weakness of SRO programs (May et al., 2011; Merkwae, 2015; Myrstol, 2011). To improve SRO evaluations, school administrators' input should be included in the process and mechanisms for gathering useful data should be implemented.

SROs and school administrators work closely together each school day. In contrast, SROs may not have contact with their superiors at the police department for several days. This places school administrators in a position to act as an important source of information when police supervisors are conducting SROs' performance evaluations. Merkwae (2015) stated that police supervisors often failed to adequately monitor SROs and Coon and Travis (2012) suggested that school administrators should take full responsibility for SRO evaluations. However, this position failed to recognize that SROs were employed by and ultimately responsible to their police supervisors. Police supervisors should take the lead in evaluating SROs, but do so with substantial input from school administrators. Lamont et al (2011) stated that SROs should be supervised by their employing police agency, but that there should be formalized methods for school administrators to report information to an SRO's supervisor. To accomplish this, an SRO's supervisor should meet with school administrators regularly. However, this is rarely the case. 47.1% of school administrators surveyed by May et al. (2004) stated that they had never met with their

SRO's supervisor and less than 10% indicated meeting with their SRO's supervisor at least monthly. Regular meetings between police supervisors and school administrators have been found to bolster police-school partnerships (Lamont et al., 2011), increase administrators' confidence in the SRO program, and ensure transparency and interagency cooperation (May et al., 2004). SRO evaluations should include input from not only school administrators, but also teachers and parents (Lipari, 2018). It also may be useful to survey students to determine their opinions about the SRO's performance and solicit information about the SRO's competence as a teacher and counselor. By obtaining information from a variety of sources, but especially school administrators, police supervisors can negate the impact of SRO isolation and effectively evaluate SRO performance.

Without useful data, it is difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of an individual SRO or an overall SRO program. However, few police agencies or school districts gather data about SROs' activities, even though the Triad model provides a framework upon which to construct an SRO-specific evaluation. Many SRO programs are established without an assessment plan or a way to gather data to make an evaluation possible (Myrstol, 2011). One issue is that police supervisors attempt to employ traditional police evaluation practices to SROs. Instead of measuring the number of interventions an SRO has conducted or estimating the number of incidents those interventions may have prevented, SROs continue to be evaluated based on citation and arrest statistics (Briers & Dickmann, 2009). To improve SRO evaluations, police departments should tailor them to SROs' unique roles and gather data measuring an SRO's ability to de-escalate situations, employ alternatives to student arrests (Lipari, 2018), and achieve positive outcomes in their interactions with students and staff members (Small, 2014). To accomplish this, SROs should maintain activity logs documenting what law enforcement, counseling, and teaching activities they engage in on a daily or weekly basis as well as any positive or negative outcomes perceived to be related to those activities. In addition, a survey instrument should be developed to gather data from students, teachers, school administrators, parents, and other stakeholders regarding their perceptions of an SRO's activities and their effectiveness at improving school safety and climate.

The popularity of SRO programs grew exponentially during the past few decades. This rapid expansion in the number of SROs has shown positive results in many areas. However, this swift growth may have occurred in a manner which caused law enforcement agencies and school districts to implement SRO programs without taking proper steps to ensure that SRO programs were properly administered and that SROs were appropriately selected, trained, and evaluated. These factors may contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline through the criminalization of student misconduct by SROs who are ill-suited or unprepared for their positions or are part of SRO programs which fail to sufficiently define their roles or evaluate their performance. By implementing the suggestions discussed here, SRO programs can be improved to the benefit of all stakeholders while also alleviating concerns posed by school-to-prison pipeline research.

CONCLUSION

An SRO's job is unique within the law enforcement community. They work more regularly with educators than they do with other police officers. Their beat consists of one or more school campuses instead of a specified geographical area. Contact with juveniles is persistent instead of sporadic and something to be embraced instead of avoided. Determinations of an SRO's performance are based primarily on their ability to intervene and prevent incidents instead of on enforcement statistics. In fact, the position of SRO is likely the only assignment in policing where the ideal number arrests, citations, or other formal law enforcement actions during any statistical period is zero. During any given shift, an SRO may be expected to repeatedly switch between policing, teaching, and counseling. An SRO must be responsive to divergent expectations from their employing agency, school officials, administrators, and staff members, students, parents, and other concerned members of the school community. Despite these challenges, thousands of police officers have chosen to step away from traditional law enforcement and work as SROs with the goals of ensuring school safety and improving students' opinions about the police.

However, school-to-prison pipeline research has demonstrated the possibility that the increased police involvement in schools associated with the popularity of SRO programs may have caused the unnecessary criminalization of incidents of student misconduct, especially in cases involving minority, disabled, or economically-disadvantaged students. It is believed that the mere presence of an SRO at a school may cause student misbehavior that was previously addressed only through schools' disciplinary processes to be treated as criminal activity requiring formal law enforcement action. The criminalization of student misconduct can lead to early justice system involvement, which has been shown to have numerous long-term, negative consequences. School-to-prison pipeline research also questioned whether SROs were actually effective at enhancing school safety or improving students' perceptions of the police.

While there are disagreements about the methodology and conclusions of school-to-prison pipeline research, it has unquestionably revealed areas where SRO programs can be improved. The four

improvements suggested in this paper are: implementing MOUs for SRO programs, improving SRO selection processes, enhanced SRO training, and the development of SRO-specific evaluation methods. Through the widespread implementation of MOUs, police-school partnerships can be formalized and issues of role conflict and ambiguity can be reduced. MOUs can be especially effective at reducing opportunities for the criminalization of student misconduct by SROs. By separating the types of misbehavior that should be handled only as school discipline issues from those requiring police involvement, MOUs can ensure that SROs are only called-upon for incidents which constitute criminal behavior or pose a legitimate threat to school safety. By improving SRO selection processes, it can be ensured that the right police officer is chosen and that the SRO is well-matched to the school and its administration. The involvement of stakeholders from all parts of the school community will be essential to improving SRO selection processes. At minimum, an administrator from each school where an SRO will be assigned should be included because effective SRO/administrator partnerships are essential to the success of SRO programs. Consideration should also be given to including teachers, parents, and students in the SRO selection process to obtain their input and promote transparency. Through improvements in SRO training, SROs will be better prepared to work as teachers, counselors, and law enforcers in an educational setting while being regularly updated about relevant changes in laws and policies. Training for SROs should cover a variety of areas often lacking in standard law enforcement instruction, such as: youth psychology, relationship-building, classroom instruction, alternatives to arrests, students' rights, de-escalation techniques, and special education laws. Lastly, by developing SRO-specific evaluation methods, SROs' performance can be assessed in a manner that is more accurate and in a way that allows for the gathering of the data needed for effective program evaluation. Supervisors of SROs should recognize that standard police evaluation data, such as citations and arrests, fail to adequately measure an SRO's effectiveness at proactively intervening before incidents occur, improving students' opinions of the police, or improving school safety and climate. Instead, SRO evaluation procedures should utilize the Triad model as a framework and include data from multiple sources, such as: SRO activity logs, input from school administrators, and surveys of students, parents, teachers, and other stakeholders.

Overall, research is supportive of SRO programs and SROs' abilities to make schools safer so that students can focus on learning and educators can focus on preparing the next generation of American youth. Research also supports the concept that SROs can enhance police-community relations by improving students' opinions about the police. However, law enforcement programs should always be looking for ways to improve so that current best practices are followed and the public continues to receive quality police services. SRO programs are not exempt from this expectation and school-to-prison pipeline research has identified ways in which SRO programs should be improved. Law enforcement agencies, in conjunction with their partners in education, should codify their relationships through MOUs, ensure that SROs are properly selected and trained, and establish SRO-specific evaluation methodologies. The implementation of these improvements can improve SRO programs in ways that benefit the entire school community while also addressing concerns posed by school-to-prison pipeline research.

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FINAL REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COMMISSION ON
School Safety



Presented to the
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

December 18, 2018



Disclaimer

Since the horrific February 14, 2018 shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School, the Trump Administration has devoted considerable time, resources, and effort to studying ways to keep our students safe and our schools secure. The Federal Commission on School Safety was designed to both research and recommend solutions to advance the safety of our schools. The Commission's observations and recommendations are contained in this report.

The Commission recognizes that the problem of school violence is long-standing and complex and that there are certain limits to what the federal government can do. This Commission was not established to provide a single solution to this problem, nor did the Commissioners set out to mandate uniform policy to every community. In fact, it is our considered belief that doing so would prove counterproductive. There can be no "one-size-fits-all" approach for an issue this complex.

The shooting in Parkland, FL, was not the first of its kind, nor is it likely to be the last. This does not mean we should give up on doing all we can to minimize the chances that something like that could happen again.

In the pages that follow, the Commission makes recommendations that address multiple aspects of school safety. It does so based on the insights, experiences, and expertise of a wide range of individuals. The recommendations are predicated on the policies already working in state and local communities. They outline steps we all can take—families, communities, schools, houses of worship, law enforcement, medical professionals, government, and others.

Each of us has a role to play in improving the safety of our students and the security of our schools. Only by working together can we help prevent future tragedies and, when those incidents do occur, mitigate their effects and continue to learn from them.

The U.S. Departments of Education, Justice, Homeland Security, and Health and Human Services do not mandate or prescribe practices, models, or other activities in this document. This report contains examples of, adaptations of, and links to resources created and maintained by other public and private organizations. This information, informed by research and gathered in part from practitioners, is provided for the reader's convenience and is included here to offer examples of the

many resources that educators, parents, advocates, administrators, and other concerned parties may find helpful and use at their discretion. The Departments do not control or guarantee the accuracy, relevance, timeliness, or completeness of this outside information. Further, the inclusion of links to items and examples does not reflect their importance, nor are they intended to represent or be an endorsement by the Commission or any of its members, any federal agency or department, or the U.S. Government of any views expressed, or materials provided.

This document has no force or effect of law and does not create any additional requirements for the public beyond those included in applicable laws and regulations; nor does it create any additional rights for any person, entity, or organization. Implementation of the practices identified in this guide is purely voluntary, and no federal agency will take any action against schools that do not adopt them.



LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

December 18, 2018

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

Our nation's schools must be safe places to learn. Sadly, incidents of school violence are too common in the United States, and far too many families and communities have suffered.

Following the school shooting in Parkland, FL, you established the Federal Commission on School Safety. You tasked the Commission with producing a report of policy recommendations in an effort to help prevent future tragedies.

Our work included field visits, listening sessions, and meetings with anyone and everyone who is focused on identifying and elevating solutions. After learning from students, parents, teachers, school safety personnel, law enforcement officers, mental health professionals, and others who play a role in keeping students safe, we have developed recommendations for leaders at the local, state, and federal levels. Our key observations and recommendations are included in this report. Our goal has been to identify local, state, and federal policy for lawmakers and local officials to consider. The report's recommendations can assist states and local communities in preventing school violence and improving recovery efforts following an incident.

There is no universal school safety plan that will work for every school across the country. Such a prescriptive approach by the federal government would be inappropriate, imprudent, and ineffective. We focused instead on learning more about, and then raising awareness of, ideas that are already working for communities across the country. That is why the Commission's work and recommendations focus on a variety of school sizes, structures, and geographic locations.

The federal government can play a role in enhancing safety in schools. However, state legislators should work with local school leaders, teachers, parents, and students themselves to address their own unique challenges and develop their own specific solutions. What may work in one community may or may not be the right approach in another. Each local problem needs local solutions. Rather than mandate what schools must do, this report serves to identify options that policymakers should explore.

Ultimately, ensuring the safety of our children begins within ourselves, at the kitchen table, in houses of worship, and in community centers. The recommendations within this report do not and cannot supplant the role families have in our culture and in the lives of children. Our country's moral fabric needs more threads of love, empathy, and connection.

Together with states, local communities, and families, we can all continue working to uphold our promise to keep students safe as they pursue their futures at school.

Sincerely,

Betsy DeVos, Secretary
U.S. Department of Education
Chair, Federal Commission on School Safety

Kirstjen M. Nielsen, Secretary
U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Alex M. Azar II, Secretary
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services

Matthew Whitaker, Acting Attorney General
U.S. Department of Justice

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Background

Decades of Problems

On February 14, 2018, a former student walked into Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL, and began firing. He murdered 17 people, and wounded many more.

Three months later, a shooter at Santa Fe High School in Texas murdered 10 people. These successive school shootings are two tragedies on a ledger that now spans decades.

School violence has been a persistent problem in the United States. For example, on January 29, 1979, a 16-year-old opened fire on Grover Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, CA. She killed two adults and wounded eight students and one police officer, for seemingly no reason at all.

In each decade since, we have experienced tragedies of this kind. In the 1980s, communities across the country suffered from school killings—in Alabama and Nevada, in Missouri and Kansas, in Washington, North Carolina, Michigan, and Virginia.

The incidents continued during the 1990s. The decade culminated in a shooting in Littleton, CO—now known as the Columbine High School Massacre. On April 20, 1999, two shooters killed 13 fellow students and



wounded 21 before taking their own lives. Virginia Tech came eight years later, with the death toll at 32. At Sandy Hook Elementary School in December 2012, a shooter claimed 26 lives.

These are not just numbers. These are lives that were tragically cut short.

A Tragic Chronology

The following list of school violence incidents is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather to illustrate the breadth of the problem.

January 29, 1979	Grover Cleveland Elementary School in San Diego, CA—two adults killed, eight students and one police officer wounded
October 31, 1980	Hueytown High School in Hueytown, AL—one student wounded, shooter takes his own life
March 19, 1982	Valley High School in Las Vegas, NV—one teacher killed, two students wounded
January 20, 1983	Parkway South Junior High in St. Louis, MO—one student killed, one wounded, shooter takes his own life
January 21, 1985	Goddard Junior High School in Goddard, KS—school principal killed, two teachers and one student wounded
November 27, 1985	Spanaway Junior High School in Spanaway, WA—two students killed, shooter takes her own life
May 9, 1986	Pine Forest High School in Fayetteville, NC—three students wounded, one critically
April 17, 1987	Murray Wright High School in Detroit, MI—one student killed, two wounded
December 16, 1988	Atlantic Shores Christian School in Virginia Beach, VA—two teachers shot, one fatally
January 17, 1989	Cleveland Elementary School in Stockton, CA—five students killed, 29 others wounded, shooter takes his own life
February 2, 1996	Frontier Middle School in Moses Lake, WA—one teacher and two students killed, another student wounded
October 1, 1997	Pearl High School in Pearl, MS—shooter kills his mother then kills two classmates and injures seven others
December 1, 1997	Heath High School in West Paducah, KY—three students killed and five others wounded
March 24, 1998	Westside Middle School in Jonesboro, AR—four students and one teacher killed, 11 others wounded

April 20, 1999	Columbine High School in Littleton, CO—13 students killed and 21 wounded, shooters take their own lives
March 25, 2001	Santana High School in Santee, CA—two students killed and 13 wounded
December 5, 2001	Springfield High School in Springfield, MA—school counselor killed
April 14, 2003	John McDonogh Senior High School in New Orleans, LA—one student killed and three wounded
September 24, 2003	Rocori High School in Cold Spring, MN—two students killed
March 21, 2005	Red Lake High School in Red Lake, MN—after killing his grandparents, shooter kills five students, a teacher, and an unarmed security guard
April 16, 2007	Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University in Blacksburg, VA—shooter kills 32 people, takes his own life
February 27, 2012	Chardon High School in Chardon, OH—three students killed and two wounded
December 14, 2012	Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newton, CT—shooter kills his mother, 20 students, and six adults before taking his own life
October 21, 2013	Sparks Middle School in Sparks, NV—shooter kills a teacher, wounds two classmates, and takes his own life
December 13, 2013	Arapahoe High School in Centennial, CO—one student killed, shooter takes his own life
May 27, 2014	University of California Santa Barbara, CA—six students killed, 14 wounded, shooter takes his own life
June 10, 2014	Reynolds High School in Troutdale, OR—one student killed, one teacher wounded, shooter takes his own life
October 24, 2014	Marysville-Pilchuck High School in Marysville, WA—four students killed and a fifth critically wounded
April 10, 2017	North Park Elementary School in San Bernardino, CA—one teacher and one student killed, one student wounded, shooter takes his own life
January 23, 2018	Marshall County High School in Benton, KY—two students killed, 18 other people wounded
February 14, 2018	Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL—14 students and three teachers killed
May 18, 2018	Santa Fe High School in Santa Fe, TX—eight students and two teachers killed, 10 others wounded

Establishment and Operation of the Federal Commission on School Safety

On March 12, 2018, President Donald Trump established the Federal Commission on School Safety to review safety practices and make meaningful and actionable recommendations of best practices to keep students safe. Members of the Commission include Secretary Betsy DeVos of the U.S. Department of Education (“ED”), Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker of the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”) (succeeding former Attorney General Jeff Sessions), Secretary Alex Azar II of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), and Secretary Kirstjen Nielsen of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”).

To inform its work the Commission held a series of meetings, field visits, and listening sessions. Commission meetings provided a forum to hear from key stakeholders such as school safety experts, educators, and other concerned citizens. Field visits involved travel to schools by Commission members and staff to observe and learn firsthand about current practices in

school safety. Listening sessions occurred around the country and provided the opportunity for the Commission to receive input directly from members of the general public. Parents, students, teachers, counselors, psychologists, administrators, and many others presented statements at these sessions. In addition to hearing from the public, most listening sessions included one or two separate roundtable discussions with state and local officials including Governors, State School Chiefs, law enforcement leadership, mental health representatives, and others.

The Commission held an organizational meeting on March 28, 2018. On May 17, 2018, the Department of Education hosted several families directly impacted by past school shootings, as well as authors of key reports. Full Commission meetings, field visits, and listening sessions began on May 31, 2018, and ended on August 28, 2018. (See page 7 for details of Commission events.) The Commission held four formal meetings, four field visits, and four listening sessions. Responsibilities for planning and carrying out the meetings and field visits were shared by each of the four depart-



ments, while the listening sessions were organized by ED, in consultation with the other departments.

The Commission's meetings, field visits, and listening sessions were livestreamed and preceded by media advisories. In addition, Commission meetings and listening sessions were transcribed. All of the Commission events are posted to the Commission's website, <http://www.ed.gov/school-safety/>. Speakers' written statements at Commission meetings as well as other useful information are also posted to this website.

In addition to the Commission meetings, field visits, and listening sessions, various Commission and agency staff members have met regularly with others in the school safety community. The Commission has repeatedly encouraged all who have an interest in school safety to submit their recommendations and views at safety@ed.gov for consideration by the Commission. Learning from students, parents, teachers, administrators, school safety personnel, school counselors, mental health professionals, law enforcement officers, security professionals, and others through the above-noted means has been critical to the work of the Commission. The Commission reviewed information received from each of these fora.

Organizational Meeting. On March 28, 2018, Secretary DeVos convened an organizational meeting of the Commission at the Lyndon B. Johnson Department of Education Building (LBJ). The Commission discussed the scope of work, staffing, coordination with state and local partners, the timeline for future meetings with stakeholders, and how best to incorporate stakeholder input on the areas of focus that President Trump directed the Commission to study.

Discussion with Families and Authors. On May 17, 2018, Secretary DeVos hosted a discussion at LBJ to learn from survivors and family members affected by the mass shootings at Columbine High School, Virginia Tech, Sandy Hook Elementary School, and Marjory

Stoneman Douglas High School. The discussion session also included authors of official after-action reports as well as others knowledgeable on school safety.

ED-led Field Visit in Hanover, MD. The first field visit occurred on May 31, 2018, at Frank Hebron-Harman Elementary School in Hanover, MD. The Commission toured the school and hosted a roundtable discussion with administrators, principals, teachers, students, and a national expert on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports, which is a framework designed to improve social, emotional, behavioral, and academic outcomes for all students.

ED-led Listening Session in Washington, D.C. On June 6, 2018, the Commission hosted a public listening session at LBJ. The open session included stakeholders, students, experts, and others who offered recommendations on how best to improve school safety.

ED-led Commission Meeting in Washington, D.C. On June 21, 2018, the Commission held a Commission meeting at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building (EEOB) titled, "Ecology of Schools: Fostering a Culture of Human Flourishing and Developing Character." Commissioners heard from three panels of experts who focused on the effects of entertainment, media, cyberbullying, and social media upon violence and student safety.

ED-led Listening Session in Lexington, KY. On June 26, 2018, the Commission hosted two roundtable discussions and its second listening session in Lexington, KY. The discussion included state and local officials, including the Governor of Kentucky, the First Lady of Wisconsin, a State Commissioner of Education, a State Commissioner of Safety and Homeland Security, a State Commissioner of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Services, a Chairman of a State Board of Education, a Commissioner of State Police, and law enforcement officers. This session focused on how schools, districts, colleges and universities, and other state and local government agencies can improve school safety. As with the earlier listening session, this occasion provided an opportunity for members of the public to provide their recommendations.

HHS-led Commission Meeting in Washington, D.C. On July 11, 2018, the Commission hosted its second meeting at the EEOB titled "Curating a Healthier and Safer Approach: Issues of Mental Health and Counseling for

our Young.” Commissioners heard from three panels of experts who focused on mental health, psychotropic medications, and data and student records confidentiality issues.

HHS-led Field Visit in Adams County, WI. On July 24, 2018, the Commission held its second field visit at Adams Friendship Middle School in Adams County, WI. During this visit, the Commission learned about a rural middle school’s implementation of a statewide mental health framework and how the framework transformed the school’s ability to meet the behavioral health needs of its students. The visit included a roundtable discussion with state officials and mental health professionals. Commissioners also heard from a panel consisting of parents, students, administrators, law enforcement officers, and others, who shared details about integrated behavioral health, home visits and community navigation, cross-agency collaboration, and crisis response.

DOJ-led Commission Meeting in Washington, D.C. On July 26, 2018, the Commission hosted its third meeting at the EEOB titled “Proactively Protecting Our Schools.” This meeting focused on the importance of information sharing between schools and law enforcement, as well as the role of school resource officers (SROs).

DOJ-led Field Visit in Percy, AR. On August 1, 2018, the Commission held its third field visit at the Lake Hamilton School District in Percy, AR. The Commission heard from state-level elected leaders, legislators, local superintendents, a teacher, state and local education board members, and parents about the challenges faced by rural school districts as well as the strategies they have adopted in an effort to meet them. In particular, the Commission learned about the school district’s Commissioned School Security Officer program, which was developed with the community’s guidance and in cooperation with law enforcement to improve the armed response time to active shooter situations.

ED-led Listening Session in Cheyenne, WY. On August 7, 2018, the Commission hosted two roundtable discussions and its third listening session in Cheyenne, WY. The discussion included state and local officials, including two State Superintendents, a State Attorney General, State Board of Education members, a State Commissioner of Public Safety, local district officials,

law enforcement officers, and SROs. In addition, members of the general public from Wyoming and surrounding states presented statements to Commission representatives. This session focused on the particular concerns of rural districts and the distances law enforcement and SROs must travel from school to school.

DHS-led Commission Meeting in Washington, D.C. On August 16, 2018, the Commission hosted its fourth meeting at the EEOB titled, “Creating a Citadel of Learning: New Tools to Secure Our Schools, Inside and Out.” This meeting focused on best practices for school building security, active shooter training for schools, and school-based threat assessments.

DHS-led Field Visit in Las Vegas, NV. On August 23, 2018, the Commission held its fourth field visit at the Miley Achievement Center in Las Vegas, NV. The Commission heard from local school leaders, law enforcement officers, security professionals, and architects about what schools can do to enhance their security through various preventive and protective activities.

ED-led Listening Session in Montgomery, AL. On August 28, 2018, the Commission hosted two roundtable discussions and its fourth listening session in Montgomery, AL. The discussion included state and local officials, including the Governor of Alabama, state legislators, a State Superintendent of Education, a State Law Enforcement Secretary, a State Commissioner of Public Safety, higher education leaders, a member of the State Board of Education, and law enforcement officers. In addition, members of the general public from Alabama and surrounding states presented statements to Commission representatives. This session focused on physical security and school design, information sharing among community partners, providing mental health services in schools, and the unique challenges and potential solutions for rural communities.

Federal Commission on School Safety: Accomplishments

At the direction of the President following the shooting in Parkland, FL, the Administration and specifically the Departments of Education (ED), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), and Health and Human Services (HHS) immediately began taking steps to support state and local efforts to improve school safety.

Immediate Actions to Secure Our Schools

On March 12, 2018, President Trump called for immediate action on a range of policies designed to protect schools and students.¹ The Trump Administration worked to build a bipartisan coalition to garner passage and enactment of two bills: HR 4909, Students, Teachers, and Officers Preventing (STOP) School Violence Act of 2018² and S. 2135, Fix NICS (National Instant Criminal Background Check System) Act.³

The STOP School Violence Act helps school personnel and law enforcement identify and prevent violence in schools. The law authorizes more than \$1 billion in grant funding through Fiscal Year 2028, administered by the DOJ, to support evidence-based violence-prevention programs in schools throughout the country. These grants will support a range of proactive strategies for identifying and preventing school violence, including evidence-based training, anonymous reporting systems, threat assessments, intervention teams, and increased coordination between schools and local law enforcement. The first grants were announced in October 2018, when DOJ awarded more than \$70 million in grant funding to support school safety.⁴

The Fix NICS Act strengthens the federal firearms background check system. Federal agencies are required by law to share critical information with the NICS, which can help determine whether a person is legally prohibited from buying or possessing firearms. The Fix NICS Act reinforces those obligations by requiring federal agencies to submit to the Attorney General semi-annual certifications on a number of reporting metrics, as well as to submit four-year plans for improving reporting. The Attorney General must publish the names of those agencies that fail to comply with these requirements, and political appointees from non-complying agencies may not receive bonus pay. In addition, the DOJ is in the midst of working with states and tribal governments to develop plans to improve record sharing with the NICS, as required by the act. Finally, through grant preferences, the law incentivizes states and tribal governments to provide accurate and timely submissions, including through the Domestic Abuse and Violence Prevention Initiative, an effort designed to strengthen their ability to identify and submit to the NICS all felony conviction and domestic violence records.



President Trump also called for immediate action to “encourage States’ Attorneys General to audit school district compliance with State emergency preparedness activities.”⁵ In response, the Commission sent a letter to Governors, State Attorneys General, and Chief State School Officers encouraging them to take such action.⁶

Additional Action from Federal Agencies and States

Following the October 1, 2017 massacre in Las Vegas, NV, the Trump Administration commenced the process to produce a new regulation that would ban bump stocks. Following consideration of public comments on the proposed rule, a final rule implementing the ban is expected to be announced soon.

In addition, HHS and ED have begun initial planning for the Safe School and Citizenship Education demonstration program (referenced in the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018).⁷ With the goal of providing and expanding mental health services in low-income public elementary schools and secondary schools, the program is designed to test and evaluate innovative partnerships between institutions of higher education and states or high-need local educational agencies to train qualified school-based mental health service professionals.

In June 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) convened a School Safety Summit that brought together state and local law enforcement partners to provide a forum for sharing information and discussing best practices in school safety. The topics discussed included how to identify troubled students; threat assessments; anonymous reporting systems; school resource officers and other law enforcement coordination; information sharing; hardening of schools; and grants and technical assistance.

Efforts at ED include awarding new grants related to school safety and the delivery of technical assistance to states and school districts, as well as a commitment to regular evaluations of programs. In FY 2018, the Department awarded 11 grants to state education agencies to expand their capacity to support local schools in creating and implementing high quality emergency management plans.⁸ ED has also awarded 14 School Climate Transformation Grants to state education agencies to implement multi-tiered behavioral frameworks to improve school safety and well-being.⁹

ED continues to evaluate programs authorized under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (ESEA) to understand how states and local schools are using funds provided under the ESEA to ensure that students are safe in schools. For example, ED published the report *Collaboration for Safe and Healthy Schools: Study of Coordination Between School Climate Transformation Grants and Project AWARE* in 2018.¹⁰ The Department is also developing studies under the Title IV, Part A program to further understand how funds are being used to support school safety, as well as to examine how it can best support schools in maximizing the use of these funds.

In addition to funding, ED has placed an increased emphasis on improving technical assistance related to school safety including readiness and emergency management, safe and supportive learning, and social and emotional learning.¹¹

DHS has continued to engage students, teachers, school administrators, law enforcement officers, and other members of the K–12 school community on how to better prepare for and protect our schools from active shooters and other emergencies. Since the Parkland shooting, DHS Protective Security Advisors and the Transportation Security Administration have participated in hundreds of school security engagements with K–12 administrators, conducting assessments, sharing best practices, and facilitating exercises. During this period, the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center provided guidance and training to approximately 2,000 school personnel, law enforcement, legislators, and other government representatives on the prevention of school violence. In August 2018, DHS held a two-day roundtable discussion with members of the K–12 school community to collect insight and feedback on how to improve school safety and security. That same

month DHS announced a grant opportunity to support the development of mass casualty trauma training for high school students.¹² DHS also recently released a number of new school safety resources, including an operational guide that describes the steps schools can take to create a comprehensive targeted violence prevention plan,¹³ a separate guide and self-assessment tool to assist schools in conducting their own security risk assessments,¹⁴ and K–12 Active Shooter Exercise Starter Kits, which provide a package of exercise design, conduct, and evaluation templates to assist schools and school districts in conducting their own tabletop exercises focused on an active shooter incident.

With respect to HHS, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) established Mental Health Technology Transfer Centers.¹⁵ SAMHSA also awarded grants to a privacy technical assistance center to provide training to individuals, families, and practitioners on the implementation of privacy rules such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), 42 CFR Part 2, and the intersection of these rules and FERPA in addressing the needs of school-aged children. SAMHSA has developed a free online interactive guide titled the “Safe Schools Framework Implementation Toolkit” to help schools and communities plan, implement, evaluate, and sustain a comprehensive and coordinated approach to school safety, prevention of youth violence, and activities that promote good mental health.¹⁶ Efforts are underway between SAMHSA and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to provide states and school systems with guidance on school-based funding approaches to address mental and substance use issues.¹⁷ SAMHSA has also awarded more than 160 grants at a total of approximately \$57.5 million to communities across the country.¹⁸ The Administration is also implementing mental health programs authorized in the 21st Century Cures Act.¹⁹

In addition, individual states have taken on enhanced leadership roles in school safety by forming state-level commissions, passing state legislation, and supporting new resources (such as school safety centers).²⁰ Together, this Administration and the states have made significant near-term progress in strengthening our schools and ensuring educators have the necessary resources to keep our students safe.

Background Endnotes

- 1 President Donald J. Trump is Taking Immediate Actions to Secure Our Schools (March 12, 2018). <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-immediate-actions-secure-schools/>
- 2 STOP School Violence Act, Title V, Division S, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141 (March 23, 2018).
- 3 Fix NICS Act, Title VI, Division S, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 115-141 (March 23, 2018).
- 4 <https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/departement-justice-announces-more-70-million-support-school-safety-and-64-million-improve>
- 5 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-immediate-actions-secure-schools/>
- 6 <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/letter-review-emergency-operations-plans>.
- 7 Pub. L. No. 115-141 (March 23, 2018) and Joint Explanatory Statement at <https://docs.house.gov/billsthisweek/20180924/Joint%20%20Statement.pdf>.
- 8 For additional information about these grants, see <https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schlemgmt-sea/index.html>.
- 9 For additional information about these grants, see <https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatesea/contacts.html>.
- 10 For a copy of the report, see <https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/school-safety/school-climate-transformation-grants-aware-full-report.pdf>.
- 11 The Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center provides a comprehensive cadre of free resources to assist States, local educational agencies, schools, and institutes of higher education with comprehensive emergency management planning. More information can be found at <https://rems.ed.gov>. The National Center for Safe and Supportive Learning Environments offers information and technical assistance to States, districts, schools, institutions of higher learning, and communities focused on improving student supports and academic enrichment including but not limited to school conditions. More information can be found at <https://safe-supportivelearning.ed.gov>. The Administration has also supported the funding of the Center to Improve Social and Emotional Learning and School Safety to provide technical assistance to States and districts in the implementation of evidence-based programs and practices in social and emotional learning. More information can be found at <https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/16/2018-10474/applications-for-new-award-center-to-improve-social-and-emotional-learning-and-school>. Also, in September 2018, ED awarded funding for the National Center on Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports. The new investment expands funding and services to include enhanced services to students with disabilities with intensive behavioral needs, expanded support to state and local educational agencies for activities to improve student safety and activities to improve student achievement by improving conditions for learning.
- 12 <https://www.grants.gov/web/grants/view-opportunity.html?oppld=307563>
- 13 U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center. (July 2018). *Enhancing school safety using a threat assessment model: An operational guide for preventing targeted school violence*. https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC_Enhancing_School_Safety_Guide_7.11.18.pdf.
- 14 Department of Homeland Security. (2018). *K-12 school security: A guide for preventing and protecting against gun violence*, Second Edition, at p. 6. <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/K12-School-Security-Guide-2nd-Edition-508.pdf>.
- 15 These MHTTCs include a Network Coordinating Center, 10 Regional Centers, a Tribal Affairs Center and a Hispanic/Latino Center that will support resource development and dissemination, training and technical assistance and workforce development to the mental health field, including a focus in each Center on addressing school-based mental health.
- 16 This toolkit can be accessed at <https://healthysafechildren.org/safe-schools-healthy-students-framework-implementation-toolkit>. FAQs about the toolkit can also be found at <https://healthysafechildren.org/sites/default/files/FIT-FAQ-508.pdf>.
- 17 Given funding challenges faced by many states and local school systems in seeking to provide comprehensive support and services to students, this SAMHSA-CMS document will: 1) examine practices that states are using to support school-based mental health and substance-related services, and 2) present options that states and school systems may pursue to expand and finance school-based services.
- 18 The purpose of these grants is to increase education and training of school personnel, including teachers and student support personnel (as well as other adults that interact with and work with youth including family members, first responders, and law enforcement/juvenile justice personnel) around mental health issues on the identification and connection to school-based and other community resources for youth and families in need of treatment; and to decrease youth violence. <https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/awards/SM-18-006>
<https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/awards/SM-18-009>
- 19 For more information about the 21st Century Cures Act, see <https://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/lawsenforcedbyfda/significantamendments-to-the-fdcact/21st-century-cures-act/default.html>.
- 20 Select Homeland Security Initiatives on School Safety in 2018. (October 11, 2018). <https://www.nga.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/10-10-18-HSPS-GHSAC-Quarterly-Memo-on-School-School-Safety.pdf>.

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Executive Summary

The efforts of the Federal Commission on School Safety have been guided by the need to promote state and local solutions to school violence. To that end, the Commission conducted field visits, listening sessions, and meetings with hundreds of Americans all across the country. The input of these individuals—state and local policymakers, administrators, principals and teachers, law enforcement and healthcare professionals, students and their families—was critical in identifying best practices and the recommendations contained in this Report.

As set forth in the pages that follow, the work of the Commission falls into three broad categories:

- a) Prevent—preventing school violence;
- b) Protect and Mitigate—protecting students and teachers and mitigating the effects of violence; and
- c) Respond and Recover—responding to and recovering from attacks.

The Commission’s work is summarized below.

Prevent

Character education and creation of a positive school climate: Character education and a positive school climate can help students feel connected to, rather than isolated from, teachers and fellow students. They can also help combat cyberbullying, an area where states, districts, and schools are developing and evaluating promising new approaches. Student-led efforts are critical to addressing cyberbullying. Firm and prompt responses to cyberbullying by staff are necessary as well as having suitable systems for the reporting of incidents.

Mental health: Improving access to school-based mental health and counseling for young people is an important aspect of prevention. So, too, is community involvement and support, including the faith community. Prescribing psychotropic medications for complex mental health needs should only be part of a broader treatment plan.

Integrating mental health, substance misuse, and other supportive services into school and pediatric

settings can help early identification of needs and access to treatment. Testimony and information gathered from Commission listening sessions, site visits, and meetings noted a lack of school-based or easily accessible mental health professionals. Telephonic and telepsychiatry consultations have the potential to dramatically expand and enhance care.

Threat assessment: Beyond the school building and campus, informed and alert communities play a critical role in keeping our schools safe. Prior to most attacks, other students had concerns about the attacker, yet most did not report what they knew to a parent or other responsible adult. Outreach campaigns such as “If You See Something, Say Something®” and similar state-specific programs are essential to encouraging and facilitating the reporting of suspicious activities or other concerning behaviors. There are significant opportunities to customize or expand such efforts.

Suspicious activity reporting programs must incorporate appropriate privacy protections to ensure compliance with the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). However, confusion remains in some localities about whether and when student records can legally be shared during a health or safety emergency. Reducing this confusion can lead to greater compliance and appropriate reporting of threats to the safety of students and schools.

Press coverage: For optimal engagement with the media after a school safety incident, state and local authorities should develop a media plan as part of their broader crisis preparedness, response, and recovery plan. The “No Notoriety Campaign” (i.e., not using shooters’ names or photos, but instead focusing on facts and victims) is a policy that media outlets and communities across the country should consider.

Violent entertainment and rating systems: The role of the family is central to controlling violent entertainment. State and local educational agencies should collaborate with parents to strengthen internet safety measures to curb access to inappropriate content.

In addition, the entertainment industry should ensure its rating systems provide parents with the full complement of information needed to make informed decisions about entertainment for their children.

School discipline: Maintaining order in the classroom is a key to keeping schools safe. Teachers are best positioned to identify and address disorderly conduct. However, guidance issued by the prior Administration advocated a federal solution that undercut the ability of local officials to address the impact of disciplinary matters on school safety. The guidance also relies on a dubious reading of federal law. The guidance should be rescinded and information about resources and best practices for improving school climate and learning outcomes should be developed for schools and school districts.

Law enforcement: The available research does not support the conclusion that age restrictions for firearms purchases are effective in reducing homicides, suicides, or unintentional deaths. Most school shooters obtain their weapons from family members or friends rather than by purchasing them. States should consider offering training or other resources to promote safe storage of firearms.

Other recommendations include encouraging states to adopt laws permitting “extreme risk protection orders” (ERPOs), which can prevent individuals who pose a threat to themselves or others from possessing or purchasing firearms. The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Public Access Line—a critical component of the FBI’s efforts to keep Americans safe—has undergone changes to improve the process for receiving and evaluating tips from the public.

Protect and Mitigate

Training: All school personnel play a role in school safety and should take part in school safety training. Those best positioned to respond to acts of violence are those with specialized training such as school resource officers (SROs) who are generally sworn law enforcement officers. With respect to training and other related aspects of school safety, states and local policies and approaches should reflect their own unique circumstances and needs.

When a school shooting occurs, law enforcement officers are the ones who rush to the scene, neutralize the shooter, assist victims, and secure the site. The federal government provides a wide array of emergency and crisis training resources to state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to help prevent, plan for, and respond to such incidents.

Troops to Teachers: Military veterans and retired law enforcement officers often possess the leadership, experience, and essential training to help ensure the safety and security of our nation’s schools. As the Troops to Teachers program attests, veterans and retired law enforcement officers can also serve as highly effective educators where there are reduced barriers to certification and appropriate incentives are in place.

Building and campus security: Every school in America is different, and the appropriate protective measures will vary based on the characteristics of the site, location, resources, and personnel available. A risk assessment can identify vulnerabilities and enable the development of a strategy to address any security gaps.

Effective security plans use a layered approach across all three areas of a school: entry points, the building envelope (e.g., walls, roofs, windows, doors), and the classroom. An effective security plan can be especially valuable in rural areas, where law enforcement response times may be significantly longer than in more urban jurisdictions.

Respond and Recover

Active shooter preparedness: Reports prepared in the aftermath of school shootings have universally recognized the value of preparing for a potential active shooter incident through training, planning, and related strategies. According to some reports, total casualties could have been higher in Parkland, FL, had the school not provided active shooter preparedness training to staff (the latest training coming just six weeks before the shooting incident).

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SECTION 1

Prevent

Character Development and a Culture of Connectedness

School shooters don't simply "snap."¹ The circumstances that lead to violence are complex and far ranging, often the culmination of months and years of individual experiences. Accordingly, improving school safety cannot focus solely on mitigating incidents of violence. Successful efforts must improve the culture in which students live and learn. This includes developing students of strong character who are connected in meaningful ways to their peers, educators, and communities.

Character development naturally and properly begins in the home. Since the founding of our nation, a clear consensus has recognized that character development is key to a successful society.² There must be intentional efforts to foster both the academic advancement and the moral, ethical, and social-emotional development of students.

Character development is essential for a healthy school climate. The promotion of core ethical values such as fairness, respect, and personal responsibility can create a caring community that fosters students' self-motivation and positive interactions.³

Fostering a culture of connectedness is another important aspect of school safety. In the aftermath of the Parkland shooting, multiple reports indicated the alleged shooter experienced feelings of isolation and depression in the years leading up to the shooting. His inability to connect with classmates increased his feel-

ings of detachment and withdrawal, and his isolation only exacerbated other factors that led to violence.⁴

Perpetrators of previous school shootings shared that sense of detachment. For example, one Columbine shooter was characterized as depressed and reclusive. In a journal entry he expressed his sense of loneliness and isolation: "I want to die really bad right now...no girls (friends or girlfriends), no other friends except a few, nobody accepting me...I feel so lonely w/o a friend."⁵

In a similar fashion, family members and acquaintances of the Virginia Tech shooter said that, as his isolation grew during his senior year, his "attention to schoolwork and class time dropped." By the end, he had done all he could to exclude himself from Virginia Tech's campus community.⁶

The same was true at Sandy Hook. In the months prior to the tragedy, the shooter isolated himself in his bedroom. He covered his windows with black trash bags and, even though he and his mother lived on the same floor of the home, insisted on communicating with her through email.⁷

Both the Bush Administration's 2007 *Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy* and the Obama Administration's 2013 *Now is the Time* report issued recommendations on character education. The Bush Report encouraged teachers to increase connectedness in their classrooms and states to develop school cultures that promote safety, trust, respect, and open communication.⁸ The Obama Report proposed a \$50 million initiative to help 8,000 schools train teachers and other school staff to implement strategies that would improve school climate.⁹

The U.S. Department of Education has awarded grant funds through the School Climate Transformation Grant program to support schools implementing an evidence-based multi-tiered behavioral framework for improving behavioral outcomes and learning conditions for all students.¹⁰ The Department has invested \$226.5 million in School Climate Transformation Grants.¹¹ Since 2014, these grants have promoted state



and district efforts to develop and enhance school-wide positive behavioral interventions and supports (PBIS) frameworks to improve school climate and promote positive school behavior.¹²

In addition, the Department’s Office of Special Education Programs and the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education jointly fund a Technical Assistance Center on PBIS that supports schools, districts, and states in their implementation of a multi-tiered approach to social, emotional, and behavioral support.¹³ The multiple tiers of PBIS include core instruction, supplemental instruction, and more intensive intervention and supports.

Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS)

The PBIS framework supports local flexibility in the selection and implementation of practices in each site, based on unique needs and resources. It has included a variety of programs addressing classroom management, bullying, discipline, character development, social emotional development, and general school climate. For example, a teacher at Hebron-Harman rearranges her classroom seating every two weeks. But before doing so, she asks students to write down the names of five classmates they would like to sit close to and five they think would like to sit near them. Through this simple but effective practice, she can identify which students lack connections with their classmates.

Commission Observations

Character education programs may work best when the whole school integrates character education into the day-to-day work of the students. School leaders can establish character development as a priority by supporting both classroom-level and school-level practices, as well as collaborating with families and community organizations.

Commission members witnessed such an approach when they visited Frank Hebron-Harman Elementary School in Anne Arundel County, MD, to learn about the PBIS framework. The school program seeks to develop a positive school culture by helping educators to develop trusting relationships with their students,

who in turn experience schools as a safe and responsive environment supporting their diverse needs, strengths, and learning.¹⁴

Along with character education programs, fostering social and emotional learning can help prevent school violence and improve safety. At a May 17, 2018 information session, Secretary DeVos heard from Scarlett Lewis, who founded the Jesse Lewis Choose Love Foundation after her son was killed at Sandy Hook Elementary School. Lewis applauded First Lady Melania Trump’s “Be Best” initiative for endorsing social and emotional learning, acknowledging the positive force of social and emotional skills to improve school safety.¹⁵

Social emotional learning (SEL) and character education are distinct aspects of human development. Research suggests that SEL builds the skills that allow youth to put into practice the knowledge they receive through character education.¹⁶

Researchers have developed different frameworks to define skills that support character development. One well-accepted framework was developed by the Collaborative for Academic, Social, and Emotional Learning (CASEL).¹⁷ Based on its experience working with researchers, school administrators, teachers, and others, CASEL encourages the development of five core skills: self-awareness, self-management, social awareness, relationship skills, and responsible decision-making.



Research suggests that social emotional learning (SEL) builds the skills that allow youth to put into practice the knowledge they receive through character education.

Youth who learn these core skills are able to “manage their emotions and interactions in ways that benefit themselves and others.”¹⁸ Most importantly, recent research suggests that the development of social and emotional skills can lead to improved outcomes for educational attainment, employment, and earnings. It can also lead to a significant decrease in the likelihood of crime and delinquency, substance use, antisocial behavioral conditions, aggression, and violent behavior.¹⁹

In addition, the Commissioners heard testimony that 34 percent of high schoolers in America are cyberbullied, and 80 percent of students who are cyberbullied are also bullied at school. Research has tied experi-

ence with bullying and cyberbullying to low-self-esteem, depression, anxiety, family problems, academic difficulties, delinquency, school violence, and suicidal thoughts and attempts. Dr. Sameer Hinduja, Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida Atlantic University and Co-Director of the Cyberbullying Research Center, told Commissioners that students who cultivate characteristics such as social intelligence, resilience, and confidence are less likely to be bullied or to bully others. Hinduja also cited recent studies that found significantly less bullying in schools where students perceived a better or more positive school climate.²⁰

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

▣ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. States should provide resources for their schools to help create a positive school climate where students feel connected to, rather than isolated from, their teachers and fellow students.
2. States should support character education programs and expand those already in existence using various federal²¹ or state funds.²²
 - When considering the character education programs, states might use a framework researchers have summarized using the acronym PRIMED: Prioritization, Relationships, Intrinsic Motivation, Modeling, Empowerment, and Developmental Pedagogy.²³
 - *Prioritization* to ensure character education is an authentic priority for the school by developing shared language, values, and active support from leadership that affirms character as an integral part of a school’s mission.
 - *Relationship building* among staff, youth, families, and communities (including teachers) emphasizing cooperative learning and teaching interpersonal skills.
 - *Intrinsic motivation* to help youth internalize ethical and performance values. Effective programs focus on integrating activities that promote self-growth, such as personal goal setting.
 - *Modeling* ethical and performance values for fostering character development. Youth learn from their older peers as well as adults (e.g., teachers can demonstrate respect in how they speak to students).
 - *Empowerment* results from youth having opportunities for leadership responsibility and a voice in the classroom.
 - *Developmental pedagogy* identifies explicit teaching, setting high expectations for youth and practicing identified skills as hallmarks of effective character development programs.

- The U.S. Department of Education’s What Works Clearinghouse completed a systematic review of character education interventions and identified nine that had positive or potentially positive effects on one or more of the following: students’ behavior; academic achievement; and students’ knowledge, attitudes, and values.²⁴
3. Schools and districts should adopt effective social and emotional learning (SEL) strategies.
 - SEL programs might include the following: a curriculum to teach specific SEL skills; a modification to school or classroom climate through teacher practices or school-wide changes to rules and expectations; and practices to help students develop a growth mindset (i.e., the belief that they can develop most basic abilities through dedication and hard work).²⁵
 - A recent review of state and district resources for implementing SEL programs highlights the importance of leadership, resources, and legislative support from states and school districts.²⁶
 4. Schools and districts should use a variety of data sources, including school climate surveys, to guide the selection of evidence-based interventions tailored to their specific needs.
 - To assist districts in measuring school climate, the U.S. Department of Education developed school climate surveys that school leaders can download and administer on a web-based platform at no cost. The Department also developed resources for district leaders to use as they interpret their school climate data.²⁷ Using these resources, once a district identifies needs related to school climate, it can then select and implement an evidence-based intervention and then examine and reflect on the outcomes of the intervention.²⁸
 5. Schools and districts should adopt tiered social, emotional, and behavioral supports to establish a climate that appropriately supports and responds to student behavior.
 - The Pennsylvania State University and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation issued a joint briefing paper that discusses school climate, SEL, and blended models that have positive effects on school climate and social and emotional competence. This paper illustrates six key elements for nurturing a healthy school climate and building students’ emotional competence: supportive relationships, engagement, safety, cultural responsiveness, academic challenge, and high expectations.²⁹
 - Research illustrates the potential of a comprehensive tiered system of support for academics, behavior, and SEL.³⁰
 - The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Healthy Students (OSHS), a part of the Office of Elementary and Secondary Education (OESE), administers the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center. The Center helps school districts assess the safety, security, accessibility, and emergency preparedness of school buildings and grounds. It also offers tips to help guide school officials in using multi-tiered interventions and supports to improve school climate.³¹

Chapter 1 Endnotes

- 1 Statement from Dr. Marisa Reddy Randazzo to the Federal Commission on School Safety (May 17, 2018). <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/federal-commission-school-safety-marisa-reddy-randazzo.pdf>.
- 2 See Benjamin Franklin's statement of 1750: "...nothing is of more importance for the public weal, than to form and train up youth in wisdom and virtue. Wise and good men are, in my opinion, the strength of a state..." <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Franklin/01-04-02-0009>. See also the words of John Quincy Adams: "Public Virtue cannot exist in a Nation without private, and public Virtue is the only Foundation of Republics. There must be a positive Passion for the public good, the public Interest, Honour, Power, and Glory, established in the Minds of the People, or there can be no Republican Government, nor any real Liberty." <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/06-04-02-0044>; and "Human nature with all its infirmities and depravation is still capable of great things. It is capable of attaining to degrees of wisdom and of goodness, which, we have reason to believe, appear respectable in the estimation of superior intelligences. Education makes a greater difference between man and man, than nature has made between man and brute. The virtues and powers to which men may be trained, by early education and constant discipline, are truly sublime and astonishing." <https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Adams/04-01-02-0209>.
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- 10 U.S. Department of Education. (n.d.). *Programs: School Climate Transformation Grant – Local Educational Agency Grants*. Retrieved from <https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatelea/index.html>.
- 11 The \$226.5 million represents the total of such grants from 2014 through 2018 based on U.S. Department of Education data.
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Cyberbullying and School Safety

Social media can help students access information, connect with family and friends, and provide a means of communication for those who feel isolated or disconnected in the offline world. However, social media can also provide a platform for unfortunate interactions with others,¹ such as cyberbullying.² Educators are equally aware that some online conduct, although perceived as bullying, may be protected by the First Amendment.

Based on lessons learned from the shooting in Parkland, the Broward County League of Cities indicated a need for proactive social media monitoring protocols to identify threats and at-risk behaviors.³ The role of schools in intervening in cyberbullying can be challenging, as students access technology using school and personal internet services, during and outside of school hours, and on and off school grounds. Most schools are limited in their ability to identify and address behavior that occurs off school grounds.

In spite of this, there are many examples of school efforts to address cyberbullying. Since 2010, the Federal Partners in Bullying Prevention have developed and disseminated key resources via StopBullying.gov and hosted a biannual bullying prevention summit.⁴ First Lady Melania Trump recently launched the “Be Best” initiative, which focuses, in part, on addressing cyberbullying.⁵ Various federal programs may, among other purposes, support efforts to address cyberbullying, such as improving school climate and anti-bullying interventions.⁶

Commission Observations

In recent surveys, 34 percent of youth reported being cyberbullied in their lifetime, and bullying has been cited as a contributing factor in cases of extreme retaliation, including school shootings.⁷

The Commission heard about the importance of engaging the broader community in cyberbullying prevention efforts and of empowering students to lead such initiatives. Presenters characterized cyberbullying as a behavioral issue that is not distinct from more traditional in-person forms of bullying. They empha-

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sized the importance of not blaming technology or restricting access as the means to address cyberbullying. Instead, the presenters suggested focusing on improving overall school climate and changing social norms on how technology is used.

At the June 21 Commission meeting, Dr. Sameer Hinduja, Professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida Atlantic University and Co-Director of the Cyberbullying Research Center, made the point that cyberbullying is not a technology issue, but rather a social issue. He recommended efforts to build school climate, normalize pro-social behaviors (i.e., responsible digital citizenship), support student-led initiatives, and facilitate student resilience. Hinduja also stressed the importance of students having an adult to turn to if they are dealing with an issue such as cyberbullying.⁸ This reinforces recent findings about the key role educators play in empowering students to inform them of cyberbullying and the need to break the “code of silence.”⁹

Dr. Paul Gausman, Superintendent of the Sioux City Community School District, shared with the Commission some successful strategies in his district for addressing cyberbullying. The district collaborates with a company to scan potential social media threats and receive actionable alerts. (Recommendations following the Parkland shooting similarly included the need for proactive social media monitoring protocols to identify threats and at-risk behaviors.¹⁰) Sioux City also has an online reporting tool for parents and community members to raise concerns. This serves as a significant tool given that a lot of bullying, including cyberbullying, goes unreported and that cyberbullying is a community-based problem. In addition, Gausman

spoke about his district’s digital citizenship courses for freshmen and reward systems that encourage appropriate social media use.¹¹

With respect to state and local laws, a handful of states and localities have begun to enact laws with criminal penalties for cyberbullying. Key components of state-enacted laws may include specification of prohibited conduct and development and implementation of district procedures for reporting, investigating, and responding to bullying.¹²

Many schools are using programs designed to intervene in both bullying and cyberbullying behaviors, given their inherent linkages. However, program outcomes have largely been inconsistent in the United States. Many have not led to a significant reduction in bullying (even those programs with demonstrated results in other countries).¹³ On the other hand, developing a positive school climate is consistently associated with lower rates of bullying and cyberbullying behaviors.¹⁴

Districts and schools approach cyberbullying in a variety of ways, including:

- Implementing strategies to improve school climate using feedback gathered from school climate surveys that measure perceptions of bullying and cyberbullying;
- Providing direct programming for social and emotional learning or digital citizenship;
- Providing students access to mental health services; and
- Updating discipline policies to include cyberbullying.

Considerations for parents

Parents can alert school staff if they become aware that their child may be engaging in, or a target of, cyberbullying. Schools and districts can coordinate with parents to clarify protocols for how parents, students, and members of the community can report this information.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. The appropriate federal agencies should assist states and school districts in leveraging support from existing programs that help reduce cyberbullying.
 - StopBullying.gov provides information from various government agencies on what bullying is, what cyberbullying is, who is at risk, and how people can prevent and respond to bullying. The site provides helpful research and resources about bullying-prevention training, state laws and policies, what schools and students can do to prevent bullying, and more.¹⁵
 - The U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Healthy Students administers the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center. The Center offers tips to help guide school officials in considering the use of social media in school behavioral threat assessments.¹⁶
 - The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services’ website MedlinePlus provides resources that inform users of the warning signs of bullying, prevention and risk factors, and how to help children deal with bullying.¹⁷ It also discusses existing laws and policies regarding bullying.

STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. Many states, districts, and schools are creating their own, innovative approaches to cyberbullying. These practices, many of which are still in the process of being evaluated, could show promise for

preventing and/or addressing cyberbullying. States should adopt similar and effective practices or develop their own. Some examples include:

- Sioux City, IA: As shared by Dr. Paul Gausman during the June 21 Commission meeting, Sioux City Community School District is investing in a multifaceted approach to tackling bullying and cyberbullying. Efforts include empowering and training school staff to take an active role in responding to bullying incidents. They also involve creating a positive school climate; implementing evidence-based social and emotional learning, character education, and mentor programs for students; and enacting clear anti-bullying policies.
 - Seattle, WA: Seattle Public Schools is partnering with a nonprofit organization that serves as an intermediary between the district and social media companies to identify and negotiate the removal of cyberbullying content.¹⁸
 - Deer Park, TX: The Deer Park Independent School District is using a computer-and smart-phone-based anonymous reporting application to receive reports of concerning student behavior (such as bullying, cyberbullying, suicidal behaviors, and cheating) from students and parents. The school not only receives these reports but can connect students to school-based resources such as school counselors.¹⁹
 - Poughkeepsie, NY: Poughkeepsie High School and other schools across the state teamed with students from Sienna College to host peer-to-peer learning sessions to create an “upstander” culture around cyberbullying. The goal of the trainings was to build students’ digital responsibility and identify student leaders to become ambassadors for their school.²⁰
 - Pennsylvania: The state convened a workgroup of key stakeholders to explore its current capacity to prevent bullying, including cyberbullying, and identify potential facilitators and barriers to creating safer and more supportive learning environments. The workgroup, consisting of youth-serving agencies, health providers, educators, and researchers, provided recommendations that form the basis of a statewide plan to address bullying.²¹
2. States, districts, and schools should adopt policies to help prevent cyberbullying, such as school climate initiatives and support for digital citizenship and character development. Because of the importance of peer influence, schools can consider ways to have these efforts led by students.
 3. States, districts, and schools should use appropriate systems to monitor social media and mechanisms for reporting cyberbullying incidents.²² Examples include:
 - Michigan’s OK2SAY program allows students to confidentially report tips on potential harm or criminal activities directed at schools, students, or school employees. It uses a comprehensive communication system to facilitate tip sharing—about harmful behaviors that threaten to disrupt the learning environment—among parents, school personnel, students, community mental health service programs, the Michigan Department of Health and Human Services, and law enforcement officers. OK2SAY also has a free mobile app that allows users to submit real-time confidential tips.²³
 - Colorado’s Safe2Tell program provides an anonymous way for students, parents, school staff, and community members to report concerns regarding their safety or the safety of others. It also provides resources to educate the community on the importance of breaking the code of silence as well as technical assistance to schools and communities before and after tragic events. A Safe2Tell mobile app for reporting threatening behaviors and safety concerns in Colorado is available for students, parents, and community members.²⁴

Chapter 2 Endnotes

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- 5 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/bebest/>.
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Curating a Healthier and Safer Approach: Issues of Mental Health and Counseling for Our Young

A consistent theme throughout Commission listening sessions, site visits, and meetings was the lack of mental health professionals in schools or centers that students and schools can easily access.

Individuals who commit mass shootings may or may not have a serious mental illness (SMI). There is little population-level evidence to support the notion that those diagnosed with mental illness are more likely than anyone else to commit gun crimes. Researchers have concluded that less than 3–5 percent of U.S. crimes involve people with mental illness, and the percentages of crimes that involve guns are lower than the national average for persons not diagnosed with mental illness.¹ Databases that track gun homicides (such as the National Center for Health Statistics) similarly show that less than 5 percent of the 120,000 gun-related killings in the United States between 2001 and 2010 were perpetrated by people diagnosed with mental illness.²

A U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service analysis found that as many as a quarter of individuals who committed mass shootings had been in treatment for mental illnesses, and more than three-quarters had symptoms of a mental illness prior to the time of the shooting.³ Earlier research suggests that such individuals often feel aggrieved and extremely angry, and nurture fantasies of violent revenge. They typically do not voluntarily seek out mental health treatment.⁴

Although the presence of a mental illness may not be directly correlated to violence, trends with respect to youth mental illness are of great concern. Rates of youth depression, anxiety, self-harm, and most tragically, suicide are climbing.^{5,6,7,8} Approximately one in 10 children and youth in the United States experience a serious emotional disturbance (SED), yet only 20 percent of them receive the help they need.^{9,10,11} The reasons for this include failure to recognize problems, fear of negative attitudes and discrimination, and lack of resources.¹²

Many of these children perform poorly in school and have difficulties at home and in the community. For example, according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), between 2007 and 2015 suicide rates increased by 31 percent for males aged 15–19 (from 10.8 to 14.2 per 100,000 population) and by 40 percent for females aged 15–19 (from 2.4 to 5.1 per 100,000).¹³ Trauma, social isolation, and bullying are highly correlated with the development of SED.^{14,15,16} Transition-age youth (16–25 years) are a population of particular concern given their high rates of SED and low rates of seeking help.

Similar factors and signs existed in the case of the Parkland shooting, which was allegedly committed by a transition-aged youth. The alleged shooter had experienced numerous instances of difficulties in the community and with his family, including violence against animals and toward his mother and others. The aforementioned social isolation also appeared to be a factor in the Parkland case. The alleged shooter was reported to be lonely, ostracized, and volatile.

A growing number of studies suggests that greater mental, emotional, and behavioral health impacts might be achieved by enhancing protective factors and reducing risk factors that place children and adolescents at risk for adverse health and educational outcomes. These efforts also might buffer children and adolescents from the potentially harmful effects of negative situations and events, such as exposure to violence.¹⁷

Unfortunately, past experience demonstrates that these trends are not new. The US has seen alarming school shootings which previous Administrations

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Half of all lifetime cases of mental illness begin by age 14 and three-quarters by age 24.

have aimed to address. An examination of recommendations from previous Administrations reveals that many did not focus specifically on mental illness identification or service provision. For example, recommendations following the Columbine shooting focused largely on improving law enforcement's response to these types of events. Recommendations from subsequent reports, such as following the Virginia Tech shooting, did address access to the mental healthcare system; however, the recommendations centered on a very narrow and specific component of the mental healthcare delivery system. The *Now is the Time* response following the tragedy at Sandy Hook demonstrated an evolving understanding of the need to address mental health issues through comprehensive recommendations on mental healthcare reform. A review of the Parkland shooting indicates that we need to be more specific and comprehensive with these recommendations.

There is an urgent need to reduce risk for youth mental, emotional, and behavioral difficulties through the implementation of efficacious and effective prevention interventions, as well as identify youth at risk for mental illness in schools and connect them with needed treatment and services.¹⁸ This includes efforts to increase basic mental health literacy, particularly for those working with young people. Research has shown that early identification and treatment improves outcomes. Thus, intervening early is critical given that half of all lifetime cases of mental illness begin by age 14 and three-quarters by age 24.¹⁹

Most communities and schools lack high-quality treatment for children and adolescents, however.²⁰ Many areas of the nation are without psychiatrists, psychologists, and other professionals (especially those with experience in treating children) to meet the growing needs. Navigating complex systems to seek care is often challenging for families and involves long wait times, few services, and poor insurance coverage.

Commission Observations

Schools have the potential to play a key role in preventing youth mental, emotional, and behavioral difficulties, identifying and supporting students with mental health problems and reducing youth violence. Yet up to 79 percent of school-age youth have unmet mental health needs.²¹ The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) makes available a free appropriate public education to eligible children with disabilities throughout the nation and ensures special education and related services for them. The IDEA governs how states and public agencies provide early intervention, special education, and related services to more than 6.5 million eligible infants, toddlers, children, and youth with disabilities.

Unfortunately, many schools lack the capacity to identify and adequately treat mental illness. School principals report that student mental health needs are one of their biggest challenges.²² Integrating mental health prevention and treatment services and supports into schools can provide many benefits, including reducing risk for mental health disorders and increasing access to care for those who need treatment while reducing the stigma of seeking help. It can also help provide early identification, intervention, and a full continuum of services while using a multidisciplinary approach. This involves engaging teachers, parents, and community providers as partners in promoting social, emotional, and academic learning for all students. The continuum of services includes violence prevention programs along with social and emotional development efforts, such as the evidence-based model of the Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) framework.²³ Bringing these efforts to scale across the nation and sustaining them are important steps in improving student mental health and preventing adverse outcomes, including aggression and bullying.

Healthcare providers can also play an important role in identifying children at risk. For example, at a school-based health center in Ashland, OR, a family nurse practitioner addresses a range of behavioral health concerns, including depression, threats of violence, and suicide, for students as well as their families.²⁴ Additionally, some schools have embedded health clinics that may play an important role in identifying and treating children and adolescents with certain behavioral health conditions.

Comprehensive school-based mental health systems (CSMHS) are school-community partnerships that provide a continuum of mental health services (such as prevention, early identification, and treatment) that support students, families, and the school community. They seek to improve the school climate and can decrease social isolation and marginalization, including bullying.^{25,26} Key aspects include evidence-based universal prevention; training for school and community members to identify and respond to early warning signs of mental health difficulties; and targeted prevention and treatment intervention programs and services supporting the mental health of students. Mental health care delivery is integrated within school settings.

Several states are implementing CSMHS, including Pennsylvania, Maryland, Wisconsin, New Hampshire, Tennessee, and Alaska. The cost of implementing a comprehensive system varies depending on factors such as student needs, evidence-based practices used, and reimbursement for certain services by public and private insurance. Multiple streams of funding, including public and private insurance, are used to finance CSMHS. Currently, federal grants provide support for 20 states to develop CSMHS at up to \$1.8 million per year, per state.²⁷

The following approaches have been effective in addressing the mental health needs of youth.

Prevention of mental, emotional, and behavioral difficulties in youth

There is a body of research showing that there are efficacious and effective developmentally focused prevention intervention from prenatal through adolescence that decrease risk for mental, emotional, and behavioral difficulties, and there are examples of them being implemented at scale in communities.²⁸

Violence prevention

Reducing Youth Violence: Addressing youth violence requires a comprehensive approach. The Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Framework was developed by the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) in response to the Columbine School shooting. It provides schools and communities with a template for implementing best practices to prevent youth violence.^{29,30} These practices include:

1. collaboration and partnership with juvenile justice, law enforcement, and other related agencies;
2. enhanced technology to identify patterns and trends;
3. policy change and development, including diversion intervention plans to keep students out of juvenile justice systems;
4. capacity building; and
5. systemic change and integration.

More than 350 school districts have implemented the SS/HS Framework. Over 30,000 mental health professionals, teachers, and administrators have been trained in prevention and other mental health-related practices and activities as well as in the provision of specific parent and caregiver training and support.

State SS/HS successes include a 50 percent reduction in suspensions and expulsions in Connecticut, a 51 percent reduction in risks associated with depression in Pennsylvania, and a 37 percent decrease in the number of students who reported staying home from school due to feeling unsafe in Nevada.³¹

SS/HS programs can also use enhanced technology to develop a comprehensive data-collection system to track student behavior, providing an interactive online map to depict disciplinary data and identify patterns and trends. The integrated database identifies the time of day and location of disciplinary incidents so that staff can respond to “hot spots” and use the data to make decisions about how to best allocate resources. The estimated cost is approximately \$1–3 million to implement at the school district level.

Another valuable resource available to the public is the CDC’s A Comprehensive Technical Package for the Prevention of Youth Violence and Associated Risk Behaviors. This represents a select group of strategies based on the best available evidence to help commu-

Table 3-1

Safe Schools/Healthy Students Results

State	Result
CT	50% reduction in suspensions and expulsions
PA	51% reduction in risks associated with depression
NV	37% decrease in the number of students who reported staying home from school due to feeling unsafe

nities and states sharpen their focus on prevention activities with the greatest potential to prevent youth violence and its consequences.³²

Access to treatment for mental illness

Starting Early in Life: Training adults to appropriately identify and respond to concerning behavioral health problems allows children to stay in supportive environments and optimizes their potential for successful development.³³ The training and education of parents and families is equally important and a critical part of these efforts.³⁴

Work is underway across 32 states, tribes, and territories to implement Project Launch, an evidence-based SAMHSA program, by training staff in childcare, Head Start, home visiting, and other settings.³⁵ These efforts help improve children’s social skills and emotional functioning, promote healthy relationships, reduce challenging behaviors, reduce the number of suspensions and expulsions, improve classroom quality, and reduce provider and teacher stress, burnout, and turnover.^{36,37}

In addition, the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA), Maternal and Child Health Bureau, in collaboration with the Administration for Children and Families, administers the Maternal, Infant, and Early Childhood Home Visiting (MIECHV) Program. The MIECHV Program gives pregnant women and families, particularly those considered at-risk, necessary resources and skills to raise children who are physically, socially, and emotionally healthy and ready to succeed. Awardees select from a list of evidence-based service delivery models.

Helping Children and Families with the Highest Needs:

Children with high needs may have serious mental health diagnoses, such as major depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). Mental illness significantly affects their ability to function at home, in school, or in the community. Affected children and their families may have complex medical, behavioral health, and social needs that require a more in-depth and broader array of assistance.

The Commission meeting “Curating a Healthier and Safer Approach: Issues of Mental Health and Counseling of Our Young” comprised experts who testified to the importance of including access to mental health



service provision in schools and/or providing robust systems of referrals and linkages to such services. One witness testified that “by providing these services in schools, we have an opportunity to decrease stigma associated with seeking mental healthcare, and we can also decrease many of the barriers to getting students help when they need it.”³⁸

Ensuring High Quality of Integrated Care: The quality of community mental healthcare across the nation varies greatly. Very few communities provide comprehensive, coordinated, evidence-based care for children and adults with SMI and SED. The Certified Community Behavioral Health Clinic demonstration and expansion program provides comprehensive, high-quality, integrated care in a “one stop shop” model. It includes access to crisis care, evidence-based treatment for mental and substance use disorders, recovery support services, and linkages with primary healthcare.

Addressing Childhood Trauma: In many instances, children with a mental illness have experienced trauma and need treatment. SAMHSA supports the National Child Traumatic Stress Initiative and the National Children Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN), which improves access to treatment and services for children and adolescents who have experienced or witnessed traumatic events and has identified more than 30 evidence-based interventions to support such children and their families.

These interventions include screening and assessment practices as well as training curricula implemented in approximately one-third of schools of social work. They also include resources targeted to parents, families, and caregivers who play an essential role in understanding and supporting children and teenagers

who have experienced traumatic events.³⁹ NCTSN has engaged more than 10,000 local and state partnerships integrating trauma-informed services into a range of child-serving systems.

NCTSN supports efforts in 44 states and D.C. Outcomes from this work show that the percentage of children who reported positive functioning in everyday life (e.g., dealing effectively with daily problems, crises, social situations, school/work) increased by 61 percent from baseline to the most recent assessment.⁴⁰

Caring for Transition-Age Youth: Evidence-based interventions, such as the Transition to Independence Process (TIP), can help improve treatment engagement and functioning for youth and young adults aged 16–25 with or at-risk for SED/SMI. Specifically, TIP involves youth and young adults in a process that facilitates greater self-sufficiency and successful attainment of adult roles and responsibilities. It does so by engaging them and, as appropriate, their families in their own future planning process while providing developmentally appropriate and appealing services and supports.

TIP has been shown to improve the lives of young people in the areas of employment and career, education, living situation, personal effectiveness and well-being, and community-life functioning. Currently, 15 states and D.C. are implementing this approach. Findings from these efforts indicate significant decreases in psychological distress, improvements in physical health, decreases in homelessness, and increases in employment.⁴¹

Treating First Episode Psychosis: Each year approximately 100,000 individuals, primarily youth, experience a First Episode of Psychosis (FEP). Coordinated Specialty Care (CSC) is a demonstrated effective model for them.⁴² Research shows that individuals with early psychosis who receive CSC achieved significant improvements in education and employment as well as a decrease in hospitalization rate.⁴³

CSC is a coordinated care approach that provides treatment, family education and engagement, and recovery support services delivered by an integrated, multidisciplinary care team. A set-aside in the SAMHSA Mental Health Block Grant supports states to implement this practice nationwide. For example, Kentucky has developed a data infrastructure to track outcomes and improve the eight CSC programs its set-aside

funding supports. Approximately 250 CSC programs are currently in place across the country to reduce the duration of untreated psychosis, improve outcomes, and promote recovery.⁴⁴

Identifying and Supporting At-Risk Youth: A growing evidence base supports approaches to identifying youth at risk for psychosis and providing early interventions that could have an impact on the trajectory of this serious condition.⁴⁵ On average, there is a more than 50 percent reduction in risk of an individual actually having a first episode of psychosis after demonstrating early phases of a psychotic disorder for those receiving psychosocial treatment services, such as cognitive behavioral therapy.^{46,47}

Research also demonstrates the association of early intervention services with engagement in treatment, improved involvement in school, and improvement in symptom severity.⁴⁸ SAMHSA is working with communities to better understand and address the needs of youth and young adults in the earliest stages of psychosis.

Building Mental Health Literacy: Raising awareness and literacy around mental health issues is a critical component of improving school-based mental health. Mental Health First Aid and Youth Mental Health First Aid are examples of mental health literacy curricula designed to provide a basic understanding of common mental health issues and how to refer people in mental health crises appropriately.

These trainings are widely available to school personnel, parents and families, first responders, law enforcement, and others, with more than one million people across the nation already trained. Research has indicated that gains in mental health knowledge over the course of the training were associated with increased help-seeking intentions, suggesting that mental health literacy may facilitate treatment utilization. Instructor training costs between \$1,500 and \$2,000, while individual course training varies, with an average cost of \$119.

During the Commission's visit to Adams Friendship Middle School in Wisconsin, it was noted that the Mental Health First Aid model was an essential element to changing school climate and ultimately increasing access to care. Crisis Intervention Team training provides specific training to law enforcement and other first responders in safely responding to people

with mental illness or addiction who are in crisis. Most states have implemented such mental health literacy efforts.^{49,50}

Financing School-Based Mental Health: States have been using a variety of strategies for school-based mental healthcare, including the use of Medicaid and other resources. According to the 2015 CMS (Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services) Medicaid Financial Management Report, the total computable expenditure for “school-based services” was more than \$3.1 billion. The state share was about \$1.4 billion. 2016 Financial Management Data indicates expenditure of \$3.3 billion.

The 2015 report indicates that 44 states offer reimbursement.⁵¹ Examples include Louisiana, which authorized the use of school nurses to deliver Medicaid-funded mental health services to students with Individualized Education Plans, and Arkansas, which developed administrative procedures to finance school-based mental health programs. During the Commission’s Wisconsin site visit, the Adams Friendship School District shared its innovative approach to braiding federal funding streams. This approach enabled the development and implementation of a school-climate culture change to foster access to treatment and provision of services.

Workforce

Behavioral Health Workforce Shortages: A consistent theme throughout the Commission’s listening sessions, site visits, and meetings was the lack of mental health professionals in schools or in centers that students and schools can easily access. Clinical, peer, and family support is critical to help youth and their families with SED engage in and navigate complex systems of care.

High turnover rates, an aging workforce, and low compensation all contribute to workforce shortages across the mental health arena. Unfortunately, this shortage is all too apparent in the school system. Clinical, peer, and family support providers may enhance the workforce efforts by developing trust and effective relationships through similar lived experiences.^{52,53} They help to address critical caregiver supports and have been shown to improve quality of life, engagement, and satisfaction with services and supports. They also help improve overall health and reduce overall cost of services.⁵⁴

Training the Workforce: It is important to support clinicians and others in providing high-quality care to ensure broad use and appropriate implementation of best practices. Several new efforts have recently been initiated to accomplish this, including:

1. the Clinical Support System for Serious Mental Illness, to support the implementation of evidence-based practices in the treatment and recovery of individuals with SMI;
2. 12 Mental Health Technology Transfer Centers, which provide regionally focused assistance to clinicians and others;
3. a 90-minute Specialized Educational Tool on Assessing and Addressing Risk of Youth Violence, developed in partnership with the U.S. Department of Education and made available at no cost to teachers, first responders, parents, and students; and
4. mental health literacy training, such as Mental Health First Aid and Crisis Intervention Training.

In addition, HRSA supports several training programs that include the training of future child and adolescent behavioral health professionals. Within HRSA’s Maternal and Child Health Bureau, the Developmental Behavioral Pediatrics Program supports the advanced postdoctoral fellowship training of pediatricians to enhance the behavioral, psychosocial, and developmental components of pediatric care.

Establishing Counseling, Psychological, and Social Services (CPSS) Coordinators: Coordination can have a positive impact on the quality and delivery of mental health and other related services.⁵⁵ CPSS Coordinators can bring together various providers within and outside of schools to meet students’ needs.⁵⁶ This can also result in a clear mission, goals, and objectives that promote the integration of procedures and programs.⁵⁷ Integration of services within the larger school environment helps secure resources, such as confidential space for providing services, and helps minimize lost class time for students seeking services. A recent survey of school districts revealed that 79.5 percent of them had staff to oversee CPSS.⁵⁸

Using Technology to Address Workforce Issues: Technology can play a significant role in enhancing the workforce. “Telemental health” is the use of video-conferencing to conduct real-time mental health

treatment between a clinician and patient. This can provide needed treatment to people who otherwise may not have access to mental healthcare, including those in underserved or rural areas.

The use of telemental health services in both rural and urban environments, including schools, has been

effective and cost efficient, and has met with high ratings of satisfaction by students. The cost of implementing telemental health services can vary. The purchase of equipment can be between \$500 and \$10,000, with each encounter costing approximately \$78.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. SAMHSA and CMS should provide information to states on available financing options for comprehensive school-based mental health care services, enabling states to develop innovative solutions within current requirements.
2. All appropriate federal agencies should increase awareness of mental health issues among students and ways to seek needed care. Often, stigma is associated with the lack of seeking help for a mental health condition. As discussed during the July 11 Commission meeting, stigma is often the reason that individuals needing help choose not to seek treatment.
3. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Health Resources and Services Administration should continue to support the mental health workforce response to children's needs through existing programs such as the National Health Services Corps Loan Repayment Program.

■ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. All appropriate state and local agencies should continue to increase awareness of mental health issues among students and ways to seek needed care. Often, stigma is associated with the lack of seeking help for a mental health condition. As discussed during the July 11 Commission meeting, stigma is often the reason that individuals needing help choose not to seek treatment.
2. Schools and local behavioral health agencies should increase training of adults who interact with children (e.g., caregivers, preschool staff) to recognize signs and symptoms of mental illness. This is an imperative step in enhancing school-based mental health services. The Early Childhood Mental Health Consultation model trains such adults to identify early signs of mental health conditions and to respond appropriately.⁵⁹

Additionally, training can be enhanced through the development of a network of national and regional technical assistance centers for children, adolescent and youth school-based mental disorder prevention and treatment. The network should assist states and localities in adopting mental health promotion activities, including suicide prevention and clinical treatment provision. It would work in collaboration with the SAMHSA-established national network of Technology Transfer Centers in Prevention, Addiction, and Serious Mental Illness.

Trainings to increase mental health literacy to recognize signs and symptoms of mental illness, such as Mental Health First Aid, also provide key resources for individuals working with children. Distribution of tools and resources, including the SAMHSA-developed PowerPoint "Assessing and Addressing Risk of Violence in Youth," to all school districts and college campuses, could also be considered.

3. State and local school districts in collaboration with social service, faith based, primary care and law enforcement agencies should develop and implement comprehensive and coordinated approaches that are inclusive of all systems involved in service provision. This is a critical factor in addressing school-based mental health in the most efficient way possible. The systems of care (SOC) framework is an approach that explicitly includes all systems that are involved with providing services to children and is a proven best practice in providing comprehensive, community-based mental health prevention, treatment, and support services to youth with SED or SMI and their parents and families. Examples of the types of systems in an SOC approach are social services, education, and juvenile justice. Youth and transition-aged youth receiving services in SOC programs may include those experiencing an FEP, those with SED, or those with SMI. Recipients of SOC services have demonstrated significant improvements in behavioral and emotional functioning; significant reductions in thoughts of suicide and suicide attempts; significant reductions in unlawful activities; and significant cost reductions due to decreases in hospitalizations and arrests.⁶⁰
4. State and local behavioral health agencies should increase the availability of high-quality community-based services such as Certified Community Behavioral Health Clinics and crisis/acute care services (e.g., mobile teams, inpatient care), as needed. These services could include evidence-based practices, trauma-informed services, multidisciplinary team-based approaches, recovery supports, and medication-assisted treatment, where indicated.
5. State and local school districts should engage and activate natural supports in communities. It is not enough simply to engage law enforcement, healthcare, and schools. Other supports, such as the faith community, can help identify and support youth with SED and refer them to needed treatment. Although the school system plays an integral role in ensuring the sound mental health of its students, a holistic community approach is needed. Community partnerships contribute to the success of the expansion of school-based mental health.
6. State and local school districts should increase the use of technology, including telemental health infrastructure, to increase access to services for individuals in underserved or rural areas. Telehealth service provision and care extension strategies include collaborative models of medical education and support to manage patients with complex conditions such as the Extension for Community Healthcare Outcomes (ECHO) type model. These models have been very effective in serving hard-to-reach populations and areas. Telehealth provides a means to treatment access for those who might otherwise not be able to access it.

Chapter 3 Endnotes


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Integrating Mental Health, Primary Care, Family Services, and Court-Ordered Treatment

Students often come to school with multiple complex health, mental health, and social service needs. Schools can play an important role in curating healthy environments that seek to prevent and mitigate the onset of health and mental health conditions. Developing and promoting models in which mental health and substance use screening, treatment, and support services are integrated into school and pediatric settings can help to ensure that children, youth, and adolescents with needs (along with their families) are identified earlier and gain access to treatment and other support services.

Research has shown that less than half of children and adolescents with a mental disorder receive the treatment they need. Of those who received treatment, 24 percent were in school-based settings, 23 percent in specialty mental health settings (such as community-based mental health centers), and 10 percent in primary care.¹ Ensuring there are services and systems available and accessible that support positive social and emotional development early in a child's life is more effective than working to address problems later in life.² Therefore, it is important to provide an array of services that are evidence-based and address a child's overall health, including mental health.³



Given the amount of time children spend there, schools are a natural environment in which to provide these services.⁴ Studies show that the way to integrate services and shift the overall school culture to support these services is to develop and implement a plan that works with other important school issues and supports the goals of education.^{5,6,7,8} In general, the most successful integration programs also include buy-in from committed and dedicated leaders, and exhibit effective communication and collaboration among the integrated care team.^{9,10} There is solid evidence in support of the impact that school mental health programs can have on academics.¹¹ Embedded school-based mental health services make the services accessible and acceptable to both students and families.^{12,13} A significant amount of research demonstrates that treatment is much more likely to be effective and completed when services are school based.¹⁴

Another approach in which mental and physical health services can be integrated is by providing mental and substance use healthcare services in a pediatric primary care setting. Twenty-five percent of children and adolescents seen in primary care settings and about half of all pediatric office visits involve behavioral, emotional, developmental, psychosocial, and/or educational concerns in children and adolescents. It is important to note that psychiatric disorders in children and adolescents are often evaluated and treated in the pediatrician's office.¹⁵ Research has demonstrated that, in some communities, seeing a pediatrician for a mental health concern may be associated with significantly less stigma than seeing a mental health provider.¹⁶

There is an increasing trend toward addressing children's and adolescents' "whole health" (i.e., both physical and mental health needs) in primary care settings. Evidence suggests that mental health conditions are correlated with adverse physical health conditions, and approximately 75 percent of physical

health outcomes in conditions like asthma, obesity, and diabetes are correlated with mental health problems.^{17,18,19} When mental health outcomes are addressed, physical health outcomes also improve.²⁰

Multiple efforts have been made to integrate pediatric primary care and behavioral health.²¹ The patient-centered medical home model (PCMH), which originated in pediatrics, has at its core the idea of attending to both the individual's physical and mental health.²² The integration of mental health services into pediatric primary care settings has shown effectiveness in several approaches from consultation models (e.g., telephonic consultation with child and adolescent psychiatrists as described in sections of this report), co-location of mental health providers, and care coordination.²³

Often included in the integration of primary care and mental health services is care coordination. This involves referring and linking to resources and sharing information among all participants involved with an individual's care to achieve better health outcomes. Care coordination links youth and their families to services such as specialty healthcare, mental healthcare, and social services programs. As one study puts it, "Coordination of care across settings permits an integration of services that is centered on the comprehensive needs of the individual and their family, leading to decreased healthcare costs, reduction in fragmented care, and improvement in the individual/family experience of care."²⁴

Care coordination is a key part of the SAMHSA (Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration) Systems of Care model. This is a recommended approach for working with children and their parents/caregivers as they navigate complex multisystem agencies and services. Involving the family in the care of their children and adolescents by including them in the services and supports provided in schools or in pediatric primary care settings is an essential part of providing integrated care. Parents and the family play a key role in supporting any interventions. Not only do parents make treatment decisions for their children, they are also critical in facilitating treatment. In addition, parents and caregivers of children with complex needs often need support and services themselves.

Families should be engaged in the development and implementation of treatment services in a meaningful way. Equal partnerships with child, family, and

Involving the family in the care of their children and adolescents by including them in the services and supports provided in schools or in pediatric primary care settings is an essential part of providing integrated care.

system need to be developed to produce positive outcomes.^{25,26}

Shared decision-making is an emerging best practice in mental and physical health. It is one way to assist people in treatment and recovery and help their families engage in informed, meaningful, and collaborative discussions with providers about their healthcare services. The American Academy of Pediatrics has also acknowledged the critical role of families in improving children's health outcomes (and outcomes for the family as a whole) and improving the pediatrician's ability to provide high-quality care.^{27,28}

Prevention and early intervention programs to divert youth from the Justice System

Prevention services that address mental health conditions and divert youth from the juvenile justice system are an essential part of an effective continuum of services. Prevention strategies include: education for both the family and the youth on key issues such as substance use, social skill development, support for academic achievement, connection to family and other adults, and close and positive relationships with peers, as well as services and supports for the family, among other interventions. These approaches can lead to the lessening or prevention of future risk.²⁹ Research has shown that there are a number of strategies and interventions that reduce youth violence victimization and perpetration and associated risk factors.^{30,31}

In general, persons receiving mental disorder treatment would benefit from treatments that are provided in the least restrictive and most integrated setting possible. It is known that early interventions that support healthy social and emotional development do make a

Prevention services that address mental health conditions and divert youth from the juvenile justice system are an essential part of an effective continuum of services.

difference in longer-term outcomes, particularly with regard to children at risk for involvement with juvenile justice. The prevention adage “you can pay now, or you can pay later” is an important foundation for all prevention and early intervention services. This is particularly so when considering interventions that would prevent children from entering into juvenile justice systems that often are very hard for them to get out of once they have a criminal record.

Students with disabilities, including those with mental and substance use disorders, are more likely to be involved in disciplinary actions at school and are more often suspended or expelled.³² These actions can have a significant negative impact on a young person and may result in social disconnectedness as well as law enforcement and/or juvenile justice involvement. Once a youth becomes involved in the juvenile justice system, receiving needed treatment is challenging.

The prevalence of mental disorders among justice-involved youth ranges from 50 to 75 percent, with about 25 percent having significant impairment.^{33,34} Recidivism studies indicate that the rates of re-arrest for juvenile offenders who have returned from residential treatment and/or juvenile correctional settings range from 40 percent to 85 percent.^{35,36,37} These findings tend to suggest that when juvenile justice-involved youth are released to the community, there is a higher likelihood that they will reoffend and end up back in the juvenile justice system.

Ensuring that at-risk youth receive timely and appropriate prevention and early intervention services is highly recommended as a best practice.^{38,39} States and localities have implemented programs to divert youth as early in the process as possible as a way to address their mental health needs and keep them out of the juvenile justice system. To increase participation in treatment, they have also provided less formal, community-based alternatives to the justice system.^{40,41}

Court-ordered or emergency treatment

There are multiple avenues for children and adolescents to receive treatment through emergency mental health services and/or court orders. The following four areas summarize these possibilities.

Emergency Mental Health Treatment: Pediatric primary care settings and pediatric emergency departments are now seeing increasing numbers of children

and adolescents with mental health conditions. These visits account for 25–50 percent of primary care and 5 percent of pediatric emergency department visits.^{42,43,44,45,46,47} As children’s legal guardians, parents are generally able to make medical treatment decisions for their children, although specific details around mental health and substance use may vary by state. When safety is jeopardized as a result of a mental health condition, parents or guardians can usually facilitate and consent to treatment. In such situations, court involvement is generally not needed.

Emergency Petitions to Access Treatment: For the most part, parents have the authority to consent for medical and psychiatric treatment for their minor children (even over youth objections) for most conditions up to the age of majority, which is usually 18.^{48,49} In some states, a youth may consent to treatment without parent knowledge; likewise, a youth may have the right to refuse mental health or substance use care even when the parent consents to it.⁵⁰ At times, parents may have to petition the court for an emergency hold or temporary detention order to access diagnosis and treatment and to keep their child—and others—safe. Generally, older adolescents enjoy greater legal rights to consent to their own treatment, and a cutoff age is often 14 or 16 years of age.

In some instances, a provider or court may opine that a child’s well-being or safety is in conflict with the wishes of the parent. In circumstances of extreme safety risk in some states, a physician may detain a child or adolescent even if the parent objects. A parent still may need to consent to treatment given (such as medication), even if the child or adolescent is legally committed to a hospital over the objection of the parent. In some jurisdictions, this process would occur through a court-appointed emergency guardian for the child or adolescent. These details vary from state to state.

While involuntary treatment is a tool that can be used, it may lead to a child’s or family’s distrust of a service system that initiated this kind of intervention. In these situations, parents may find themselves responsible for payment of treatment and transportation costs that they were not expecting.⁵¹ If a community has a comprehensive array of services, including care coordination and other more intensive services, the need for involuntary treatment can be reduced.⁵²



“Homicide is the third leading cause of death for young people between the ages of 10 and 24, and nationwide, 15.7 percent of students carried a weapon (e.g., gun, knife, or club) on at least one day in the past month.”

When possible, decision-making in behavioral health-care should be made jointly by family, caregivers, and youth. Partnerships between child, family, and system facilitate positive outcomes.⁵³

Child Welfare: The state may become involved in treatment decisions if the child or adolescent is in the custody of the state. Child abuse and neglect are defined by state laws, and child protective agencies can become involved in situations of abuse or neglect. “Medical neglect” is a term that can trigger the involvement of the child welfare system if the parent is not agreeing to needed treatment for the child or adolescent or is not following through with treatment determined necessary to treat a serious condition.⁵⁴ A temporary or permanent court-appointed guardian may be required to consent to treatment on behalf of the child or adolescent.

Child in Need of Services (CHINS): A child or youth’s behavior can be so challenging that parents cannot manage it. In these situations, the family can enter into a “child in need of services” or “child in need of supervision” arrangement. This is a legal process whereby courts can mandate treatment compliance and/or school attendance. The CHINS process varies by state. In Maryland, for example, it begins when someone makes a referral to the Department of Juvenile Services (DJS). The DJS officer may elect to file a petition that results in a hearing to determine if the child or youth should be placed under formal supervision by DJS.

Additional measures can be considered for some transition-age youth and young adults who exhibit ongoing serious and significant mental health needs and who may be at risk of violence. According to one study, “Homicide is the third leading cause of death for young people between the ages of 10 and 24,⁵⁵ and nationwide, 15.7 percent of students carried a weapon

(e.g., gun, knife, or club) on at least one day in the past month.”⁵⁶ Interventions can mitigate the risk of violent behavior.⁵⁷

Commission Observations

Mental health conditions are a leading cause of health-related disability and often go unidentified and untreated. Screening that identifies emotional and behavioral problems is a first step in promoting early intervention and, if necessary, referral to treatment. Schools are a viable setting for screening, which could be incorporated just like visual and hearing screening.

During the July 11 Commission meeting, one expert testified that providing services in schools could reduce stigma and increase access to needed care. Primary healthcare providers, parents, caregivers, and other community agencies could also identify signs of mental health and substance use issues. This position is endorsed by the American Academy of Pediatrics⁵⁸ and (for depression in youth over age 11) by the United States Preventive Services Task Force.⁵⁹

Unfortunately, the alleged Parkland shooter was not able to access mental health or counseling services within his school. (This is the case with many students with mental health conditions.)

In view of his apparent emotional problems, it was recommended that he attend an alternative school in which services would have been provided. But because he was 18, he had the right to refuse such services and stay in the mainstream school that did not provide services.

Through its work, the Commission has identified the following integrated models and approaches that have been successful.

Whole School, Whole Community, Whole Child: The WSCC model includes and expands on previously developed frameworks focusing on the “greater alignment, integration, and collaboration between education and health to improve each child’s cognitive, physical, social, and emotional development.”⁶⁰

Primary healthcare providers, parents, caregivers, and other community agencies could also **identify signs** of mental health and substance use issues.

This model builds on the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s (CDC) coordinated school health approach, which has been the blueprint for integrating health-promoting practices in school settings, recognizing the relationship between educational attainment and health.^{61,62} The WSCC model prioritizes the child and the development of a school-wide approach, and supports learning, health, and the school as being a part of the local community.⁶³ Colorado, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Maine have implemented aspects of this model at the state and local levels.⁶⁴

Interconnected Systems Framework: Another program that integrates behavioral health services into schools is the Interconnected Systems Framework (ISF). This program uses a Multi-tiered System of Supports (MTSS) approach of academic and behavioral support in schools. The Positive Behavioral Intervention and Supports (PBIS) is an example of an MTSS. The MTSS approach involves three levels, or tiers:

- a) a universal tier that provides basic interventions for all students;
- b) selective tier for some students at risk; and
- c) tertiary intervention for those students in need of diagnosis and treatment for a mental health condition.

This provides the appropriate level of care for each student.^{65,66}

SAMHSA’s Project AWARE (Advancing Wellness and Resilience in Education) currently supports 20 states in developing quality comprehensive school mental health systems that seek to meet the needs of all students, especially those at high risk for violence perpetration and suicide.⁶⁷ Findings from this program show improved ability to identify and refer children and youth with mental health problems to appropriate treatment.

School-Based Health Centers: SBHCs are one more model of providing behavioral health services. These centers include “primary medical care; mental/behavioral healthcare; dental/oral care; and health education and promotion.”⁶⁸ SBHCs operate in a variety of ways and can be managed through healthcare providers employed by the school or in partnership with other healthcare agencies. Currently, there are more than 2,300 SBHCs in 49 states and Washington D.C.



Some 94 percent of them are in or on school property, and 67 percent include behavioral health providers on staff.⁶⁹

SBHCs increase access and improve health, mental health, and educational outcomes for youth and families.^{70,71} Funding for them comes from multiple sources, such as local, state, and federal government, private foundations, and public and commercial health insurers. Examples of federal programs that support school-based services include: the Health Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) SBHC Capital Program, Federally Qualified Health Center funding (Section 330 of the Public Health Service Act), and Title X of the Public Health Service Act.⁷² Services may also be reimbursed by Medicaid if the services are Medicaid coverable and delivered by qualified Medicaid practitioners to eligible and enrolled Medicaid children.

Coordinated Specialty Care: CSC is an evidence-based, recovery-oriented, and team-based treatment program for transition-aged youth experiencing a first episode psychosis (FEP). The young person and a defined team of professionals work together to make treatment decisions. Family members and school or employment coaches are essential elements of the treatment intervention.⁷³

Integration of mental healthcare and pediatric primary care

The Chronic Care Model: The Chronic Care Model was developed to assist primary care settings to more effectively manage long-term conditions. It served as the foundation for the patient-centered medical home and is recommended by the American Academy of Pediatrics as a practice model for children with mental health problems.⁷⁴ The Chronic Care Model was developed more than 20 years ago and includes care coordination staff as a key element.⁷⁵ The National Initiative for Children's Healthcare Quality describes this program in detail.⁷⁶ The Chronic Care Model has been widely adopted in modern healthcare settings.⁷⁷

The System of Care Approach: The System of Care approach begins with recognition that youth with complex conditions and their families must interact with multiple different systems. When these systems are not coordinated, the direction and support given to a family can be confusing, unclear, and overwhelming.⁷⁸ The System of Care model builds a team around a family so that interventions and efforts are aligned and staged in a way that families can better manage implementation.⁷⁹ It is effective in improving outcomes for children, including functioning, school attendance, reduced depression levels, improved chronic physical health conditions, and several other positive indicators.⁸⁰

The Massachusetts Child Psychiatry Access

Project: MCPAP is a statewide system in Massachusetts that uses regional consultation teams focused solely on children's mental health. It supports a telephone consultation service wherein primary care physicians and providers can consult directly with specialty child mental health professionals on-demand. Services include care coordination and follow up, as well as psychopharmacology and psychotherapy consultations.⁸¹

MCPAP also trains primary care providers on how to respond to mental health needs and increases their competency to provide mental healthcare. Primary care providers are often able to address the needs of youth with mild to moderate mental health concerns, while the consultation teams triage and direct to mental health providers those children with more complicated, serious mental health conditions.⁸²

Care4Kids: Care4Kids is a Wisconsin program that addresses individualized needs by providing a comprehensive care coordination healthcare model for children in out-of-home care (OHC). To ensure access to quality services in a timely manner, Care4Kids provides children with access to primary care physicians trained in the needs of children in OHC by establishing a healthcare coordination team that manages the care for the child.

Facilitated by a healthcare coordinator, the team comprises a variety of key stakeholders, such as child welfare staff, healthcare professionals, foster parents, the child's family, and other important partners as needed. These stakeholders work closely together to ensure that children in the program receive individualized and developmentally appropriate care in a timely way by medical staff trained in trauma-informed care practice. This approach to healthcare is designed to improve physical and mental health outcomes for children, as well as to promote improved resiliency and create stronger natural support systems for children.⁸³

Programs to support diversion of children and youth into mental health treatment and services from juvenile justice systems

Developing strong partnerships between the juvenile justice system and community organizations (such as mental health agencies, primary care settings, and schools) can help prevent or mitigate an individual's involvement with the juvenile justice system. The goal of this partnership is to provide needed treatment services and supports to keep the individual functioning effectively in the community and to divert him or her from law enforcement or juvenile justice involvement where appropriate.

Diversion programs can be very effective in improving behavioral health outcomes and reducing future delinquency.^{84,85} The Community Preventive Services Task Force's systematic review of the transfer of juvenile offenders to adult criminal courts showed this strategy resulted in a 34 percent increase in rearrests for violent crimes. Clearly, alternative approaches are important.⁸⁶

School-Based Diversion Models: Keeping students with mental disorders out of the juvenile justice system where appropriate and getting them the care they need is an integral component of addressing mental

health. School-based diversion models are designed to fill this critical function.

Multi-Systemic Therapy: Multi-Systemic Therapy (MST) is an intensive family- and community-centered program for youth at risk of incarceration and/or out-of-home placement due to problematic behavior. MST is an evidence-based treatment program that provides time-limited, flexible, individualized interventions that address specific issues and needs.

Therapeutic Foster Care for Delinquent Juveniles: Therapeutic Foster Care service for young people who have had ongoing interactions with the juvenile justice system has been shown to have positive outcomes, including the reduction of violent crime. The service involves placing at-risk youth with foster families who have received several months of specialized training in how to provide the young person with intensive services in a structured environment. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Community Prevention Services Task Force reviewed this approach and found it to reduce violent crime by 71.9 percent among participants when compared with youths in standard group residential treatment facilities and to have net benefits of \$20,351 to \$81,664 per youth.⁸⁷

Court-Ordered Treatments for Adults : Civil commitment processes can mandate treatment for transition-aged youth and young adults over the age of 18 when the individual refuses treatment that would be helpful for the mental illness present. The process usually begins with a temporary hold or petition that seeks to allow time for a diagnostic assessment and determination of the best level of care.

When there is insufficient time to make an accurate diagnosis and treatment recommendation, persons may be subject to unnecessary civil commitment to inpatient treatment or premature release without adequate time to secure appropriate and available outpatient treatment. State laws vary widely regarding the time holds allowed and the process involved.

Assisted Outpatient Treatment (AOT) is a civil commitment law available in 46 states. It allows a court to mandate participation in outpatient treatment and services. Criteria for participation in AOT differ across states, but eligibility may include: posing a threat of substantial harm to oneself or others; having a history of relapsing serious mental illness and/or deterioration of mental status with demonstrated impairment; experiencing multiple hospitalizations or incarcerations related to a mental disorder; a documented history of non-adherence with prescribed treatment; and impaired judgment that is interfering with the ability to make informed decisions about treatment.

Currently, there is wide variability within most states regarding the extent to which AOT laws are utilized. They are almost always used for outpatient step-down after a psychiatric admission and not as a legal intervention that could prevent clinical deterioration. North Carolina is one example of a state with an AOT law that can mandate participation in outpatient treatment designed to stabilize the person and his or her situation so that hospitalization can be avoided.

AOT has produced positive outcomes in adults. This is particularly so in the case of AOT ordered in the context of services that include psychiatric care with attention to medication adherence, counseling, community support services, and medical care. Positive outcomes include increased participation and engagement in treatment and other services, increased adherence to prescribed medication, improved community and social functioning, and reduced incidence of harmful behaviors to self or others.⁸⁸ But current laws make it difficult to place individuals into AOT because the legal standard is high—imminent danger of violent behavior toward self or others.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. SAMHSA and CMS should provide guidance and technical assistance to states on how to utilize federal funding sources to support mental healthcare for children and youth.
2. All appropriate federal agencies should support the implementation of evidence-based diversion models, including development and dissemination of clear, step-by-step guidance for schools on how to build an approach that best meets the mental health, developmental, and educational needs of children and youth in their systems.

One such model is the School Responder Model, where the young person's mental health and substance abuse needs are assessed and then linked to needed community services, including mental health treatment. An effective responder initiative should identify youth with behavioral health needs, reduce their disproportionate referral to the juvenile justice system, and increase their connection to appropriate services that have been shown to improve mental health outcomes and decrease interactions with the justice system. Key components of this model are 1) cross-systems collaboration teams; 2) family and youth engagement; 3) implementation of a behavioral health response (e.g., screening, assessment and services); and 4) creation of formal structures.

3. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should develop guidance for service providers, justice officials, first responders, and school systems, on model state involuntary treatment legislation such as AOT. Clinical programs with outreach to individuals are often a necessary companion to AOT laws. An example of this style of service is Assertive Community Treatment teams, which provide psychiatric and medical care, assure adherence to prescribed medications, and provide counseling and assistance with obtaining community supports.

□ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State and local school districts and state and local behavioral health and health agencies should work together to promote screening and early intervention for mental/substance use disorders in all settings by increasing education and awareness of the importance of these services; by supporting the use of evidence-based screening tools and instruments; and by supporting increases in funding for behavioral health professionals in all settings.
2. State and local school districts and state and local behavioral health and health agencies should work together to support evidence-based care coordination models that ensure a thorough assessment and provide referral, follow up, communication, and ongoing collaboration among and between agencies and providers by working with all public and private payers to provide coverage for these services.
3. State and local school districts should expand the implementation of tiered models that intentionally focus on school climate and incorporate social and emotional learning and prevention, as well as access to specialty treatment for the minority of children who require it. WSCC, MTSS, and PBIS are examples of these systematic models.

4. Law enforcement agencies in collaboration with state and local school districts and state and local behavioral health agencies should develop clear guidance for law enforcement, courts, juvenile justice systems, and jails around developing supportive partnerships with schools to implement effective diversion programs, identifying individuals who could benefit from participation in such programs, and implementing proper procedures for identifying mental and substance use disorders. This guidance can identify specific mechanisms and related practices for diversion at various stages (or intercepts) in the criminal and juvenile justice systems, including pre-arrest, pre-bookings, arraignment, and juvenile court.
5. State and local behavioral health agencies in collaboration with state and local school districts should expand Multi-Systemic Therapy and other evidence-based treatment modalities to most effectively treat youth at risk of incarceration. Multiple controlled trials of MST report significant reductions in rates of recidivism and conduct problems.
6. State policymakers should examine AOT laws in states with attention to consideration of lowering the commitment threshold for AOT in youth with untreated and unstable mental illness. This is so that an appropriate level of care can be mandated (a) for youth with mental health conditions who would clearly benefit from treatment for a mental illness but have a pattern of not engaging with treatment; and (b) where that treatment would improve the overall condition and reduce the risk of harm to themselves or those around them.
7. State policymakers should consider redefining specific terms currently used in most civil commitment state statutes. For the involuntary commitment of an individual due to suicidality, homicidality, or grave disability, the terms “gravely disabled” and/or “imminent danger” are currently used. States should consider whether statutory modifications to incorporate language such as “mental status reasonably foreseeable to be likely to be associated with suicidality, homicidality, or grave disability” would lead to better public policy outcomes. Such a standard, for example, may help secure the involuntary hospitalization and treatment of individuals before they act on thoughts of harm to themselves or others—or the occurrence of other behaviors resulting from impairment produced by untreated mental illness likely to lead to incarceration or other adverse events.

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Using Suspicious Activity Reporting and Threat Assessments to Enhance School Safety

Informed, alert communities play a critical role in keeping our nation safe. By reporting suspicious activities, individuals may be providing the information authorities need to stop an attack before it occurs. This is especially true in relation to school attacks. Studies have shown that, prior to the incident, most attackers engaged in behavior that caused others concern and that others knew about the attacker's ideas or plan to attack.¹ Indeed, before the Parkland shooting, multiple reports were allegedly received about the shooter's concerning behavior.² How they were processed, evaluated, and acted upon remains under review. What is certain is that effective programs addressing suspicious activity reporting and threat assessment can significantly reduce—or prevent—violence.

Following the shooting at Columbine High School in 1999, the U.S. Secret Service partnered with the U.S. Department of Education to study school violence. Completed in 2002, the *Safe School Initiative* examined 37 incidents of targeted violence that occurred at elementary and secondary schools (i.e., K–12).³ The study sought to analyze the thinking and behavior of students who committed these acts from an operational perspective. Its key findings include:

- Incidents of targeted violence at K–12 schools were rarely sudden or impulsive acts.
- Prior to most incidents, other people knew about the attacker's idea and/or plan to attack.
- There is no accurate or useful “profile” of students who engaged in targeted school violence.
- Most attackers engaged in some behavior prior to the incident that caused others concern or indicated a need for help.

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- Most attackers had difficulty coping with significant losses or personal failures. Moreover, many had considered or attempted suicide.
- Many attackers felt bullied, persecuted, or injured by others prior to the attack.
- In many cases, other students were involved in some capacity.

One of the study's most significant findings was that, prior to most attacks, other students knew of the attackers' plans, yet most did not report it to an adult. This finding led the two agencies to conduct a follow-on effort titled the *Bystander Study*,⁴ which was released in 2008. The study explored barriers that may prevent someone from coming forward in advance. A series of in-depth interviews were conducted with persons who did not come forward before an attack took place, as well as those who did come forward and thereby helped to avert a potential school-based attack. The study concluded:

- The relationships between the bystanders and the attackers, and when and how the bystanders came upon information about the planned attacks, varied.
- Bystanders' willingness to share information ranged from those who took no action to those who actively conveyed their concerns.
- School climate affected whether students came forward.
- Some students did not come forward because they disbelieved that the attacks would occur or they misjudged the likelihood and immediacy of the planned attack.
- In some situations, parents and parental figures influenced whether the bystander reported the information to school staff or other adults in positions of authority.



Based on the above, it is clear that there exists an opportunity to customize or expand the framework of suspicious activity reporting to include the identification and reporting of student behaviors of concern. Outreach campaigns, such as the U.S. Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign, and similar state-specific programs, are essential to both encouraging and facilitating the reporting of suspicious activities or other concerning behavior. They not only remind individuals that it is important to stay vigilant and report things that appear out of the ordinary, they also provide guidance on both what should be considered concerning and how and to whom to report it.

Reporting suspicious or concerning behavior on its own, however, will not prevent a violent act from occurring. The reported information must be appropriately evaluated and, if determined to indicate a legitimate potential threat or concern, properly acted upon. This typically means the conducting of a threat assessment.

The school threat assessment process essentially involves a three-step model in which a team *identifies* students of concern, gathers information about their behavior and circumstances to *assess* whether they pose a risk of harm to themselves or the school community, and develops a *management* plan to mitigate that risk. Threat assessment does not definitively predict whether someone will commit an act of violence. Rather, its goal is to evaluate the risk an individual may pose and implement intervention strategies to address concerns.

Research has shown that threat assessment programs are beneficial, including in preventing mass casualty shootings. For instance, a 2008 field study examined 209 student cases from 103 schools that were referred to a centralized threat assessment team because the student had communicated a threat to commit a violent act resulting in a long-term suspension. For each case, the threat assessment team conducted interviews, assessed the threat, and developed a written

report containing findings and recommendations. The results of the threat assessment concluded that all but five students should be returned to school, and none of the alleged threats were carried out.⁵

A 2009 study examined data gathered from Virginia’s 2007 annual school safety audit. It showed that 95 schools had adopted the Virginia threat assessment guidelines, 131 schools used locally developed threat assessment procedures, and 54 reported not using a threat assessment approach. Students were randomly selected from these 280 schools and administered a school climate survey. The schools that used a threat assessment approach had lower rates of bullying and fewer long-term suspensions. Further, students had a greater willingness to seek help for bullying and threats of violence, and had a more positive perception of their school climate.⁶

The importance of suspicious activity reporting and the establishment of threat assessments has been a common theme identified in the wake of past school shootings. The Virginia Tech Commission’s report recommended that states “[e]ducate and train parents, teachers, and students to recognize warning signs and known indicators of violence and mental illness and to alert those who can provide for safety and treatment” and to “[e]stablish and publicize widely a mechanism to report and respond to reported threats of violence.”⁷ The report also noted that creating interdisciplinary teams to evaluate information reported by students and staff, assess the degree of threat, and intervene to preempt the threat was an effective practice.⁸ It recommended that federal agencies work together and with other appropriate partners to share information on and best practices in behavioral analysis, threat assessments, and emergency preparedness.⁹ The Obama Administration’s plan also discussed suspicious activity reporting, and proposed clarifying that no federal law prevents healthcare providers from warning law enforcement authorities about threats of violence.¹⁰

The Columbine Review Commission report stressed the need for school officials to overcome the “code of silence” that often prevented the reporting of concerning behavior. It recommended all schools establish and encourage students to use an anonymous telephone line or other mechanism to report statements or behavior that they found concerning.¹¹ The report also recognized the value of threat assessment teams, recommending that they “should be established at

every Colorado high school and middle school.”¹² The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission report discussed how schools can be designed in a way to facilitate the observation of changes in behavior that may be of concern and should be reported.¹³

Various states and districts have implemented suspicious activity reporting and related threat assessment programs. For instance, in 2004 under Governor Bill Owens, the State of Colorado created Safe2Tell to deliver a statewide anonymous 24-hour reporting tool where parents, students, teachers, school administrators, law enforcement, and others can report a perceived threat to their safety or the safety of others.¹⁴ The reporting tool can be accessed from the Safe2Tell website, calling into the hotline, or through an application on a mobile phone. When imminent action is needed on a report, Safe2Tell passes along the information to local school officials and law enforcement. Also, an accountability component was developed to confirm that every report that comes in is investigated by school and law enforcement agencies, that action was taken, and that the outcome was tracked. In May 2014, Colorado incorporated Safe2Tell under the Colorado Office of the Attorney General to ensure reporting avenues, trainings, and education and awareness efforts are available across the entire state.¹⁵ Similarly, in 2013, Virginia was the first state to pass a law requiring every school in the state to establish a threat assessment team.¹⁶

Commission Observations

Suspicious activity reporting

The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative has issued a publication that provides an overview of some of the key characteristics of an effective suspicious activity reporting program.¹⁷ These include the timely vetting of reports received, educating the

community on the reporting process, complementary training for staff, and privacy protections.¹⁸

Outreach Campaigns: During the August 16 Commission meeting, Officer Chris Fraley, Region 2 Director for the National Association of School Resource Officers, told Commission members: “students are a source of valuable information through social media and talk amongst their peers of potential threats or incidents that are being planned. Security in the school building also involves the promotion of see something, say something wherein the students and staff report crime or suspicious activity.”¹⁹

Visible public awareness messaging campaigns increase vigilance and reporting of suspicious behavior. Successful campaigns, such as the “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign, typically perform outreach through multiple means, both physically and online. This includes posters, factsheets, infographics, websites, audio and video public service announcements, and public events.²⁰ Simple messaging focused on what suspicious activity or concerning behavior looks like and how to report are the hallmarks of many of the major campaigns.

Colorado’s Safe2Tell program similarly uses a variety of methods to raise awareness, including age-appropriate videos, posters, direct messaging, and classroom discussions.²¹ By combining direct messaging along with relevant promotional materials, Safe2Tell effectively spreads its message and tip line number to thousands of students each year.²² Data shows that more Safe2Tell tip reports come from schools that incorporate the Safe2Tell solution in all practices.²³

Many campaign organizers also encourage partnering with other organizations to help expand the reach of the messaging. For example, in the execution of the “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign,



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DHS partners with states, cities, and counties; airports and mass transit entities; sports leagues and teams; major sports events and entertainment venues; colleges and universities; fairs and festivals; private sector businesses; and media outlets. Partners typically work together to tailor campaign messages and distribution mechanisms to their specific stakeholder community. All school districts are encouraged to work with DHS to obtain official “If You See Something, Say Something®” materials that increase awareness of the importance of reporting suspicious activity or concerning behavior within their school community.²⁴

Anonymous Reporting: As early as the Columbine Commission Report, experts have recognized the importance of providing a mechanism for anonymous reporting.²⁵ Numerous witnesses at various Commission events concurred, including Chris Harms, Director of the Colorado School Safety Resource Center; Marguerite Herman, Federal Legislative Chair of the Wyoming Parent Teacher Association; and Trisha Daniel, Nationally Certified School Psychologist from the Alabama Association of School Psychologists.²⁶ Anonymous reporting can be done through various means (e.g., mobile applications, online, email, and phone). It is now a commonplace part of many statewide safety tip lines, such as Michigan’s OK2SAY,²⁷ Wyoming’s Safe2Tell Wyoming,²⁸ Utah’s SafeUT,²⁹ and Nevada’s SafeVoice.³⁰

Anonymous reporting is not without its challenges. For example, it sometimes can make it more difficult to evaluate the veracity of a tip and may increase the likelihood of an individual using a reporting system as a means for harassment or false accusations. However, these challenges are considered infrequent and far outweighed by the benefits of allowing anonymous reporting. Further, they can be greatly mitigated through the incorporation of protocols to ensure that all reports are properly evaluated by trained staff and handled with appropriate discretion.

Complementary Training: Training individuals on how to implement a program is critical to its continued success. As Safe2Tell founder Susan Payne pointedly stated in her testimony to the Commission, “we do not rise to the level of expectation in a crisis, we fall to our level of training.”³¹ In acknowledgement of this, the National Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative calls training one of the 10 key elements to successfully integrating suspicious activity reporting into an

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organization’s operations.³² In the case of suspicious activity reporting and “If You See Something, Say Something®” campaigns, this includes training the intended audience on how to identify and report suspicious behavior as well as training the recipients of the suspicious activity reporting on how to manage and respond to incoming reports.

In her testimony, Payne provided an overview of the many ways in which Safe2Tell raises education and awareness of the program. Its methods include:

- **Train the Trainer Certifications and Staff Trainings.** Safe2Tell developed a training program that certifies individuals and leaders to present Safe2Tell information, materials, and classroom discussion materials to their communities and schools.
- **Conversation Jumpstarts.** Safe2Tell developed educational lessons to provide school staff a tangible tool to lead guided classroom discussions. Available Conversation Jumpstart topics include bullying, cyberbullying, dating, sexting, weapons, depression, and substance abuse. While discussing issues, trainers talk about the code of silence, when it is appropriate to make a report, and what happens when a report is made.

As part of its “See, Say, Do Something” campaign, in May 2018 the Dallas (TX) Independent School District (Dallas ISD) brought thousands of its students to the city’s American Airlines Center to talk about how to prevent and respond to gun violence in schools. At the event (which was planned with help from the International Association of Venue Managers), representatives of the DHS, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Dallas ISD police, and other officials spoke with students about the importance of being vigilant in observing and reporting classmates’ behavior. This event is a potential model for high-impact community outreach and training.³³

Another example of a successful approach to suspicious activity reporting training is the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) First Observer Plus™ Program,³⁴ which TSA offers as a complement to the



“If You See Something, Say Something®” campaign. The First Observer Plus™ Program is a security awareness and training program meant to deliver a simple message to surface transportation professionals to “Observe, Assess, and Report” suspicious activity. Through online and in-person training, the program provides transportation professionals tools to recognize suspicious activity possibly related to terrorism, guidance in assessing what they see, and a method for reporting those observations. Training participants are instructed not to intervene or engage suspicious persons or items, but to follow their organization’s policy for reporting information to local law enforcement and, when possible, to TSA by calling 1-844-TSA-FRST. The TSA First Observer Plus™ Program is available to school transportation frontline employees. Over the past few years, TSA employees have conducted more than 1,000 online school bus training registrations as well as in-person training for more than 200 school bus professionals.

Privacy Protections: As John Verdi, Vice-President of Policy at the Future of Privacy Forum, stated during the July 11 Commission meeting: “trust between students and adults is crucial to ensure that children reach out for help when they need it and report concerns about other students when they have them. Maintaining appropriate safeguards for students’ privacy helps create and maintain that trust.”³⁵

During the design and execution of any suspicious activity reporting program it is important to incorporate appropriate privacy protections and to comply with privacy laws. This can raise additional complexities in the school environment where privacy rights embedded in both the Family Educational Rights and

Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) may apply. As multiple witnesses noted during the July 11 Commission meeting, there often is some confusion regarding what information legally can be shared and with whom when it involves the behavior or mental health history of a student.³⁶

The *Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans*, which was issued by the U.S. Departments of Justice, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, and Education in 2013, provides guidance on how FERPA and HIPAA affect the ability to share and act upon suspicious behavior reported in a school environment.³⁷ Additionally, the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative has issued a Privacy Fact Sheet with some general tips on how to incorporate privacy into suspicious activity reporting efforts.³⁸ For additional information on FERPA and HIPAA, see Chapters 17 and 18 of this Report.

Threat assessment teams and comprehensive targeted violence prevention programs

In July 2018, the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center published *Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence*. It notes the following: “[e]nsuring the safety of our schools involves multiple components, including physical security, emergency management, and violence prevention efforts in the form of a threat assessment process. This process begins with establishing a comprehensive targeted violence prevention plan.”³⁹ Numerous witnesses stressed the importance of threat assessment teams during Commission meetings, including Donna Michaelis, Manager for the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety; Kathy Martinez-Prather, Director of the Texas School Safety Center; and Dr. Kathy Murphy, Superintendent of Hoover (AL) City Schools.⁴⁰

In its *Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence*, the U.S. Secret Service enumerated the following eight steps for creating a comprehensive targeted violence prevention plan.

8 Steps for Creating a Comprehensive Targeted Violence Prevention Plan

STEP 1: Establish a multi-disciplinary threat assessment team. Threat assessments are best performed by multi-disciplinary teams that include highly trained professionals from a variety of different disciplines (e.g., teachers, administrators, school resource officers, school psychologists, guidance counselors). The team will conduct the threat assessments, implement crisis prevention when needed, assess the student’s potential for violence, and develop intervention and management strategies to mitigate that risk.

STEP 2: Define behaviors to include those that are prohibitive and concerning. *Prohibited behaviors* should trigger immediate intervention. These behaviors can include, but are not limited to, intimidation, threats, harassment, bullying, and carrying weapons on school property. *Concerning behaviors* may indicate the need for a threat assessment. These behaviors can vary in nature, but may include sudden or dramatic changes in mood and appearance or a decline in school performance. There should be a low threshold of concern so that the plan addresses a continuum of concerning behaviors, not just direct threats or behaviors indicative of planning for an attack.

STEP 3: Establish and provide training on a central reporting system. This can include an online form on the school website, email address, phone number, smartphone application, or other mechanism. It is also important to ensure the reporting tool is continually monitored, each report is followed up, and that it allows individuals to report anonymously. Programs and policies must be put into place that promote a climate that ensures those reporting feel safe in their concern and break down the code of silence.

STEP 4: Determine the threshold for law enforcement intervention. Although the majority of cases will be handled using school or community resources (e.g., mentoring, counseling, tutoring, and social or family services), some will require law enforcement, especially if there is a safety risk.

STEP 5: Establish replicable threat assessment procedures. These procedures include practices for maintaining documentation, identifying sources of information, reviewing records, and conducting interviews with an emphasis on rapport building. Procedures should include the following investigative themes to guide the assessment process: *Motive, Communications (unusual or concerning), Inappropriate Interests, Weapons Access, Stressors, Emotional and Developmental Issues, Desperation or Despair, Violence as an Option, Concerned Others, Capacity to Organize an Attack, Pre-Attack Planning Behaviors, Consistency Between Students’ Actions and Statements, and Protective Factors.*

STEP 6: Develop risk management options. Threat assessment teams should develop a set of risk management options that can be implemented once an assessment is complete. Based on the information developed by the team, an individualized management plan can be created to mitigate any identified risks. Other components of management include notifying law enforcement if an attack is imminent, ensuring the safety of potential targets, creating a situation less prone to violence, and reducing the effect of stressors.

STEP 7: Create and promote a safe school climate. School climates should facilitate a culture of safety, respect, trust, and emotional support, where open communication is encouraged, school staff intervene in conflicts and bullying, and students feel empowered to share their concerns.

STEP 8: Provide training for all stakeholders. As Donna Michaelis stated at the August 16 Commission meeting, “Training is absolutely vital to the success of a threat assessment program.”⁴¹ Recipients of the training should include faculty, staff, and administrators; students; parents; and school resource officers and local law enforcement. Topics covered by the training might include how to recognize and report concerning behavior, suicide prevention, conflict resolution, and de-escalation techniques.

As more and more states, localities, school districts, and schools begin implementing threat assessment and targeted violence prevention programs, they are developing new approaches. Thus far, three states—Virginia, Florida, and Maryland—have legally mandated the use of threat assessment teams in all public K–12 schools or school systems. Under these laws, the local or district school board must adopt policies for the establishment of threat assessment teams that can assess and intervene against individuals whose behavior may pose a threat to the safety of school staff or students.⁴² The policies must include procedures for referrals to approved community service boards, healthcare providers, or mental health services, when appropriate.⁴³

Funded under California’s Mental Health Services Act, the Los Angeles Police Department created a School Threat Assessment Response Team (START) program to address the need for comprehensive threat prevention and management. In collaboration with the Los Angeles Police Department, START works to address school violence by providing training to communities on risk/threat assessment and developing multi-disciplinary Crisis or Threat Management Teams. The program also assists educational institutions with case consultations, conducting threat assessments, and implementing intervention response and case management plans. It has fielded more than 8,000 calls since its establishment in 2009.⁴⁴

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. The federal government should develop options to support the creation (in conjunction with federal and state partners) of guidance for state and local jurisdictions to implement a comprehensive early warning and reporting system modeled on programs like “If You See Something, Say Something®” and Safe2Tell.
2. As numerous witnesses noted to the Commission, students themselves must be part of the solution and often can help identify the best ways to communicate to and educate their peers. In recognition of that, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the U.S. Department of Education should explore sponsoring a Peer-to-Peer Competition Challenge for high school students to develop school security campaigns.
3. To assist schools and school districts in establishing threat assessment teams and targeted violence prevention programs, DHS, as warranted, should periodically update its *Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence*. Additionally, DHS should develop options for supporting the development of a train-the-trainer program to facilitate consistent application of the recommended practices contained in the Guide.

■ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. States, school districts, and individual schools should establish and provide training on a central suspicious activity reporting system that is continually monitored, allows anonymous reporting, and has procedures in place to ensure proper action is taken on each report.

Funds may be available through the STOP School Violence Act of 2018 to assist in developing these systems. The reporting system could be supplemented by an education and awareness campaign that encourages students, teachers, and other members of the school community to report their concerns, provides guidance on what types of activities should be reported, and provides instructions on the various options for submitting a report.
2. School districts and individual schools should establish threat assessment teams and develop comprehensive targeted violence prevention programs. States and localities should consider encouraging and supporting this activity in whatever manner they determine to be the most appropriate. This may include the enactment of legislation mandating that school districts or schools take these actions, the establishment of state or local teams to provide training to school administrators and staff on these activities, and/or the provision of grants or other funds to schools to support these activities.
3. School districts and individual schools should establish comprehensive targeted violence prevention programs supported by multi-disciplinary threat assessment teams as outlined in the U.S. Secret Service guide *Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence*. Schools may be able to receive funds through the STOP School Violence Act of 2018 to assist in establishing these programs. To establish a comprehensive violence prevention program, it is recommended that schools/school districts perform the following steps:

- Establish a multi-disciplinary threat assessment team consisting of highly trained school professionals from a variety of different disciplines (e.g., teachers, administrators, school resource officers, school psychologists, guidance counselors) who, among other things, will conduct threat assessments, assess a student’s potential for violence, and develop intervention and management strategies to mitigate that risk.
 - Define concerning behaviors that initiate the need for a threat assessment (e.g., sudden or dramatic changes in mood, appearance, or behavior) and prohibited behaviors (e.g., harassment, bullying, carrying a weapon on school property) that initiate immediate intervention. There should be a low threshold for defining concerning behaviors so that protocols address a continuum of behaviors, not just direct threats or behaviors indicative of planning for an attack.
 - Establish and provide training on a central reporting system.
 - Determine the threshold for law enforcement intervention.
 - Establish replicable threat assessment procedures to include practices for maintaining documentation, identifying sources of information, reviewing records, and conducting interviews with an emphasis on rapport building.
 - Develop risk management options to enact once an assessment is complete and individualized management plans to mitigate identified risks and enhance positive outcomes for students of concern.
 - Create and promote a safe school climate.
 - Provide training for all stakeholders.
4. As numerous witnesses noted to the Commission, students themselves must be part of the solution and often can help identify the best ways to communicate with and educate their peers. In recognition of that, school districts and schools should empower students by increasing engagement with students in the development of school security campaigns.

Chapter 5 Endnotes

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Effects of Press Coverage of Mass Shootings

Press coverage of school shootings is often sensational, which can exacerbate the trauma of those directly and indirectly affected and potentially incite successive events. Wall-to-wall cable television coverage, front-page images, and overloaded social media feeds make it nearly inevitable that most people will learn about what transpired, including the names, faces, and personal stories of those who perpetrated the acts of violence.

Reports indicate that the alleged Parkland shooter received letters of encouragement, greeting cards, and even money in prison.¹ The Broward County Public Defender finds this deeply disturbing: “The letters shake me up because they are written by regular, everyday teenage girls from across the nation.”²

The extensive correspondence as well as the Facebook communities defending the accused have left many to wonder how a mass shooter became a national celebrity. Indeed, achieving celebrity may have been his very intent. The *Sun Sentinel* reported that the accused, via a social network, recorded a video bragging about how the massacre he planned would make him notorious: “when you see me on the news you’ll all know who I am.”³

Researchers have found that most shooters desire fame and wish to emulate other mass shooters.⁴ In several recent surveys, approximately 80 percent of the general public agreed that media coverage of mass shootings can make offenders famous, and 70 percent agreed that this coverage can lead to subsequent attacks.⁵ Analyses of media coverage following violent incidents provide strong evidence for a “contagion effect,”⁶ which holds that media coverage can increase the probability of future violent incidents.

Social media only amplifies this problem. In the absence of traditional journalistic tools—like editorial discretion—social media allows for the wide dissemination of information, where nearly every individual can be a contributor and a consumer (including would-be shooters). It is increasingly difficult for all involved to strike an appropriate balance between informing the public about school shootings—espe-




Figure 6-1

cially in the context of active security events, where parents and educators need immediate and accurate information—and the real danger that saturated coverage of mass killings may instigate future violence.

In the wake of Parkland, several national news outlets released profiles of the alleged shooter, and media sites reported widely on his YouTube and Instagram posts. In May 2018, news outlets released to the public the videos the accused made. Several Parkland survivors strongly opposed the release of the videos on Twitter, one of them claiming that doing so “only gives him what he wants.”⁷ In response, several media outlets, including the *Orlando Sentinel*, removed the videos from their webpages.

This is the first federal report to examine the issue of media coverage as it relates to the perpetuation of violence. Given the dramatic growth of social media, understanding this new dynamic (including the significantly different ways in which citizens consume information) remains an ongoing challenge. According to a recent poll by the Pew Research Center, “fully 95% of teens have access to a smartphone, and 45% say they are online ‘almost constantly.’”⁸

Commission Observations

The American Psychological Association released a study in 2016 that concluded that “the prevalence of mass shootings has risen in relation to the mass media coverage of them and the proliferation of social media sites that tend to glorify the shooters and downplay the victims.”⁹

Senior administrators from the Santa Fe, TX, School District shared with Commission leaders how the



“significant evidence that mass killings involving firearms are incited by similar events in the immediate past.”

district intentionally worked with media to focus coverage on the victims, on the heroic actions of the students, teachers, and school resources officers, and on the community’s efforts to come together (rather than on the perpetrator).

A 2015 Arizona State University research paper highlighted data indicating that mass shootings often occur in bunches.¹⁰ Likening mass shooting events to the spread of an infectious contagion, researchers found “significant evidence that mass killings involving firearms are incited by similar events in the immediate past.”¹¹ Researchers further hypothesize that television, radio, and other media exposure of one mass shooting could infect the next perpetrator.¹²

The Commission received testimony and written submissions on the material impact that press coverage can have on schools and communities. For instance, Ben Fernandez, Chair of the National Association of School Psychologists (NASP) School Safety and Crisis Response Committee, testified about not only the contagion effect that press coverage can create but also the effect it can have on children and youth, such as an increase in anxiety levels or substance abuse. Governments, he said, can provide “education, guidance,

and technical assistance to help schools better understand the best practices around media engagement following a school crisis to both gather information, disseminate verified facts, and connect with members of the school community.”¹³

Dr. Jennifer Johnston, Assistant Professor, Psychology, Western New Mexico University, shared with the Commission that the Parkland shooting had a contagion effect as far as the Los Angeles Unified School District, which had 63 threats that required investigation.¹⁴ Johnston also noted that some in the media have adopted the “Don’t Name Them, Don’t Show Them” (similar to “No Notoriety”¹⁵) voluntary policy in an effort to reduce the appeal of mass shootings by those who may be susceptible to external influence. Started in response to the Aurora, CO, movie theater shootings in 2012, the “No Notoriety” campaign emphasizes that media outlets should not use names or display photos of killers.

The Society of Professional Journalists’ Code of Ethics suggests a “heightened sensitivity” when it comes to the coverage of crime victims and families. It recommends that journalists “balance the public’s need for information against potential harm.”¹⁶ Survivors of the Parkland shooting have encouraged more journalists to adhere to this code.¹⁷

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. The White House and all federal departments and agencies should adopt the principles of the “No Notoriety” campaign. This helps keep the focus on the facts and the victims and does not mention the names or publish photos of perpetrators once they are apprehended.

□ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State, local, and school leaders play a critical role in developing any crisis preparedness, response, and recovery plan. They should include a media plan as well. Those who have already done so should continually review and revise their plans.¹⁸

The media portion of these plans can cover a number of issues, including:

- *who* will talk to the press after a tragedy,
 - *what* information should be released (including considerations for the level of detail, existing safety measures, and details about any forthcoming notifications to families),
 - *how* to communicate through a variety of media vehicles (e.g., press conference, press release, social media), and
 - *when* designated individuals should talk to the media, including if families should be contacted first and when media are permitted to enter school grounds.
2. As they examine their media plans, schools should coordinate with local law enforcement and other community leaders on a regular basis to ensure consistent messaging and clear lines of authority. States and local communities can take advantage of support that the U.S. Department of Education’s Office of Safe and Healthy Students administers from the Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center. It provides some tools that school districts can use to assess the safety, security, accessibility, and emergency preparedness of school buildings and grounds. The Center also offers tips to help guide school officials in preparing, developing, and ultimately implementing high-quality school emergency operations plans along with other actionable resources. The Center’s website (<https://rems.ed.gov/>) is updated frequently.
 3. National and local media outlets should consider adopting the “No Notoriety” campaign. State and local authorities should consider employing the principles of “No Notoriety” when communicating the facts of a school safety incident to media outlets.

Chapter 6 Endnotes

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Violent Entertainment and Rating Systems

Children have 24/7 access to multiple forms of entertainment at their fingertips. Their exposure to violent entertainment is of particular concern—in television, video games, social media, music, movies, graphic novels, and books. Violent content is ubiquitous across these platforms and continues to grow.¹

Neighbors of the alleged Parkland shooter, for instance, told reporters that he often played violent video games for up to 15 hours a day. According to one, “It was kill, kill, blow up something, and kill some more, all day.”²

The Bush Administration did not directly address this issue in its 2007 *Report to the President on Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy*. Following Sandy Hook, the Obama Administration’s *Now is the Time* report called on Congress to provide, among other things, \$10 million for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) to conduct further research on the relationship between video games, media images, and violence.³ President Obama also issued a presidential memorandum that directed the CDC to research the causes and prevention of violence, including links between violent entertainment and aggression.⁴

Commission Observations

It is estimated that depictions of violence are present in 90 percent of movies, 68 percent of video games, 60 percent of television shows, and 15 percent of music videos.⁵ While no single factor causes someone to engage in an act of violence, some scholars argue that children who regularly consume violent images are more prone to social isolation and aggressive behavior.⁶

Dr. Rowell Huesmann, Professor of Psychology at the University of Michigan, explained to the Commission that exposure to violence creates “violent behavior scripts” that are a predisposing factor in a child’s developing mind. When behavior scripts are activated under certain environmental conditions, they could

✓ FAST FACTS

It is estimated that depictions of violence are present in 90 percent of movies, 68 percent of video games, 60 percent of television shows, and 15 percent of music videos.

lead to a child acting aggressively and violently.⁷

In addition, research has found a relationship between the amount of time children spend viewing violent entertainment and the amount of time they spend with friends. One correlational study found that children who view more violent programs spend less time interacting with other children, which could be an indicator for social isolation.⁸

Others argue that exposure to media violence is not predictive of violent actions. Some studies show that violent entertainment can help to reduce violent behavior,⁹ and their authors contend that most studies in this area find only weak correlational results and not causal results of the potentially negative effects of violent entertainment. Dr. Christopher Ferguson, a Professor of Psychology at Stetson University, reported to the Commission that studies that purport to link video games and violence are often not replicable. Because research on the negative effects of violent entertainment has produced mixed results, he believes debate about the possible role of violent entertainment after a mass shooting is a distraction from other factors.¹⁰

Even though scholars and researchers disagree about the effect of exposure to violent entertainment, some advocate that rating systems can play an important role in informing parents about what their children are watching and playing.

A landmark Supreme Court case, *Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association*, established video games as protected speech under the First Amendment.¹¹ As a result, the entertainment industry continues to

establish voluntary rating systems in the United States for motion pictures, software, television programs, and music.

A variety of rating systems exist to inform the public of entertainment content. The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) film rating system was established in 1968 to provide “parents, guardians, and teachers the tools they need to make informed decisions about what children watch.”¹² Ratings are determined by the Classification and Ratings Administration (CARA), an independent division of the MPAA, via a board comprised of an independent group of parents.¹³ In addition to film ratings, CARA provides parent resources such as movie reviews and online sources for movie information.

Some criticize the MPAA rating system for not providing enough information for parents and viewers beyond the simple designation of movies into the categories “G,” “PG,” “PG-13,” and “R.” Additionally, some say the overuse of the “PG-13” rating has resulted in confusion regarding what kind of content is actually included in these movies.¹⁴

The television industry designed the TV Parental Guidelines ratings system to give parents more information about the content and age-appropriateness of television programs.¹⁵ The TV Parental Guidelines Monitoring Board is responsible for ensuring uniformity and consistency in applying the Guidelines. It is comprised of experts from the television industry and public interest advocates.

With respect to music, the Recording Industry Association of America and its member companies created the Parental Advisory Label (PAL) program to help parents determine what may be inappropriate for children.¹⁶ This rating system helps parents recognize music releases containing explicit lyrics, including explicit depictions of violence and sex.¹⁷

The Entertainment Software Ratings Board (ESRB) provides guidance about video games and applications to help consumers make informed choices about what is suitable for their families. As the video game industry’s self-regulatory body, the ESRB is responsible for enforcing its rating system. It requires complete disclosure of content during the rating process and proper display of rating information on packaging and wherever the game is marketed or sold. This is to

comply with “industry-adopted advertising and marketing guidelines intended to ensure that video games are not marketed to audiences for whom they are not intended.”¹⁸

According to a 2016 survey, 86 percent of parents with children who play video games know about the ESRB’s rating system, and 73 percent say they check a computer or video game’s rating before buying it for their children.¹⁹ The ESRB rating system has gained high levels of trust among parents, who regularly report being satisfied with the level of information as they choose which games to select for children.

Considerations for parents

Parents are best positioned to determine which forms of entertainment are appropriate for their children. While rating systems can be helpful tools, they are not a substitute for conversations with children about the content children consume. Parents can consider having direct discussions with their children about such common things as:

- Movies and television programs their children are watching;
- Video games and apps their children are playing or using;
- Music their children are listening to;
- Standards the family has set regarding what is appropriate; and,
- Limits and rules on what can be watched and played.

In addition to rating systems, parents can consider other resources to better understand what entertainment media may be appropriate for their children. For example, Common Sense Media is a source for users to search for specific movies, books, television shows, games, applications, and websites by a range of considerations, including age appropriateness. The site includes user reviews from both the parent’s and the child’s perspective.²⁰

Another resource is the Parents’ Choice Foundation, which provides information about children’s media and toys through its Parents’ Choice Awards. Awards focus on design and function, learning value, long-term play value, and the benefits to a child’s social and emotional growth and well-being. Products that contain violent content are not eligible for awards.²¹

The Federal Trade Commission’s website includes a page on Consumer Information on Kids, Parents, and Video Games provides guidance for parents on how they may talk to their kids about entertainment choices. It also provides information and resources for parents regarding video game ratings, mobile game apps, and web-based games.²²

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

▣ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State education agencies (SEAs) and local educational agencies (LEAs) should ensure adequate internet safety measures are in place to curb access to potentially inappropriate content. For example, the Narragansett School System in Rhode Island made rigorous filtering decisions to prevent students from accessing inappropriate content.²³
2. School and district leaders should partner with parents in an effort to strengthen internet safety measures at schools. For example, parents in the Boulder Valley school district in Colorado requested that the district block social media sites at middle schools and provide parents with a log of their child’s internet activity.²⁴
3. While some self-regulators provide easy-to-understand rating systems and effectively restrict content through retailer requirements, all of them should review and improve policies to ensure access to content is limited to age-appropriate consumers.

Chapter 7 Endnotes

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The Obama Administration’s “Rethink School Discipline” Guidance

Teachers are often best positioned to identify and address disorderly conduct at school. They have an understanding of the students entrusted to their care and can see behavioral patterns on an ongoing basis. In partnership with principals and other school leaders, teachers can help correct—and where necessary, discipline—those behaviors that are unwelcome or unsafe for the school community. Maintaining order in schools is a key to keeping schools safe. Federal policies that adversely impact maintaining order in schools should be corrected.

Policy guidance issued under the Obama Administration placed an emphasis on tracking school disciplinary actions by race. That guidance, set forth largely in a Dear Colleague Letter and other sub-regulatory documents (hereinafter collectively “Guidance”), suggests that even facially neutral school discipline policies may violate federal law if they have a “disparate impact” upon members of certain racial groups in rates of suspension, expulsion, or referral to law enforcement.¹ The Guidance further communicates that such outcomes could give rise to an investigation by the U.S. Department of Education, putting a school at risk of losing federal funds.

As written and implemented, the Guidance has been criticized on three primary grounds. First, it creates a chilling effect on classroom teachers’ and administrators’ use of discipline by improperly imposing, through the threat of investigation and potential loss of federal funding, a forceful federal role in what is inherently a local issue. Second, authorities, including the United States Supreme Court,² have questioned the applicability of a disparate impact legal theory to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, upon which the Guidance relies, thus calling into question its legal basis in the school discipline context.³ Third, the threat of investigations by the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) under sub-regulatory documents such as the “Rethink School Discipline” Guidance has likely had a strong, negative impact on school discipline and safety.⁴

This Administration is committed to ensuring that educational programs and policies are administered in a fair, equitable, and racially neutral manner that does not result in unlawful discrimination. When there is evidence beyond a mere statistical disparity that educational programs and policies may violate the federal prohibition on racial discrimination, this Administration will act swiftly and decisively to investigate and remedy any discrimination. At the same time, the federal government must also ensure that its policies and actions protect student safety, including when it is acting to ensure that educational programs and policies are administered in a racially neutral fashion. Where well-meaning but flawed policies endanger student safety, they must be changed. As President Trump noted when creating this Commission, “[e]very child deserves to grow up in a safe community surrounded by a loving family and to have a future filled with opportunity and with hope.”⁵

The Guidance sent the unfortunate message that the federal government, rather than teachers and local administrators, best handles school discipline. As a result, fearful of potential investigations, some school



districts may have driven their discipline policies and practices more by numbers than by teacher input. School discipline is a complex issue that is affected by local circumstances. For example, there may be other reasons for disparities in behavior if students come from distressed communities and face significant trauma. Local solutions are best suited for dealing with the unique needs of local communities.

Commission Observations

The Departments of Justice and Education held a summit on school discipline in April 2018. Numerous educators, parents, and experts shared their experiences. Some favored preserving the Guidance to reinforce the message that discrimination based on race, nationality, or ethnicity is unacceptable. Others stressed the importance of preserving specific portions of the Guidance designed to reduce exclusionary discipline (i.e., discipline that results in students spending time away from the classroom), such as the Positive Behavioral Interventions and Supports (PBIS) program discussed in Chapter 1. These individuals argued that exclusionary discipline practices have negative outcomes that fall disproportionately on certain demographic groups.

Others spoke against the Guidance, arguing that it is legally flawed and poses severe unintended consequences for school safety. These speakers described how their schools ignored or covered up—rather than disciplined—student misconduct in order to avoid any purported racial disparity in discipline numbers that might catch the eye of the federal government. They also argued that some alternative discipline policies encouraged by the Guidance contributed to incidents of school violence, including the rape of an elementary school student with a disability, the stabbing of one student by another student, and numerous assaults of teachers by students.

At the July 26 Commission meeting, school experts testified about the need for more local flexibility in handling student discipline and that the Guidance endangers school safety. These experts noted that disciplinary policy is most effectively addressed at a local level and that federal intervention in day-to-day disciplinary matters undermines local decision-making. Francisco Negrón, General Counsel for the National School Boards Association, argued that discipline is a matter on which classroom teachers and local school leaders deserve both autonomy and deference.⁶

Judy Kidd, the President of the Classroom Teachers Association of North Carolina, stressed that the fear of an investigation by OCR has a negative effect on school climate and discipline. Specifically, she stated that the prospect of OCR intervention makes school staff less likely to refer matters to law enforcement. Instead of focusing on safety concerns and creating a climate conducive to learning in the classroom, Kidd noted that, in response to the Guidance, some school leaders have chosen to avoid potential OCR investigations by eliminating the use of out-of-school suspensions and expulsions, without considering the adverse impact that such practices have on school safety.⁷

When school leaders focus on aggregate school discipline numbers rather than the specific circumstances and conduct that underlie each matter, schools become less safe. A report of the AASA, The School Superintendents Association specifically discussed the safety issues that arise when schools are compelled to keep students in the classroom under circumstances where removal may be warranted. Salient comments from the survey underlying the report include:

Comments from 2018 AASA Discipline Survey

- “Students who are allowed to stay in school after gross offenses amp up their behavior in order to see how much they’ll get away with without consequence.”
- “There is a feeling that by keeping some students in school, we are risking the safety of students.”
- “Without proper additional staffing and facilities to keep these students in school, staff do experience a perceived (sometimes real) safety concern.”
- “Schools are not equipped to provide supports to mentally or emotionally unstable children. We need help.”
- “We have received numerous complaints from parents and staff about students who should not be in school based on their disciplinary records.”
- “We see victims of bullying and harassment tend to miss more days of school and are more likely to leave the district when the perpetrators are not removed from school.”⁸

During an August 28, 2018, Commission listening session, Jonathan Butcher, the Senior Policy Analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Center for Education Policy, shared similar sentiments, emphasizing that the Guidance extends beyond the appropriate role for the federal government on school safety.⁹ Instead, Butcher advocated “school-specific, targeted responses” created at the local level and cautioned that districts do not interpret the Guidance “simply as a suggestion.” Rather, he stated that districts respond to the Guidance in whatever manner is most likely to avoid a lawsuit or federal investigation. In other words, avoiding legal jeopardy rather than achieving school safety drives decision-making.

Those who spoke in support of the Guidance focused on reducing the racial disparities in the discipline numbers without addressing the adverse consequences of the Guidance on school safety and climate.¹⁰ No speaker took the position, for instance, that the Guidance protected schools and teachers from violent acts. Some speakers promoted PBIS and similar policies as innovative, evidence-based reforms that both reduce exclusionary practices and improve school safety. However, no speaker claimed that schools need a federal mandate to adopt those policies, nor did any identify how repeal of the Guidance would prevent states and local school districts from adopting such policies. The Commission encourages schools and localities to implement programs that work best for them as noted in Chapter 1 of this Report on Character Development and a Culture of Connectedness.

In addition to the information provided by experts at Commission meetings, field visits, and listening sessions, materials considered by the Commission confirm the same troubling pattern noted by critics of the Guidance. For example, Gail Heriot, a University of San Diego law professor who also serves on the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, captured how some teachers are caught in the unfortunate web of the Guidance.¹¹ She noted that school administrators are naturally concerned about scrutiny that may occur if students are disciplined at racially disparate numbers. That concern, she notes, can lead to school administrators closely scrutinizing individual teachers’ disciplinary practices for real or imagined evidence of racial bias, while ignoring the underlying causes of student misbehavior. Heriot noted that students are less safe at

school when teachers turn a blind eye to misbehavior by disruptive or violent students in the interest of avoiding running afoul of federal investigators.¹²

Surveys of teachers confirm that the Guidance’s chilling effect on school discipline—and, in particular, on the use of exclusionary discipline—has forced teachers to reduce discipline to non-exclusionary methods, even where such methods are inadequate or inappropriate to the student misconduct, with significant consequences for student and teacher safety. Indeed, while research indicates that exclusionary discipline practices are associated with negative academic outcomes¹³ and increased behavioral problems,¹⁴ some teachers have reported challenges with relying on non-exclusionary discipline practices. In Santa Ana, CA, 65 percent of teachers stated that non-exclusionary practices were not effective. Similarly, in Hillsborough, FL, 65 percent of teachers reported that non-exclusionary practices failed to improve school climate. In Madison, WI, only 13 percent of teachers reported that non-exclusionary practices had a positive effect on student behavior.¹⁵ In Charleston, SC, only 13 percent of teachers thought the school district’s “new discipline system works, that the consequences are appropriate, and that it represents an improved approach.”¹⁶

As one teacher observed,

[P]olicymakers have made it so we have no authority. Only perceived authority. Only as much power as you get your kids to believe. Once the kid finds out he can say ‘F*** you,’ flip over a table, and he won’t get suspended, that’s that.¹⁷

Accounts of similar teacher experiences have been reported across the country.¹⁸ And while alternatives to exclusionary discipline may be appropriate in many cases, it is important for teachers and schools to have the flexibility they need to impose appropriate discipline and maintain order in the classroom.

Separately, the Commission reviewed the Texas School and Firearm Safety Action Plan. That Plan notes that, when the individual disciplinary decisions of teachers are frequently questioned, teachers may pull back on removing potentially dangerous students from class. Not surprisingly, the Plan also showed that students in classes with disruptive students were less likely to learn.¹⁹

Research also supports the Texas findings, clearly indicating that the failure of schools to appropriately discipline disruptive students has consequences for overall student achievement.²⁰ For instance, research conducted by Scott Carrell of the University of California, Davis and Mark Hoekstra of Texas A&M University found as follows:

[D]isruptive students have statistically significant negative effects on the reading and math scores of students in their class. [Carrell and Hoekstra] also found that the presence of a disruptive student increases the probability that his classmates will commit a disciplinary infraction, with the largest behavioral effect observed in boys from low-income families. Thus, disruptive students can create a domino effect, increasing misbehavior and lowering academic achievement across the school.²¹

This domino effect can be seen, for example, in Wisconsin, where schools that adopted “non-punitive disciplinary measures” may have experienced lower reading and math scores than schools that maintained a traditional approach to discipline.²² In another study, University of Georgia professor Joshua Kinsler used data to simulate the interaction between school discipline policies and student achievement. His simulation found that a policy aimed at decreasing the racial discipline gap were associated with *increases* in the racial achievement gap, because the retention of disruptive students negatively impacted the achievement of African-American students as a whole.²³

There are also concerns about the underlying premise that African-American students are overrepresented in disciplinary matters due to racial discrimination. Research indicates that disparities in discipline that fall along racial lines may be due to societal factors other than race. For example, using data from the Early Childhood Longitudinal Study, Kindergarten Class (ECLS-K), researchers replicated the racial gap

Research clearly indicates that the failure of schools to appropriately discipline disruptive students has consequences for overall student achievement.

in student suspensions, but then analyzed the specific circumstances underlying these suspensions and discovered that “the racial gap in suspensions was completely accounted for by a measure of the prior problem behavior²⁴ of the student—a finding never before reported in the literature.”²⁵ The report concluded that “[t]hese findings highlight the importance of early problem behaviors and suggest that the use of suspensions by teachers and administrators may not have been as racially biased as some scholars have argued.”²⁶ This research undermines the core proposition in disparate impact theory that statistical disparities necessarily demonstrate that classroom teachers and administrators are motivated by race when disciplining students.²⁷

Legal concerns about the current Guidance

The Guidance relies on a disparate impact legal theory, but that theory lacks foundation in applicable law and may lead schools to adopt racial quotas or proportionality requirements.

A school’s general duty to treat all students equally is enshrined into law by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.²⁸ Title VI protects all students who attend institutions receiving federal funding from being treated differently based on their race, color, or national origin. That protection extends to the entire course of the school disciplinary process, from behavior management in the classroom, to referral to an authority outside the classroom because of misconduct, and to resolution of a discipline incident.

The Guidance relies, however, on principles that are not enshrined in Title VI. Instead, it relies upon an implementing regulation of questionable validity to argue that Title VI prohibits not only intentional discrimination, but also many evenhandedly implemented policies that may nevertheless have a racially disparate impact.²⁹ That reading of Title VI is dubious, at best.

In 1978, the Supreme Court determined that Congress intended Title VI to prohibit “only those racial classifications that would violate the Equal Protection Clause” if committed by a government actor.³⁰ Just prior to this holding, the Supreme Court also held that the Equal Protection Clause requires proof of intentional discrimination and that disproportionate or disparate impact alone does not constitute a violation.³¹

In 2001, the Supreme Court went further, noting that interpreting Title VI's implementing regulations to cover unintentional discrimination is in "considerable tension" with the fact that the Title VI statute itself "prohibits only intentional discrimination."³² It also called "strange" the argument that executive agencies—like the Department of Justice or the Department of Education—would have the authority to adopt regulations that would prohibit a disparate impact on members of a specific racial group absent any evidence of intentional discrimination.

Despite the Supreme Court's case law in this area, the Guidance opted to interpret Title VI's implementing regulation as sufficient to establish a disparate impact theory for certain racial groups in the discipline area. Indeed, the Guidance told schools that even "neutral," "evenhanded" application of school discipline policies—the administration of policies without racial animus or discriminatory intent—can potentially violate this regulation.³³

By telling schools that they were subject to investigation, and threatening to cut federal funding because of different suspension rates for members of different racial groups, the Guidance gave schools a perverse incentive to make discipline rates proportional to enrollment figures, regardless of the appropriateness of discipline for any specific instance of misconduct. In response to OCR investigations involving school data, some school districts reportedly adopted racial quotas in school suspensions.³⁴ Others entered into settlements with OCR that could be interpreted as imposing racial proportionality requirements in school discipline data.³⁵

Although the Guidance did not expressly require any school to impose a strict racial quota in suspensions, it is inappropriate for the federal government to pressure schools to establish such quotas.³⁶ The Guidance presented hypothetical examples of discipline policies that might lead to a federal investigation, thereby incentivizing schools to preemptively shield themselves from federal oversight by minimizing racial disparities in discipline rates. Such expansive application of disparate impact theory is in tension with the purpose of Title VI and leads to school environments where discipline decisions may be based on race rather than student safety.

Courts are skeptical of schools attempting to achieve specific racial proportions in discipline through racial quotas or proportionality requirements, whether pursued unilaterally by a school or after an agreement with an executive agency. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit struck down as unconstitutional a rule that it said would lead to racial quotas in discipline, stating:

Racial disciplinary quotas violate equity in its root sense. They entail either systematically overpunishing the innocent or systematically underpunishing the guilty. They place race at war with justice. They teach schoolchildren an unedifying lesson of racial entitlements.³⁷

The Guidance also offends basic principles of federalism and the need to preserve state and local control over education. For example, the Department of Education Organization Act warns the Department not to "exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the...administration...of any educational institution, school, or school system."³⁸ As the Supreme Court has emphasized, "public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local authorities," which should be respected even when student dismissals reflect "subjective" policy decisions.³⁹ Schools should have the flexibility to enforce disciplinary rules in light of their "need to be able to impose disciplinary sanctions for a wide range of unanticipated conduct disruptive of the educational process."⁴⁰ Schools should also receive deference as to whether their policies promote a "valid educational purpose" due to the "special characteristics of the school environment," and these policies should not be overturned merely because others disagree about their "wisdom."⁴¹

A school's decision to alter its discipline policies, even if prompted by a concern over racially disproportionate data, may end up resulting in *another* racial group displaying disproportionate discipline numbers. The disparate impact theory implicates an extraordinary range of decisions, as Civil Rights Commissioner Gail Heriot noted by illustration to contexts outside of discipline:

For example, in the education context, a university that considers the Math SAT score of an applicant for admission gives Korean Americans and Chinese Americans an advantage while

disadvantaging many other racial and national origin groups. A college that raises its tuition has a disparate impact on Cajun Americans, Haitian Americans and Burmese Americans, all groups that have below-average median household incomes. Similarly, a high school that decides to invest in a basketball team rather than a baseball team has a disparate impact on Latinos, who, on average, are shorter than African Americans and whites and hence less likely to qualify for

the basketball team... A university that gives college credit to students who can pass a foreign language exam has a disparate impact on Irish Americans, Scottish Americans and Anglo Americans, since they are unlikely to have a language other than English spoken in the home.⁴²

The flawed Guidance rests on a provision whose validity cannot be squared with the Supreme Court's holdings.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

The Commission is deeply troubled that the Guidance, while well-intentioned, may have paradoxically contributed to making schools less safe. Significant concerns also remain regarding the legal framework upon which the Guidance is based. These concerns, together with the repeated concerns expressed by many that disciplinary decisions are best left in the hands of classroom teachers and administrators, warrant rescission of the Guidance. The Commission thus makes the following recommendations:

1. The U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Department of Education (ED), should rescind the Guidance and its associated sub-regulatory guidance documents. ED should develop information for schools and school districts that will identify resources and best practices to assist schools in improving school climate and learning outcomes as well as in protecting the rights of students with disabilities during the disciplinary process while maintaining overall student safety.
2. DOJ and ED should continue to vigorously enforce Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and provide appropriate information to assist schools and the public in understanding how ED will investigate and resolve cases of intentional discrimination.

Chapter 8 Endnotes

- 1 On January 8, 2014, the U.S. Department of Justice and Department of Education jointly issued sub-regulatory guidance (collectively referred to as the “Guidance”). The Guidance includes the following documents:
 - A Dear Colleague Letter jointly signed by the Department of Justice and the Department of Education (The Dear Colleague Letter also included an Appendix titled “Recommendations for School Districts, Administrators, Teachers, and Staff”).
 - A Resource Guide titled “Guiding Principles: A Resource Guide for Improving School Climate and Discipline”;
 - Appendix 1 titled “U.S. Department of Education Directory of Federal School Climate and Discipline Resources”;
 - Appendix 2 titled “Sample Discipline Category Profile”;
 - An FAQ document titled “School Discipline Guidance Package FAQs”; and
 - A separate document titled “Supportive School Discipline Initiative.”
- 2 See *Alexander v. Sandoval*, 532 U.S. 275, 280, 286 n.6 (2001).
- 3 Wright, J.P., et al. (2014). Prior problem behavior accounts for the racial gap in school suspensions. *Journal of Criminal Justice*. <https://www.sciencedirect.com/journal/journal-of-criminal-justice/vol/42/issue/3>. (“Our results suggest, however, that the association between school suspensions and blacks and whites reflects long-standing behavioral differences between youth and that, at least in the aggregate, the use of suspensions may not be as racially biased as many have argued.”)
- 4 As noted by the AASA, The School Superintendents Association in its 2018 Discipline Survey, “[t]he noticeable uptick in investigations and compliance reviews [by the Office for Civil Rights] over the last nine years seems to have acted as a more powerful lever in influencing districts to reduce out-of-school time for students, even if teachers, parents, or students preferred for that specific child to be removed from class.” *2018 AASA discipline survey: An analysis of how the 2014 Dear Colleague Letter on nondiscriminatory administration of school discipline is impacting district policies and practices*, at p. 6. Retrieved from [http://aasa.org/uploadedFiles/AASA_Blog\(1\)/AASASurveyDisciplineGuidance2014.pdf](http://aasa.org/uploadedFiles/AASA_Blog(1)/AASASurveyDisciplineGuidance2014.pdf). The survey was administered by the AASA, The School Superintendents Association; the Association of School Business Officials International (ASBO); and the Association of Educational Services Agencies (ASEA). For purposes of this Report, they are collectively referenced as “AASA.”
- 5 Briefing Statement from President Donald J. Trump, the White House (March 12, 2018), available at <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-immediate-actions-secure-schools>.
- 6 See transcript, at p. 19: “But ultimately decisions about student discipline are pedagogical. They’re matters of school concern, entitling school leaders to the kind of deference for their educational judgment which the courts have repeatedly acknowledged. So in considering matters of student discipline, particularly as it relates to instances of individual behavior, unrelated to instances of mass violence, for instance, the federal government should follow suit and equally defer to local education experts.”
- 7 See transcript, at pp. 28–32.
- 8 *2018 AASA discipline survey*, at pp. 4–5. [http://aasa.org/uploadedFiles/AASA_Blog\(1\)/AASASurveyDisciplineGuidance2014.pdf](http://aasa.org/uploadedFiles/AASA_Blog(1)/AASASurveyDisciplineGuidance2014.pdf).
- 9 Statement from Jonathan Butcher to the Federal Commission on School Safety (August 28, 2018). <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/transcript-08-28-2018.pdf>.
- 10 Various statements during Federal Commission on School Safety Public Listening Sessions (June 6, 2018; June 26, 2018; August 7, 2018; August 28, 2018) <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/transcript-06-06-2018.pdf>; <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/transcript-08-07-2018.pdf>; <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/transcript-08-28-2018.pdf>.
- 11 Gail L. Heriot & Alison Somin, *The Department of Education’s initiative on racial disparities in school discipline: Wrong for students, wrong for teachers, wrong on the law*. Tex. Rev. L. & Pol., 47–48, (forthcoming 2018); San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 18–321, 3. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3104221.
- 12 Ibid.
- 13 Arcia, Emily, (May 1, 2006). Achievement and Enrollment Status of Suspended Students: Outcomes in a Large Multicultural School District, *Education and Urban Society*.
- 14 Hemphill, SA et al., (November, 2006). The effect of school suspensions and arrests on subsequent adolescent antisocial behavior in Australia and the United States. *Journal of Adolescent Health*.
- 15 Madison Teachers, Inc., (May, 2015). *Joint Committee on Safety and Discipline Report*, at p. 5. <http://www.madisonteachers.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Joint-Committee-on-Safety-and-Discipline-Report-051315.pdf>.
- 16 See Charleston Teacher Alliance, *2017 Teacher Survey* (2017). <http://www.charlestonteacheralliance.com/surveys.html>.
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- 18 See Mac Donald, H. (April 6, 2018). Who misbehaves? Claims that school discipline is unfairly meted out ignores actual classroom misbehavior. *City Journal*. <https://www.city-journal.org/html/who-misbehaves-15811.html>. See also <https://www.mprnews.org/story/2015/12/08/police-say-brothers-attacked-school-officials>, and Lessons not learned. (Fall 2018). *Thinking Minnesota*. <https://www.americanexperiment.org/magazine/thinking-minnesota-issue-13-fall-2018>.
- 19 *School and firearm safety action plan*. (May 30, 2018). Governor Greg Abbott, pp. 29–30. https://gov.texas.gov/uploads/files/press/School_Safety_Action_Plan_05302018.pdf.
- 20 Eden, M. (2009). School discipline reform and disorder: Evidence from New York City public schools, 2012–16, *Education Next* 9, No. 3. (*supra* at p. 9, citing Carrell, S.E., & Hoekstra, M.L. Domino effect.).
- 21 Ibid.
- 22 Mac Donald, H. (April 6, 2018). Who misbehaves? Claims that school discipline is unfairly meted out ignores actual classroom misbehavior. *City Journal*. <https://www.city-journal.org/html/who-misbehaves-15811.html>. Heather Mac Donald, the Thomas W. Smith Fellow at the Manhattan Institute, recently reported on the impact that changes to disciplinary policies have had on teachers. For example, the district attorney in St. Paul, Minnesota called a spike in attacks on teachers following the implementation of non-exclusionary practices a “public health crisis.” Likewise, according to Ms. Mac Donald, Charlotte, North Carolina experienced “an increase in guns, drugs, and assaults on teachers; school assaults in Durham increased more than 50 percent last year.” She also noted that “the district attorney in Syracuse forced schools to return to traditional disciplinary policies after a teacher was stabbed.”
- 23 Josh Kinsler. (2013). School discipline: A source or salve for the racial achievement gap. *54 International Economic Review*, 355. (“[D]iscipline may affect achievement positively through its effect on student behavior.”); see also Eden, M. (July 28, 2017). NY educators’ plan to make schools less safe. *New York Post* (citing Kinsler, and noting that “a study by a University of Georgia professor found that efforts to decrease the racial-suspension gap actually increase the racial achievement gap”); accord Andrew Coulson. (January, 23, 2014). *Why team Obama’s new education guidelines may hurt, not help, black students*. Cato Institute (Relaxing school discipline to shrink the “racial discipline gap” and “causes overall student achievement to fall” and thus “African-American children” suffer “disproportionately.”) www.cato.org/publications/commentary/why-team-obamas-new-education-guidelines-may-hurt-not-help-black-students (citing Kinsler).
- 24 Some problem behaviors could potentially be due to adverse childhood experiences (ACEs). See generally <https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/acestudy/index.html>.
- 25 Prior problem behavior accounts for the racial gap in school suspensions. (2014). *Journal of Criminal Justice*, 42, 257–266.
- 26 Ibid.

- 27 Ibid., p. 257. “A close read of the available empirical literature suggests, however, that racial bias may not be the only factor associated with racial differences in school disciplinary rates. For example, research studies reveal that black youth, in comparison with their white counterparts, are often less prepared for school entry (Magnuson & Waldfogel, 2005; Murnane, et al., 2006; Sadowski, 2006), are disproportionately involved in delinquency and crime (Earls, 1994; Hawkins, Laub, & Lauritsen, 1998), and are more likely to behave in ways that interfere with classroom and school functioning (Beaver, Wright, & DeLisi, 2011). These studies, and others from various disciplines, suggest that the school disciplinary rates may also reflect the problematic behaviors of black youth—problem behaviors that are imported into schools and into classrooms.”
- 28 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
- 29 See January 8, 2014, Dear Colleague Letter on the Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline at 11, n.21 (“Schools also violate Federal law when they evenhandedly implement facially neutral policies and practices that, although not adopted with the intent to discriminate, nonetheless have an unjustified effect of discriminating against students on the basis of race. The resulting discriminatory effect is commonly referred to as ‘disparate impact.’” (citing 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2))).
- 30 *Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke*, 438 U.S. 265, 287 (1978) (Powell, J., announcing judgment); *ibid.* at 325, 328, 352 (Brennan, J., joined by White, Marshall, and Blackmun, J.J., concurring in part).
- 31 *Washington v. Davis*, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (finding a violation of the Equal Protection Clause requires discriminatory intent, compared to Title VII’s statutorily enacted disparate impact standard in employment); see also *Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp.* 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1979) (“Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.”); *Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney*, 442 U.S. 256, 272 (1979) (“[E]ven if a neutral law has a disproportionately adverse effect upon a racial minority, it is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause only if that impact can be traced to a discriminatory purpose.”).
- 32 See *Alexander v. Sandoval*, 532 U.S. 275, 280, 286 n.6 (2001).
- 33 See January 8, 2014, Dear Colleague Letter on the Nondiscriminatory Administration of School Discipline at 7; *ibid.* at 11 n.21 (citing 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2)); see *ibid.* at p. 18, Example 6; see also Blad, E. (April 4, 2018). DeVos meets with supporters, critics of discipline rules as GAO says racial disparities persist. *Education Week*. (Summarizing the guidance’s interpretation of disparate impact as mandating that “if a school finds black students...in violation of a rule at higher rates than their peers, that rule must be necessary to ‘meet an important educational goal’”). Even in the context of disparate impact case law, some argue that this was an overly expansive approach to disparate impact liability, in focusing on bottom line disparities in discipline rates rather than whether specific school practices caused those disparities. Regulatory Transparency Project. (September 12, 2017). *A review of Department of Education programs: Transgender issues, racial quotas in school discipline, and campus sexual assault mandates*, at 8–9; Clegg, R. (April 11, 2018). How the “Dear Colleague” Letter missed the point. *Washington Post* (Describing the “hyperaggressive approach” taken by the Dear Colleague Letter).
- 34 See Robby Soave. (November 11, 2014). Schools implement explicit racial bias in suspensions. *Reason* (Describing a Minnesota school system’s mandate that suspensions meet a racial “quota” by 2018, and that “every suspension of a black or brown student” be subject to special review and describing it as a response to an investigation by “the Department of Education’s Office for Civil Rights.”). (<http://reason.com/blog/2014/11/11/schools-implement-explicit-racial-bias-i>); Kirsanow, P. (April 10, 2017). Racial quotas in school discipline. *National Review*. (“[A]lthough proponents of OCR’s Letter may claim it does not compel the use of racial quotas, that’s precisely the outcome produced”) (www.nationalreview.com/corner/446590/racial-quotas-school-discipline); Williams, W. (April 15, 2014). Discipline and justice. *Richmond Times-Dispatch* (African-American columnist argues that the guidance incentivizes educators to adopt a “racial quota system for student discipline,” citing lawyers George Leef and Roger Clegg); letter from William Perry Pendley, Mountain States Legal Foundation, to the Attorney General and Education Secretary, dated April 3, 2017 (the Dear Colleague Letter led to “use of race-based discipline policies by local school districts”). (www.mountainstateslegal.org/docs/default-source/default-document-library/343921223-040317-doj-doe-racial-disparity-letter.pdf).
- 35 See, e.g., Resolution Agreement Oklahoma City Public Schools at 18–19, OCR Docket No. 0714119. (April 4, 2016) (Any statistical disproportionality should be “eliminated to the maximum extent possible.”).
- 36 See, e.g., *Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod v. FCC*, 141 F.3d 344, 350-352 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
- 37 See *People Who Care v. Rockford Bd. of Educ.*, 111 F.3d 528, 535–538 (7th Cir. 1997) (striking down lower court decree that would have required school district to engage in racial proportionality requirements in discipline and reasoning that even though the district was under a racial desegregation consent decree, there was no evidence that the district’s current discipline practices intentionally discriminated against students based on race and thus no justification for a policy that amounted to a racial quota).
- 38 20 U.S.C. § 3403(a).
- 39 *Board of Curators, Univ. of Missouri v. Horowitz*, 435 U.S. 78, 90–91 (1978).
- 40 *Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser*, 478 U.S. 675, 686 (1986).
- 41 *Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier*, 484 U.S. 260, 273–74 (1988) (rejecting First Amendment challenge to principal’s decision to restrict otherwise-protected news content of school publication because the decision was “not unreasonable” and thus related to a “valid educational purpose”); *Morse v. Frederick*, 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007) (school given deference as to its decision to restrict speech around school that would concededly be protected by the First Amendment if it occurred away from school); see *Bd of Educ. v. Earls*, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (upholding school search policy that would be unconstitutional outside the schools, based on rational basis for it, while expressing “no opinion as to its wisdom”).
- 42 Gail L. Heriot & Alison Somin, *The Department of Education’s initiative on racial disparities in school discipline: Wrong for students, wrong for teachers, wrong on the law*. *Tex. Rev. L. & Pol.*, 47–48, (forthcoming 2018); San Diego Legal Studies Paper No. 18–321, 3. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3104221.

The Effectiveness and Appropriateness of Psychotropic Medication for Treatment of Troubled Youth

Every youth who appears to be “troubled” or displays “troubled” behavior has a unique set of risk and protective factors contributing to his or her behaviors. Risk factors can include mental health symptoms such as mood problems, impulsivity, anxiety, hallucinations, or other psychotic symptoms. They can also include environmental factors such as history of trauma, adverse events, poor supervision, and inappropriate coping behaviors.

Often, these risks can exacerbate and compound one another. Some examples include: speech or language delays combined with past traumas; developmental and intellectual disabilities combined with being bullied; and relationship challenges with caregivers combined with substance use disorders. Protective factors play an important role and can be further developed. Among these factors are a relationship with a trusted adult such as a teacher or coach, an undeveloped skill such as art or sports, or a desire to make friends.

The term “youth with complex mental health needs” more accurately reflects the complex forces resulting in how a “troubled youth” may present and will be used henceforth. The term “youth” refers to children, adolescents, and transition-aged youth (ages 16–25).

Given the multifactorial nature of causes of challenging behaviors, the role of medications will depend on such factors as the diagnosis, the presence of co-occurring mental or physical diagnoses, and provider, youth, and family preferences. In her July 11 testimony to the Commission, Dr. Gabrielle Carlson highlighted the unique features of several youth with complex mental health needs, stating that “treatment requires an accurate diagnosis and attention to the individual circumstances and presentation of each child, his or her school, and family.”

Despite the unique needs of every youth, there are several overarching principles that are important to consider with respect to the use of psychotropic medications.¹ While a full review of the principles to con-

sider in prescribing is beyond the scope of this report, the most important points are listed in the sidebar.

The categories of medications most commonly used for youth with mental health conditions include selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors (SSRIs, such as fluoxetine, sertraline, citalopram), stimulant medications (e.g., methylphenidate medications, mixed amphetamine salts), antipsychotic medications (e.g., aripiprazole, risperidone), post synaptic alpha2-ad-

Overarching principles that are important to consider with respect to the use of psychotropic medications

1. The goal of the use of psychotropic medications for youth with complex mental health needs should be to provide safe, effective, and evidence-based prescribing in the context of good quality mental healthcare.
2. Particularly for youth with complex mental health needs, psychotropic medications should not be prescribed as the sole treatment modality. They should be part of a broader treatment plan to include psychosocial supports, therapies, coordination across service sectors, and educational supports.
3. Collaboration among providers and service systems (e.g., school, medical, juvenile justice, child welfare) is important to reduce inappropriate prescribing.
4. Prescribing of psychotropic medications should be conducted by professionals with adequate training and expertise or in consultation with professionals with such expertise.
5. The conditions that allow for safe and appropriate prescribing of psychotropic medications include ongoing clinical monitoring.
6. Informed consent is an important part of prescribing. Further, the more engaged and informed youth and families are about medications, the greater the likelihood that medications are taken as prescribed and their adverse effects avoided (or addressed and monitored as they arise). Shared decision-making approaches—where the family and youth are fully involved in medication decisions—should be employed.

renergic agonists (e.g., guanfacine), and other antidepressants (e.g., bupropion). The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has approved these medications for specific uses in youth (e.g., fluoxetine for youth with major depressive disorder, fluvoxamine or sertraline for youth with obsessive compulsive disorder, and methylphenidate for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, or ADHD).

Medications are often prescribed for youth even when the FDA has not approved them for that specific diagnosis or age group. This is referred to as prescribing for an “unapproved use.” In general, healthcare professionals may prescribe or use FDA-approved drugs for unapproved uses when they judge it medically appropriate for their individual patients. In some cases, depending on the medication and its use, prescribing an unapproved drug may be within the standard of care. A common example of prescribing an FDA-approved drug for an unapproved use is prescribing a medication for a child that has been FDA-approved for use in adults for a certain condition and not separately studied and approved for use in children. (See Table 9.1 for medications approved by the FDA for children and adolescents and for what conditions.)

Psychotropic medications are effective for many conditions in youth. They can facilitate better outcomes, such as improved academic functioning, reduced anxiety, decreased impulsivity, and decreased symptoms of major depressive disorder. Some examples of these medications and some of their uses include methylphenidate for ADHD, sertraline for generalized anxiety disorder, guanfacine for ADHD, and fluoxetine for depression.^{2,3,4}

When prescribed appropriately, psychotropic medications can play a lifesaving role in the lives of youth with complex behavioral health needs. To give several examples, antipsychotics for youth with schizophrenia can not only reduce symptoms such as hallucinations, but may also reduce the severity of subsequent psychotic episodes.⁵ For youth with severe major depression, antidepressants can improve mood and improve functioning.⁶ In situations of severe anxiety, an SSRI such as fluoxetine or sertraline can enable the youth to engage in therapy to develop new coping skills.⁷ Despite evidence supporting the use of psychotropic medications for specific conditions, more evidence is needed to better understand which medications are helpful for various conditions in youth.



As Dr. Mark Olfson noted in his July 11 testimony to the Commission, “There is compelling evidence that U.S. children and adolescents are undertreated with psychotropic medications.” For example, although one in nine U.S. adolescents suffers from depression, only around 40 percent of them receive any treatment and only about half of those receive an antidepressant medication.⁸ Olfson noted that even larger gaps exist in the treatment of anxiety and substance use problems.⁹

Psychotropic medications also can be associated with adverse effects irrespective of whether the prescriber is adhering to best practice guidelines. Common examples of adverse effects include increased restlessness or agitation with SSRIs (particularly in younger age groups), weight gain, associated cardio-metabolic effects, sedation with antipsychotics, and decreased appetite with stimulants.

Concerns have been raised regarding whether SSRIs cause increases in suicidality in youth. Some research has found an elevated risk of suicidality among youth who were prescribed SSRIs compared to those receiving placebo.¹⁰ It also described potential mechanisms for this phenomenon, including activation (i.e., increased energy for self-harm). Other researchers found that lower rates of SSRI use could be associated with higher rates of suicide among youth.^{11,12} Therefore, it is important to consider this potential risk when prescribing SSRIs. The current standard of care for youth on SSRIs includes close clinical monitoring. There is also significant uncertainty about the long-term impact of psychotropic medications on developing brains, and more research is needed in this area.

There is variability across the United States in how closely prescribers adhere to best practice guidelines,

especially for vulnerable populations like youth and youth with complex behavioral health needs.¹³ Examples of inappropriate prescribing include: prescribing medications without a clear diagnosis; not monitoring at the recommended intervals (e.g., not checking a glucose level if prescribing second generation anti-psychotics) and/or not monitoring the recommended clinical parameters (e.g., not checking blood pressure at regular intervals if the child is on a stimulant); and prescribing without appropriate consideration of proven non-pharmacological interventions, including various disorder-specific psychosocial interventions.

Deviation from best practice prescribing impacts certain groups of youth disproportionately, such as those involved in the foster care system and minority youth.¹⁴ There is evidence that youth who have multiservice system involvement more frequently experience polypharmacy—the concurrent use of multiple medications by a patient—and long-term use, even in the absence of psychosocial treatments.¹⁵ While prescribing more than one medication may be clinically indicated, polypharmacy without a full psychiatric evaluation and without proper monitoring is not consistent with best practice treatment.

Youth with substance use disorders (SUDs) commonly have co-occurring psychiatric disorders¹⁶ and are represented in high numbers in the juvenile justice population.¹⁷ The standard of care is to evaluate and treat co-occurring psychiatric disorders while also addressing the SUDs.¹⁸ In conjunction with the full array of services for youth with SUDs, the use of buprenorphine in youth is promising.¹⁹

At this time, only buprenorphine/naloxone is approved for individuals aged 16 and older, although methadone pharmacotherapy for opioid use disorder can be provided at specially certified opioid treatment programs where specialized interventions for youth are offered for those aged 16–17. Methadone treatment for opioid use disorder can only be undertaken with informed consent from parents (unless the youth has been emancipated) and the adolescent patient. More research is needed to determine when Medication-Assisted Treatment (MAT) is clinically indicated in youth, as well as its adverse effects and efficacy. MAT is currently only available for opioid, alcohol, and nicotine use disorders. Workforce gaps also limit access to MAT.

The standard of care is to evaluate and treat co-occurring psychiatric disorders while also addressing the substance use disorders.

Workforce issues for clinicians who prescribe psychotropic medications to youth

Pediatricians and other primary care providers prescribe the majority of psychotropic medications in the United States,²⁰ but their lack of training in behavioral health conditions is frequently cited as a major concern.²¹ Clinicians who prescribe psychotropic medications to youth and adolescents include child and adolescent psychiatrists, pediatricians, advance practice nurses, physician assistants, family medicine physicians, and psychiatrists trained in adult psychiatry.

In some states and in the United States Military Health System, psychologists who have undergone specialized training can prescribe psychiatric medication. Although child and adolescent psychiatrists have the most extensive training in behavioral health conditions, physical health, and child development, families often receive psychotropic medications from providers with varying degrees of training and proficiency in prescribing for youth with complex behavioral health needs. While many pediatricians do an excellent job in addressing the behavioral health needs of their patients, there are ongoing concerns about inadequate training particularly regarding youth with complex behavioral health needs. The reasons for the high rates of prescribing by primary care providers is multifactorial. They include stigma associated with going to a psychiatrist, the convenience and trust in seeing the pediatrician, finding a psychiatrist who is affordable or in-network for insurance, and, most importantly, the critical workforce shortage of child and adolescent psychiatrists.

Appropriate treatment, particularly for youth with complex behavioral health needs, begins with a thorough psychiatric evaluation that considers their developmental and behavioral health history, family history, environment, physical health, behaviors, mood, and other factors.²² Despite the importance of obtaining a comprehensive psychiatric evaluation, many youth with complex behavioral health needs experience barriers to these services.



In the majority of states, there is a critical shortage of child and adolescent psychiatrists. For special populations, such as youth with intellectual and developmental disability disorders, shortages of child and adolescent psychiatrists are even more dire. Many counties throughout the country have no child and adolescent psychiatrists at all.²³ Although the number of adolescents in the population is expected to grow to 45 million by 2050,²⁴ the pool of child and adolescent psychiatrists is aging and not increasing at the same rate as the youth population. Even at the current time, there are approximately 8,300 practicing child and adolescent psychiatrists in the United States and more than 15 million youth in need of the special expertise of a child and adolescent psychiatrist.²⁵

Because of the national shortage of child and adolescent psychiatrists, families with youth in need of a psychiatrist often have to wait for long periods before they are able to be evaluated, travel long distances, and go without specialized care.²⁶ Pediatricians in rural and other critical shortage areas are sometimes left struggling to manage highly complex youth without adequate training in the management of mental disorders. They have limited access to providers with experience working with youth with mental and substance use disorders.

Commission Observations

Best practice treatment varies according to the condition under consideration, the specific situation of the child and family, and other factors. Best practice guidelines are generally established through a process of expert consensus and research. As Dr. Mark Olsson testified to the Commission, treatment must be tailored to individual needs.

Entities involved with developing best practice guidelines vary, but may include professional organizations, specialists contracted by states, or academic centers. In the area of psychotropic prescribing for youth with complex mental health needs, professional organizations such as the American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry and the American Academy of Pediatrics have developed a number of best practice guidelines. The guidelines cover the use of psychotropic medications in youth generally and for specific conditions.²⁷ It is also notable that the Canadian Institute for Health Research has supported the development of guidelines for specific types of psychotropic medications for youth, such as antipsychotics.²⁸ In addition, a number of states have developed psychotropic medication parameters specific to vulnerable populations, such as youth in foster care. Indiana is one such state.²⁹

A full description of the guidelines is beyond the scope of this report. However, recommended components of appropriate prescribing frequently include an evaluation of the youth's behavioral health issues and history, appropriate clinical and laboratory monitoring, appropriate informed consent procedures, access to a broader treatment plan including psychosocial services, and coordination with other providers and service systems involved with the youth.

A particular aspect of best practice prescribing incorporates an adequate informed consent process, which includes engagement of youth and their caregivers in the decision-making process as well as education about the risks and benefits of medications. Another aspect involves expanding shared decision-making approaches. When youth and families are educated about the risks, benefits, and alternatives to medications and are more involved in treatment decision-making, youth are more likely to take medications as prescribed, be engaged in treatment, and

participate in other aspects of care. Family and youth peer advocates can also play an important role in this area.³⁰

State-wide programs supporting best practice prescribing

Although guidelines exist for best practice prescribing of psychotropic medications, inappropriate prescribing is all too common. This is particularly so for vulnerable populations. A number of states have developed programs to address the problem of inappropriate prescribing of psychotropic medications for youth, especially where there are shortages of providers specializing in youth behavioral health disorders.

Among the most successful programs are those that are financially supported (often at the state level) and that have multiple components. The latter include resources supporting the education of providers and families, resources such as case management to connect youth to other psychosocial services, a process for review of medication regimens, and the ability for providers to consult with a child psychiatrist specialist. Minnesota, Washington, Ohio, and New Jersey have developed such programs.

One example is Ohio Minds Matter. This quality improvement initiative was launched by the State of Ohio to evaluate and improve prescribing of psychotropic medications. The initiative is a public-private partnership with a \$1 million investment from the Ohio Office of Health Transformation and Department of Medicaid. Initiative partners include various state departments, health systems, providers, community representatives, and child and family advocates.

The goals for the project include increasing timely access to safe and effective psychotropic medications and other treatments, improving pediatric health outcomes, and reducing potential adverse effects. A key resource created by the initiative is the Minds Matter Toolkit. The toolkit includes design algorithms, evidence-based guidelines, fact sheets, and online, on-demand learning modules for prescribers, parents, consumers, schools, and agencies.³¹

Telephonic consultation programs with child and adolescent psychiatrists

Consultation models with child and adolescent psychiatrists (which can be stand-alone or part of a broader system) have been successful in supporting pediatricians and other providers to prescribe medi-

cations and refer youth to appropriate psychosocial supports. When such telephonic consultations are provided, the primary care provider remains the prescriber of psychotropic medications, unless a decision is made for the youth to receive a face-to-face psychiatric evaluation.

Despite the promising nature of such consultation programs, many providers and communities nationally do not have access to them. Even in the approximately 30 states that have telephonic consultation lines in place, the service is not available to all pediatricians and providers statewide.³²

Access to best practice psychosocial services for youth with complex behavioral health needs

To address complex behavioral health issues in youth, the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA) has developed, funded, and implemented a treatment approach called the systems of care framework. The framework stipulates care coordination across multiple systems for youth. Systems such as schools, behavioral health, juvenile justice, and social services are commonly involved in care coordination.

This approach has proven a best practice, as evidenced by annual reports to Congress that review and analyze data from the multisite national evaluation. Data from the 2016 report, “The Comprehensive Community Mental Health Services for Children with Serious Emotional Disturbances Program,” indicate that youth participating in systems of care demonstrate significant:

- improvements in behavioral and emotional functioning;
- reductions in suicide and suicide attempts;
- reductions in unlawful activities; and
- reductions in costs due to hospitalizations and arrests.³³

New Jersey has invested significant efforts in developing coordination across multiple systems to enhance its system of care. The state has demonstrated some promising outcomes associated with these efforts.³⁴

Several models of care have been effective for youth with complex behavioral health needs, such as wraparound systems of care.³⁵ Multisystemic therapy is another evidence-based model for youth with severe behavioral health conditions who have been

Youth participating in systems of care demonstrate significant:

- improvements in behavioral and emotional functioning
- reductions in suicide and suicide attempts
- reductions in unlawful activities
- reductions in costs due to hospitalizations and arrests

or are involved in the justice system.³⁶ For symptoms of trauma, which are common in youth with behavioral health disorders, there are a number of evidence-based psychotherapies.³⁷ However, psychosocial treatments are only available to a small percentage of the youth who might benefit from them.³⁸

Models beyond traditional outpatient behavioral health services are described elsewhere in this report. These models should also be acknowledged for facilitating youth access to appropriate psychotropic medication prescribing.³⁹

Child and adolescent psychiatrists can play a variety of roles within school-based mental health programs, both in direct service provision as well as consultation.^{40,41} One example of an innovative model of integrating psychiatry into schools is the University of New Mexico's Center for Rural and Community Behavioral Health (CRCBH). It uses telehealth technology to connect child and adolescent psychiatry trainees and faculty with youth in rural and frontier schools. In addition to providing care, the CRCBH model provides continuing education to school-based providers.

SAMHSA has considerably enhanced its approach to the provision of technical and training assistance (TTA) on addressing mental disorders, including serious mental illness (SMI). In FY 2019, SAMHSA will fund a Network of Regional TTA Centers, the Mental Health Technology Transfer Centers, to provide training and

education to professionals across the country working to address the needs of those affected by mental disorders. The network will include specialty areas of focus related to treating mental disorders. Two population-specific centers will address the needs of the American Indian/Alaska Natives and Hispanic populations.

The network focus will be enhanced with the addition of a specialty emphasis on school-based mental health in each region. Complementing this regional approach, the Clinical Support Services for SMI is a new national TTA Center. It will serve as a national resource on best practices for the provision of evidence-based treatment for individuals living with SMI.

In addition to the shortage of child and adolescent psychiatrists, there are multiple barriers to the availability of other evidence-based psychosocial services for youth with complex behavioral health needs. In fact, as described above, medications are a very small component of the broader treatment plan for many youth with complex behavioral health needs.



“Medication is one aspect of treatment. We have considerable knowledge about how to use it. And often it works best in combination with psychosocial treatments including family and/or individual psychotherapy. It is a tragedy that misinformation, stigma and lack of access keep people from effective treatment.”

— Dr. Gabrielle Carlson, testimony to the Commissioners,
July 11, 2018

Table 9-1

Psychotropic medications approved by the FDA for behavioral health conditions in children and adolescents

Medication	Brand names	Indication	Age group
Methylphenidate preparations	Methylin, Ritalin, Ritalin SR, Methylin ER, Quillivant XR, Concerta, Metadate CD, Ritalin LA, Daytrana, Focalin, Focalin XR, Aptensio XR, Cotempla-XR, Quillichew ER	Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)	≥ 6 years
Amphetamine, dextroamphetamine and mixed amphetamine salts	Liquadd, Dexedrine, Dexadrine spansules, Vyvanse, Adderall, Adderall XR, Dexosyn, Adzenys, Evekeo, Mydayis	Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)	≥ 6 years (Note several formulations specifically approved for children > 3 years)
Lisdexamfetamine	Vyvanse	Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)	≥ 6 years
Non-controlled ADHD medications	Strattera (atomoxetine) Tenex, Intuniv (guanfacine and guanfacine ER) Kapvay (clonidine)	Attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD)	≥ 6 years
quetiapine	Seroquel	Bipolar disorder Schizophrenia	≥ 10 years ≥ 13 years
paliperidone	Invega	Schizophrenia	12–17 years
olanzapine	Zyprexa	Bipolar disorder Schizophrenia	≥ 13 years ≥ 13 years
risperidone	Risperdal	Autism Bipolar mania Schizophrenia	≥ 5 years 10–17 years 13–17 years
aripiprazole	Abilify	Bipolar disorder Irritability associated with autistic disorder Schizophrenia	≥ 10 years ≥ 5 years ≥ 13 years
asenapine	Saphris	Bipolar mania	10–17 years
lurasidone	Latuda	Schizophrenia, Bipolar depression	13–17 years 10–17 years
chlorpromazine	Thorazine	Schizophrenia/psychosis	≥ 6 months
haloperidol	Haldol	Sedation/psychotic disorders/Tourette's disorder	3–12 years
pimozide	Orap	Tourette's disorder	≥ 12 years
lithium	Eskatolith, Lithobid	Bipolar disorder	≥ 12 years
duloxetine	Cymbalta	Generalized anxiety disorder (GAD)	≥ 7 years
escitalopram	Lexapro	Major depressive disorder	≥ 12 years
fluoxetine	Prozac	Depression Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD)	Ages 8–18 Ages 7–17
fluvoxamine	Luvox	OCD	Ages 8–17
Sertraline	Zoloft	OCD	Ages 6–17
amitriptyline	Elavil	Depressive disorders	≥ 12 years
clomipramine	Anafranil	OCD	≥ 10 years
imipramine	Tofranil	Depression Enuresis	≥ 12 years ≥ 6 years

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.⁴²

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should seek to increase the number of specialty physicians by encouraging the Accreditation Council on General Medical Education (ACGME) and other key stakeholders to increase the number of residency slots for general psychiatry programs, as well as child and adolescent psychiatry, in order to increase the number of medical students entering psychiatry and increase the number of residents in child and adolescent psychiatry.
2. Appropriate federal agencies should work to support care coordination across multiple systems for complex youth by supporting mechanisms where feasible for collaboration between providers (e.g., billing codes to support communication of physicians with teachers, child welfare workers, probation officers, psychologists, social workers, and other providers as well as other team-based planning).
3. HHS operating divisions, such as the National Institutes of Health, should support research to answer questions regarding effectiveness, safety, and tolerability of psychotropic treatment in youth (including long-term effects) as well as research on safe, effective alternatives, such as psychosocial interventions.
4. All appropriate federal agencies should support technical assistance (TA) for children's mental health, school-based mental health services, and TA to support evidence-based treatments for serious emotional disturbances.
5. Appropriate federal agencies should strengthen standards and quality metrics so that youth have access to high-quality treatment that matches their needs. Because of the uneven quality of psychotropic medication treatment, there is a need to coordinate federal, state, and local approaches to measuring the quality of mental healthcare for children and adolescents, including use of psychotropic medications.

STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State and local health and behavioral health departments, in collaboration with primary care facilities and practitioners and medical schools as appropriate, should expand and enhance the existing primary care workforce by making telephonic and telepsychiatry consultation models available, expanding and supporting provider education, and supporting provider learning collaboratives. Well-designed consultation models include real-time availability by phone of a child and adolescent psychiatrist to consult with a primary care provider to discuss treatment needs and consider the need for additional evaluations or resources.⁴³
Some of these programs include access to additional types of services, such as connecting youth to case management or therapy services. Examples include the Massachusetts Child Psychiatry Access Program (<https://www.mcpap.com/>), Maryland's Behavioral Health Integration in Pediatric Primary Care (<http://www.mdbhipp.org/>), and the University of Washington Partnership Access Line (<http://www.seattlechildrens.org/healthcare-professionals/access-services/partnership-access-line/>).
2. State and local behavioral health departments should expand the integration of behavioral health providers appropriately trained to deliver psychosocial interventions. In addition, they should expand training and capacity in the delivery of non-pharmacological interventions as safe alternatives and/or augmentations to appropriate pharmacotherapy.
3. State and local behavioral health agencies, in collaboration with state and local school districts, should increase access to good treatment through increasing opportunities to access a full array of treatment services in schools. The provision of treatment delivery in schools is imperative to addressing the needs of youth with complex mental health needs. The direct availability of these services in the school setting reduces barriers to access and ensures easy access to mental health service provision.

Chapter 9 Endnotes

- 1 American Academy of Child and Adolescent Psychiatry. (2009). *Practice parameter on psychotropic medications*. [https://www.aacap.org/article/S0890-8567\(09\)60156-8/pdf](https://www.aacap.org/article/S0890-8567(09)60156-8/pdf).
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- 42 Recommendations were made with the underlying premise that promising and effective practices to support youth with complex behavioral health needs should be expanded and promoted. It is also important to note that the evidence for a causal link between the use of psychotropic medications and general school safety is weak; rather, the recommendations focus on promoting positive clinical and functional outcomes for youth with complex behavioral health needs.
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The Efficacy of Age Restrictions for Firearm Purchases

The suspected shooter at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School is a 19-year-old who purchased the long gun he allegedly used from a licensed dealer after passing a federal background check. His ability to do so sparked new debate about age restrictions on firearm sales. This section provides an overview of federal and state laws that place age-related restrictions on the possession and purchase of firearms. Existing research does not demonstrate that laws imposing a minimum age for firearms purchases have a measurable impact on reducing homicides, suicides, or unintentional deaths.

Federal laws

Long Guns: Federal law provides no minimum age for the possession of long guns or long gun ammunition. However, the Gun Control Act of 1968 (GCA)¹ does prohibit federally licensed importers, manufacturers, dealers, or collectors (collectively, Federal Firearms Licensees or “FFLs”) from selling or delivering any long gun or ammunition for a long gun to any individual less than 18 years old. Unlicensed persons may sell a long gun to a person of any age.

Handguns: Federal law establishes a minimum age for possession of handguns. The GCA² prohibits persons under 18 years of age from possessing handguns or handgun ammunition, with certain exceptions

for employment, ranching, farming, hunting, target practice, education, and a handgun possessed while defending the home of the juvenile or a home in which the juvenile is an invited guest.

The GCA also prohibits FFLs from selling or delivering any handgun or handgun ammunition to any individual less than 21 years of age. This leaves a three-year “window” when an individual may legally possess handguns and handgun ammunition, but may not purchase them from an FFL. Unlicensed persons may sell a handgun to a resident of their own state so long as the buyer is 18 years old.

State laws

Similar to federal firearms laws, state laws pertaining to possession of firearms differ from those pertaining to their purchase. State laws may also distinguish between sales by FFLs and sales by unlicensed persons.

The laws in a number of states reach beyond federal law, placing further age restrictions on the purchase of handguns and long guns. Shortly after the Parkland shooting, the State of Florida passed a law that prohibits firearms (handguns and long guns) purchases by individuals under 21 years old regardless of whether the purchase is from a licensed firearms dealer or from

Table 10-1

Federal Laws

	Long Guns	Handguns
Minimum Age of Possession	None	18, with exceptions
Minimum Age of Purchase from Licensed Sellers (FFLs)	Prohibited from selling or delivering long guns/ammunition to individuals younger than 18	Prohibited from selling or delivering handguns/ammunition to individuals younger than 21
Minimum Age of Purchase from Unlicensed Seller	May sell a long gun to a person of any age	May sell a handgun to a resident of their own state as long as the buyer is at least 18

a non-licensee/private party.³ In taking this action, Florida joined two other states—Hawaii and Illinois—that have similar laws setting the minimum age for all firearms purchases at 21. The 2018 change in the firearms law in Florida did not include modifications to age restrictions on firearms possession.

Research on minimum age of purchase laws and firearms violence⁴

A 2017 study on the effects of firearms laws on firearms homicides in the United States was based on a systematic review of 34 empirical studies published between January 1970 and August 2016.⁵ Five of the 34 studies examined juvenile age restrictions prohibiting the possession and/or purchase of handguns by persons younger than 18 or 21 years.

This review found that the evidence does not indicate that additional state law age requirements would be effective.⁶ For example, one study included in the systematic review evaluated the effects of state firearms regulations on homicide and suicide death rates.⁷ The study examined laws in effect from 1979 to 1998, including laws pertaining to a minimum age of 21 for handgun purchases and a minimum age of 21 for private handgun possession. None of these state laws was associated with a statistically significant decrease in the rates of firearms homicides or total homicides. Another study found these state age restrictions do not appear to be as effective in reducing homicide or suicide rates as other measures.⁸

One further study examined state-level minimum age laws in place between 1981 and 2010 for handgun possession and found no significant effects on youth suicides or youth unintentional deaths.⁹ However, it noted that the current federal minimum age of possession laws are effective in reducing suicide and unintentional deaths among youths.

Where do shooters obtain their firearms?

Laws that modify the age of purchase are likely to be effective if individuals obtain their firearms through legal purchase prior to using them in violent acts. As school shootings are of particular concern, it is important to ask: Where do school shooters get the firearms they use?

The U.S. Department of Education and U.S. Secret Service reviewed 37 incidents of targeted school violence between 1974 and 2000 and found that most attackers had access to and had used weapons prior to the attack.¹⁰ More than two-thirds of the attackers acquired the gun (or guns) used in their attacks from their own home or that of a relative. The School Associated Death Study conducted by the Centers for Disease Control found similar results in a study of 323 school-associated violent death events that occurred between 1992 and 1999. Of the firearms used to commit homicides, 23.4 percent were obtained from the home of the perpetrator and 27.6 percent came from a friend or a relative.¹¹

The National Institute of Justice is funding researchers at City University of New York's John Jay College to develop a database of all of the publicly known shootings that have resulted in at least one injury on K–12 school grounds since 1990. This project will provide a detailed understanding of the perpetrators of school shootings as well as recommendations for intervention points that could prevent or reduce the harm caused by shootings. Although the project is ongoing, a preliminary analysis of 106 cases found that only 13 percent of shooters purchased the firearms legally. Higher percentages took the firearms from their parents (29 percent) or stole them from friends or family (25 percent) or strangers (2 percent). Another 5 percent purchased the firearms illegally.

A *Wall Street Journal* analysis of school shootings with at least three victims dead or injured since 1990 found 32 incidents.¹² Twenty-five of these cases involved shooters who were minors. In 20 cases, reporters were able to identify a source for the gun, and in 17 cases the gun came from the home. Given what we know about how underage shooters most often procure weapons (i.e., taking them from home or stealing them), laws aimed at a minimum purchase age would not have affected most school shooters.

Analyses of completed school shootings indicate that school shooters do not frequently use legal purchase as a method for obtaining firearms. More often, they obtain them from within the home or steal them.

Commission Observations

The existing research findings on the efficacy of current minimum age of firearm purchase laws do not support the conclusion that those laws have a measurable impact on reducing homicides, suicides, or unintentional deaths. Analyses of completed school shootings indicate that school shooters do not fre-

quently use legal purchase as a method for obtaining firearms. More often, they obtain them from within the home or steal them. These findings suggest that modifying the minimum age of firearm purchase is unlikely to be an effective method for preventing or reducing school shootings.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. Without more comprehensive research, and because most school shooters obtain their weapons from family members or friends rather than by purchasing them, states seeking to prevent unlawful adolescent access to firearms should consider offering training or other resources to promote safe storage of firearms.
2. States should consider sponsoring additional research to determine how best to prevent adolescents from unlawfully accessing firearms.

Chapter 10 Endnotes

- 1 18 U.S.C. § 922(b)(1).
- 2 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2).
- 3 The Florida statute only prohibits licensed dealers from engaging in sales (or facilitation of sales) to those under 21. For practical purposes, this means that no criminal penalty applies to a private seller who fails to ensure a purchaser is over 21 (i.e., a private seller has no affirmative legal obligation to verify the age of a purchaser).
- 4 The studies discussed in this section focus on the use of firearms by youth in homicides and suicides; they do not specifically address the use of firearms by youth in other crimes.
- 5 Lee, L.K., Fleegler, E.W., Farrell, C., Avakame, E., Srinivasan, S., Hemenway, D., & Monuteaux, M.C. (2017). Firearm laws and firearm homicides: A systematic review. *JAMA Internal Medicine*, 177(1), 106–119. DOI: 10.1001/jamainternmed.2016.7051.
- 6 This discussion examines the results of a systematic review of multiple studies. We highlight several examples to elaborate on the overall finding of the review, but it is not our intention to summarize the characteristics of all studies included in the review. We note that one of the studies that was reviewed produced contradictory results, but that study was based on cross-sectional data, which cannot explain the impact of enacting a law.
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- 12 Hobbs, T.D. (April 5, 2018). Most guns used in school shootings come from home. Retrieved from the *Wall Street Journal*. <https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-school-shootings-most-guns-come-from-home-1522920600>. Similarly, an August 1, 2018 *Washington Post* report studied 145 acts of gun violence at primary and secondary schools that occurred between 1999 and 2018 and concluded that “[w]hile investigators don’t always determine—or publicly reveal—the weapons’ origins, the Post found 105 cases in which the source was identified. Of those, the guns were taken from a child’s home or those of relatives or friends 84 times. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2018/08/01/feature/school-shootings-should-parents-be-charged-for-failing-to-lock-up-guns-used-by-their-kids/?utm_term=.0369cf9a1045

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Extreme Risk Protection Order Laws

Too often following a mass shooting we learn that people who knew the shooter saw warning signs of potential violence but felt powerless to do anything. If the person has not yet broken any law and may not meet the mental health standards for involuntary commitment, what can be done?

A number of states have attempted to answer this question, at least in part, through “**extreme risk protection order**” (**ERPO**) laws. Also known as gun violence protection orders, risk warrants, or red flag laws, these state laws provide law enforcement (and in some instances, family members) with a legal, temporary way to prevent individuals who pose a threat to themselves or others from possessing or purchasing firearms.

President Trump has called on states to adopt ERPO laws that protect the due process rights of law-abiding citizens.¹ This section describes the state laws that have been enacted, reviews the limited research on their effectiveness, and offers several recommendations.

ERPO laws: what they are and how they work

In every state, some form of protection or restraining order is already available in cases involving domestic violence, harassment, stalking, sexual assault, and, in some states, workplace issues. But outside of the context of domestic violence, most protection orders do not result in a temporary legal prohibition against possessing firearms.² Additionally, most protection order laws focus on threats directed at the specific person requesting the order. Generalized threats (e.g., against a school) may not qualify under state laws.

ERPO laws seek to fill these gaps by providing a temporary mechanism for removing firearms from individuals found by a court to be a danger to themselves or others. Thirteen states currently have an ERPO law in effect, including eight states that have enacted laws since the Parkland shooting.³

The terms of each state statute are summarized in Table 11.1. While state laws differ, the basic process in each state is largely similar:

President Trump has called on states to adopt ERPO laws that protect the due process rights of law-abiding citizens.

Initial Petition. A law enforcement officer, an attorney for the state, or, in some states, a family or household member offers a court evidence that an individual presents an imminent threat to himself or herself or to others and is in possession of a firearm. Depending on the jurisdiction, the evidence can include a history or pattern of recent threats or acts of violence, dangerous past behavior with firearms, substance abuse, and mental illness.

Temporary Order. If the petitioner offers sufficient evidence, the court issues either a search and seizure warrant or a temporary protective order. The initial evidentiary threshold varies by jurisdiction, including reasonable cause, substantial likelihood, clear and convincing evidence, and probable cause.

Seizure of Firearms. Once a warrant or protection order is issued, law enforcement seizes and temporarily holds for safekeeping the firearm(s) the at-risk individual owns or has access to.

Hearing. Typically, within 14 to 21 days of the issuance of the temporary order or warrant, the court holds a hearing at which the at-risk individual has the opportunity to present evidence that he or she is not an imminent threat to himself or herself or to others.⁴

Extension of Prohibition. If the court agrees with the finding that generated the initial warrant or temporary order (though the evidentiary standard may be higher at this point), it can extend the prohibition such that

Thirteen states currently have an ERPO law in effect, including eight states that have enacted laws since the Parkland shooting.

the individual may not retain or purchase firearms for a period of, typically, one year.

While the basic features of these state laws are largely similar, there are a number of notable differences. They include the following:

Scope. Both ERPOs and risk warrants provide for initial seizure of firearms already in the possession of the at-risk individual. However, ERPO statutes provide a clearer prohibition against future purchases or possession by the individual, while risk warrant statutes focus on seizure of firearms at the outset of the warrant's issuance.

Petitioners. In five states, only a law enforcement officer or other designated state official may file a petition. In eight states, a family or household member may file a petition with the court. One state also authorizes petitions by mental health professionals.

Standard of Proof. At the hearing that takes place after the issuance of the initial order, most states require the petitioner to prove that the individual continues to be a threat to himself or herself or to others by clear and convincing evidence. In three states, the standard of proof is a preponderance of the evidence.

False Petitions. Filing a false petition or filing a petition with the intent to harass an individual is punishable in nine jurisdictions, either as a misdemeanor or a felony.

Additional Notice. In one state, if the court finds that the individual poses a risk of imminent personal injury to himself or herself or to others, it provides notice to that state's Department of Mental Health and Addiction Services, as it deems appropriate. In five states, the order must be made available to the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS).⁵

ERPO laws: do they work?

ERPO laws are of relatively recent vintage—the oldest is less than 20 years old, and more than half have been in effect for less than a year. So it is not surprising that there is little research on their effectiveness. Two studies (in the states where such laws have been around

the longest) suggest a positive impact on suicide prevention.

In the first study, researchers examining Connecticut's risk warrant law concluded that the removal of firearms from high-risk individuals may have prevented up to 100 suicides.⁶ They estimated the law resulted in one averted suicide for every 10–11 cases. In 44 percent of cases, the risk warrant led to the respondents receiving psychiatric treatment they may not have received otherwise. Importantly, the study examined the impact of the law on suicides only, not violence against others.

A more recent study looked at both the Connecticut and Indiana risk warrant laws.⁷ It found that Indiana's law was associated with a 7.5 percent decrease in firearm suicides during the 10 years following its enactment. Connecticut's law was associated with a 1.6 percent decrease in firearm suicides immediately after its passage, and a 13.7 percent decrease between 2007 and 2015, following increased enforcement in the wake of the Virginia Tech shooting. Like the other study, it did not examine effects on gun violence more generally.

Commission Observations

A growing number of states is adopting ERPO laws in an effort to prevent gun violence. The available evidence suggests that the older risk warrant laws may have a positive impact on suicide prevention. We do not know whether they impact gun violence more generally, and it appears no studies have yet evaluated the more recent ERPO laws in other states.

Table 11-1

Summary of State Extreme Risk Protection Order and Risk Warrant Laws*

	Type	Who can petition?	Standard of proof for initial order or warrant	Hearing held within	Standard of proof at hearing to continue prohibition	How long is firearm held initially?	Order MUST BE made available to the NICS	Penalty for false petition/ harassment
California Cal. Pen. Code § 18100	ERPO	Law enforcement (LE) officer; immediate family member	Ex parte order: Substantial likelihood that person poses a significant danger Temporary emergency order (available to LE only): Reasonable cause that person poses immediate and present danger	21 days	Clear and convincing evidence	One year	No	Misdemeanor
Connecticut C.G.S.A. § 29-38c	Risk Warrant	State's Attorney; Assistant State's Attorney; or 2 LE officers	Probable cause	14 days	Clear and convincing evidence	Not more than one year	No, but must report to Dept. of Mental Health and Addiction Services	N/A
Delaware H.B. No. 222 (effective Dec. 27, 2019)	ERPO	LE officer, family member	Nonemergency hearing: Petition may be filed, but no ex parte order available Emergency hearing (available to LE only): Preponderance of the evidence that respondent poses an immediate and present danger	15 days	Clear and convincing evidence	Not more than one year	No	Perjury
Florida Fla. Stat. § 790.401	ERPO	LE officer; LE agency	Reasonable cause	14 days	Clear and convincing evidence	Not more than one year	Yes	Third-degree felony

* This table is not intended to provide an exhaustive account of the differing provisions of these state laws. For more detailed information, please consult the various state statutes.

	Type	Who can petition?	Standard of proof for initial order or warrant	Hearing held within	Standard of proof at hearing to continue prohibition	How long is firearm held initially?	Order MUST BE made available to the NICS	Penalty for false petition/harassment
Illinois H.B. 2354 (effective Jan. 1, 2019)	Firearms Restraining Order	LE officer; family member	Probable cause	14 days (30 days if petitioner requests a six-month order and not an ex parte order)	Clear and convincing evidence	Six months	No	Felony (perjury)
Indiana IC 35-47-14	Risk Warrant	LE officer	Probable cause	14 days	Clear and convincing evidence	At least 180 days, after which the individual may petition the court for return of firearm	No	N/A
Maryland Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety § 5-601	ERPO	Physician; mental health provider; LE officer; spouse; co-habitant; relative; person with whom the individual has a child in common; current dating or intimate partner; current or former legal guardian	Reasonable grounds for initial interim ERPO (good for up to two days); probable cause for temporary ERPO (good for up to additional seven days)	A temporary ERPO hearing must be held within two business days of issuance of the interim ERPO A final ERPO hearing must be held within seven days after service of temporary ERPO (The parties may waive the temporary ERPO hearing and proceed directly to final hearing)	Clear and convincing evidence	Not more than one year	No	No affirmative sanction, but statute says person who files a petition in good faith is not civilly or criminally liable
Massachusetts H. 4670 (not yet codified)	ERPO	Family or household member; licensing authority (local police department)	Reasonable cause	10 days	Preponderance of the evidence	One year	Yes	Fines between \$2,500 and \$5,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than 2.5 years

	Type	Who can petition?	Standard of proof for initial order or warrant	Hearing held within	Standard of proof at hearing to continue prohibition	How long is firearm held initially?	Order MUST BE made available to the NICS	Penalty for false petition/harassment
New Jersey A-1217; P.L. 2018, c. 35 (not yet codified)	ERPO	LE officer; family or household member	Good cause	10 days	Preponderance of the evidence	One year	No	N/A
Oregon ORS 166.525	ERPO	LE officer; family or household member	Clear and convincing evidence	Respondent has 30 days to request hearing, which must take place within 21 days of request; if the respondent does not request a hearing, the protection order is effective for one year	Clear and convincing evidence	One year	Yes	Class A misdemeanor
Rhode Island S. 2492 (not yet codified)	ERPO	LE agency	Probable cause	14 days	Clear and convincing evidence	One year	Yes	Felony
Vermont 13 V.S.A. § 4051	ERPO	State's Attorney or Office of the Attorney General	Preponderance of the evidence	14 days	Clear and convincing evidence	Up to six months	No	Imprisonment up to a year and/or fine up to \$1,000
Washington RCWA § 7.94.010	ERPO	Family or household member; LE officer or agency	Reasonable cause	14 days	Preponderance of the evidence	One year	Yes	Gross misdemeanor

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

▣ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. States should adopt ERPO laws that incorporate an appropriate evidentiary standard to temporarily restrict firearms access by individuals found to be a danger to themselves or others.

- States' ERPO laws should ensure that the due process rights of the at-risk individual are respected. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are foundational principles of American law, guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and gun ownership and possession are protected by the Second and Fourteenth Amendments.

These rights must be upheld through appropriate processes, beginning with the initial consideration of a temporary order and continuing through all subsequent steps. For example, state laws that do not require a full hearing promptly after a temporary order is issued, but that put the burden on the respondent to seek a hearing, do not afford as meaningful and robust of an opportunity to be heard as those state laws that do require full hearings. State laws should also provide for prompt return of firearms at the conclusion of the order's duration, assuming no other lawful restrictions apply.

- States should likewise be thoughtful about who can file a petition for an ERPO so that the laws effectively address safety concerns without inviting misuse by individuals who are less likely to possess reliable information relevant to a person's dangerousness.

Some existing state laws have prompted concerns that the scope of possible petitioners might be too broad and poorly defined, potentially allowing the filing of petitions by people who are unlikely to have relevant and reliable information. To mitigate such concerns, states should adopt clear and narrow definitions identifying appropriate persons with standing to file a petition. States can deter misuse or abuse of the ERPO process through appropriate criminal penalties for false (bad faith) or harassing petitions.

- States with ERPO laws, and those considering them, should require and establish procedures for sharing information regarding issued protection orders (including their expiration dates) with the National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS), by submitting those orders to the appropriate database (the National Crime Information Center or NICS Indices). Prohibitions on the purchase of firearms can be enforced only if the information is made available to the NICS in a timely and accurate manner. States wishing to explore how to accomplish this should contact the Federal Bureau of Investigation's NICS Section at CJIS-STATE@fbi.gov.

Chapter 11 Endnotes

- 1 <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/president-donald-j-trump-taking-immediate-actions-secure-schools/>.
- 2 The federal Gun Control Act contains a provision that makes it unlawful for persons subject to certain qualifying domestic violence restraining orders to possess firearms during the pendency of the order. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(8). State laws may also impose such a restriction, or the restriction may be included as part of the underlying restraining order itself.
- 3 Connecticut (1999); Indiana (2006); California (2014); Washington (2016); Oregon (2017); Delaware (2018); Florida (2018); Illinois (2018); Maryland (2018); Massachusetts (2018); New Jersey (2018); Rhode Island (2018); and Vermont (2018). The earliest laws (Connecticut and Indiana) are known as “risk warrant” laws and bear a closer resemblance to the process followed by law enforcement to obtain search warrants. Later ERPO statutes in other states bear a stronger resemblance to protection order processes. Similar bills have been introduced a number of other states. In addition, Texas provides a different mechanism for seizing firearms from certain mentally ill people who are taken into custody. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 573.001(h).
- 4 Oregon appears to be the only state in which a subsequent hearing is not required. Instead, a respondent has 30 days to request a hearing after he or she is served; if the respondent does not request a hearing, the ex parte order remains in effect for one year, unless terminated by a court.
- 5 Some of these states direct entry of the order into the National Crime Information Center (NCIC), which is one of three databases accessed by the NICS. However, these orders may not meet the criteria for entry in the protective order file of NCIC. In these instances, the order may qualify for entry into a separate NCIC file. The orders may also be entered into the NICS Indices (one of the other databases accessed by the NICS). In addition, although some states do not require orders to be made available to the NICS by statute, they may submit the orders to state agencies that do so as a matter of policy.
- 6 Swanson, J.W., et al., (2017). Implementation and effectiveness of Connecticut’s risk-based gun removal law: Does it prevent suicides? *Law and Contemporary Problems*, 179. Available at <https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4830&context=lcp>.
- 7 Kivisto, A.J., et al. (2018). Effects of risk-based firearm seizure laws in Connecticut and Indiana on suicide rates, 1981–2015. *Psychiatric Services*. Abstract available at <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/29852823>.

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Improvements to the FBI's Public Access Line

The Federal Bureau of Investigation receives thousands of calls a day from the public through its Public Access Line (PAL), a unit operating within its Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division. PAL serves as a central intake point for tip information from the public about potential or ongoing crimes. Following the February 14 shooting in Parkland, FL, the FBI conducted a special review of PAL to better understand the operational system and to recommend potential changes to PAL's protocols and procedures. This section describes the changes made to PAL by the FBI as a result of this review.

PAL operates 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, providing an around-the-clock way for the FBI to receive and evaluate potentially critical information from the public and take appropriate action. Once PAL receives and processes information provided by the public for FBI investigative and intelligence purposes, it assesses the data and reports appropriate information to the local FBI field office.

As of August 2017, PAL also assumed responsibility for telephone complaint calls from all 56 field offices (as well as most of the FBI's smaller local offices, called resident agencies), the Major Case Contact Center, the Weapons of Mass Destruction tip line, and all other FBI electronic tips (E-Tips). Through these efforts, PAL centralizes the flow of tip information from the public to the FBI. Since its inception on September 24, 2012, it has received more than three million telephone calls and more than one million E-Tips.

Improvements to PAL

PAL is undergoing a transformation, from being the functional equivalent of a call intake center to being a full-fledged Operations Center. This change will provide PAL with greater resources and capabilities related to processing and taking action on information provided by the public. Although PAL will continue to perform the call-intake services associated with the FBI's tip lines, as an Operations Center it will have the staff and functionality to analyze and disseminate information in a timely manner to the field.

The objective of this transition to an Operations Center is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tip handling by making changes to the process, personnel, and systems.

In developing the plans for this transition, FBI personnel visited operations centers of various law enforcement agencies to identify best practices and staffing models. The objective of this transition to an Operations Center is to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of tip handling by making changes to the process, personnel, and systems. The major features of the updated PAL are described below.

Process: PAL's internal processes have been updated to ensure that decision-making is conducted at the most appropriate level. These processes include a new automated tiered triage structure for handling tips. Based on the selection made by the caller, each tip is automatically routed to the appropriate staff.

- **Threats to Life.** These calls are routed to designated Customer Service Representatives (CSRs) for expedited resolution.
- **Non-emergency Situations.** All other appropriate calls offering tips or information are sent to CSRs via automated routing. CSRs then determine the lead value or lead potential of the call and disseminate the information to FBI offices and other law enforcement as appropriate.
- **Nuisance Callers.** CSRs take appropriate action pursuant to PAL's protocols.

Supervisory Special Agents (SSA) serve as Watch Commanders to provide oversight of this process. For calls determined by a CSR not to have any value as a lead ("No Lead Value" or NLV) that also contain words from a Key Threat Word List, an SSA must review the call and the NLV decision prior to closing the tip. Between January 1, 2018, and June 30, 2018, approximately 40 percent of calls were determined to be NLV. The process ensures that final designations for NLV calls are made based on the judgment of SSAs, who are subject to greater accountability and oversight.

In addition, the FBI implemented a standalone Quality Management (QM) program to review PAL accuracy and quality in near real time. In this program, a QM team tracks performance by conducting reviews of calls to assess CSRs on phone skills, technical skills, and decision skills. The QM team proactively identifies and addresses gaps in PAL's processes, procedures, and training.

The FBI also made improvements to the Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) that serves as a reference resource for CSRs. The improvements include the development of a single comprehensive and concise SOP that is searchable and available electronically.

Personnel: The FBI implemented a new staffing model for PAL in July 2018 that includes a staffing increase of 50 CSR and 12 SSA positions. The FBI has also provided a series of mandatory trainings that focus on threats, including a refresher training for CSRs on how to identify and respond to threat-to-life matters.

The CJIS Training and Advisory Process Unit is working with the FBI Headquarters Training Division to develop specific training for the new two-tiered structure. The FBI Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) provided a number of training sessions to PAL personnel, including sessions relating to threat assessments of potential school shooters and identification of pre-attack mental health indicators. In August 2018, the United States Secret Service's National Threat Assessment Center (NTAC) staff provided a daylong consultation for PAL personnel discussing threat assessment and the assessment and triage of concerning behavior. In addi-

PAL is a critical component of the FBI's efforts to keep the American people safe, and the FBI believes the improvements outlined here will result in a more effective and efficient tip-handling process.

tion, NTAC staff provided training at the PAL facility in West Virginia in November 2018.

Information Technology: The FBI updated PAL's information technology system to better document the steps CSRs and SSAs take to process and review calls prior to final disposition. Additionally, a new product will be implemented by the end of the year that will use speech-to-text technology to identify key threat words in the digital transcript of a call as a means of elevating the call's priority. The word cloud for E-Tips has already been improved to alert staff of trending and emerging threats. Finally, the FBI added a feature to SSAs' desktop computer display to alert them when immediate assistance is needed to assess ongoing calls for potential lead value.

PAL is a critical component of the FBI's efforts to keep the American people safe, and the FBI believes the improvements outlined above will result in a more effective and efficient tip-handling process. The FBI continues to review its processes and procedures for receiving and evaluating tip information reported to PAL to ensure that tip information is effectively and efficiently handled.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendation below.

▣ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State and local leaders should encourage the public—including school staff and parents—to be vigilant about reporting information to the FBI that might help prevent violence in schools. This information can be reported by using the FBI's Online Tips and Public Leads form (<https://tips.fbi.gov/>) or by contacting a local FBI field office (<https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices>).
2. State and local leaders should also continue to encourage the public to contact their local police department or call 911 to report information regarding immediate threats.

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SECTION 2

Protect & Mitigate

Training School Personnel to Help Ensure Student Safety

All school personnel play an important role in school safety. Training on safety matters helps prepare them to respond to incidents of school violence. The school personnel best positioned to respond to acts of violence are those with specialized training such as school resource officers (SRO), who are typically sworn law enforcement officers, and school safety officers (SSO), who are typically unsworn school security staff. These officers have been specifically trained in school safety to act as a first-line of defense. Their presence at school facilities and on campus allows them to build the kinds of relationships with students that can prevent or mitigate incidents of school violence.

The Columbine Review Commission made specific recommendations about the use of SROs in responding to potential acts of school violence. In the years since Columbine, school leaders have increased the number of specially trained school security staff as part of their strategies to combat school violence. Between 2005 and 2016, the percentage of public schools that reported the presence of security staff at least once a week increased from 42 to 57 percent.¹

However, these changes are not enough. At a meeting of the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Commission held in the aftermath of the Parkland shooting, Commission members (including the parents of victims) raised specific concerns regarding the training and actions of school personnel during the tragedy.² Effective training is critical, making it imperative that schools regularly review training protocols to ensure that every SRO, SSO, teacher, administrator, and student is as prepared as possible to respond to incidents of school violence within the framework of a comprehensive school safety plan.

Placement of specially trained personnel in schools is an effective tool in stopping acts of school violence. In Dixon, IL, SRO Mark Dallas stopped a gunman targeting a high school graduation rehearsal before anyone was harmed.³ In Leonardtown, MD, SRO Blaine Gaskill reacted quickly after a gunman fired one shot down

the hallway by shooting the perpetrator in the hand before he could harm fellow students.⁴ In Ocala, FL, SRO Jimmy Long responded to a gunshot by rushing into a classroom and disarming the shooter before he could fire again.⁵

Commission Observations

Research and presentations to the Commission from subject matter experts like Officer Don Bridges from Baltimore, MD highlight the importance of defining the roles and responsibilities of all school staff, including SROs. One way to do so is through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between schools and law enforcement agencies.⁶ These MOUs should include a discussion of key areas such as training expectations, duties and responsibilities, funding, information sharing, and student discipline.



Sample Memorandum of Understanding Between the School District and Law Enforcement

The School Resource Officer (SRO) program in the Montgomery County Public Schools (MD) includes a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between four different police departments operating within the county, the Montgomery County State's Attorney, and the Montgomery County Sheriff's Office. The MOU is comprehensive and can serve as a model for other entities. Key provisions include:

1. Defined duties and responsibilities of the SROs (see Section B);
2. Training requirements, whereby twice annually the SROs, the school district administrators, and the security staff are required to participate in joint training opportunities (see Section D);
3. Expectations about the chain of command and supervision of SROs between building level administrators and law enforcement (see Section H(1));
4. Expectations regarding information sharing between educators and SROs (see Section H(1)); and
5. Expectations regarding the handling of information received about a student who may pose a threat to himself or herself or to another (see Sections H(2), (4) & (5)).

For the full MOU, visit <https://www.montgomeryschoolsmd.org/uploadedFiles/departments/security-new/Executed%20SRO%20MOU.PDF>.

As subject matter experts such as Mo Canady, the Executive Director for the National Association of School Resources Officers (NASRO), told the Commission, it is imperative that school safety personnel receive extensive training and be screened for their effectiveness in working with students. NASRO's *Standards and Best Practices for School Resource Officers*, first unveiled during the July 26 Commission meeting, emphasizes four main areas: administrative standards, careful selection of SROs, specialized SRO training, and interagency collaboration between schools and law enforcement.⁷

State education agencies (SEAs) play a key role in providing resources and training for all school personnel to help create and sustain a safe environment for students and educators. SEAs have found success in engaging school staff with law enforcement officers in unified safety training. For example, Sheriff D.J. Schoeff highlighted to the Commission the achievements of Indiana's School Safety Specialist Academy. The Academy facilitates collaboration between educators and law enforcement officers through an annual two-day training in which educators from each district and SROs/SSOs train side by side.⁸

A review of state-mandated emergency drills and training related to school safety identified 43 states that required schools to conduct safety training for teachers or other school staff.⁹ Some 21 of the 43 required training on emergency operations plans or emergency response procedures, and 14 of them required training related to mental health or violence prevention.¹⁰

In addition to training requirements, there are other considerations about personnel training such as the extent of collaboration between school leaders and law enforcement officers. Officer Rudy Perez of the Los Angeles Unified School District (LAUSD) explained to the Commission how states and school districts can collaboratively approach school personnel training.¹¹ Virginia's Center for School and Campus Safety provides in-person training on evidence-based bullying prevention tactics and the identification of students who may be at risk for violent behavior.¹² The experience of the LAUSD and the Virginia Center may be of value to others.

Examples of Training Requirements

The Los Angeles Unified School District (CA) offers a comprehensive emergency preparedness training program to build the capacity of all LAUSD employees (including educators and school police officers) in school safety, security, and emergency management. The Safety Training for Emergency Preparedness at Schools Program is a series of short, online courses that prepare employees for emergencies by detailing common procedures that employees can adopt. Participants receive certificates after completing each course and a Master Certificate of Emergency Preparedness for completing the entire series of courses. The U.S. Department of Education's Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools grant funded this program. For more information, visit <https://achieve.lausd.net/steps>.

Virginia has created a rigorous training regimen for the certification of school security officers, including the following minimum requirements:

- Prospective school security officers must undergo a background investigation to include fingerprint-based criminal history record inquiry of both the Central Criminal Records Exchange and the Federal Bureau of Investigation;
- Have a high school diploma, have passed the General Educational Development exam, or have passed the National External Diploma Program;
- Be a minimum of 21 years of age;
- Possess a valid driver's license if duties require operation of a motor vehicle;
- Successfully complete basic first aid training;
- Complete the minimum entry-level training requirements approved by the board and the Department of Criminal Justice Services and include, at a minimum:
 - The role and responsibility of school security officers;
 - Relevant state and federal laws;
 - School and personal liability issues;
 - Security awareness in the school environment;
 - Mediation and conflict resolution;
 - Disaster and emergency response; and
 - Student behavioral dynamics.

6 Va. Admin. Code § 20-240-20. For more information, visit <https://www.dcjs.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety/k-12/safety-security/school-security-officer-sso-certification-program>.

Indiana has statutory requirements for training SROs, including the minimum training requirements for law enforcement officers and at least 40 additional hours of training specific to SROs. This SRO training must be provided by the Indiana law enforcement training board, the NASRO, or another approved SRO training program. Training must include instruction on skills and strategies for school security. See Ind. Code § 20-26-18.2 - School Resource Officers.

Ohio has statutory requirements for training SROs, including a minimum of 40 hours of training from specific entities articulated in the statute including the NASRO, the Ohio school resource officer association, or a current SRO certified to conduct such training. Training requirement topics include how to be a positive role model for youth and strategies for classroom management. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 3313.951. Qualifications for school resource officers.

As noted earlier, in 2016 some 57 percent of public schools reported the presence (at least once a week) of security staff. That number, while an increase over prior years, leaves almost half of America's public schools without any regular school security staff presence.

There are a wide variety of reasons for the decision not to have regular designated school security staff on site, ranging from funding to remoteness of locale. Ten states have sought to address this situation by allowing school staff to possess or have access to

firearms at school. No state mandates arming school staff. Several hundred school districts provide school staff access to firearms, usually as part of a layered approach to school security (see Chapter 16 of the Report for more information about this strategy). All of these programs require a mandatory minimum level of training. Examples of effective training programs include the Texas School Marshal Program,¹³ the South Dakota School Sentinel Training Program,¹⁴ the Alabama Sentry Program,¹⁵ and the Arkansas Commissioned School Security Officer program.¹⁶

Examples of Additional State Statutes

Ga. Code Ann. § 16-11-127.1(a)(6). Weapons on school safety zones, school buildings or grounds, or at school functions

(6) A person who has been authorized in writing by a duly authorized official of a public or private elementary or secondary school or a public or private technical school, vocational school, college, university, or other institution of postsecondary education or a local board of education as provided in Code Section 16-11-130.1 to have in such person's possession or use within a school safety zone, at a school function, or on a bus or other transportation furnished by a school a weapon which would otherwise be prohibited by this Code section. Such authorization shall specify the weapon or weapons that have been authorized and the time period during which the authorization is valid.

Kan. Stat. Ann. § 75-7c10(d). Same; restrictions on carrying concealed handgun; exceptions; liabilities; employees permitted to carry; penalties for violations; sign requirements.

(d) The governing body or the chief administrative officer, if no governing body exists, of any of the following institutions may permit any employee, who is legally qualified, to carry a concealed handgun in any building of such institution, if the employee meets such institution's own policy requirements regardless of whether such building is conspicuously posted in accordance with the provisions of this section:

- (1) A unified school district;
- (2) A postsecondary educational institution, as defined in K.S.A. § 74-3201b, and amendments thereto.

Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 21-3-132. Possession of firearms on school property

(a) The board of trustees in each school district may adopt rules and regulations, in consultation with local law enforcement, to allow the possession of firearms by employees possessing a valid concealed carry permit under W.S. 6-8-104 on or in any property or facility owned or leased by the school district. Employees of a school district who hold a valid concealed carry permit issued under W.S. 6-8-104 may carry a concealed firearm on or into school facilities or other areas designated by the board of trustees, provided the employing school district has adopted rules and regulations that allow possession of firearms on school property and the employee has received approval by the board of trustees as required by this section.

✓ FAST FACTS

In 2016, some 57 percent of public schools reported the presence (at least once a week) of security staff.

During a field visit to the Lake Hamilton School District in Percy, AR, Commission members learned about the Arkansas Commissioned School Security Officer (CSSO) program. School leaders told them about the challenges small rural school districts face in terms of lengthy police response times. As Superintendent Steve Anderson said, “[w]hile we are blessed to have excellent law enforcement officers...because of where we’re located, the last two sheriffs here in Garland County told me we could expect 20 to 30 minutes’ wait time if an active shooter situation happened on campus before an officer could be here. We’re not willing to take that chance. We need someone to protect our kids.”¹⁷ As an example, the Parkland shooting took less than seven minutes.¹⁸

These concerns led the Arkansas legislature to amend Ark. Code Ann. § 17-40 et seq. to authorize the use of CSSOs by schools. CSSOs can be administrators, faculty, or staff, and they must pass a standard background check and undergo extensive training.¹⁹ In its preliminary report dated July 1, 2018, the Arkansas School Safety Commission reaffirmed the deterrent effect that such practices can have on school violence.²⁰

There is no one-size-fits-all solution, and these programs vary according to the needs of each state. After the Parkland shooting, for example, Florida adopted the Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School Public Safety Act, which requires every school to have a “safe school officer.” Safe school officers can be deployed

as an SRO, as an SSO, or through participation in the Coach Aaron Feis Guardian Program, which permits a school employee who does not work exclusively in the classroom to carry a weapon after completing 176 hours of specialized training.²¹

Support for training

Numerous federal programs may, among other purposes, be used to support efforts to train school personnel in various school safety topics.²² Others specifically focus on criminal justice. For example, the Justice Assistance Grant (JAG) is a formula-based grant program that provides critical federal funding to states, tribes, and local governments to support a range of criminal justice program areas, including “prevention and education programs.”²³ Typically, 56 states and territories and more than 900 local and tribal jurisdictions receive grants each year.²⁴

JAG funds may support firearms training for school personnel so long as the training is part of an allowable prevention and education program carried out by an authorized recipient jurisdiction. For example, a local law enforcement entity police department or sheriff’s office might choose to use part of its JAG funds to support a program specifically designed for crime prevention that incorporates such firearms training.²⁵

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

▣ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. States, districts, and local schools should develop a comprehensive school safety plan that includes a requirement for school safety training for all school personnel. When developing training for all school personnel, states and local communities should consider the following:
 - Use specialized school personnel who are trained to prevent, recognize, and respond to threats of violence;
 - Review the quality and quantity of training for all school staff, especially specialized school personnel and others who may carry weapons;
 - Ensure that school administrators are trained on the proper role of SROs and SSOs, including how to work collaboratively with them;
 - Clarify the roles and responsibilities of specialized school personnel such as SROs and SSOs through MOUs;
 - Clarify the parameters of information sharing between school staff, SROs, and SSOs, with special consideration and training regarding the privacy requirements of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA); and
 - Determine, based on the unique circumstances of each school (such as anticipated law enforcement response times), whether or not it is appropriate for specialized staff *and* non-specialized staff to be armed for the sake of effectively and immediately responding to violence. This can be particularly helpful in districts where the distances involved can make police response times longer.
2. States and local communities, in concert with law enforcement, should consider various approaches to school safety based on their own unique needs. School districts may consider arming some specially selected and trained school personnel (including but not limited to SROs and SSOs) as a deterrent. Before deciding on the voluntary arming of school personnel, states, districts, and schools should carefully consider the following:
 - *Existing security measures*
What types of security measures already exist to ensure student safety?
Is there a full-time SRO already present in case of emergency?
 - *Proximity of police*
How quickly can local police arrive in the event of an active shooter?
How well do local police know the school (e.g., layout of the school, area around the school) in order to coordinate an effective response?
 - *Acceptance of the school community*
Are school community stakeholders comfortable with arming school personnel?
Are there staff members willing to voluntarily participate in such a program, particularly those with prior law enforcement or military training?

- *Preparedness*
What would initial and ongoing background checks and screening requirements entail?
What initial and ongoing robust training requirements would be in place?
How would firearms be properly secured yet made easily accessible when necessary?
- *Local policy and state law*
Does local policy and state law allow for the arming of school personnel?
What infrastructure and resources exist for the creation of such a program?
What potential liabilities exist for such a program (e.g., ability to maintain insurance coverage)?

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- Virginia law (VA. CODE ANN. § 9.1-184) requires the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety (Center) to provide training for public school personnel on evidence-based anti-bullying tactics, as well as how to identify students who may be at risk for violent behavior and in need of special services. The Center is also required to develop, along with other Virginia State agencies, a model “critical incident” (e.g., an active shooter) training program for public school personnel. Private schools may also participate in the training. The training programs are provided in-person to schools (including school security officers), either through Center staff or contractors. For additional information, see <https://www.dcs.virginia.gov/virginia-center-school-and-campus-safety>.
- First enacted in 2013, the Texas School Marshal Program authorizes public school districts and open enrollment charter schools to appoint certain qualifying individuals to serve as school marshals to prevent or abate the commission of any offense that threatens serious bodily injury or death to students, faculty, or visitors on school premises. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 2.127; TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.0811; TEX. GOV'T. CODE § 411.1871; TEX. OCC. CODE § 1701.260, 1701.001; 1701.301. An employee of a school district or an open-enrollment charter school, school marshals are authorized to carry or possess a handgun on the physical premises of a school. TEX. EDUC. ANN. § 37.0811. Marshals must attend an 80-hour training course conducted by a law enforcement academy specifically prepared to provide a school marshal curriculum, and must hold an appropriate gun license issued by the Texas Commission on Law Enforcement. TEX. OCC. CODE §1701.260 & 1701.301. Course material includes topics such as physical security, use of force, active shooter response, and weapon proficiency. TEX. OCC. CODE § 1701.260. See more at <https://www.tcole.texas.gov/content/school-marshals>.
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- 16 ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-40-330 *et seq.*
- 17 Statement from Superintendent Steve Anderson to the Federal Commission on School Safety (2018, August 1). <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/transcript-07-26-2018.pdf>
- 18 <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/16/us/stoneman-douglas-shooting.html>.
- 19 ARK. CODE ANN. §17-40-102 provides: “(10) ‘Commissioned school security officer’ means a private security officer who: (A) Provides security for the school; and (B) Has received an authorization issued by the director to carry a firearm in the course of his or her employment.” A CSSO is a Private Security Officer who has completed additional training, and who has been granted the authorization by the Arkansas State Police to carry a firearm while on the property of a public-school (K-12). <http://www.arkansased.gov/divisions/communications/safety>.
- 20 Arkansas Department of Education. (July 1, 2018). *Arkansas School Safety Commission: Preliminary report*. Retrieved from http://www.arkansased.gov/public/userfiles/Communications/School_Safety/Safe_School_Commission_Preliminary_Report_-_July_1_2018..pdf.
- 21 The Florida Senate. (2018). CS/SB 7026. *Public safety*. Retrieved from <https://www.flsenate.gov/Session/Bill/2018/07026>.
- 22 Supporting Effective Instruction Grants (<https://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherqual/index.html>) may support programs for recruiting and training teachers, school leaders, and other staff from other fields, including military and law enforcement, to become teachers, principals, or other school leaders; providing professional development to educators to help engage parents, families, and community partners, and coordinate services between school and community; training to help educators understand when and how to refer students affected by trauma, and children with, or at risk of, mental illness; and addressing issues related to school conditions for student learning, such as safety, among other allowable uses of funds. Title I grants to local educational agencies (<https://www2.ed.gov/programs/titleiparta/index.html>) may support school districts in training teachers, school leaders, and other staff as part of schoolwide program plans that, in response to a needs assessment, address school climate and safety, including disciplinary interventions and violence prevention. Student Support and Academic Enrichment grants (<https://www2.ed.gov/programs/ssae/index.html>) and grants under both REAP programs (SRSA and RLIS) may be used for activities to support safe and healthy students, such as high-quality training for school personnel, including specialized instructional support personnel, related to suicide prevention, effective and trauma-informed practices in classroom management, crisis management and conflict resolution techniques, school-based violence prevention strategies, and bullying and harassment prevention, among other allowable uses of funds.
- 23 34 U.S.C. § 10152(a)(1)(C). Also, U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance. (n.d.). *Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program*. Retrieved from <https://www.bja.gov/jag/>.
- 24 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance.
- 25 To seek JAG funds for such purposes, schools should reach out to their local recipient jurisdictions (local police departments, sheriff’s offices, or local or tribal government representatives) or to their State Administering Agency for JAG funds, which is the designated agency in each state that has a role in allocating JAG resources statewide.

Emergency and Crisis Training for Law Enforcement

When school violence erupts, it is law enforcement officers who rush to the scene, neutralize the shooter, assist victims, and secure the site. The Parkland shooting was no different. Unfortunately, too many law enforcement officers around the country have been called upon to respond to such incidents. Those who have not are training and preparing for a day they hope will never come.

The U.S. Department of Justice provides a wide array of emergency and crisis training resources for state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies across the country. Through the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department offers grant funding, training and technical assistance, and other resources for those on the front lines working to keep students safe. These programs are outlined below.

Bureau of Justice Assistance

Justice Assistance Grant: This is a formula-based grant program that provides states, tribes, and local governments with critical funding to support a range of program areas. The latter include law enforcement, prosecution and courts, crime prevention and education, corrections and community corrections, drug treatment and enforcement, planning, evaluation and technology improvement, crime victim and witness initiatives, mental health programs, and related law enforcement and corrections programs. Under this grant program, emergency and crisis training for local law enforcement can be an allowable cost. Typically, 56 states and territories and more than 900 local and tribal jurisdictions receive grants each year.¹

National Training and Technical Assistance Center: NTTAC offers online and no-cost training and technical assistance on a wide variety of criminal justice topics, including emergency and crisis training for local law enforcement.²

Identifying an Armed Person Training: This training, which is provided as part of the Project Safe Neigh-

Through the Bureau of Justice Assistance, the Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department offers grant funding, training and technical assistance, and other resources for those on the front lines working to keep students safe.

borhoods training and technical assistance support, covers guidance for handling felonious possession and use of firearm cases. It includes techniques for identifying/recognizing vehicles with hidden compartments and advanced techniques to identify/recognize armed suspects and their characteristics.³

VALOR Officer Safety and Wellness Training and Technical Assistance Program: The VALOR program delivers current, dynamic classroom and web-based trainings focused on recognizing indicators of dangerous situations. It involves applying a cognitive approach towards reinforcing effective techniques for managing difficult encounters, implementing casualty care and rescue tactics, and improving wellness and resilience. Since 2010, the VALOR Program has trained more than 41,400 law enforcement officers.⁴

Office of Community Oriented Policing Services Preparing for Active Shooter Situations (PASS) Training Program: PASS supports active shooter training to improve the safety and resiliency of law enforcement officers, other first responders, and communities. It seeks to enhance the ability of law enforcement not only to secure the scene, but also to increase the survivability of the event and protect officers, critical assets, and first responders from the long-term effects of exposure to trauma. In addition to online training, more than 15,000 participants receive in-person training with existing funding, and FY2018 funding supports the delivery of 438 classes across the country that will train more than 16,000 first responders. PASS is also adding to its portfolio more classes in advanced medical skills, solo officer rapid deployment, civilian

casualty care, and exterior response to active shooter events.⁵

School Violence Prevention Program: SVPP makes competitive awards to states, counties, and local districts to support coordination with law enforcement on training to prevent student violence, to fund deterrent hardware, and to implement technology for expedited emergency notification.⁶

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) Active Shooter

Reports: These BAU studies focus on the detection and disruption of targeted violence attacks in myriad settings, including K–12 schools.

- *The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective* presents a systematic procedure for threat assessment and intervention for use by educators, mental health professionals, and law enforcement agencies.⁷
- *Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education* was prepared by the FBI, the U.S. Secret Service, and the U.S. Department of Education. It provides an overview of targeted violence at institutions of higher education, discusses initial observations regarding behaviors of the offenders, and offers preliminary considerations on the data that may have relevance to threat assessment.⁸
- *Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing, and Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks* is a collaboration between representatives of law enforcement, academia, law, and mental health, along with the FBI's Behavioral Threat Assessment Center and the National Center for the Analysis of Violent Crime. It provides a useful and practical guide for understanding and implementing threat assessment and management at all levels.⁹
- *A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the U.S. Between 2000 and 2013* examines the pre-attack behavior of shooters in 160 active shooter incidents in an effort to pinpoint specific behaviors that might be useful in identifying, assessing, and managing those who might be on the pathway to such violence.¹⁰

Active Shooter Incidents Reports: The reports cited below focus on a specific type of shooting situation that law enforcement and the public may face.

Though limited in scope, they provide clarity and valuable data to federal, state, tribal, and campus law enforcement as well as other first responders, corporations, educators, and the general public as they seek to neutralize threats posed by active shooters and save lives during such events.

- *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013*¹¹
- *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015*¹²
- *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2016 and 2017*¹³

Crisis Communications Quick Reference Guide: This brochure is tailored to chiefs, sheriffs, command staff, and public information officers who handle crisis communications in response to an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incidents. It provides checklists for the pre-event, the onset of the incident, and updating the media (pre-press conference and second and subsequent press conferences). Also included are 10 tips to improve communications.¹⁴

The following resources are available to law enforcement and emergency management professionals by contacting the nearest FBI Field Office or calling 202-324-3000.

Behavioral Threat Assessment Center: The BTAC provides both operational support and training to K–12 schools, law enforcement, institutions of higher education, houses of worship, and private businesses. It remains the only multi-agency, behaviorally based threat assessment center operating within the federal government. The BTAC features representation from the FBI, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, the U.S. Capitol Police, and the Department of Defense's Naval Criminal Investigative Services, and is staffed by experienced agents, analysts, certified threat managers, and a contract forensic psychiatrist. It provides a full suite of threat assessment and management services to assist K–12 schools and local law enforcement agencies in efforts to mitigate school shootings.

On average, the BTAC annually receives more than 150 requests for operational assistance in managing complex, urgent matters involving potentially violent individuals. This system focuses (a) on providing operational support related to K–12 school shootings



and the prevention of acts of targeted violence against our children; and (b) on delivering the highest quality threat assessment training to law enforcement, mental health, and education professionals.

The BTAC is supported by a robust field program involving more than 230 FBI Special Agents with advanced active shooter/school shooter and threat assessment training who serve as the liaison between schools and the BTAC. Since 2007, training on the pre-attack behaviors of school shooters has been delivered to more than 30,000 K–12 educators, law enforcement officers, and mental healthcare practitioners throughout the United States.

Active Shooter: Managing the Mass Casualty Threat. This 35-minute DVD provides an in-depth look at three unique active shooter events: the Century Aurora 16 Cinemark theatre shooting in Aurora, CO, the Washington Navy Yard shooting in Washington, D.C., and the Los Angeles International Airport shooting in Los Angeles, CA. Each story is told by the emergency professionals and private sector partners who were there. They offer a frank and introspective look at what worked and what could have been done better to manage these chaotic incidents.

Initial On Scene Command Considerations. A two-inch by three-inch pocket guide, it delineates vital issues that need to be considered during the initial minutes

and hours of an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incident. Topics include priority staging areas, top-tier priority concerns, and secondary-tier priority concerns.

Tactical Considerations for Law Enforcement: Quick Reference Guide. This two-inch by three-inch pocket guide covers pre-scene considerations, scene arrival, training, equipment, and active shooter lessons learned.

The Coming Storm. Through a fictional attack on a college campus, this DVD illustrates lessons learned and best practices drawn from real-life active shooter incidents. It offers practical and detailed first steps law enforcement should take when arriving at the scene of a critical incident. The film is designed to inspire discussion, preparation, and collaboration in managing these devastating and potentially overwhelming events.

A Revolutionary Act. This documentary plus workshop seek to educate the law enforcement community on “the pathway to violence” and key warning behaviors. This can be useful to school resource personnel as the documentary traces the radicalization of shooters by their online media activity.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendation below.

▣ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State and local law enforcement should take advantage of these resources to assist them in preventing, planning for, and responding to school shooting incidents. They are also encouraged to suggest areas in which additional resources might be useful.

Chapter 14 Endnotes

- 1 <https://www.bja.gov/jag/>.
- 2 www.bjatrainning.org.
- 3 <http://www.theiacp.org/psnInitiative>.
- 4 www.valorforblue.org.
- 5 <https://cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=2936>.
- 6 <https://cops.usdoj.gov/default.asp?Item=2958>.
- 7 <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-school-shooter-school-shooter/view>.
- 8 <https://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/campus-attacks>.
- 9 <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view>.
- 10 <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view>.
- 11 <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-study-2000-2013-1.pdf/view>.
- 12 https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/activeshooterincident-sus_2014-2015.pdf/view.
- 13 <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-incidents-us-2016-2017.pdf/view>.
- 14 <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/as-study-quick-reference-guide-updated1.pdf/view>.

The Transition of Military Veterans and Retired Law Enforcement Officers into New Careers in Education

Military veterans and retired law enforcement officers often have the leadership, experience in high-stress environments, and essential training to help ensure the safety and security of our nation’s schools. Many will also possess pedagogical skills—classroom management and real-world experience training others—that can make for highly effective educators. Former service members and police officers stepping into roles as principals, administrators, teachers, counselors, school resource officers (SROs), and other school-related positions could help foster safety in our schools.

As some have noted, “administrators are increasingly finding that many service members make good teachers.”¹ The Troops to Teachers (TTT) program of the U.S. Department of Defense has placed more than 21,000 veterans since 1993 into teaching positions across the country.² TTT officials believe “veterans are an untapped resource to respond to a nationwide teacher shortage that has made it difficult to fill positions at high-needs schools and in math and special education.”³

Despite the success of efforts to place veterans into teaching positions, just 2.1 percent of U.S. teachers in 2016 were veterans.⁴ School campuses would benefit from more veterans and retired law enforcement officers serving our nation’s students.

In recent years, several school shootings have been stopped due to the actions of police officers serving as SROs. For example, Officer Mark Dallas’s 24 years



“veterans are an untapped resource to respond to a nationwide teacher shortage that has made it difficult to fill positions at high-needs schools and in math and special education.”

of law enforcement experience aided him in chasing down and neutralizing a shooter at a school in Dixon, IL.⁵ Similarly, Deputy Blaine Gaskill, a SWAT-trained officer who was working as an SRO at a school in Leonardtown, MD, responded rapidly to a school shooter and disabled him before he could fire another shot at one of his fellow students.⁶

Since the Columbine tragedy, several commissions at state and local levels have addressed the issue of school shootings. A task force report in response to the Parkland shooting was the first major school safety report that specifically addressed the topic of hiring retired law enforcement officers as SROs. It identified some of the financial and legal challenges in doing so: “pension plans prohibit re-hiring for a period of time post-separation and there are significant tax penalties for violating these prohibitions; there is still a need for background checks, screening and potentially training.”⁷ The report proposed a legislative recommendation “to allow agencies to re-hire certified law enforcement officers, preempting the pension provisions which prohibit re-hiring during [a] separation period without penalty.”⁸

School safety would benefit from more veterans and retired law enforcement officers leveraging their knowledge and experience to serve our nation’s students in a variety of school roles. These individuals not only have the potential to be effective educators in the classroom but also are underutilized human assets for securing and protecting our schools. Because of their unique skillset with managing conflict and emergency preparedness, they can help foster safe school climates by serving on school safety committees, mentoring at-risk youth, or volunteering in other meaningful ways.

Commission Observations

Commission research identified many programs and resources that can help veterans and retired law enforcement officers transition into new careers in

education. The TTT program provides counseling and referral services for any interested active duty service member or honorably discharged veteran to help them meet the education and licensing requirements necessary to secure a teaching position.⁹

In addition, TTT grants to states support offices for recruitment and placement assistance for service members and veterans. For example, a TTT center in Virginia works with all colleges in the state to help veterans become licensed as teachers and find teaching positions in Virginia.¹⁰ One study found that TTT instructors are particularly effective in classroom management and maintaining student discipline.¹¹ Principals say TTT participants provide a stable cadre of effective teachers who teach high-demand subjects in high-poverty schools.

Other local programs support TTT efforts. For example, the Los Angeles Unified School District military liaison and human resources office offers services to interested veterans. This includes fast-track application review, individualized guidance, and access to veteran support organizations that offer financial and career development.¹²

The U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs provides a variety of education benefits to help eligible veterans pay for tuition, training, and certification tests to support the transition into new careers in education.¹³ Veterans and law enforcement officers can take advantage of the Teacher Education Assistance for College and Higher Education (TEACH) grant program. This provides grants of up to \$4,000 per year to college students who agree to teach for four years at schools serving students from low-income families.¹⁴

Law enforcement officers can also transition to a new career as a school resource officer through the Department of Justice's Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Hiring Program.¹⁵ Various other federal programs may, among other purposes, potentially support efforts to recruit and retain military and law enforcement officers as teachers, school leaders, and other staff.¹⁶

Additionally, a number of nonprofit organizations support veterans and law enforcement officers seeking to move into careers in education. Teach For America has placed more than 50,000 teachers in high-need classrooms, including 314 veterans. The organization maintains a recruiting initiative ("You Served For

America, Now Teach For America") and partnerships with TTT and other nonprofits to encourage veterans to consider the teaching profession.¹⁷

The Mission Continues is a nonprofit organization with more than 11,000 veterans engaged nationwide in various community projects, including mentoring at-risk youth in schools. In one of the organization's projects, 72 veterans served alongside local volunteers to revitalize neighborhoods, parks, and schools in Detroit, MI.¹⁸

Veterans and law enforcement officers face various challenges when transitioning into new careers in education.

- There is duplication and a general lack of coordination and control over the array of programs and resources to support the transition of veterans and retired law enforcement officers into careers in education. Many veterans and retired law enforcement officers are unaware of or may not fully understand the benefits of available programs.
- Most programs are limited in scope, focusing on recruiting, preparing, and placing veterans and law enforcement officers as teachers in high-poverty public schools. Other education positions (such as SROs, security personnel, principals, administrators, deans, counselors, nurses, teacher aides, and other support personnel) are not eligible for the TTT program. While all schools could benefit from veterans and retired law enforcement officers helping to improve school safety, TTT is limited to high-poverty schools. The program should consider expanding the scope of eligible schools.
- State licensure and certification requirements can be excessive and unnecessarily burdensome for veterans and law enforcement officers seeking to transition into careers in education. A 2013 Calvert Institute for Policy Research report found that becoming certified to teach in Maryland is so burdensome that it is causing teacher shortages in key subjects such as science, math, and special education. The report suggests that the state consider altering some of its teacher certification requirements to open the field to a larger number of candidates.¹⁹

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. Congress should pass legislation that establishes a public-private partnership led by a single federal agency to unify the funding and operational control of identifying and recruiting more veterans and retired law enforcement officers into new careers in education. A public-private partnership could help ensure the reach and sustainability of existing programs.
2. Congress should change the intent and scope of the TTT program, broadening its reach to include a wide range of education professionals such as principals, administrators, nurses, counselors, and school resource officers, in addition to teachers.
3. Congress should amend the TTT program to provide financial assistance to veterans *and* law enforcement officers when teaching at *any* U.S. school. Because of the importance of school safety issues to all schools, whether high-poverty or not, Troops to Teachers could expand the scope of eligible schools.
4. The U.S. Department of Defense should consider promoting careers in education for future veterans throughout the military life cycle; creating a “future in education” curriculum within the Transition Assistance Program; and authorizing programs such as Skillbridge and the Army’s Career Skills Program to partner with state and local school districts.

□ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. States and districts should consider offering incentives and additional resources to recruit veterans and law enforcement officers into careers in education. Policies, programs, and incentives could include:
 - Instituting fast-track application reviews for veteran and law enforcement applicants (e.g., as done by the Los Angeles Unified School District);
 - Collecting and using data on veterans and law enforcement officers, including number of applications, hiring, and retention;
 - Adding preference points to a job candidate’s score for relevant military and law enforcement experience;
 - Employing a dedicated hiring officer to recruit and hire veterans and law enforcement officers; and
 - Participating in the U.S. Department of Veteran Affairs GI Bill On-The-Job training and apprenticeship program as a way to attract veteran candidates to school employment positions.

2. States should reduce barriers to certification and incorporate appropriate incentives and programs that help veterans and law enforcement officers enter new careers in education. Policies, programs, and incentives could include:
 - Encouraging districts to provide compensation structures that include salary credit for prior military and law enforcement experience;
 - Providing districts with financial incentives to hire significant numbers of veterans and law enforcement officers;
 - Changing state legislation and policies that prevent local agencies from re-hiring certified law enforcement officers because of pension penalties;
 - Establishing a dedicated military veteran and/or retired law enforcement liaison position;
 - Applying for TTT grants and/or establishing a state center designed to conduct outreach and certification support to veterans and law enforcement officers; and
 - Partnering with Department of Defense programs such as Skillbridge and the Army's Career Skills Program.²⁰

Chapter 15 Endnotes

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- 5 Victor, D. (May 17, 2018). School resource officer stopped school shooting, authorities say. Retrieved from *New York Times*. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/17/us/dixon-school-shooting.html>. Also, Grinberg, E. & Watts, A. (May 17, 2018). This officer stopped a school shooter before anyone got hurt. Retrieved from CNN. <https://www.cnn.com/2018/05/16/us/illinois-dixon-high-school-shooting/index.html>.
- 6 Hendrix, S., & Vargas, T. (March 20, 2018). School resource officer Blaine Gaskill rushed to stop gunman at Maryland high school. Retrieved from *Washington Post*: https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/school-resource-officer-blaine-gaskill-helped-stop-gunman-at-a-maryland-high-school/2018/03/20/639a8e42-2c66-11e8-b0b0-f706877db618_story.html.
- 7 The Broward County League of Cities' School and Community Public Safety Task Force (June 4, 2018). *Initial report and recommendations*. Retrieved from http://browardleague.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/BLOC_PUBLICSAFETY_TASKFORCE_FINAL_RR_6_2_18_PM1.pdf.
- 8 *Ibid.* at p. 85.
- 9 The program also offers a bonus of up to \$10,000, which may be available for eligible participants teaching three years at a school that meets the "eligible" or "high-need" school criteria. For more information, visit the following website: <https://proudtoserveagain.com/>. Also, Troops to Teachers (n.d.). *Overview* Retrieved from <https://proudtoserveagain.com/About/Overview>.
- 10 Satchell, E. (May 12, 2017). Grant will establish Troops to Teachers Center at William & Mary. Retrieved from <http://www.wavy.com/news/grant-will-establish-troops-to-teachers-pilot-program-at-william-mary/1060881880>. For additional information, visit the following website: <https://troopstoteachersvirginia.wm.edu/about/>.
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- 12 Los Angeles Unified School District. (2018). *Troops to education*. Retrieved from <https://achieve.lausd.net/Page/11121>.
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- 16 For example, Supporting Effective Instruction State grants (<https://www2.ed.gov/programs/teacherqual/index.html>) and grants under both REAP programs (SRSA and RLIS) (<https://www2.ed.gov/nclb/freedom/local/reap.html>) can support recruitment and retention efforts. Supporting Effective Educator Development grants (<https://innovation.ed.gov/what-we-do/teacher-quality/supporting-effective-educator-development-grant-program/>) support alternative pathways to education careers that allow teachers and principals with nontraditional preparation and certification to obtain employment in underserved school districts.
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Best Practices for School Building Security

In attempting to provide secure learning environments through school design and physical hardening, schools must balance many different objectives. These include reducing risks, maintaining open access for students and staff, facilitating a learning environment, and complying with required buildings codes and standards.¹ However, most schools present a variety of avenues for “designing in” layers of security, starting with controlling access at the school’s perimeter and working inward to secure individual classrooms and other internal spaces.

Previous Administrations have explored hardening schools. *The Report to the President on the Issues Raised by the Virginia Tech Tragedy* stressed the importance of emergency management planning, but did not directly address physical hardening of schools. However, it did recommend that schools use technology to improve security systems.² The Obama Administration’s plan to protect children assumed the need for physical security at schools and made it an explicit recommendation.³ It also proposed the creation of Comprehensive School Safety Grants for the purchase of, among other things, school safety equipment.⁴

State-level commissions also have a mixed record of studying school hardening. The Columbine Review Commission expressed concern over the cost of physically hardening schools and the lack of evidence demonstrating its impact in reducing school violence. Ultimately it recommended that security devices should be used as preventative measures for specific problems at individual schools but not as a broad-based antidote to school violence.⁵ Conversely, the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission focused much of its report on “safe school design and operation,” largely endorsing the detailed school design standards developed by the Connecticut School Security Infrastructure Council.⁶ While doing so, the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission articulated some key principles that are well-established today, such as ensuring school security design enhances, rather than diminishes, the school’s central educational mission.⁷

... schools can reduce the likelihood of a violent incident with significant casualties from occurring on their campuses by **establishing a strong security team, completing a security assessment, and developing and implementing appropriate plans for security and emergency operations.**

A full analysis of the school security measures in place at the time of the shooting at Parkland’s Marjory Stoneman Douglas (MSD) High School was still being developed at the time of the finalization of this Report by the MSD High School Public Safety Commission.⁸ However, public reporting on the incident provides a general outline of some of the vulnerabilities in the school’s overall physical security that the shooter exploited. For instance, MSD reportedly had classroom doors that could only be locked with a key from outside the classroom, requiring teachers to reach outside or fully exit the classroom to lock the door during the shooting.⁹ It also has been reported that classroom doors had translucent windows without deployable window blockers that would have allowed teachers to prevent the shooter from seeing through door windows and targeting victims inside the classroom.¹⁰ Moreover, doors and windows were made of standard, non-reinforced materials, allowing the shooter to kill many of his victims without having to breach a locked door or enter the classroom.¹¹

Even with adequate funding for physical security, the decision on how best to provide security at a school to protect the students, visitors, and staff is complex and difficult. School officials should consider characteristics such as the age of the students, school campus layout, building design, and available financial resources to identify the policies, procedures, and equipment that can best assist efforts to secure their schools and mitigate overall risk. While it is generally agreed that it is not possible to stop every potential

act of violence in schools,¹² schools can reduce the likelihood of a violent incident with significant casualties from occurring on their campuses by establishing a strong security team, completing a security assessment, and developing and implementing appropriate plans for security and emergency operations.

Commission Observations

The Commission identified various components of an effective approach to enhancing the security of schools. These include practices that have proven successful at either the school, school district, or state government level. Special emphasis was laid on proven plans to establish a sound security management program and enhance physical security at access points (including building façade) and in the context of the classroom.

Security management

Schools and school districts employ people, develop plans, and implement procedures to manage school security and the safety of students on campus. Factors that contribute to the effectiveness of security and emergency management efforts at schools include the establishment of a security management team; the development of a school safety community of interest; the conduct of school risk assessments, with the inclusion of the full spectrum of activities that occur at a school during planning; and the existence of security and emergency operations plans.

Establishing a Security Management Team and Cultivating a “Community of Interest” for School Safety and Security:

To oversee proper development and implementation of a comprehensive school safety and security program, school districts and individual schools should consider first establishing a security management team and designating a team lead.¹³ The team should include individuals with a management, oversight, or other significant role in the security of the school, such as the principal or vice-principal, the designated emergency manager, and, if the school has one, the school resource officer.

In addition, every school district and individual school should try to develop a coalition from the community for the common purpose of enhancing the safety of students and the security of schools.¹⁴ As noted in the Final Report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission: “the successful implementation of Safe School Design

✓ FAST FACTS

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and Operations (SSDO) strategies requires the support of ‘local champions.’ Each community or school district should have a small standing committee or commission, comprised of individuals representing the school community, law enforcement, fire, EMS and public health, whose responsibility is to ensure that the SSDO standards and strategies are actually implemented in their community.”¹⁵

A school’s security community of interest begins with its teachers, administrators, counselors, other staff, parents, and students, and also includes external partners like local first responders, social workers, and elected officials. These groups can collaborate to develop emergency operations plans that establish protocols for handling all types of potential hazardous incidents, including natural disasters, accidents, and deliberate attacks like an active shooter. A strong coalition can help carry the message to the rest of the community and minimize resistance to necessary security measures.¹⁶

Conducting Risk Assessments at Schools: A school’s security management team should first consider conducting a risk assessment to determine needs, identify vulnerabilities, and develop a security strategy. A facility risk assessment provides school administrators with an evaluation of current security practices and identifies options for preventing and protecting against violent incidents, including active shooters. In concert with school safety and security decision-makers, school administrators can use these assessments to prioritize security enhancements based on available resources. Recognizing the importance of risk assessments, in 2018 the Florida Department of Education is requiring all Florida school districts to complete an extensive facility risk assessment for each of their schools.¹⁷

A school's security management team should first consider conducting a risk assessment to determine needs, identify vulnerabilities, and develop a security strategy.

A risk assessment can be conducted internally, in conjunction with local law enforcement, or by a specialized third party security firm. To assist schools in conducting their own risk assessments, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security recently released *K-12 School Security: A Guide for Preventing and Protecting against Gun Violence*.¹⁸ The Guide includes both a narrative overview of proven security practices, as well as considerations and instructions for completing a security self-assessment survey. Together, these documents outline action-oriented security practices and options for consideration based on the results of the individual school's responses to the survey.

The Phoenix Police Department's Threat Mitigation Unit is a good example of how local law enforcement can be leveraged to conduct school risk assessments. The Threat Mitigation Unit uses its critical infrastructure vulnerability assessment capability to assess schools across Arizona. In the assessment process, detailed information is gathered about each school and provided to first responders electronically. In return, school districts receive options regarding ways to make their campuses more secure based on the training and experience of the assessment teams.

Developing Comprehensive Emergency Operations Plans: A school's emergency operations plan should center on regular engagement between schools, school districts, and first responders. Collaboration increases the efficiency and effectiveness of response to school-based incidents by providing first responders with the information required to navigate and secure a campus during an incident. Any reduction in the time between the beginning and end of an incident can save lives. In 2013, a federal interagency team released the *Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans*, which outlines the steps schools can take in collaboration with their local government and community partners to plan for potential emergencies through the creation of a school emergency operations plan.¹⁹ The Guide outlines the functions (e.g., com-

munications, evacuation, shelter-in-place, lockdown) and threats or hazards (e.g., hurricanes, earthquakes, active shooters) for which every school should consider developing a plan.

Emergency operations plans must describe the actions that students, teachers, and school staff will take during an emergency. Actions may differ significantly depending upon the type of emergency. These differences should be outlined clearly according to the different threats and hazards. Everyone in the school should have a common understanding of what will be expected of them during an emergency—students, teachers, and school staff as well as parents, substitute teachers, coaches, and any contracted workers on the school campus. All areas of the school should be included in the planning, such as auxiliary locations for which the school is responsible and for any events that occur outside of regular school hours or school days.

Informing students, teachers, and school administrators of the practices outlined in a security or emergency operations plan is just as important as developing the plan in the first place. Training provides the most effective way of educating everyone on their roles and responsibilities during an emergency. An effective plan requires meticulous practice and stakeholders trained in executing the plan.

Considering Before School, After School, and Extra-Curricular Activities in Planning: At many schools, large numbers of students or other members of the community will be present at the school before school, after school, during extra-curricular activities, and other times when classes are not in session.²⁰ During these periods, schools often reduce security measures, such as by leaving entry doors unlocked or reducing security staff presence.²¹ When designing their security and emergency operations plans, schools need to consider security for these periods.

Emergency operations plans must describe the actions that students, teachers, and school staff will take during an emergency.

School building hardening and other physical improvements

Three key areas comprise the physical aspects of schools: the campus, the buildings on the campus, and the classrooms in the buildings. When implemented as part of a security strategy, measures specific to each of these parts of schools can enhance the overall security posture of a school. When designing a physical security plan, schools should keep in mind certain principles, such as respecting the school's primary mission and incorporating a layered approach to security.

Available funding and the age of existing infrastructure also play a role in determining the best strategy for hardening a school. Administrators must consider their budgetary constraints and identify the most appropriate investment for their schools. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, the average age of the main building of public schools in the United States is 44 years,²² and 53 percent of schools require funding for repairs, renovations, and modernization to ensure buildings are in overall good condition.²³ Older schools are more challenging to retrofit for security. In addition, many schools do not have the funding to make basic infrastructure repairs, and this makes investing in security difficult.²⁴


- **Respecting the School Mission:** Schools are first and foremost places for learning. When designing physical security measures, schools should ensure that the primary educational mission is not sacrificed for enhanced security.²⁵ During his testimony at the August 16 Commission meeting, architect Jay Brotman provided numerous examples of how the new Sandy Hook Elementary School was able to further its primary institutional objective as a place of learning while ensuring improved security. For instance, architects designing schools often look for ways to incorporate security while still allowing natural light as “[d]aylight illuminates classrooms while using less energy and research shows positively influences a student’s ability to concentrate and learn.”²⁶ To achieve this at Sandy Hook, the architects did not use high windows that might prove more difficult to breach but which would also be difficult for the elementary school children to see out of and would reduce natural light in the classroom. Instead, they sloped the ground away from the building, such that the

windows are higher to a potential assailant but feel normal to the children inside.²⁷

- **Layers of Security:** As multiple experts noted during Commission meetings, school security strategies should use a layered approach that incorporates multiple, reinforcing echelons of policy, programs, and protective measures.²⁸ This can help prevent an attacker from exploiting a gap or single point of failure in a school’s security plan. Layering security can also prove valuable in delaying an attacker, thus providing more time for law enforcement to respond to an attack.²⁹ This is especially valuable in more rural areas where law enforcement response time may be significantly longer due to the need to cover a significantly greater geographic area.³⁰
- **Access Controls—Limited Entry Points:** As all of the experts testifying during the Commission’s August 23 field visit to Miley Achievement Center in Las Vegas, NV, acknowledged, denying intruders and attackers access to school campuses and buildings is a key line of defense. It begins at the entrance to the school’s campus or building.³¹ Entry control measures limit the number of access points, allow access only to those who should be on the campus, and provide an opportunity to conduct searches of suspicious items or persons. Having entry controls in place can deter individuals from initiating violent attacks, detect attacks earlier from a safe distance, and delay attackers from reaching vulnerable locations or densely populated areas.

By applying the principles of Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, schools can implement security measures such as fencing, bollards, planters, curbs, or walls to create a single point of entry to the campus, for both vehicles and pedestrians. This allows school staff to more effectively monitor every individual who comes onto the campus.³² For example, the new Sandy Hook Elementary School is designed with a rain garden with three footbridges

Schools are first and foremost places for learning. When designing physical security measures, schools should ensure that the primary educational mission is not sacrificed for enhanced security.



in front of its main entrance.³³ Through this approach, the school was able to incorporate a natural barrier to vehicles that funnels pedestrian traffic to a single entryway in a visually pleasing design that can also help teach the children about the cycle of water and seasonal plants.

Rerouting roads or eliminating access points might be necessary to assure minimal access points to the campus. Schools that consist of a single building should also work to have limited, monitored entry points by applying the appropriate security measures. All schools should consider equipping exterior doors with an electronic access system that allows for scheduled lock and unlock times. During lock times the use of access cards or video intercom door release systems may be used for student, teacher, or visitor movement.

- **Access Controls—Video Surveillance:** Video surveillance is a valuable security measure for entry control. Surveillance cameras can also be used beyond entry points to monitor areas that are not within the normal view of teachers, administrators, or security personnel, such as hallways and enclosed stairwells. When feasible, school security personnel or other staff should actively monitor video feeds, and the local first responder community should have access to them.³⁴ Schools sharing video feeds with local law enforcement or others should ensure they are complying with all appropriate privacy laws, such as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), when doing so. Additional information on how to properly share video surveillance while complying with FERPA can be found in Chapter 17 of this report.

- **Access Controls—Screening Systems:** Some schools may also wish to use screening systems to limit who and what can enter a building. These systems typically require one-at-a-time entry to check the person and belongings. Such systems can use metal detection, X-ray, explosives detection devices, or a physical search. The purpose of screening is to prevent illegal or prohibited items from entering any given facility, and there is evidence that supports the efficacy of screening as a method to detect, deter, or deny violent actors. However, these screening systems are labor-intensive, time consuming, and costly. The cost of a retrofit of a school or the time it takes to admit students into the building in accordance with screening procedures may be impediments to implementation. The impact of metal detectors, X-ray machines, and similar screening technologies on school violence is questionable, with at least one study concluding that metal detectors have no apparent effect on reducing violence on school grounds.³⁵
- **Building Envelope:** The exterior face of school buildings, including the walls, roof, windows, and doors, comprise the building envelope. Much like in a classroom, these structural components can serve as a significant layer of defense from an incident or natural disaster. In particular, construction materials for doors and windows influence the effectiveness of these features in deterring, delaying, or denying active-shooter attacks. Doors constructed primarily with wood and non-reinforced glass windows offer a lower degree of protection than doors made from steel with blast or bullet-resistant glass windows. Replacing wood framed doors with fire-rated steel or aluminum can improve the level of protection offered. Replacing any non-reinforced glass windows with tempered, wire-reinforced, laminated, or bulletproof glass and applying blast-resistant safety films can strengthen windows to increase the protection they provide.³⁶ Securing exterior windows so that individuals cannot use them to access a building can also improve the overall security of the building. In addition, clearing the exterior spaces surrounding school buildings of unnecessary foliage or structures may also eliminate spaces that

could conceal illicit activity, provide access to the building above the first floor, or otherwise aid an intruder or attacker's efforts.

- **Classroom Doors, Locks, and Window Panels:** Depending on their construction and configuration, classroom doors can significantly delay or prevent an attacker from reaching individuals within a classroom, thereby providing a safe area for students and staff during a lockdown. Much like the building envelope, the material from which doors are made will greatly affect their protective value. Reinforcing existing doors or replacing them with bulletproof doors can be very costly, but is an investment that some schools and school districts are making. For instance, in the wake of the Parkland shooting, the Charleston County (SC) School District announced that it will pilot bulletproof doors at three of its schools. The doors were designed to be strong enough to withstand high-powered ammunition, but lightweight enough for school-aged children to open.³⁷

Regardless of the type of door used, all classrooms should have locks that allow the teacher to lock the classroom door from the inside. Locksets installed on classroom doors should have the ability to be opened from outside the classroom using a key, code, credential, or other method of deactivation. This enables teachers, administrators, and first responders to access the classroom, but not an attacker or intruder. When deciding on a locking device school officials must be aware of, and comply with, fire codes, life safety codes, and Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) requirements.³⁸ In addition to the physical locking hardware, training and continued reinforcement of their use is important to get the full benefits of locks. Entry control technologies such as locks can be (and have been) rendered useless by individuals not adhering to proper security processes, such as by propping open doors for convenience or other reasons.³⁹

Many school doors have windows that allow someone outside the door to observe the inside of the classroom. These windows should be protected or reinforced and have a removable covering that can be quickly applied that obscures visual observation from both sides. Additionally, windows often are



All classrooms should have locks that allow the teacher to **lock the classroom door from the inside.**

Figure 16-2

located on the door in a position where an attacker could smash the window to gain access to the door's locking mechanism. Schools can address this by installing reinforcing film that strengthens the glass or using doors designed in a way that a breach of the window will not provide the attacker the ability to access the locking mechanism and unlock the door.

Other measures can be taken to keep students and staff beyond the line of sight and line of fire of an attacker seeking to cause harm through the door window. One school district in southern Ohio has installed hurricane-type screening on door windows in its schools. These retractable screening devices prevent an outside observer from seeing into a room as they allow observation in a straight line only, thereby narrowing the field of view from outside of the classroom. Another approach some schools use is to place tape on the floor of the classroom designating areas of the classroom that cannot be seen through the door window. Students are trained to congregate in those designated areas during lockdowns.

- **Door Numbering Systems:** School buildings come in all shapes and sizes with many entrances and exits. To help first responders gain access to an incident scene in the most efficient manner, schools can collaborate with local first responders to apply a common numbering system to the walls, doors (interior, exterior, and non-access), roof hatches, and stairwells.⁴⁰

The value of numbering systems was noted during the August 23 Commission field visit to the Miley Achievement Center by Clark County School District Police Chief James Ketsaa. He stated that the local fire marshal is exploring amending the fire code to require all schools to visibly number outside doors, provide directional (i.e., north, south,

east, west) markings, and number school roofs to support identification from the air.⁴¹ At present, 20 states provide recommendations and resources to schools about this practice via their Statewide School Safety Centers.⁴²

- **Hallways, Stairwells, Utility Rooms, and Other Areas:** Each building will have certain areas that are more difficult than others to monitor, such as hallways, stairwells, and utility rooms. Although data about the location of school violence within a school is limited, there is some indication that students feel the least safe in areas with minimal adult oversight and that violence is most prevalent in areas like hallways and stairways that are least monitored.⁴³ Similarly, spaces behind ceiling panels or walls can be easily accessed but prove difficult to monitor and can serve as staging areas for contraband or hiding places for intruders. Developing or installing systems to monitor these spaces by either physical inspection or surveillance cameras may be necessary to mitigate their use for nefarious purposes. Eliminating non-structural elements of ceilings and walls such as removable panels may help to serve the same purpose.
- **Portable Classrooms:** Portable buildings that are used for classrooms can present unique challenges because they frequently do not have the same construction features as the primary buildings, resulting in windows and doors with lower levels of security. They might also be located in less secured areas that provide easier access to an attacker. If a school has portable buildings (and eliminating their use is not practical), additional security measures may be warranted, including increased monitoring, assigned security personnel, retrofitting doors and locks, or ballistic protection on the windows.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. One of the biggest concerns raised by schools and school districts since the Parkland shooting has been their inability to easily sift through the multitude of security options, equipment, technologies, etc., that are available to their schools. As a way to address this, many individuals in the school security community have suggested the establishment of a federal clearinghouse that could assess, identify, and share best practices on school security.⁴⁴ The federal government should develop a clearinghouse to assess, identify, and share best practices related to school security measures, technologies, and innovations.
2. To assist schools and school districts in performing risk assessments and developing emergency operation plans, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) should periodically update and provide training on its *K–12 School Security: A Guide for Preventing and Protecting against Gun Violence* (including the associated security self-assessment) and, along with its interagency partners, the Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans. In addition, DHS should develop options for the creation of a train-the-trainer program to push expertise out into the states and localities to help school districts and individual schools complete these activities.
3. DHS, in partnership with the U.S. Departments of Education and Justice, should explore legislative, regulatory, or procedural modifications to existing grant programs to enable more grant funding or related resources to be available for enhancing school security operations and physical infrastructure. As part of this, DHS should explore designating a portion of Homeland Security Grants for school security activities, and premise the use of those funds on activities that accomplish enhancements recommended in DHS guidance or standards.

□ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. Schools or school districts should establish a security management team with a designated lead official to oversee security efforts. States and localities should consider supporting these efforts by providing dedicated funding for security management teams. States and localities should also consider requiring school districts or the individual schools within their jurisdiction to establish security management teams. Once established, these teams should work to develop a school security community of interest by engaging the school's teachers, administrators, counselors, and other staff, parents and students, and external partners like local first responders, social workers, and elected officials.
2. Schools should conduct a risk assessment or have a risk assessment performed in order to identify existing vulnerabilities and support the development of a strategy to address security gaps. To do this, schools could use the security self-assessment that DHS released along with its *K–12 School Security: A Guide for Preventing and Protecting against Gun Violence* or another assessment methodology (or they could work with a third party to conduct the assessment for them). States and localities should consider supporting these efforts by providing dedicated funding for the performing of school risk assessments. They can also consider requiring individual schools within their jurisdiction to complete risk assessments.

3. All school districts and/or individual schools should develop and implement emergency operations plans in accordance with the *Guide for Developing High Quality School Emergency Operations Plans*, or other similar guidance. Indeed, according to a U.S. Government Accountability Office’s 2015 survey of the 50 states and the District of Columbia, only 32 of the 51 state education departments surveyed indicated that their state required school districts to have emergency operations plans.⁴⁵ When designing their security and emergency operations plans, schools should consider security for before school, after school, during extra-curricular activities, and other times when classes are not in session. States and localities should consider supporting these efforts by providing dedicated funding for the development and implementation of emergency operations plans. States and localities should also consider requiring individual schools within their jurisdiction to develop and implement emergency operations plans.
4. Following the completion of a risk or vulnerability assessment to determine what risks and security gaps exist in the school’s current building security program, schools should take steps to address those gaps. In doing so, they should design security measures in a way that achieves security goals without requiring sacrifices to the school’s primary educational and developmental missions. Every school is different, and, therefore, the protective measures in place will vary based on the characteristics of the site, location, resources, and personnel available. Schools should make sure to take into account their unique physical characteristics when designing a security plan. School security plans should use a layered approach across all three areas of a school (i.e., the entry points, the building envelope, and the classroom) with measures designed to complement and support each other. Schools also should consider the special needs of the student population and other individuals who access the school to ensure security measures, emergency notifications, and response plans are effective and account for all.

Chapter 16 Endnotes

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- 5 *The report of Governor Bill Owens’ Columbine Review Commission*. (May 2001) at pp. 120–121.
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- 16 Department of Homeland Security. (2018). *K–12 school security: A guide for preventing and protecting against gun violence*, Second Edition, at p. 6. <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/K12-School-Security-Guide-2nd-Edition-508.pdf>.
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- 33 Testimony of Jay Brotman to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), *Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out*.
- 34 See, e.g., testimony of Sheriff Tim Troyer to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), *Best practices for school building safety*.
- 35 Schwartz et al. (2016). *The role of technology in improving K-12 school safety*, at p. 15 (citing Hankin, Hertz, and Simon 2011 study).
- 36 Underwriters Laboratory (UL) 752 Standard for Bullet-Resisting Equipment offers a standard for use in determining the appropriate construction material for use in retrofitting or designing classroom components. School and school district administrators must determine the appropriate level of ballistic resistance that is necessary and apply the corresponding level from UL 752. UL 752 is a widely recognized standard in the security industry.
- 37 See, Bowers, P. (June 28, 2018). Bullet-resistant doors coming soon to three Charleston County schools. *Post and Courier*. https://www.postandcourier.com/news/bullet-resistant-doors-coming-soon-to-three-charleston-county-schools/article_051ade5e-7a49-11e8-8579-ff174799a51e.html.
- 38 The National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 3000 guideline provides standard specifications that locksets must meet in order to comply with the ADA and widely accepted life safety best practices. NFPA 3000 should be reviewed and its standards considered by everyone who is responsible for school security and student safety. For more information on different types of locks and considerations to take into account when selecting locks for a school, one valuable resource is the National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities Guide to Door Locking Options in Schools, which can be found at http://www.ncef.org/pubs/door_locks.pdf.
- 39 See e.g., Schwartz et al. (2016). *The role of technology in improving K-12 school safety*, at p. 22.
- 40 In Kentucky, for instance, schools in Allen, Edmonson, Grayson, Mercer, Warren, and Scott Counties have worked with their local first responders to incorporate fast path door numbering, a logical system of marking doors, windows, hallways, and classrooms that assists first responders in navigating through school buildings quickly. Similarly, in New Jersey, schools are encouraged to use the Model Door Numbering System, which helps first responders more rapidly respond to incidents by numbering external doors. The New Jersey Center for Safe Schools has issued a guide to help New Jersey schools implement this system, which can be found at <https://www.nj.gov/education/schools/security/resources/DoorNumbering.pdf>. Finally, a high school in Imperial County, CA, has also adopted the practice of labeling doors for first responders in a way that indicates which key to use, the direction in which the doors will open, and how many rooms are located behind the door.
- 41 Testimony of Chief James Ketsaa to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), *Best practices for school building safety*.
- 42 Information on Statewide Schools Safety Centers can be found at <https://www.ncpc.org/programs/be-safe-and-sound-in-school/state-school-safety-centers/>.
- 43 Schwartz et al. (2016). *The role of technology in improving K-12 school safety*, at p. 6.
- 44 See, e.g., testimony of Jay Brotman to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), *Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out*; testimony of Max Schachter to the Federal Commission on School Safety Meeting (August 16, 2018), *Creating a citadel of learning: New tools to secure our schools, inside and out*; testimony of Sheriff Tim Troyer to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), *Best practices for school building safety*; testimony of Russell Davidson to the Federal Commission on School Safety Field Visit (August 23, 2018), *Best Practices for School Building Safety*.
- 45 U.S. Gov't ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-144, IMPROVED FEDERAL COORDINATION COULD BETTER ASSIST K-12 SCHOOLS PREPARE FOR EMERGENCIES, (2016).

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act and Other Statutory and Regulatory Privacy Protections

A delicate balance exists between privacy and security in schools. On the one hand, there is the legal requirement to protect the privacy of student education records. On the other hand, it is critical to recognize that some education records may contain information that, if disclosed to appropriate officials, could help prevent students from harming themselves or others.

The primary federal law that governs the privacy of education records is commonly referred to as the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA).¹ It grants parents certain rights with regard to their children's education records. These include the right to inspect and review their education records, to seek to have their education records amended, and to file a written complaint with the U.S. Department of Education regarding an alleged violation of FERPA. The law also provides parents with certain consent rights over the disclosure of education records and personally identifiable information (PII) contained therein.

While pursuing the laudable goal of protecting student privacy, FERPA was written in 1974, before the internet, and has repeatedly been criticized as archaic and in need of updating for the digital age. For example, a 2014 White House report on "Big Data" recommended that the federal government "should explore how to modernize the privacy regulatory framework under the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act."² Unfortunately, this modernization has not yet taken place, and FERPA retains a pre-Internet approach to data that is out of touch with today's modern and digitally connected classroom.

For students receiving special education and related services (or being evaluated for eligibility), the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)³ and the associated federal regulations at 34 C.F.R. Part 300 provide separate and additional confidentiality protections. Many of these confidentiality provisions are similar to FERPA in scope.⁴

Educators, parents, law enforcement officers, and others are often unclear about FERPA's specific require-

ments and exceptions, and some take advantage of the confusion surrounding FERPA. Following the Parkland shooting, one article noted how schools use FERPA as a shield to hide incriminating or embarrassing information.⁵

Troy Eid, Chief Legal Counsel to Colorado Governor Bill Owens at the time of the Columbine shooting, said that a fear of liability and "overly restrictive interpretation" of FERPA has "sparked needless confusion among officials and their lawyers."⁶ Teachers injured on the job by violent students similarly complained that their school administrators did not inform the teachers about any known violent behavior of students.⁷

Following the Virginia Tech shooting, the George W. Bush Administration recommended that school policies articulate what types of student information can be shared, with whom it can be shared, and under what conditions it can be shared.⁸ Based on those recommendations, the Department of Education amended FERPA regulations to clarify permissible disclosures of student records and PII contained therein in health or safety emergency situations.⁹

Prior to the amendments, schools and districts were more limited in what they could non-consensually disclose in the context of a health or safety emergency. In 2008, citing the need for "greater flexibility and deference" and "so they [schools administrators] can bring appropriate resources to bear on a circumstance that threatens the health or safety of individuals," the Department removed the strict construction requirement.¹⁰ With the rule change, the Department affirmed that it would review determinations to disclose education records under FERPA's health or safety exception by assessing whether: (1) there was an "articulable and significant threat to the health or safety of the student or other individuals;" (2) the disclosure was made to appropriate parties; and (3) there was a rational basis for the determination.¹¹ The Department also stated that, assuming the foregoing was satisfied, it would "not substitute its judgment for that of the

FERPA and School Safety

What is FERPA?

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) [20 U.S.C. § 1232g – 34 C.F.R. Part 99]

- Applies to all educational agencies (i.e., school districts) and institutions (i.e., schools) that receive funds under any program administered by the U.S. Secretary of Education. In K–12, FERPA applies to most public schools. In postsecondary, FERPA applies to nearly all postsecondary institutions.
- Gives parents the right to access the student’s education records (and to seek to amend any information in the student’s education record that is inaccurate, misleading, or in violation of the student’s right of privacy).
- Requires written parental consent before personally identifiable information (PII) from the student’s education record may be disclosed, subject to certain exceptions.
- When a student turns 18 years of age, or enrolls in a postsecondary institution (at any age), the student becomes an “eligible student” and all parental rights transfer to the student.

What education records does FERPA protect?

- Education records are generally defined as those records that are directly related to the student and maintained by (or on behalf of) an educational agency or institution.
- FERPA excludes certain types of records from this definition, including, but not limited to:
 - Records created and maintained by the educational agency’s or institution’s law enforcement unit for law enforcement purposes;
 - Records made or maintained by a professional or paraprofessional (e.g., physician, psychologist, etc.) that are made, maintained, or used only in connection with treatment of an eligible student, if certain conditions are met.

What are several key exceptions to FERPA’s written consent requirement?

- **Health and Safety Emergencies.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent to appropriate parties (e.g., law enforcement, emergency responders) in connection with an articulable and significant health or safety emergency, if knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student or other individuals. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(10) and 99.36;
- **School Officials.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent to school officials (including School Resource Officers), provided they meet the school’s criteria for “school officials” with “legitimate educational interests.” 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1);
- **Judicial Orders/Subpoenas.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records without consent in order to comply with judicial orders and lawfully issued subpoenas if the conditions set forth at 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9) are met;
- **Parents of Dependent Students.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from the education records of an “eligible student” without consent to the parents of that student if the parents claim the student as a dependent for federal tax purposes. 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(8).
- **Juvenile Justice System.** Educational agencies and institutions may disclose PII from education records to state and local officials or other authorities if the disclosure is allowed by a state law adopted after November 19, 1974, and if the disclosure concerns the juvenile justice system and its ability to serve, prior to adjudication, the student whose records are disclosed. The officials and authorities to whom such information is disclosed must certify in writing to the school that the information will not be provided to any other party without written consent, except as provided for under state law. 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.31(a)(5) and 99.38.

educational agency or institution in evaluating the circumstances and making its determination.”¹²

After these regulatory changes, the Departments of Education and Health and Human Services issued Joint Guidance on the Application of FERPA and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). This guidance sought to explain the relationship between the two laws and address apparent confusion on the part of school administrators, health-care professionals, and others as to how they apply to student records and the ability to communicate information.¹³

Though these recommendations and actions sought to clarify FERPA, substantial misunderstanding remains at the local level among officials and educators concerning the privacy law, and in particular its application to school-based threats.

Commission Observations

A misconception in both the education and law enforcement communities is that FERPA poses an impediment to the sharing of student information that could help prevent school violence and other emergencies.¹⁴ In her comments to the Commission, Sonja Trainor, Managing Director for Legal Advocacy at the National School Boards Association, highlighted this confusion which creates barriers to information sharing and collaboration, thus hampering the ability to prevent potential acts of violence.¹⁵

Privacy advocates have correctly noted that FERPA already permits schools to disclose the information necessary to protect students and other individuals before and during emergencies, but that continued confusion over the scope of FERPA remains. For example, John Verdi, Vice President of Policy at the Future of Privacy Forum, explained to the Commission how schools can educate school officials and other stakeholders about the existing legal authorities for sharing data to support school safety, rather than expand legal bases for disclosure of student data.¹⁶

Contrary to common misconceptions, schools have a great deal of flexibility under FERPA to disclose students’ education records, or the PII contained therein, in the context of school safety. These five exceptions to FERPA’s general requirement for written consent are especially relevant:

- disclosures to other school officials;¹⁷
- disclosures pursuant to a court order or lawfully issued subpoena;¹⁸
- disclosures in connection with a *health or safety emergency*;¹⁹
- disclosures (pursuant to state law) relating to juvenile justice;²⁰ and
- disclosures to the parents of an eligible student that is claimed by the parents as a dependent for federal tax purposes.²¹

Especially relevant to potential violence at school is FERPA’s health or safety emergency exception which permits the disclosure of students’ education records, or the PII contained therein, to appropriate parties if knowledge of such information is necessary to protect the health or safety of students or other persons in connection with an emergency.²²

FERPA’s health or safety emergency exception specifically permits schools or districts themselves to disclose PII from students’ education records in the context of emergencies. However, there are certain circumstances when it may not be practical or expedient for schools or districts themselves to make the determinations and disclosures necessary to address the emergency. These situations might include natural disasters that impact multiple districts across the state, emergencies that disrupt a district’s data systems, or emergencies that occur when district personnel are not available. In these limited situations, it is often advantageous for the state education agency to make the disclosure directly, on the school’s or district’s behalf. In a 2005 letter to the Texas Education Agency relating to the disruption caused by Hurricane Katrina, the Department affirmed that in these



types of situations FERPA authorizes state education agencies to re-disclose students' education records to appropriate parties under the health or safety emergency exception.²³

Police departments often seek access to school surveillance footage to help ensure school safety—only to have schools claim it is an education record protected by FERPA and therefore deny the request. However, FERPA's definition of "education records" excludes those created and maintained by a school's law enforcement unit for a law enforcement purpose.²⁴ If a school's security department or campus police maintains the school's surveillance video system and, as a result, creates surveillance footage for a law enforcement purpose, FERPA would not prevent sharing the surveillance footage with local law enforcement.²⁵ Smaller schools without an existing law enforcement unit or security department can still utilize this exclusion by designating a school official, such as the vice-principal, as the school's law enforcement unit for this purpose.²⁶

Another exception to FERPA's written consent requirement allows disclosures to school officials who have been determined to have a legitimate educational interest in the education records, such as needing to review the education records in order to fulfill their

Five exceptions to FERPA's general requirement for written consent to disclose student education records are especially relevant:

- disclosures to other school officials;
- disclosures pursuant to a court order or lawfully issued subpoena;
- disclosures in connection with a health or safety emergency;
- disclosures (pursuant to state law) relating to juvenile justice; and
- disclosures to the parents of an eligible student that is claimed by the parents as a dependent for federal tax purposes.

professional responsibilities.²⁷ Schools and districts specify the criteria for determining both who they consider school officials and what constitutes a legitimate educational interest.²⁸ Under this exception, schools can disclose education records, or the PII contained therein, that are relevant to school safety to individuals designated as school officials and determined to have a legitimate educational interest, including teachers and school resource officers.²⁹

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. The U.S. Department of Education (ED), should provide technical assistance to clarify that FERPA’s “school official” exception may permit disclosures of disciplinary information about students to the appropriate teachers and staff within the school.
2. ED should work with Congress to modernize FERPA to account for changes in technology since its enactment.
3. ED should clarify that limited disclosures of PII from students’ education records by state education agencies (SEA) under the health or safety emergency exception are permitted, when done on behalf of the school(s) or district(s), and in compliance with other FERPA requirements when the SEA is best positioned to respond to the emergency.

□ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. States should examine their state-level student privacy laws to identify protections that go beyond FERPA and may impede schools’ and districts’ efforts to promote school safety and student well-being. FERPA is not the only student privacy law that can hinder the appropriate sharing of student information in the context of emergency situations. Schools and districts may find that information that could be shared under FERPA may not be shareable under their state student privacy laws.
2. Districts and schools should raise awareness of existing FERPA flexibilities and utilize existing (and forthcoming) trainings through the U.S. Department of Education’s Privacy Technical Assistance Center (PTAC). District and school staff can also make recommendations on additional training needs that can support increased awareness and understanding of FERPA requirements by emailing privacyTA@ed.gov.

The following are some of the existing PTAC resources:

- In 2018, ED published a series of Frequently Asked Questions that clarified FERPA’s applicability to photos and video recordings of students, with specific applicability to surveillance videos.³⁰
- ED has responded to requests from states, school districts, postsecondary institutions, law enforcement agencies, and others for technical assistance on FERPA’s requirements and general privacy best practices in the context of school safety.³¹
- ED’s June 2010 guidance “Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Disclosure of Student Information Related to Emergencies and Disasters,” and June 2011 guidance “Addressing Emergencies on Campus,” provide detailed explanations of the various exceptions to consent under FERPA that may apply in different safety scenarios.³²

Chapter 17 Endnotes

- 1 20 U.S.C. § 1232g.
- 2 https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf, at p. 70.
- 3 20 U.S.C. § 1400 *et. seq.*
- 4 For additional information on the interaction of FERPA and IDEA confidentiality provisions, see Department guidance *IDEA and FERPA confidentiality provisions*. (June 6, 2014). Available at: https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/sites/default/files/resource_document/file/IDEA%20FERPA%20Confidentiality%20Provisions%20Comparison%20Chart%2006.06.14.pdf.
- 5 LoMonte, F. (March 16, 2018). Student privacy laws have been distorted (and that's a problem). *Education Week*. Retrieved from <https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/03/21/student-privacy-laws-have-been-distorted-and.html>.
- 6 Statement of Troy A. Eid Greenberg Traurig, LLP and former United States Attorney for the District of Colorado to the Federal Commission on School Safety (May 17, 2018). <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/press-releases/federal-commission-school-safety-troy-eid.pdf>. See also Colorado School Safety Resource Center, Department of Public Safety. (September 2016). *Review of the three Arapahoe High School shooting 2013 reports facilitated by the Colorado School Safety Resource Center*. Available at <http://cdpsdocs.state.co.us/safeschools/CSSRC%20Documents/CSSRC-RWG-Report-FINAL.pdf> (noting the need for school staff to be aware “that FERPA does not prevent reporting on students about whom staff have safety concerns.”).
- 7 Lonetree, A. (April 5, 2016). Minnesota bill would bolster teachers in discipline matters. Retrieved from *Star Tribune*: <http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-bill-would-bolster-teachers-in-discipline-matters/374669351/>. See also <https://www.twincities.com/2017/06/23/st-paul-central-safety-meetings-foreshadowed-violent-attack-on-teacher>.
- 8 U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education. (May 2008). *Prior knowledge of potential school-based violence: Information students learn may prevent a targeted attack*, at p. 9. Washington, D.C. Retrieved from https://rems.ed.gov/docs/DOE_BystanderStudy.pdf.
- 9 73 Fed. Reg. 74806 (December 9, 2008).
- 10 *Ibid.* at 74837 (citing 73 Fed. Reg. 15574, 15589 (March 24, 2008)).
- 11 *Ibid.*; 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(c).
- 12 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(c).
- 13 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and U.S. Department of Education. (November 2008). *Joint guidance on the application of the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) to student health records*. Retrieved from <https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf>.
- 14 See, e.g., *NBC10 Investigators*. (June 7, 2018). Local police director wants laws protecting student records loosened in midst of school shootings. Retrieved from NBC 10: <https://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/investigations/School-Shootings-FERPA-Student-Privacy-Bensalem-Pennsylvania-Fred-Harran-484749221.html>.
- 15 Statement from Sonja Trainor to the Federal Commission on School Safety (July 11, 2018). <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=od-s0BrghKs>.
- 16 Statement from John Verdi to the Federal Commission on School Safety (July 11, 2018). <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=od-s0BrghKs>.
- 17 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1).
- 18 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(9).
- 19 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(10) (emphasis added).
- 20 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(5).
- 21 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(8).
- 22 73 Fed. Reg. 74806 (Dec. 9, 2008).
- 23 Spellings, M. (September 21, 2005). Letter to Neeley. Retrieved from <https://www2.ed.gov/katrina/letters/050921.html>.
- 24 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.3 (definition of “[e]ducation records”) and 99.8(b).
- 25 See *ibid.*; see also U.S. Department of Education. (May 2018). *FAQs on photos and videos under FERPA*. Retrieved from <https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/faqs-photos-and-videos-under-ferpa>.
- 26 See 60 Fed. Reg. 3464, 3467 (January 17, 1995).
- 27 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1). <https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/can-school%E2%80%99s-law-enforcement-unit-officials-be-considered-schools-officials-legitimate>; 73 Fed. Reg. 74806; 74813-74815 (Dec. 9, 2008) on “Outside Parties who Qualify as School Officials” (<https://www2.ed.gov/legislation/FedRegister/finrule/2008-4/120908a.html>).
- 28 Schools and districts must specify the criteria in their annual notice to parents and eligible students of their FERPA rights. 34 CFR § 99.7(a)(3)(iii).
- 29 Disclosures to school officials must meet the requirements of 34 CFR § 99.31(a)(1)(i) and 34 C.F.R. § 99.7(a)(3)(iii).
- 30 34 C.F.R. §§ 99.3 (definition of “[e]ducation records”) and 99.8(b). See also U.S. Department of Education. (May 2018). *FAQs on photos and videos under FERPA*. Retrieved from <https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/faq/faqs-photos-and-videos-under-ferpa>.
- 31 The U.S. Department of Education’s Privacy Technical Assistance Center is a “one-stop” resource for education stakeholders to learn about data privacy, confidentiality, and security practices related to student-level data systems and other uses of student data. For more information visit <https://studentprivacy.ed.gov>.
- 32 U.S. Department of Education, Family Policy Compliance Office. (June 2010). *Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and the disclosure of student information related to emergencies and disasters*. Retrieved from https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/sites/default/files/resource_document/file/ferpa-disaster-guidance.pdf. Also, U.S. Department of Education, Family Policy Compliance Office. (June 2011). *Addressing emergencies on campus*. Retrieved from https://studentprivacy.ed.gov/sites/default/files/resource_document/file/emergency-guidance.pdf.

The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and Other Statutory and Regulatory Privacy Protections

Protecting our students and preventing school violence require ensuring that the right people have access to the right information at the right time. There is a need to disclose information to enable safe medical treatment while maintaining a respect for privacy. This is particularly critical with the treatment of mental health conditions. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)¹ is a privacy rule that establishes national standards to protect medical records and other personal health information. It applies to health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers who conduct certain healthcare transactions electronically.²

The HIPAA Privacy Rule³ regulates the sharing of individually identifiable health information known as “protected health information” (PHI) and applies to covered entities (and their business associates).⁴ Covered entities are defined as health plans, healthcare clearinghouses, and healthcare providers who transmit health information in electronic form in connection with covered transactions, such as billing insurance electronically.⁵ Some healthcare providers, including cash-only practices that do not conduct covered transactions, are not subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule. Even so, such providers may be subject to states’ health information privacy laws.

Mental health and substance use information is highly relevant in the school safety context. The HIPAA Privacy Rule applies to PHI, including mental health information such as substance use disorder (SUD) diagnosis and treatment information. In addition to HIPAA, much substance use disorder diagnosis and treatment information is protected by 42 CFR (Code of Federal Regulations) Part 2, which is regulated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA). 42 CFR Part 2 is discussed later in this report.



The HIPAA Privacy Rule establishes a floor of federal privacy protection for PHI held by covered entities and their business associates. However, it does not preempt or replace other federal or state laws that may offer greater privacy protection. Many states or other jurisdictions impose stricter privacy protections than HIPAA, particularly for information considered especially sensitive, such as information related to mental disorder and SUDs. Privacy protections for individuals’ health information are not uniform across the nation, and this is a source of confusion for healthcare entities.

Congress recently considered whether HIPAA interferes with effective communication and treatment for people with serious mental illnesses. It concluded that there is confusion in the healthcare community regarding circumstances under which information can be released under HIPAA. This confusion often hinders communication of information with appropriate caregivers that would support safe and coordinated treatment.

At the July 11 Commission meeting, Jennifer Mathis, Director of Policy and Legal Advocacy at the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, referenced the provision in the 21st Century Cures Act that directed HHS to issue guidance clarifying permissible disclosures of protected information under HIPAA (and as of December 2017 this guidance is available online). Mathis

stated that additional work needs to be done to promote this guidance to the public.⁶

The HIPAA Privacy Rule does not require a covered entity to disclose PHI in its possession.⁷ The Privacy Rule *permits* a covered entity to disclose an individual's PHI pursuant to his or her authorization or under circumstances and for purposes expressly described in the Privacy Rule.

Covered entities are permitted to share PHI in several circumstances that are relevant to the school safety context. This includes sharing information with law enforcement, public health authorities, parents and other caregivers, and persons in a position to help prevent a serious and imminent harm to health or safety.

The February 14 Parkland shooting further highlighted many of the complexities surrounding HIPAA and other privacy rules—and the need for individuals, families, schools, and communities to better understand these regulations. The protection of the privacy of the alleged shooter, even after the shooting, has been a source of confusion and criticism.

Commission Observations

It is important to note that disclosures are permissible and often necessary in certain circumstances. As one expert testified during the July 11 Commission meeting, often individuals find HIPAA complex and do not understand the scenarios under which disclosure is permitted.⁸

Disclosing to law enforcement

The Privacy Rule allows covered entities to disclose PHI to law enforcement under certain circumstances.⁹ For example, providers are permitted to make such disclosures when required by state or federal law or in response to an administrative subpoena or other civil legal process. Providers may also disclose limited information to help identify or locate a suspect, witness, or missing person; and about individuals who are suspected to be or who are victims of crime. In general, school employees are not providers under HIPAA. However, there may be certain situations where a school employee (such as a nurse or counselor) is a health provider, and in that case HIPAA may apply.

Disclosing to a public health authority

Covered entities may disclose PHI to public health authorities for public health activities (45 CFR

Disclosures are permissible and often necessary in certain circumstances.

164.512(b)), which could include violence prevention initiatives or state law requirements to report child abuse or neglect.

Disclosing to parents and other caregivers

The Privacy Rule generally treats parents as “personal representatives” of their minor children. Personal representatives generally have the authority to act on behalf of the minor child when providing consent to share information under HIPAA. Providers can decide not to treat a parent as a personal representative if, for example, they have concerns that doing so might put the child's safety at risk.¹⁰

The HIPAA Privacy Rule also permits healthcare providers and other covered entities to share PHI with persons involved in the care or payment for care of individuals who are not able to agree or object to the disclosure (e.g., due to a mental health crisis). This is based on the entity's judgment that sharing PHI is in the best interests of the patient. Under these circumstances, the recipients of the information may include family members, such as parents of children who are no longer minors.

Doris Fuller is a mental illness researcher, advocate, and family member and the former Chief of Research and Public Affairs (ret.) at the Treatment Advocacy Center. During the July 11 Commission meeting, she stated that providers have a history of “stonewalling” families when it comes to providing protected health information. Her experience is that medical providers and schools routinely withhold medical information from family members to avoid liability for violating HIPAA.

Disclosing to anyone who can prevent serious and imminent harm

Providers and other covered entities may disclose patient PHI to avert a serious and imminent threat to the health or safety of the patient or others when they have a good faith belief that such a disclosure is necessary to prevent or lessen the threat. Under these circumstances, providers may alert those persons they believe are reasonably able to prevent or lessen the threat. This includes law enforcement, school offi-

cial, teachers, parents, friends, school counselors, or anyone reasonably able to help avert the harm. The disclosure must be made in good faith and be consistent with applicable law and standards of ethical conduct.¹¹

Education records

With respect to records held by schools, HIPAA excludes individually identifiable information in “education records” covered by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) and certain “treatment records” of eligible students from the definition of PHI.¹² In most cases, therefore, records created by a school nurse or other school health professional (including those that are HIPAA-covered entities) are not subject to the HIPAA Privacy Rule.

When HIPAA does apply in school settings and for PHI related to minor children, HHS Office for Civil Rights (OCR) guidance and resource materials help clarify the circumstances when providers may disclose information to parents.¹³

At the July 11 Commission meeting, Jennifer Mathis also stated that the privacy protections of HIPAA are extraordinarily important for individuals with mental health disabilities. Without the assurance of privacy protections, students are less likely to seek help when needed and less likely to engage openly with mental health counselors or other service providers. Mathis stated HIPAA is not to blame for the lack of appropriate disclosures of mental health information.

Confidentiality of substance use disorder patient records

Federal regulations governing the confidentiality of SUD patient records (42 CFR Part 2) include statutory provisions (42 U.S.C. 290dd-2) enacted nearly 50 years ago, at a time when individuals seeking treatment for SUDs faced significant discrimination and negative consequences because they sought treatment for addiction. Thus, Part 2 is “intended to ensure that a patient receiving treatment for a SUD in a Part 2 program is not made more vulnerable by reason of the availability of their patient record than an individual with a SUD who does not seek treatment.”¹⁴

Persons who seek help for and who are in recovery from SUDs may face discrimination in education, healthcare, employment, housing, and family law (e.g., child custody disputes).¹⁵ This may deter patients from seeking treatment or make them reluctant to

share information with their healthcare providers about their diagnosis and treatment for SUDs. For SUD patients who often have comorbid conditions, proactive, preventive, and chronic care is important to achieving desired outcomes. Such outcomes are facilitated by appropriate sharing of information by patients with their healthcare providers, among medical staff, and, occasionally, with non-medical providers (such as teachers and coaches) supporting their care.

Information about a patient’s medical conditions, including SUDs, is critical to ensuring patients receive comprehensive care that facilitates and sustains their recovery and overall health. For instance, a healthcare provider treating a patient in recovery from a SUD may wish to avoid prescribing a highly addictive pain medication for the patient’s non-SUD condition because it could cause the patient in recovery to relapse.

The Part 2 regulations apply to any federally assisted program that identifies itself as a SUD program providing treatment services. The regulations require that treatment records identifying a patient as having or having had a SUD be confidential and only disclosed under expressly authorized circumstances.¹⁶ In general, a SUD treatment program that is subject to Part 2 must obtain written patient consent before disclosing patient-identifying information. Once this information is disclosed, re-disclosure is not permitted unless expressly permitted by the written consent of the patient or unless otherwise permitted under Part 2. Certain exceptions to the written consent requirement are permitted under Part 2, such as disclosures for research, medical emergency, and audit and evaluation purposes.¹⁷

Historically, Part 2 has included more stringent disclosure requirements for SUD records when compared to other health privacy laws such as HIPAA. However, in 2017 and 2018 SAMHSA issued final Part 2 rules that aligned some aspects of Part 2 with HIPAA to facilitate greater information sharing and to ensure that care for SUD patients could be provided in a coordinated and integrated manner. In addition, in 2018 SAMHSA and the Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology released fact sheets that provide examples of how Part 2 data can be shared through electronic health records and health information exchanges.

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. OCR should analyze current HIPAA guidance to:
 - a) Determine whether simpler, more user-friendly information is needed;
 - b) Identify additional scenarios based on current school settings to improve understanding of when HIPAA applies to such settings; and
 - c) Determine how new or revised guidance may improve coordination between mental health providers, family members, other healthcare professionals, law enforcement, and school personnel.
2. The U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) should analyze the need for joint OCR-SAMHSA guidance to clarify and explain how HIPAA and 42 CFR Part 2 apply and intersect across different settings to help further address the potential for violence related to comorbidity of SUDs and Serious Mental Illness.
3. HHS should analyze the HIPAA Privacy Rule and existing guidance to determine how current provisions related to disclosures (such as those relating to serious and imminent harm) impact the ability or willingness of covered healthcare providers to report when an individual poses a risk of violence to a school or in another setting. Determine if changes to the Privacy Rule are warranted.
4. HHS should amend the HIPAA Privacy Rule to create a stronger safe harbor for providers to disclose (to a state public health or law enforcement authority) information about patients who need to receive continuous, monitored care because they may be a threat to themselves or others.
5. All appropriate federal agencies should support the development of applications (including for mobile platforms) and electronic health record systems that facilitate patient consent to information sharing among providers.

■ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. State and local healthcare providers should ask patients to identify any family members or other helpers or caregivers involved in their care before an emergency occurs so the providers know not only who to notify in an emergency situation, but also who to call about their care.
2. To prepare for potential emergency circumstances, schools, healthcare providers, and others affected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule should familiarize themselves with the OCR guidance described above (as well as other applicable law and professional ethical standards) before an emergency occurs.

Chapter 18 Endnotes

- 1 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) (Pub. L. No. 104–191).
- 2 HHS, Office of Civil Rights, accessed July 17, 2018. <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/index.html>.
- 3 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164, Subparts A and E.
- 4 See the definition of “business associate” at 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
- 5 A transaction under the Privacy Rule is the transmission of information between two parties to carry out healthcare-related financial or administrative activities. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
- 6 Statement from Jennifer Mathis, Director of Policy and Legal Advocacy at the Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law, to the Federal Commission on School Safety. (July 11, 2018). <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/transcript-07-11-2018.pdf>.
- 7 A covered entity must disclose protected health information in only two situations: (a) to individuals (or their personal representatives or designated third party) when the individuals request access to, or an accounting of disclosures of, their protected health information; and (b) to HHS when it is undertaking a compliance investigation or review or enforcement action. See 45 CFR § 164.502(a)(2).
- 8 Statement to the Federal Commission on School Safety. (July 11, 2018). <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/transcript-07-11-2018.pdf>.
- 9 See 45 CFR § 164.512(f). Also see <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/505/what-does-the-privacy-rule-allow-covered-entities-to-disclose-to-law-enforcement-officials/index.html>.
- 10 Additional materials for consumers and families with minor children can be found at <https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/mental-health/index.html>.
- 11 45 C.F.R. § 512(j).
- 12 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
- 13 <https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/when-your-child.pdf>. See also Joint guidance issued in November 2008 by OCR and the Department of Education, and which remains applicable, can be found at: <https://www2.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/doc/ferpa-hipaa-guidance.pdf>.
- 14 See Purpose and Effect, § 2.2 (b)(2).
- 15 See, e.g., *Ending discrimination against people with mental and substance use disorders: The evidence for stigma change*. (2016). <https://www.nap.edu/catalog/23442/ending-discrimination-against-people-with-mental-and-substance-use-disorders>; van Boekel, L.C., et al. (July 1, 2013). Stigma among health professionals towards patients with substance use disorders and its consequences for healthcare delivery: Systematic review. *Drug & Alcohol Dependence*, Vol. 131, Issue 1, 23–35.
- 16 See Definitions, § 2.11 (<https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/2.11>); Applicability, § 2.12, Prohibition on Redisclosure (<https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/2.12>); § 2.32 (<https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/2.32>).
- 17 See Minor Patients, § 2.14 (<https://www.law.cornell.edu/cfr/text/42/2.14>).

SECTION 3

Respond & Recover

Active Shooter Preparedness and Mitigation

An active shooter is an individual actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a confined and populated area.¹ Active shooter situations are unpredictable and devolve quickly. In most cases, there is no pattern or method to the selection of victims. Because active shooter situations are often over before law enforcement arrives on the scene, individuals must be prepared both mentally and physically to deal with an active shooter attack—without the assistance of trained crisis response personnel.

The shooting at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, FL, bore all the standard characteristics of an active shooter situation. The shooter appeared to indiscriminately target people, firing into some classrooms while walking by others.² In less than seven minutes, 17 individuals were killed, and the shooter exited the campus well before off-campus local law enforcement arrived on scene.³ According to some reports, total casualties may have been higher had the school not provided active shooter preparedness training to staff, the latest coming just six weeks before the shooter required teachers to put that training to use.⁴

Reports prepared in the aftermath of school shootings have universally recognized the value of preparing for a potential active shooter incident and other mass casualty events through training, planning, and related strategies. For example, the Columbine Commission recommended “a much-increased emphasis on training in preparation for large-scale emergencies.”⁵ The Virginia Tech Commission recommended that states and locals “[i]ntegrate comprehensive all-hazards emergency management planning for schools into overall local and state emergency planning.”⁶ The Sandy Hook Advisory Commission recommended that appropriate agencies “review all existing policies concerning planned responses to active shooters” and “develop and conduct joint regional exercises of planned responses to major events.”⁷

Approaches to address active shooter incidents at schools must be specific to each school’s unique environment.

In its report on school safety, the Obama Administration stated “[o]ne of the best ways to minimize the loss of life in a mass shooting is to make sure law enforcement, first responders, school officials, and others are prepared to respond to an active shooter.”⁸ The report called for the immediate expansion of access to federal training and for Congress to provide an additional \$14 million to help train police officers and others to respond to active shooter situations.⁹

The unique characteristics of K–12 school environments, including campus layout and building design, present complex challenges to active shooter planning. Therefore, approaches to address active shooter incidents at schools must be specific to each school’s unique environment. Numerous factors should inform the design of a school’s active shooter preparedness program. They include the following.

- **Age:** Students in grades K–12 typically range in age from five to 19, presenting unique challenges for each age group. Elementary students, for example, are unable to understand and respond to an incident in the same manner as a high school student. Therefore, age is often an important consideration in how to discuss awareness campaigns and response methods with students. While the “Run, Hide, Fight”¹⁰ approach for reacting to active shooter incidents is widely taught nationwide, the “Fight” portion of the campaign may not be appropriate for all age groups and may require modification to ensure younger students better understand, respond, and react to an active shooter. Federal, state, and local governments as well as associations and nonprofits have developed approaches tailored for children to respond to active shooter incidents, including: “Lock Out, Get Out, Take Out” and “Observe, Navigate, Escape.”¹¹

The Safe and Sound Schools organization created a guide to assist school communities in determining the appropriate approach for educating and training students and staff.¹² Descriptions of the seven levels identified in that guide are below.

Table 19.1

Safe and Sound Schools’ Summary of Developmental Levels of Safety Awareness¹³

Level	Description
Early (Pre-K and Kindergarten)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • General understanding of danger. • Heavily reliant on adults for direction. • Capable of practicing basic safety concepts like “get out” and “keep out.”
Developing (Early Elementary)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates characteristics of early awareness. • Capable of providing basic assistance in an emergency (e.g., turning out lights).
Practiced (Upper Elementary)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates characteristics of developing awareness. • Capable of assisting adults in an emergency (e.g., closing doors).
Proficient (Intermediate/ Middle School)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable of performing practiced actions independently. • May or may not demonstrate the ability to interrupt an attacker.
Independent (High School and Adult)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Demonstrates automatic response in a variety of safety situations. • Demonstrates ability to independently adapt and apply safety skills and knowledge in a variety of situations. • May or may not demonstrate the ability to interrupt an attacker.
Advanced (Professionally Trained Adults or Staff Members)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capable of leading others and making decisions in emergencies. • May or may not demonstrate the ability to interrupt an attacker.
Professionals (Responders, Military, Security Professionals)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Highly capable of decision-making in an emergency. • Trained and equipped to provide tactical response in an emergency.

Individual levels may vary due to the unique developmental, cultural, educational, and personal profiles within a community or classroom. School communities and parents, in partnership, should consider the individual psychological backgrounds and educational needs of students when determining awareness levels as well as appropriate education and training.¹⁴

- School Design:** A school’s design will have a great impact on how it prepares to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from active shooter incidents. Suburban schools often have campus-style environments with multiple buildings, while urban schools tend to consist of single multi-level buildings. Campus-style schools can be more difficult to secure, as the dispersed school buildings are exposed to attacks from multiple directions. A more compact organization of buildings or a single building provides for more streamlined surveillance and access control.¹⁵ The level of security in individual classrooms (e.g., strength of classroom doors and locks, presence or absence of windows with lines of sight) may influence decisions on active shooter preparedness, as can the existence or absence of layers of security to delay potential attackers. More information on school design and school hardening can be found in Chapter 16 of this Report.
- Student Background and Special Needs:** Students come from a variety of family, cultural, and medical disabilities and medical history backgrounds. This presents additional considerations for school safety and security. According to the most recent data provided by the National Center for Education Statistics, approximately 4.8 million public school students identify as English language learners,¹⁶ and 6.7 million students received special education services in 2015.¹⁷ Active shooter awareness and response communications, training, and planning should take language differences and disabilities into consideration to include the entire student population. For example, Washington, D.C.-based Gallaudet University serves deaf and hard-of-hearing students and employs several different methods to communicate with students during an emergency, such as emails, emergency blue lights, orange flags, and person-to-person messaging.¹⁸
- Laws and Policies:** Schools may need to follow different rules than businesses when implementing security policies. Schools are not only responsible for training and keeping students safe, but also for leading students in an emergency.¹⁹ State and local laws as well as school policies concerning security and response vary nationwide, and schools should be aware of the regulatory responsibilities imposed upon them in their jurisdictions.

Commission Observations

Through its various engagements with school safety and security stakeholders, the Commission identified a variety of elements and approaches that experts routinely recommend schools incorporate when developing their active shooter preparedness and mitigation program. These include physically hardening the school, engaging in community planning, encouraging and facilitating the reporting of suspicious behavior, conducting training and exercises, maintaining and testing effective communications systems, and establishing threat assessment teams. Each of these key elements are summarized below.

- **School Hardening:** As numerous witnesses testified during the August 16 Commission meeting and the August 23 Commission field visit, there are several core parts of a comprehensive active shooter preparedness strategy. They include security measures that help control access to the school and its campus, physically strengthen the building, and seek to create secure spaces within classrooms where students and teachers can shelter in the case of an active shooter.²⁰ These measures can deter an attacker from initiating an attack, protect individuals during an attack, and delay the attacker to allow additional time for local law enforcement to respond. Information on best practices for physically hardening school buildings can be found in Chapter 16 of this Report.
- **Community Planning:** As of the 2015–2016 school year, 92.4 percent of public schools reported having written plans to address a shooting on campus.²¹ As Paul Timm, Vice President of Facility Engineering Associates, testified to the Commission at the August 23 Commission field visit, it is beneficial for schools to establish safety planning teams that include school administrators, teachers, parents, students, and other community partners.²² This approach ensures a multi-disciplinary, multi-perspective methodology that reflects the communi-

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ty's values, priorities, and unique needs, thereby increasing the chances of implementation success. Whole community planning should happen concurrently, and be coordinated, at the school district and individual school levels. Additional information on cultivating a "community of interest" can be found in Chapter 16 of this Report.

- **Identification and Reporting of Suspicious Behavior:** Physical protection measures only go so far when it comes to preventing an active shooter incident. Potential warning signs are not always the result of a direct threat—more often, there is observable conduct that could signal a threat. As various witnesses during the August 16 Commission meeting attested, detecting and addressing concerning behavior, thoughts, or statements can prevent active shooter situations from occurring.²³ Information related to identifying, reporting, assessing, and acting upon suspicious activity can be found in Chapter 5 of this Report.
- **Training and Exercises:** It is widely agreed that a robust training and exercise program is essential to successfully addressing the complex active shooter threat. For example, during the August 28 Commission listening session, Alabama Governor Kay Ivey discussed how training is a major part of her Smart on Safety Initiative. Also during that session, Alabama State Representative Mac McCutcheon noted



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Figure 19-1

A robust training and exercise program is essential to successfully addressing the complex active shooter threat.

the importance of having law enforcement and school officials train together to respond to emergency situations. Similarly, Kathy Martinez-Prather, Director of the Texas School Safety Center, noted how school districts in Texas are required to train school employees to respond to an emergency and conduct drills and exercises to prepare both school employees and students.²⁴

Active shooter training for students should be age-appropriate and consist of prevention, situational awareness, and response training. School administrator and teacher training should include tabletop exercises (i.e., group exercises that do not involve hands-on practice or fieldwork, but rather are intended to generate discussion of issues surrounding a hypothetical, simulated emergency) with school safety and security teams. When possible and age-appropriate, response training for school administrators, teachers, and students should involve role-play, scenario-based training that simulates a real-life active shooter incident requiring quick decision-making. To the extent possible, all active shooter trainings, especially those related to responding to and recovering from an active shooter incident, should be trauma-informed.²⁵ Additional details on active shooter training and exercises are found later in this section.

In addition to active shooter training, it is important for school staff and students to be trained on and follow appropriate security protocols. The best single entry access control system is of no use if a teacher or student leaves an alternative door propped open. The importance of people and training is well-stated in the Indiana School Safety Guidelines for Emergency Response Systems and echoed in the Broward County League of Cities' School and Community Public Safety Task Force: "[n]o matter how much money or how many safety and security tools a facility can purchase, the most common failure to safety and security is human error. The term 'People over Products' stresses the important role of the individuals within a school in regard to safety. It is critical to ensure training

opportunities are provided to employees and students, ensure awareness programs are taking place for the implemented safety and security measures, and employees and students are being empowered to be the most important line of defense."²⁶

- **Communication Systems and Protocols:** The ability to communicate quickly and effectively often is central to a successful response to an active shooter incident. This includes the ability of school staff or students to quickly inform law enforcement of an active shooter situation, thus initiating the law enforcement response; the ability to quickly alert staff, students, and other members of the community of an ongoing active shooter situation in order to initiate a lock down, evacuation, or other appropriate action; and the ability for law enforcement to communicate among themselves and with the school as necessary during a response.

Unfortunately, as Max Schachter, CEO and Founder of Safe Schools for Alex, noted during his testimony to the Commission, there are "communication-related problems that impede law enforcement during all tragedies, including [the Parkland school shooting]."²⁷ These may include outdated or insufficient communications equipment (e.g., radios or phones that do not receive signals inside school buildings), lack of training on existing communications equipment or protocols, and a lack of interoperability between the communications equipment possessed by first responder organizations and the school.

In regards to notifying law enforcement of an active shooter, Sheriff Tim Troyer told the Commission that calls to 911 typically occur two to three minutes after the start of an attack. As was the case in Parkland, 911 calls are often indirect calls (e.g., made by parents of students who had called their parents rather than law enforcement).²⁸ In order to reduce this delay in notification, Troyer recommended that schools implement mechanically simple means of notification that contact the 911 center directly.²⁹ One school in Indiana accom-

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plishes this by having teachers wear an emergency fob around their neck that they can press in the event of an active shooter incident, immediately triggering a school-wide alarm and notifying law enforcement.³⁰

Schools should consider establishing, maintaining, testing, and training on communication technology and protocols (e.g., emergency alerts, mass notifications, intercom announcements) that can alert both staff and students, as well as parents and the broader local community, of an active shooter situation. Within schools, it is best if alerts are both audible and visual, and can be seen and heard throughout the entire school grounds.

Finally, schools should consider working with local law enforcement to test, drill, and exercise the communications equipment first responders will be using during a response to ensure its adequacy. Often, the hardened physical construction of school buildings can make radio or phone communication within the school buildings difficult.³¹ Communications equipment that does not properly function within the school will be of extremely limited value during a response. Additionally, as Max Schachter pointed out in his testimony, interoperability of communications equipment, which was a problem during the 9/11 attacks, remains a problem today.³² For instance, during the response to the Parkland shooting, a lack of interoperable equipment forced law enforcement to resort to hand signals.³³ States and localities can take action to help address these concerns. For example, during the August 28 Commission listening session, Georgia State Representative Rick Jasperse noted how the Georgia legislature provided funding for schools that many are using to acquire “better communication within the school building so when law enforcement rides up, the radios work in the building.”³⁴

- **Threat Assessments:** Numerous witnesses stressed to the Commission the importance of schools establishing threat assessment teams. They included Dr. Jennifer Johnston, Assistant Professor of Psychology at Western New Mexico University; Donna Michaelis, Manager for the Virginia Center for School and Campus Safety; Kathy Martinez-Prather, Director of the Texas School Safety Center; and Dr. Kathy Murphy, Superintendent

of Hoover (AL) City Schools.³⁵ Threat assessment teams are most effective if they are multi-disciplinary and include a diverse group of stakeholders, such as school counselors, school resource officers, teachers, and school administrators.

Parents and students are not typically part of the threat assessment team, as personal and confidential information about a student is often discussed. Threat assessment teams are addressed in greater detail in Chapter 5 of the Report.

Many state and local school districts, as well as their local communities, have implemented robust and innovative mitigation strategies, tactics, policies, and procedures to combat the active shooter threat. One example that demonstrates some of the key elements listed above through a layered approach to safety and security is the Spokane (WA) Public School District.

Immediately following the December 2012 Sandy Hook tragedy, the Spokane Public School District commissioned a safety audit of every district school. Areas reviewed included access control, training, physical building security, security team staffing, and community suggestions.³⁶ Spokane Public Schools have engineered a school safety program that combines important physical safeguards and crucial human elements to deter school violence. The district instituted a single-point-of-entry policy at each school—meaning the school locks every door once school begins and visitors must check in at a single entrance. Visitors enter only after having been cleared via video camera and intercom by office staff or a resource officer. They receive a badge, and the school scans their drivers’ licenses and checks them against a registered sex offender database and a database for anyone with trespass or domestic violence issues.

Spokane Public Schools launched a “See Something, Say Something®” initiative that encourages students to report anything that may indicate a student is struggling and may need help or is posing a danger to himself or herself or to others. The initiative recommends students talk to an adult or report their concerns via text, email, or voicemail. The school district also has a threat assessment team that evaluates the reported information against possible threat indicators. It includes a school psychologist, special education personnel, teachers, principals, vice principals, and resource officers. Under state law, Spokane schools also are required to conduct multiple safety drills each year.

Numerous guides, trainings materials, and other resources have been developed by various federal entities, states, and nonprofit organizations to help schools develop comprehensive active shooter preparedness plans or aspects thereof. A number of these resources are listed in Appendix A.

Active shooter preparedness training, exercises, and workshops

As San Bernardino Chief of Police Jarrod Burguan told the Commission when discussing his experiences with two active shooter incidents in his community, “training works. And not just first responders, but it works for everybody involved.”³⁷ Training for active school shooter scenarios should be designed with the audience receiving the training in mind, whether they are students, teachers and school administrators, or law enforcement officers.

Active Shooter Training for Students: While there is some disagreement over whether it is appropriate to subject students to active shooter training,³⁸ as school shootings become more prevalent, more schools are opting to drill their students on how to respond to an active shooter situation. According to a 2016 U.S. Government Accountability Office report, an estimated 67 percent of school districts conduct active shooter drills involving their students.³⁹ Whether or not to conduct active shooter drills with the student population is something each community must determine for itself. For those that do elect to conduct active shooter drills with students, they should ensure that the training is age-appropriate and designed in a manner not to unduly traumatize any of the participants.

Active Shooter Training for School Staff: All schools should consider providing active shooter training to teachers and other on-site personnel. In his testimony to the Commission, Chief Burguan noted that during the April 2017 shooting at North Park Elementary School, previous training helped enable school staff to successfully evacuate and keep track of more than 500 students.⁴⁰ The most effective way to train staff to respond to an active shooter situation is to conduct mock active shooter training exercises. Local law enforcement is an excellent resource in designing training exercises. Training should include discussions on recognizing the sound of gunshots, the “Run, Hide, Fight” or similar approach used in the school, calling 911, reacting when law enforcement arrives, and adopting a survival mindset during times of crisis.⁴¹



“...training works. And not just first responders, but it works for everybody involved.”

— San Bernardino Chief of Police Jarrod Burguan

Some school districts have developed videos to supplement training for school staff. For instance, the Santa Ana (CA) Unified School District created a video for teachers and administrators, “Active Shooter Response Protocols: Run, Hide Fight,” that demonstrates ways to fight back or distract a shooter. Videos such as this can also reinforce other school safety practices. One of the Santa Ana video’s many messages is for teachers and administrators to say something if they notice a student or colleague acting irregularly.

Both the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) Emergency Management Institute and the U.S. Department of Education’s Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools (REMS) Technical Assistance Center provide a variety of training programs for school staff and other members of the school community on how to prepare for emergencies at schools. They include “Preparing for Emergencies—What School Staff Need to Know,” “Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Schools,” “Developing Emergency Operations Plans K–12 101,” and “Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship.” Most of these courses provide instruction applicable to both natural and human-caused events, including active shooter situations.⁴²

Active Shooter Training for Law Enforcement Officers: Both the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice manage numerous programs to help train federal, state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers for active shooter situations. Examples include:

- *Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC) Active Threat and Tactical Medical Training.* More than 60 federal agencies send their new law enforcement recruits to one of FLETC’s basic training programs, each of which includes instruction in active threat response. FLETC also delivers five advanced

programs in active threat response and tactical medical training. A significant portion of program participants are state, local, and tribal law enforcement officers from across the United States, including sworn officers serving universities and local school districts.

FLETC also offers versions of its active threat and tactical medical training programs that help officers return to their home districts with the knowledge, skills, and instructional materials to redeliver the training to others in their departments and geographic areas. Thus, when one officer completes this training, dozens of others can benefit, creating a force multiplying effect. Graduates of the Active Shooter Threat Instructor Training Program and Basic Tactical Medical Instructor Training Program gain access to FLETC's instructional materials, which state accrediting agencies have often already evaluated and approved. This enables the officers to quickly redeliver the training without having to create their own materials. Moreover, because agencies across the nation end up using identical training materials, training is more consistent, which fosters a better coordinated and integrated response to active threat events among agencies that must work together in these instances.⁴³

- *FEMA Emergency Planning for Schools*. Many of the school preparedness and emergency management training programs offered by FEMA are geared toward campus and local law enforcement officers. As noted above, most of these multi-hazard courses contain lessons relevant to preparing for and responding to both natural and human-caused events, including active shooter situations. Courses that are of particular use to law enforcement include “Multi-Hazard Emergency Planning for Schools,” “Crisis Management for School-Based Incidents—Partnering Rural Law Enforcement, First Responders, and Local School Systems,” and “Campus Emergencies Prevention, Response, and Recovery.”⁴⁴
- *The Department of Justice’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) Preparing for Active Shooter Situations (PASS) Training Program*. This program supports active shooter training to improve the safety and resiliency of law enforcement officers, other first responders, and com-

munities. It seeks to enhance the ability of law enforcement not only to secure the scene, but also to increase the survivability of the event and protect officers, critical assets, and first responders from the long-term effects of exposure to trauma. In addition to online training, more than 15,000 participants will be trained in-person with existing funding, and FY 2018 funding will support the delivery of 438 classes across the country that will train more than 16,000 first responders. PASS is adding to its portfolio more classes in advanced medical skills, solo officer rapid deployment, civilian casualty care, and exterior response to active shooter events.⁴⁵

- *The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Active Shooter: Managing the Mass Casualty Threat DVD*. This 35-minute documentary provides an in-depth look at three unique active shooter events: the Century Aurora 16 Cinemark theatre shooting in Aurora, CO; the Washington Navy Yard shooting in Washington, D.C.; and the Los Angeles International Airport shooting in Los Angeles, CA. Each story is told by the emergency professionals and private sector partners who were there. They offer a frank and introspective look at what worked and what could have been done better to manage these chaotic incidents.⁴⁶
- *Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Crisis Communications Quick Reference Guide*. This brochure is tailored to chiefs, sheriffs, command staff, and public information officers who handle crisis communications in response to an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incidents. It provides checklists for the pre-event, the onset of the incident, and updating the media (pre-press conference and second and subsequent press conferences). Also included are 10 tips to improve communications.⁴⁷
- *Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Initial On Scene Command Considerations*. This two-inch by three-inch card delineates vital issues to be considered during the initial minutes and hours of an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incident. Topics include priority staging areas, top-tier priority concerns, and secondary-tier priority concerns.⁴⁸



Tactical Emergency Casualty Care/Mass Casualty Response Training: In active shooter situations, providing rapid medical care to the injured is critical. If students and personnel are seriously injured and do not receive aid in a timely manner, they may die before first responders are even able to enter the building. However, if the students and staff around them can provide appropriate first aid, they may buy the injured time. The Tactical Emergency Casualty Care (TECC) framework outlines how best to do this.

TECC is evidence-based, best practice-driven medical guidance for providers at all levels, including lay persons. It seeks to improve survival from traumatic injuries sustained during intentional mass casualty events. Grounded in the military's lessons learned in combat, TECC translates best practices in battlefield trauma care into appropriate practices for civilian emergency medicine. TECC includes guidance for First Care Providers (i.e., lay persons who are uninjured and able to help during and immediately after an act of intentional violence). First Care Providers can include students, staff, educators, coaches, volunteers, and administrators. Empowering these individuals to act as caregivers not only saves lives, it can also decrease their sense of helplessness and encourage resilience. Some of the actions taught through TECC include hemorrhage control with direct pressure, tourniquets, and pressure bandages; simple airway management (positioning someone to breathe best); simple management of torso injuries; hypothermia prevention; efficient movement of an injured person; and psychological support/comfort to the wounded and other survivors.

There are three components to a successful First Care Provider program: policy, training, and equipment.

- *Policy:* Any school policies on intentional violence should ensure that both students and staff are empowered to act rapidly during a hostile event, not only to protect themselves but also to provide care to the injured. For adults (educators, staff, administration, custodial staff, volunteers, coaching staff, etc.), policies must provide a clear outline of what is expected of them, what is encouraged of them, and what the scope of their duty to act is in these events, including any limitations.
- *Training:* Consistent, realistic training is necessary for anyone expected to be a First Care Provider. Training should occur frequently enough that all First Care Providers receive the training within a school year. Training should include drills that account for real incident issues like sensory overload, large volumes of blood, and decision-making under stress. A good training curriculum provides not only instruction on medical interventions but also reviews actual equipment available in the facility and discusses specific school system policies. For this to be successful, it is imperative that school systems partner with their local first-arriving law enforcement, fire, and emergency medical services agencies.
- *Equipment:* While medical supplies and equipment (e.g., tourniquets, pressure dressings, hemostatic agents) may be cost prohibitive to some school systems, they are still strongly recommended. When purchasing supplies and equipment, schools should work with their jurisdiction's public safety medical director(s) to ensure they purchase supplies that are appropriate for the student population. The physical size differences between pre-K and secondary students means that different supplies and equipment may be appropriate for different schools. Guidance from a public safety medical director will prevent the purchase of equipment appropriate for military or law enforcement use that does not work on children.

A number of resources are available to help school districts or individual schools design TECC training programs. They include Tactical Emergency Casualty Care Guidelines for First Care Providers⁴⁹, You Are the Help Until Help Arrives⁵⁰, Introduction to Tactical Emergency Casualty Care⁵¹, and Stop the Bleed⁵². In August 2018, the Department of Homeland Security

(DHS) announced a grant opportunity to support the development of mass casualty event trauma training for high school students.⁵³

Exercises and workshops

Exercises and workshops help evaluate the success of training, maintain optimal levels of performance, and test and evaluate plans. A well-designed exercise provides a low-risk environment to test capabilities, familiarize personnel with roles and responsibilities, and foster meaningful interaction and communication across organizations. Workshops are a type of discussion-based exercise focused on increased participant interaction and focusing on achieving or building a product, such as a report or best practices documentation. Both formats can enhance the security of schools and safety of students across the nation by empowering states and school districts to put their emergency plans in action and identifying areas for improvement.

One of the most commonly used approaches to evaluate active shooter preparedness is through tabletop exercises (TTXs). TTXs are table-based activities typically held in an informal setting and presented by a facilitator. They do not involve hands-on practice or fieldwork, but rather are intended to generate discussion of various issues regarding a hypothetical, simulated emergency. TTXs can be used to enhance general awareness, validate plans and procedures, rehearse concepts, and/or assess the types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, protection from, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a defined incident. Delivered in a low-stress environment, the TTX offers participants the opportunity to explore different ideas in the context of a real-world scenario.

When designing TTXs, other exercises, or workshops to evaluate active shooter preparedness, designers should consider following the Homeland Security Exercise and Evaluation Program (HSEEP) approach. HSEEP provides a set of guiding principles for exercise programs, as well as a common approach to exercise program management, design and development, conduct, evaluation, and improvement planning. Principles include using capability-based and objective-driven exercises informed by risk, engaging the whole community, and designing a progressive program with an increasing level of complexity over time. These can help a school or school district develop an

Exercises and workshops help evaluate the success of training, maintain optimal levels of performance, and test and evaluate plans.

effective exercise program. HSEEP also calls for the documentation of strengths, areas for improvement, core capability performance, and corrective actions in an After-Action Report or Improvement Plan. Through improvement planning, organizations take the corrective actions needed to improve plans, build and sustain capabilities, and maintain readiness.⁵⁴

DHS offers a variety of exercises and workshops to assist schools, local law enforcement, and others prepare for active shooter situations. They include the following.

Active Shooter: What You Can Do: Developed by DHS, this independent study course seeks to guide the public on how to prepare for and respond to active shooter crisis situations. Upon completion of Active Shooter: What You Can Do, employees and managers will be able to:

- Describe the actions to take when confronted with an active shooter and to assist responding law enforcement officers;
- Recognize potential school or workplace violence indicators;
- Describe actions to take to prevent and prepare for potential active shooter incidents; and
- Describe how to manage the consequences of an active shooter incident.

The online training is available through the FEMA Emergency Management Institute.⁵⁵ Additional training for law enforcement is available through the Louisiana State University's National Center for Biomedical Research and Training's website.⁵⁶

Campus Resilience Program Tabletop Exercises:

In support of state and local efforts to build greater resilience capacity through exercises, the DHS Office of Academic Engagement's Campus Resilience Program, in partnership with the FEMA National Exercise Division, conducts a TTX series specifically for academia. The academia-focused TTX series is primarily focused on institutes of higher education. It consists of four offerings:

- the National Seminar and Tabletop Exercise—an annual two-day event that includes workshop sessions, resources, a full-scale TTX, and after-action review session;
- Regional Tabletop Exercises—one-day events hosted multiple times a year designed to address a regionally specific threat;
- the Leadership Tabletop Exercise—a half-day event hosted biannually for institution leadership designed to highlight its role in emergency management; and
- the suite of Exercise Starter Kits—instructions and a set of scalable tools for institutions to develop and run their own tailored TTX to match their most pressing needs while validating specific emergency plans, protocols, and procedures.⁵⁷

DHS Active Shooter Preparedness Workshop: These scenario-based workshops feature facilitated discussions to engage private sector professionals and law enforcement representatives from federal, state, and local agencies to learn how to prepare for, and respond to, an active shooter situation. Through the

Tabletop exercises (TTXs) can be used to enhance general awareness, validate plans and procedures, rehearse concepts, and/or assess the types of systems needed to guide the prevention of, protection from, mitigation of, response to, and recovery from a defined incident.

course of the exercises, participants evaluate current response concepts, plans, and capabilities for coordinated responses to active shooter incidents. The modules are structured following national preparedness guidance, using the national preparedness mission areas to organize the active shooter topics and the FEMA Comprehensive Preparedness guidance to cover the planning steps.⁵⁸

Recommendations

Based on the information contained in this chapter, the Federal Commission on School Safety offers the recommendations below.

■ FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

1. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in coordination with other federal agencies, should develop active shooter preparedness training guidelines for educators and administrators, including recommended minimum standards for teacher certification requirements.
2. In order to assist schools in deciding the optimal approach to preparing students for active shooter situations, federal agencies should work with school security stakeholders to identify and develop recommended, age-specific best practices or options for consideration for active shooter training and exercises for students spanning the K–12 spectrum.
3. DHS should develop options for expanding its offerings of TECC training, including train-the-trainer opportunities. Additionally, the federal government should review how grants are allocated to determine if there is a way to better support schools seeking to procure and preposition medical equipment needed to respond to a mass casualty event.

□ STATES & LOCAL COMMUNITIES

1. States should consider requiring or providing funding for all school districts and individual schools to develop and (on no less than an annual basis) provide training and exercises on comprehensive active shooter preparedness programs.
2. Teacher preparedness is critical to school security, especially in cases of an active shooter. As every state requires teachers to meet certain requirements for certification to teach in their state, it is recommended that states and school districts consider requiring basic school security and/or active shooter preparedness training as part of their state's teacher certification requirements.
3. All schools should conduct active shooter training and exercises for staff on a recurring basis as well as age-appropriate active shooter training for students. Exercises might include evaluations that assess the participant's ability to meet exercise objectives and capabilities, and document strengths, areas for improvement, core capability performance, and corrective actions in an After-Action Report or Improvement Plan. Following the exercise, organizations should develop a plan to implement the corrective actions identified during the exercise to improve plans, build and sustain capabilities, and maintain readiness.
4. Providing TECC training to school staff and maintaining appropriate, rapidly accessible medical equipment within schools is a proactive means of reducing loss of life in active shooter scenarios and other potential mass casualty incidents. School systems should provide TECC training to school staff or provide funding for school staff to complete TECC training. Schools should review existing medical equipment within the school and, to the extent possible under existing school budget conditions, maintain appropriate medical equipment consistent with the TECC training.
5. Effective communication systems and rapid dissemination of information can save lives during an incident or event. Schools should establish and maintain effective communications systems (e.g., one-way intercoms or two-way radios) to rapidly provide alerts, warnings, or other key information during an incident. Schools should test their communications equipment and methods during training and exercises. States and localities should also undertake efforts to ensure interoperability of local law enforcement and school communications equipment.

Chapter 19 Endnotes

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- 7 *Final report of the Sandy Hook Advisory Commission*. (March 6, 2015). At p. 76.
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- 18 Gallaudet University Department of Public Safety. (2018). *Annual security and fire safety report*, at p. 10. <https://www.gallaudet.edu/Documents/Public-Safety/ANNUAL%20SECURITY%20REPORT2018.pdf>.
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- 41 Department of Homeland Security. (2017). *Active shooter: How to respond*. <https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/active-shooter-how-to-respond-2017-508.pdf>.
- 42 Information on these and other FEMA and REMS courses can be found at <https://training.fema.gov/emi.aspx> and <https://rems.ed.gov/trainings/CoursesHome.aspx>, respectively.
- 43 Information on these and other FLETC courses can be found at <https://www.fletc.gov/training-catalog>.
- 44 Information on these and other FEMA courses can be found at <https://training.fema.gov/emi.aspx>.
- 45 Additional information on PASS and other COPS training programs can be found at <https://cops.usdoj.gov/training>.
- 46 Copies of this DVD are available to law enforcement and emergency management professionals by contacting the nearest FBI Field Office or calling 202-324-3000.
- 47 The reference guide is available at <https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/as-study-quick-reference-guide-updated1.pdf/view>.
- 48 Copies of the card are available to law enforcement and emergency management professionals by contacting the nearest FBI Field Office or calling 202-324-3000.
- 49 <http://www.c-tecc.org/guidelines/civilian-first-care-provider>.
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- 52 <https://www.dhs.gov/stopthebleed>.
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- 54 For more information on HSEEP, visit <https://preptoolkit.fema.gov/web/hseep-resources>.
- 55 <https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-907>.
- 56 <http://www.ncbrt.lsu.edu/Course/PER-275>.
- 57 Additional information on the DHS Campus Resilience Program TTXs is available at <https://www.dhs.gov/academicresilience>.
- 58 Additional information on the DHS Active Shooter Workshop Program is available at <https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-workshop-participant>.

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Conclusion

President Donald J. Trump announced the establishment of the Federal Commission on School Safety on March 12, 2018 in the aftermath of the shooting in Parkland, FL. The shooting outraged the nation. It reignited discussions about ways to prevent such tragedies, what we can do to better protect our students, and how to respond to and recover from these acts of violence.

This Commission has led and engaged in many of those discussions and has learned much from them.

While Washington has an important role to play, it can play that role more successfully by acknowledging a truth understood by people across the country: What works in Wyoming may not work in New York, and what is effective in an urban setting may not be effective in rural communities. One size does not fit all. Real improvement requires:

- a) the efforts and engagement of Americans and communities nationwide who have vitally important insights and experiences to share;
- b) recognition that best practices, lessons learned, and recommended approaches must be evaluated in light of, and adapted to, the particular needs and circumstances of each school and community; and
- c) the coordination of multiple efforts by schools, school districts, and communities as well as by policymakers at the local, state, and federal levels.

A Multifaceted Longstanding Problem

Engaging a wide range of Americans is essential given the complex and multifaceted nature of school violence. The Commission heard from individuals with diverse perspectives and expertise at Commission meetings, field visits, and listening sessions. Participants included students and their families, state and local policymakers, principals and teachers, and law enforcement and healthcare professionals. Each provided a unique perspective that adds to our understanding of the multiple issues involved and the role each of us must play.

The problem of school violence is complex and it has existed for decades. The Commission has drawn upon the work of previous commissions and reports on school violence at the federal, state, and local levels.

Preventing School Violence

Many individuals have a role to play in prevention efforts—parents, teachers, the media, health care professionals, entertainment industry leaders, and law enforcement. Such efforts are wide ranging. They include creating a positive school climate, combatting cyberbullying, ensuring rating systems allow parents to fully assess the appropriateness of entertainment their children are consuming, and establishing “No Notoriety” practices in the wake of shootings.

Local approaches and priorities are most important. Because teachers, in partnership with principals and other school leaders, know their schools, students, and classrooms best, they should be able to make decisions about school discipline without unnecessary worry about undue federal repercussions.

Similarly, school-based counselors and other health-care providers are best positioned to identify mental health needs and develop a course of action.

A proper understanding of how school shooters get their hands on firearms (i.e., in most cases from family and friends) must inform state legislative efforts. Individuals deemed, through appropriate processes, to pose a threat to themselves or others can be denied the ability to possess or purchase firearms through “extreme risk protection orders.” They can also be reported through the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s tip line.

Protecting and Mitigating

Training personnel, hardening schools, and engaging the community are all important tools to protect against school violence and to mitigate its effects. Training applies to teachers, school staff, school resource officers (SROs), and state, local, and tribal law enforcement. Increasing numbers of these person-

nel could come from the ranks of the country’s military veterans and retired law enforcement officers, both for security and teaching roles.

All schools will benefit from higher levels of engagement with the communities in which they are located. Greater sharing of information and reporting of suspicious behavior is essential. However, it must be done in a manner that abides by statutory privacy protections.

Responding and Recovering

The unique characteristics of each school (such as campus layout, building design, and age of students) present complex challenges to active shooter planning. Approaches to improve emergency response must be specific to each school.

There is no doubt planning and training helps prepare police officers and first responders to deal with active shooters. However, because active shooter incidents are often over before law enforcement arrives on the scene, onsite personnel must be prepared to deal with an active shooter attack in the absence of trained crisis response officers.

An Ongoing Challenge

The Parkland, FL, shooting was not the first such tragedy in this country and is not likely to be the last without changes at the federal, state, and local levels. The job of this Commission has been to identify best practices and lessons learned that will help schools better prepare for the future.

Each section of the Report concludes with meaningful and actionable recommendations—for the federal government, states, tribes, and local authorities, and for school districts and schools. However, they are just that—recommendations to be considered and adopted as appropriate to each jurisdiction. School staff and local officials are best placed to determine which recommendations to implement in their communities.

From start to finish, this Commission has recognized that the people who best understand the needs of their schools and communities are the families whose children attend those schools and live in those communities. Our job has been to listen to them—as well as to subject matter experts, practitioners, and professionals—and then to share their experiences and knowledge about what has succeeded and what has not.

Going Forward

The important job of finding ways to protect our students and our schools goes on. Americans will continue to seek answers and solutions to the problem of school violence, and those in the federal government will continue to work with state and local governments to protect our students.

This Commission extends its deep gratitude to everyone who has contributed to this work and to those who will continue to engage in this area. The four departments will continue to disseminate federal resources on school safety and provide periodic updates.

Only by working together at all levels and in communities nationwide, can we truly make a difference. For the sake of America’s schools and America’s students, may that work continue.

Appendix A: Federal Resources for School Safety

The Commissioners identified select resources published by their agencies that highlight best practices that may be of immediate use to stakeholders at the state and local levels. Federal agencies may have additional resources that could be leveraged to support school safety efforts, and interested parties can contact relevant program offices to inquire further about such options.

Prevent

Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 2nd Edition, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The guide addresses both prevention and intervention from a systemic view, clarifying the role of the school, the community, families, law enforcement, and the justice system and how these groups can work together effectively to prevent and respond to school violence. (<http://www.theiacp.org/portals/0/pdfs/schoolviolence2.pdf>)

Police-Mental Health Collaboration Toolkit, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This toolkit provides resources for law enforcement agencies to partner with mental health providers to effectively respond to calls for service, improve outcomes for people with mental illness, and advance the safety of all. (<https://pmhctoolkit.bja.gov>)

States' Roles in Keeping Schools Safe: Opportunities and Challenges for State School Safety Centers and Other Actors, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This report documents the conclusions of a 2016 stakeholder meeting that assembled representatives from 20 states to discuss state school safety issues. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250608.pdf>)

Preventing School Shootings: A Summary of a U.S. Secret Service Safe School Initiative Report, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This report summarizes a U.S. Secret Service Report that examined the prevention of targeted violence in schools. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000248c.pdf>)

Preventing School Violence: Plenary Papers of the 1999 Conference on Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This document puts forward the main points of a research forum on preventing school violence, co-sponsored by a variety of OJP offices. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/180972.pdf>)

School-Based Bullying Prevention, Model Programs Guide, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This is a school-based bullying prevention research literature review (<https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/Bullying.pdf>) and program implementation guide (<https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg-iguides/topics/bullying/index.html>).

School Violence Prevention Program (SVPP), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program makes competitive awards to states, county and local districts to support coordination with law enforcement on training to prevent student violence; fund deterrent hardware; and implement technology for expedited emergency notification. (<https://cops.usdoj.gov/svpp>)

Addressing the Risk of Violent Behavior in Youth, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This PowerPoint presentation will help teachers and school personnel identify behaviors and other signs that could result in youth violence. The material is intended as a general guide regarding what is known about risk and protective factors and the warning signs that are associated with a risk of violent behavior. The purpose is to inform and help classroom teachers, counselors, and other staff understand the basic facts about youth violence. This useful tool also addresses the protective factors that reduce the risk of violent behavior. (<https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/addressing-risk-violent-behavior-youth-know-signs-youth-violence-and-how-identify-and-reduce-risk>)

SAMHSA grants, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- Below are some examples of the school and/or child/adolescent/youth focused grants that were announced in fiscal year 2018.
 - [Project AWARE \(Advancing Wellness and Resiliency in Education\)](#)
 - [Mental Health Awareness Training \(MHAT\) Grants](#)
 - [Garrett Lee Smith Campus Suicide Prevention Grants](#)
 - [Healthy Transitions: Improving Life Trajectories for Youth and Young Adults with Serious Mental Disorders Program](#)
 - [Community Programs for Outreach and Intervention with Youth and Young Adults at Clinical High Risk for Psychosis](#)
 - [Infant and Early Childhood Mental Health Grant Program](#)
 - [Drug-Free Communities \(DFC\) Support Program](#)

School Climate

Student Support and Academic Enrichment, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, U.S. Department of Education.

- Title IV, Part A of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act is the Student Support and Academic Enrichment (SSAE) program. The SSAE program is intended to improve students' academic achievement by increasing the capacity of states, school districts, and local communities to provide all students with access to a well-rounded education; improve school conditions for student learning; and improve the use of technology to enhance academic achievement and digital literacy of all students. (<https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/ESSA-TitleIVPartA-SSAE>)
- More information about how states subgrant these funds to districts is included in the “Non-Regulatory Guidance Student Support and Academic Enrichment Grants.” (<https://www2.ed.gov/policy/elsec/leg/essa/essassaegrantguid10212016.pdf>)

School Climate Improvement Resource Package, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, U.S. Department of Education and National Center on Safe Supportive Learning Environments (2016).

- This resource package contains a set of guides and reference manuals to improve school climate. Resources include information about planning for improvements, collecting and analyzing data, identifying and implementing interventions, and monitoring and evaluating such efforts. Guides contain action steps for district and school administrators, teachers and school staff, students, and community partners. (<https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/scirp/about>)

School Climate Transformation Grants, U.S. Department of Education.

- The U.S. Department of Education provides funding to school districts and states to support schools implementing an evidence-based multi-tiered behavioral framework (such as positive behavior and intervention supports) for improving behavioral outcomes and learning conditions for all students. (<https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schoolclimatelea/index.html>)

School Climate Surveys, U.S. Department of Education.

- The U.S. Department of Education developed the high-quality, customizable ED School Climate Surveys (EDSCLS) and associated web-based platform. The EDSCLS allows states, local districts, and schools to collect and act on reliable, nationally-validated school climate data in real-time. (<https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/edscls>)

Positive Behavioral Interventions & Supports: Technical Assistance Center, U.S. Department of Education.

- The Technical Assistance Center on PBIS helps schools, districts, and states build systems capacity for implementing a multi-tiered approach to social, emotional and behavioral support that can improve school climate, safety, and academic outcomes for all students, including students with disabilities and students from under-represented groups. (<https://www.pbis.org/>)

Center to Improve Social and Emotional Learning and School Safety, U.S. Department of Education.

- The Center to Improve Social and Emotional Learning and School Safety provides technical assistance to states and districts in the implementation of evidence-based programs and practices in social and emotional learning. (<https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2018/05/16/2018-10474/applications-for-new-award-center-to-improve-social-and-emotional-learning-and-school>).

National Center on Safe and Supportive Learning Environments, U.S. Department of Education.

- The National Center on Safe Supportive Learning Environments offers information and technical assistance to states, districts, schools, institutions of higher learning, and communities focused on improving student supports and academic enrichment. The center also supports state and local efforts to implement the Title IV-A SSAE program previously described, which can help with the following: 1) provide all students with access to a well-rounded education, 2) improve school conditions for student learning, including school climate and safety, and 3) enhance the use of technology so all students have the opportunity to realize academic success and digital literacy in safe and supportive learning environments. (<https://safesupportivelearning.ed.gov/>)

Project Prevent, U.S. Department of Education.

- This program provides funding to school districts to increase their capacity to identify, assess, and serve students exposed to pervasive violence, helping to ensure that affected students are offered mental health services for trauma or anxiety; support conflict resolution programs; and implement other school-based violence prevention strategies. (<https://www2.ed.gov/programs/projectprevent/index.html>)

School Connectedness: Strategies for Increasing Protective Factors Among Youth, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- School connectedness—the belief held by students that adults and peers in the school care about their learning as well as about them as individuals—is an important protective factor. This webpage contains fact sheets and training materials on strategies for increasing school connectedness for school administrators, teachers, and families. (https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/protective/school_connectedness.htm)

Parent Engagement in Schools, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- *Parent engagement in schools* is defined as parents and school staff working together to support and improve the learning, development, and health of children and adolescents. Parent engagement in schools is a shared responsibility in which schools and other community agencies and organizations are committed to reaching out to engage parents in meaningful ways, and parents are committed to actively supporting their children's and adolescents' learning and development. Engaging parents in their children's school life is a promising protective factor. This webpage includes strategies and fact sheets for increasing parent engagement in schools. (https://www.cdc.gov/healthyyouth/protective/parent_engagement.htm)

Creating and Sustaining a Positive and Communal School Climate: Contemporary Research, Present Obstacles, and Future Directions, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This report puts forward four recommendations for creating and sustaining a positive and communal school environment. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250209.pdf>)

Development of a Standard Model for School Climate and Safety Assessment, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The purpose of this project was to develop a standard model for the assessment of school climate and safety guided by authoritative school climate theory. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/251102.pdf>)

Bullying and Cyberbullying

Readiness and Emergency Management for School (REMS) Technical Assistance Center Fact Sheets. Office of Safe and Healthy Students, U.S. Department of Education, and Readiness and Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center (2017).

- The Prevention for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet describes “prevention” and the role it plays in school preparedness including examples of prevention activities, steps for integrating prevention into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. (https://rem.ed.gov/Docs/Prevention_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf)

- The Cyber Safety Considerations for K–12 Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet includes information on the most common online threats facing students, including cyberbullying. The fact sheet describes how school and school district administrators can prepare and respond to online threats. (https://rems.ed.gov/docs/Cyber_Safety_K-12_Fact_Sheet_508C.PDF)

Electronic Media and Youth Violence: A CDC Issue Brief for Educators and Caregivers, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This brief focuses on the phenomena of electronic aggression, which is any kind of aggression perpetrated through technology—any type of harassment or bullying (teasing, telling lies, making fun of someone, making rude or mean comments, spreading rumors, or making threatening or aggressive comments) that occurs through email, a chat room, instant messaging, a website (including blogs), or text messaging. (<https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/ea-brief-a.pdf>)

KnowBullying app, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This SAMHSA-developed app helps parents and educators start conversations with children; provides tips and strategies for children, youth, and teens; and teaches the warning signs of bullying or being bullied. (<https://store.samhsa.gov/apps/knowbullying/>)

Prevent Bullying, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. This website provides general information on bullying, such as definitions of bullying and tools to prevent bullying in schools. (<http://www.cdc.gov/features/prevent-bullying/>)

Stopbullying.gov, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This website contains resources for youth, parents, schools, and others to better understand bullying and cyberbullying, including the warning signs, those particularly at risk, and prevention tips. (<https://www.stopbullying.gov/>)
- Take Action Today: How Families and Students Can Take the Lead in Creating Safer School Environments (<https://www.stopbullying.gov/blog/2014/09/16/take-action-today-how-families-and-students-can-take-lead-creating-safer-school.html>)

Bullying Prevention for Parents, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This podcast discusses the crucial role parents play in bullying prevention. (<https://tools.cdc.gov/medialibrary/index.aspx#/media/id/304116>)

MedlinePlus, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This website provides resources that inform users of the warning signs of bullying, prevention and risk factors, and how to help children deal with bullying. (<https://medlineplus.gov/bullying.html>)

Impact of Cyberbullying: Addressing the Needs of Children and Youth, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This YouTube video reviews ways to help parents, caregivers, and educators better understand the issue of cyberbullying and the mental health needs of both the young person being bullied, and the young person initiating the bullying. (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IUjxqh0ZC0I&t=3s>)

Mental Health

MentalHealth.gov resources for educators, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This site provides general information for educators regarding warning signs for mental health issues, how to respond to mental health issues in schools, and how to access crisis support and other mental health services. (<https://www.mentalhealth.gov/talk/educators>)

Addressing Emotional and Behavioral Issues in K–5 Classrooms, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This YouTube video addresses the topic of identifying and managing behavioral health concerns in elementary school classrooms. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uMHn_E5cR4)

Addressing Mental Health Concerns in College, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This YouTube video addresses the topic of mental and substance use disorders among college students. (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PfIFLG5yY38>)

Supporting Young Adults with Mental Health Difficulties in Post-Secondary Education, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This YouTube video focuses on supporting young people with mental health difficulties—including co-occurring substance abuse—who are engaged in post-secondary education. Presenters provide an overview of trends in college attendance of young adults with mental health difficulties and the challenges of living away from home while working toward recovery. (https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=3&v=zMmS4PU1eNI)

Finding Help, Finding Hope: What to Do If You Think Your Child May Have a Mental Health Problem, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This YouTube video focuses on how parents and caregivers can actively engage in their child’s behavioral health care, as well as identify available resources that can help the entire family thrive. (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PRlxmmdsH8Y&feature=youtu.be>)

Mental Health Awareness Training Grants, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- These grants train individuals to recognize the signs and symptoms of mental disorders, particularly serious mental illness; establish links with school-and/or community-based mental-health agencies for referrals; train emergency services personnel and others to identify people with a mental disorder; employ crisis de-escalation techniques; and educate individuals about resources available in the community for individuals with a mental disorder. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-18-009>)

School-based health centers, Health Resources and Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- These centers are the center of health in the schools in which they are based. Services include primary medical care, mental/behavioral health care, dental/oral health care, health education, substance abuse counseling, case management, and nutrition information. Approximately 20 percent of these centers receive funding through the Health Resources and Services Administration’s Health Center Program. (<https://www.hrsa.gov/our-stories/school-health-centers/index.html>)

Project LAUNCH Grant Program (birth–eight years), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The purpose of Project LAUNCH (Linking Actions for Unmet Needs in Children’s Health) is to promote the wellness of young children by addressing the physical, social, emotional, cognitive, and behavioral aspects of their development (<https://healthysafekids.org/grantee/project-launch>)

Infant and Early Childhood Mental Health Grant Program (birth–12 years), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This program addresses children who are at risk for, show early signs of, or have been diagnosed with a mental illness including a serious emotional disturbance. The purpose of this program is to improve outcomes for these children by developing, maintaining, or enhancing infant and early childhood mental health promotion, intervention, and treatment services. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-18-018>)

The Center of Excellence for Infant and Early Childhood Mental Health Consultation (IECMHC), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The Center of Excellence for IECMHC helps communities support the success of the next generation by increasing access to evidence-based IECMHC—an approach that pairs mental health professionals with people who work with young children and their families. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/iecmhc>)

System of Care (SOC) Expansion and Sustainability Cooperative Agreements (birth–21 years), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The SOC grants provide services to improve behavioral health outcomes for children and youth with serious emotional disturbances and their families. This program creates sustainable infrastructure and services that are required as part of the Children’s Mental Health Initiative. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-16-009>)

Project Advancing Wellness and Resilience Education (AWARE) Grant Program, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This program promotes youth mental health awareness among schools and communities and improves connections to services for school-aged youth. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/project-aware-grant-information>)

Safe Schools/Healthy Students (SS/HS) Grant Program, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This program is a collaborative effort and comprehensive model to promote mental health among students and create safe and secure schools. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/safe-schools-healthy-students>)

Healthy Transitions Grant Program, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The *Now Is the Time* Healthy Transitions grant program improves access to treatment and support services for 16- to 25-year-olds who have, or are at risk of developing, a serious mental health condition. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/nitt-ta/healthy-transitions-grant-information>)

Clinical High Risk for Psychosis Grant Program, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The purpose of this program is to identify youth and young adults, not more than 25 years old, at clinical high-risk for psychosis and provide evidence-based interventions to prevent the onset of psychosis or lessen the severity of psychotic disorder. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/grants/grant-announcements/sm-18-012>)

The Role of Adverse Childhood Experiences in Substance Abuse and Related Behavioral Health Problems, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This overview of the Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACEs) Study includes findings on the role of ACEs in substance use and related behavioral health problems. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/aces-substance-abuse-behavioral-health>)

A Critical Look at Intergenerational Trauma and Substance Misuse: Implications for Prevention, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This webinar offers an introduction to intergenerational trauma and its link to substance misuse and explores ways for prevention practitioners to support and implement trauma-informed prevention approaches. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/critical-look-intergenerational-trauma-substance-misuse-implications>)

Trauma & Adverse Childhood Experiences: Implications for Preventing Substance Misuse, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This webinar outlines SAMHSA's comprehensive approach to trauma-informed care, highlighting the mechanisms by which trauma and ACEs influence substance misuse and related behavioral health problems. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/trauma-adverse-childhood-experiences-implications-preventing-substance>)

Improving the Behavioral Health of Boys and Young Men of Color: Addressing Data Challenges, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This webinar discusses the prevalence of health disparities among boys and young men of color and how programs can strengthen their protective factors. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/improving-behavioral-health-boys-color-data>)

Youth.gov, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This program directory features evidence-based programs whose purpose is to prevent and/or reduce delinquency or other problem behaviors in young people. Youth.gov is composed of representatives from twenty federal agencies, including HHS. (<https://youth.gov/>)

Increasing Effectiveness of Providers for Child Victims of Violence, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This training session was designed for mental health professionals. (<https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspInEffectProv.cfm>)

Violence Prevention

School Violence: Prevention Tools and Resources, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This page provides various tools developed by CDC to help us understand and effectively prevent school violence, including the factors that increase or decrease the likelihood of school violence and what prevention strategies work. (<https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/tools.html>)

Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) School Assessment (2017), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This school assessment can be used to rate the physical attributes of a school and provide specific indicators where protective measures are lacking. (<https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/46282>)

A Comprehensive Technical Package for the Prevention of Youth Violence and Associated Risk Behaviors;

Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This technical package represents a select group of strategies based on the best available evidence to help communities and states sharpen their focus on prevention activities with the greatest potential to prevent youth violence and its consequences. These strategies include promoting family environments that support healthy development; providing quality education early in life; strengthening youth's skills; connecting youth to caring adults and activities; creating protective community environments; and intervening to lessen harms and prevent future risk. The strategies represented in this package include those with a focus on preventing youth violence from happening in the first place as well as approaches to reduce the immediate and long-term harms of youth violence in order to prevent future violence. (<https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/pdf/yv-technicalpackage.pdf>)

Youth Violence: Using Environmental Design to Prevent School Violence (2016), Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This website provides an overview of how CPTED can be incorporated at schools to help manage access to all school areas and minimize opportunities for out-of-sight activities. (<https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/cpted.html>)

National Summits on Preventing Multiple Casualty Violence Reports, Federal Law Enforcement Training Centers (FLETC), U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- These reports summarize the outcomes of summits hosted by FLETC that brought together experts from a variety of disciplines, including law enforcement, academic education, social sciences, private security, and emergency management to develop cross-cutting prevention strategies and a framework for a prevention toolkit adaptable to individual communities. (<https://www.fletc.gov/summits-preventing-multiple-casualty-violence>)

Preventing Violent Extremism in Schools, Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This booklet was designed to educate school personnel about at-risk behaviors and activities that assist students with reducing social/psychological commitment to violence as a method of resolving a grievance. (<https://info.publicintelligence.net/FBI-PreventingExtremismSchools.pdf>)

Violence Among Middle School and High School Students: Analysis and Implications for Prevention, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This "Research in Brief" summarizes conclusions drawn from in-depth interviews with students at risk of violence in schools. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/166363.pdf>)

Violence Prevention in Schools: Enhancement Through Law Enforcement Partnerships, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice (March 2017).

- This report includes practical advice gathered from experienced school resource officers (SROs) on how law enforcement, schools, and school districts can work together to keep schools safe. The report includes best practices on choosing an SRO, necessary training and resources, improving school climate, and developing threat assessment teams. (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/violence-prevention-in-schools-march-2017.pdf/view>)

Face Recognition Policy Development Template for Use in Criminal Intelligence and Investigative Activities, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Facial Recognition Template was developed by state, local, and federal law enforcement, privacy, and criminal justice partners to provide law enforcement, fusion centers, and other public safety agencies with a framework for developing face recognition policies that comply with applicable laws, reduce privacy risks, implement minimum required training for authorized users and examiners, and establish entity accountability and oversight. (<https://www.it.ojp.gov/GIST/1204/Face-Recognition-Policy-Development-Template-For-Use-In-Criminal-Intelligence-and-Investigative-Activities>)

Threat Assessments

Enhancing School Safety Using a Threat Assessment Model: An Operational Guide for Preventing Targeted School Violence (2018), U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- This guide, produced by the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center, provides actionable steps that schools can take to develop comprehensive targeted violence prevention plans. (https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/USSS_NTAC_Enhancing_School_Safety_Guide_7.11.18.pdf)

REMS Technical Assistance Center School Behavioral Threat Assessments: An Introduction, U.S. Department of Education.

- The REMS Technical Assistance Center offers a one-day Train-the-Educator training designed to familiarize schools and school districts with school behavioral threat assessments in preventing and reducing targeted violence at K–12 schools. Topics covered include how a threat assessment team can be integrated into the broader framework of school safety, security, emergency management, and preparedness put forth in the Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans (School Guide) referenced above. (https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Threat_Assessment_Website_Marketing_Flyer_508C.pdf)

The School Shooter: A Threat Assessment Perspective, Behavioral Analysis Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- In response to the 1999 attack at Columbine High School, the FBI’s Behavioral Analysis Unit (BAU) convened a symposium of educational, law enforcement, and mental health experts. This unprecedented effort resulted in the production of an operational manual to assist in the prevention of school shootings. The manual identified best practices for K–12 schools to detect and mitigate targeted violence and remains a foundational guide for all community safety stakeholders. (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications-school-shooter-school-shooter/view>)

Threat Assessment in Schools: A Guide to Managing Threatening Situations and to Creating Safe School Climates, U.S. Secret Service and U.S. Department of Education.

- This report sets forth a process for identifying, assessing, and managing students who may pose a threat of targeted violence in schools. (<https://rems.ed.gov/docs/ThreatAssessmentinSchools.pdf>)

Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education, U.S. Secret Service, U. S. Department of Education, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (April 2010).

- This report includes findings from a review of 272 incidents of violence that affected institutions of higher education (IHEs) between 1900 and 2008. The report’s goal is to help threat assessment and campus safety professionals charged with identifying, assessing, and managing the risk of violence at IHEs. (https://rems.ed.gov/docs/CampusAttacks_201004.pdf)

If You See Something, Say Something®, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- “If You See Something, Say Something®” is a national campaign that raises public awareness of the indicators of terrorism and terrorism-related crime, as well as the importance of reporting suspicious activity to state and local law enforcement. This campaign has partnered with a number of schools to raise student and teacher awareness and encourage reporting of suspicious activity. (<https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something>)

Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting (SAR) Initiative (NSI) is a joint collaborative effort by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and state, local, tribal, and territorial

law enforcement partners. This initiative provides law enforcement with another tool to help prevent terrorism and other related criminal activity by establishing a national capacity for gathering, documenting, processing, analyzing, and sharing SAR information. (<https://nsi.ncirc.gov>)

Making Prevention a Reality: Identifying, Assessing, and Managing the Threat of Targeted Attacks, Behavioral Analysis Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Recognizing the importance of threat assessment and threat management in the mitigation of school and active shooters, the BAU convened a panel in 2015 of domestic and international experts in targeted violence for the purpose of creating an operational guide. In 2017, the BAU released this instructional handbook for schools, colleges, businesses, and houses of worship on initiating threat assessment teams, managing persons of concern, and implementing strategic threat management plans for potentially violent individuals. (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/making-prevention-a-reality.pdf/view>)

Early Warning, Timely Response: A Guide to Safe Schools, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This guide presents a brief summary of the research on violence prevention and intervention and crisis response in schools. It tells school communities what to look for (the early warning signs that relate to violence and other troubling behaviors) and what to do (the action steps that school communities can take to prevent violence and other troubling behaviors, to intervene and get help for troubled children, and to respond to school violence when it occurs). (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/172854.pdf>)

Real-Time and Open Source Analysis (ROSA) Resource Guide, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The resource guide was developed to assist law enforcement agencies and fusion centers in understanding the lawful and appropriate use of open source information, focusing on social media. It is designed to help law enforcement agencies and analytic personnel understand the potential tools and resources available to support law enforcement operational and analytic activities. (<https://www.it.ojp.gov/GIST/1200/Real-Time-and-Open-Source-Analysis--ROSA--Resource-Guide>)

STOP School Violence Threat Assessment and Technology Reporting Program, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program provides funding for the development and operation of school threat assessments and crisis intervention teams, and the development of technology for local or regional anonymous reporting systems. (<https://www.bja.gov/Programs/STOP-School-Violence-Act.html>)

Resource Libraries and Data Sources

What Works Clearinghouse, Institute of Education Sciences, U.S. Department of Education.

- This clearinghouse reviews existing research on programs, products, practices, and policies in education. Administrators and teachers may find the clearinghouse especially helpful in choosing evidence-based programs, which may include programs such as character education. (<https://ies.ed.gov/ncee/wwc/>)

Averted School Violence Database, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This Averted School Violence Near Miss reporting system, allows law enforcement officers, school personnel, and mental health professionals to share data and information on “close calls” in order to improve school safety and prevent tragedies. (www.asvnearmiss.org)

School-Associated Violent Death Study, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- SAVD presents the most recent data available on school-associated violent deaths; common features of these events; and potential risk factors for perpetration and victimization. Data obtained from this study play an important role in monitoring and assessing national trends in school-associated violent deaths, and help to inform efforts to prevent fatal school violence. The system, which was developed in partnership with the Departments of Education and Justice, monitors school-associated violent deaths at the national level. Information is collected each year from media databases, police, and school officials. (<https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/youthviolence/schoolviolence/savd.html>)

CrimeSolutions.gov, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- CrimeSolutions.gov is a web-based clearinghouse of evaluated programs and practices, including programs related to school safety. In this video interview, Dr. Stephanie Gerstenblith discusses how to use CrimeSolutions.gov to find evidence-based programs and practices to improve school safety. (www.crimesolutions.gov)

National Registry of Evidence-based Programs and Practices (NREPP), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This registry contains information about evidence-based mental health and substance use interventions, including school-based interventions. Administrators and teachers may find the registry especially helpful in choosing evidence-based prevention programs. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/nrepp>)

Campus Resilience Program Resource Library, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- The Campus Resilience Program Resource Library is designed to provide members of the academic community with access to resources, strategies, guidelines, and templates to address a variety of different vulnerabilities and risks. This library organizes resources according to specific threats/hazards, and has a section dedicated to resources to support schools and other workplaces in preparing for and responding to violent incidents. (<https://www.dhs.gov/campus-resilience-program-resource-library>)

National Center for Campus Public Safety (NCCPS), Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The NCCPS supports campus officials in creating safer and stronger campus communities by serving as a one-stop clearinghouse for the many resources available from both the federal government and non-governmental sources. The NCCPS has partnered with an array of public safety organizations, colleges and universities, and subject matter experts to address critical issues in campus safety. (<https://www.nccpsafety.org/>)
 - The National Center Library of Resources (<https://www.nccpsafety.org/resources/library>)
 - Active Threat Response Training Resources (http://nccpsafety.org/assets/files/library/Active_Threat_Response Trainings_Final.pdf)
 - Emerging Issues Forums (<https://www.nccpsafety.org/our-work/emerging-issues-forums/>)

K–12 School Shooting Database, Naval Postgraduate School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security (CHDS).

- The research project is a widely inclusive K–12 school shooting database that documents each and every instance a gun is brandished, is fired, or a bullet hits school property for any reason, regardless of the number of victims, time, day of the week, or reason (e.g., planned attack, accidental, domestic violence, gang-related). The database is available for download as a csv file from the CHDS website. (<https://www.chds.us/ssdb/>)

Indicators of School Crime and Safety Annual Report, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice and National Center for Education Statistics, U.S. Department of Education.

- This report presents statistical data on crime and safety at school from the perspectives of students, teachers, and principals. The report contains 23 indicators of crime and safety at school on topics including victimization at school, teacher injury, bullying and cyber-bullying, school conditions, fights, weapons, availability and student use of drugs and alcohol, student perceptions of personal safety at school, and crime at postsecondary institutions. Data sources include the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS), the School Crime Supplement to the NCVS, the Youth Risk Behavior Survey, the School Survey on Crime and Safety, and the School and Staffing Survey. (<https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/iscs16.pdf>)

Summary of School Safety Statistics, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This document provides research and data to discuss common myths around school safety. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/250610.pdf>)

School Safety: By the Numbers, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This document summarizes the findings of the NIJ report *Summary of School Safety Statistics*. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251173.pdf>)

High School Youths, Weapons, and Violence: A National Survey, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This “Research in Brief” discusses the findings of an NIJ-funded survey on the firearms experience of the average youth. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/172857.pdf>)

A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the U.S. Between 2000 and 2013, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The report examines the pre-attack behavior of shooters in 160 active shooter incidents in an effort to pinpoint specific behaviors that might be useful in identifying, assessing, and managing those who might be on the pathway to such violence. (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view>)

Protect and Mitigate

Personnel and Training

Be Safe and Sound in School (B3S), Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- In collaboration with the National Crime Prevention Council, B3S is a program that seeks to raise awareness of school safety and security issues and provide the tools and resources needed to effectively address them. (<https://www.ncpc.org/programs/be-safe-and-sound-in-school/>)

Serving Safely, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program, launched in May 2018, is a national initiative designed to improve interactions between police and persons affected by mental illnesses and developmental disabilities. The initiative includes leaders in policing, mental illness, intellectual/developmental disability, crisis intervention, peer advocacy, emergency medicine, technology development, and prosecution, who together serve as a network of training and technical assistance providers. (<https://www.vera.org/projects/serving-safely>)

School Transportation Security Programs, Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- TSA offers a number of services to school districts and transportation providers on school bus security including guidelines, assessments, and exercise support. (<https://www.tsa.gov/for-industry/surface-transportation>)

T3—Tact, Tactics, and Trust™ Training and Technical Assistance Program, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program provides law enforcement officers with evidence-based knowledge, tools, and skills to better defuse and resolve tense situations. This program assists in protecting law enforcement officers, enhancing public safety, and improving outcomes within the communities they serve. Since July 2017, more than 1500 law enforcement officers have been trained. (www.polis-solutions.net)

Law Enforcement and Community: Crisis Intervention Training Model Program, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Crisis Intervention Training Model Program provides law enforcement and their communities with targeted training and technical assistance to implement BJA's Crisis Intervention Team (CIT) model. (<https://www.prainc.com/lec-cit-2018/>)

Collaborative Reform Initiative for Technical Assistance (CRITA), Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This initiative delivers targeted technical assistance directly to local law enforcement based on their identified needs and requests, including those around school safety and security issues. (<https://cops.usdoj.gov/collaborative-reform>)

COPS Hiring Program, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program makes competitive awards open to all state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies to hire/rehire officers to address specific focus area using community policing approaches, including funding for school resource officers. (<https://cops.usdoj.gov/chp>)

School Resource Officer Training, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program provides funding for the Basic School Resource Officer Course, developed by the National Association of School Resource Officers. This is a 40-hour course designed for law enforcement officers and school safety professionals working in an educational environment. The course provides tools for officers on how to effectively carry out law enforcement and safety duties while building positive relationships with both students and staff in a school context. (https://cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/2017AwardDocs/chp/SRO_Mandatory_Training_Fact_Sheet.pdf)

DHS Campus Resilience Program Tabletop Exercise Series and K–12 Active Shooter Exercise Starter Kits,

Office of Academic Engagement, U.S. Department of Homeland Security. (<https://www.dhs.gov/academicresilience>)

- TTX Series: Includes a collection of tailored events, each with unique objectives and outcomes, designed for the academic community. Each event in the series challenges participants with multifaceted threat based scenarios that test and strengthen their institution’s preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities.
- K–12 Active Shooter Exercise Starter Kits: A set of tools and resources for the academic community to self-conduct a tabletop exercise. The kits reinforce a school’s specific emergency plans, protocols, and procedures, while also testing and strengthening its preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities when responding to an active shooter incident.

Enhanced Dynamic Geo-Social Environment (EDGE), Science & Technology Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- EDGE is a virtual training platform that allows teachers, school staff, law enforcement officers, and others tasked with school security to create and practice response plans for a wide range of critical incidents. EDGE allows first responders and educators to role-play complex scenarios in a virtual environment, improving and reinforcing coordination, communication, and critical decision-making skills. (<https://www.cesiedgetraining.com/>)

Justice Assistance Grant, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This is a formula-based grant program that provides states, tribes, and local governments with critical funding to support a range of program areas. The latter include law enforcement, prosecution and courts, crime prevention and education, corrections and community corrections, drug treatment and enforcement, planning, evaluation and technology improvement, crime victim and witness initiatives, mental health programs, and related law enforcement and corrections programs. Under this grant program, emergency and crisis training for local law enforcement can be an allowable cost. Each year, 56 states and territories and more than 900 local and tribal jurisdictions receive grants. (<https://www.bja.gov/jag/>)

National Training and Technical Assistance Center (NTTAC), Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- NTTAC offers online and no-cost training and technical assistance on a wide variety of criminal justice topics, including emergency and crisis training for local law enforcement. (www.bjatrain.org)

Identifying an Armed Person Training, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This training, which is provided as part of the Project Safe Neighborhoods training and technical assistance support, covers guidance for handling felonious possession and use of firearm cases. It includes techniques for identifying/recognizing vehicles with hidden compartments and advanced techniques to identify/recognize armed suspects and their characteristics. (<http://www.theiacp.org/psnInitiative>)

STOP School Violence Prevention and Mental Health Training Program, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program provides funding directly to state, local, and tribal jurisdictions for training school personnel and educating students to prevent student violence as well as for training school officials in responding to related mental health crises. Such training, developed and delivered at the local level, seeks to meet the jurisdictions’ localized needs regarding the prevention of school violence and responses to related mental health crises. (<https://www.bja.gov/Programs/STOP-School-Violence-Act.html>)

VALOR Officer Safety and Wellness Training and Technical Assistance Program, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The VALOR program delivers current, dynamic classroom and web-based trainings focused on recognizing indicators of dangerous situations. It involves applying a cognitive approach towards reinforcing effective techniques for managing difficult encounters, implementing casualty care and rescue tactics, and improving wellness and resilience. Since 2010, the VALOR Program has trained more than 41,400 law enforcement officers. (www.valorforblue.org)

Building Security and Emergency Planning

K-12 School Security Guide (2nd Edition) and School Security Survey, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- The documents provide preventive and protective measures to address the threat of gun violence in schools. The Guide is delivered in two parts: the first portion is a PDF with general security best practices and considerations in narrative format; while the second portion is a Microsoft Excel-based security survey. Together, these documents outline action-oriented security practices and options for consideration based on the results of the individual school's responses to the survey. While the primary audience for the Guide is the K-12 community, institutions of higher education or pre-K schools may also benefit from the information presented. (<https://www.dhs.gov/publication/k-12-school-security-guide>)

DHS Protective Security Advisors, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) are security subject matter experts who engage with state, local, tribal, and territorial government mission partners and members of the private sector stakeholder community to protect regional, state, and local infrastructure. Since 2013, PSAs have engaged with more than 1,100 schools, providing best practices, conducting assessments, and facilitating exercises, among other things. (<https://www.dhs.gov/protective-security-advisors>).

REMS Fact Sheets, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, U.S. Department of Education (November 2017).

- The Mitigation for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet describes “mitigation” and the role it plays in school preparedness. This fact sheet contains examples of mitigation activities, steps for integrating mitigation into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. (https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Mitigation_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf)
- The Protection for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet fact sheet describes “protection” and the role it plays in school preparedness. This fact sheet contains examples of protection activities, steps for integrating protection into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. (https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Protection_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf)

Grants to States for School Emergency Management, U.S. Department of Education.

- These grants help schools address violence and foster safer school environments by providing grants to states to increase their capacity to assist school districts in the development, implementation, and review of high-quality and comprehensive school emergency operations plans (EOPs). (<https://www2.ed.gov/programs/schlemergmgt-sea/index.html>)

Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Institutions of Higher Education,

U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Emergency Management Agency (June 2013).

- This guide includes information on the principles of emergency management planning for institutions of higher education (IHEs); a process for developing, implementing, and refining a higher education Emergency Operations Plan (EOP); and suggested content of higher education EOPs. Planning teams at IHEs responsible for developing and revising a higher education EOP may find this document particularly helpful. (https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/REMS_IHE_Guide_508.pdf)

Guide for Developing High-Quality School Emergency Operations Plans, U.S. Department of Education,

U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, and U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation (2013).

- This guide includes information on the principles of school emergency management planning; a process for developing, implementing, and refining a school Emergency Operations Plan (EOP) with community partners; and suggested content of school EOPs. Planning teams responsible for developing and revising school EOPs may find this document particularly helpful. (https://rems.ed.gov/docs/REMS_K-12_Guide_508.pdf)

National Strategy on Youth Preparedness and Ready.Gov/Youth Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Education, and the American Red Cross.

- *The National Strategy for Youth Preparedness Education: Empowering, Educating, and Building Resilience* presents nine steps partners can take to help build a nation of prepared youth. The steps focus on building partnerships to enhance youth preparedness learning programs; connecting young people with their families, communities, first responders, and other youth; and increasing preparedness at school. (ready.gov/youth-preparedness)

Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings, Federal Emergency Management Agency, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (January 2012).

- This primer contains detailed information on assessing threats and vulnerabilities, and the design considerations needed to protect buildings and the people occupying them. The purpose of this primer is to provide the design community and school administrators with the basic principles and techniques to make a school safe from school shootings and ensure it meets the needs of students, teachers, and administrators. (https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/st/bips07_428_schools.pdf)

Making Schools Safer Quick Reference Guide (2018), U.S. Secret Service, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- This guide highlights the research the U.S. Secret Service National Threat Assessment Center conducted in partnership with the U.S. Department of Education Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools on targeted school violence. (https://www.secretservice.gov/data/protection/ntac/Making_Schools_Safer_Quick_Reference_Guide_2018_Update.pdf)

Comprehensive School Safety Initiative, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This is a list of awards made under the Comprehensive School Safety Initiative for various fiscal years.
 - **2014:** <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/248381.pdf>
 - **2015:** <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/249228.pdf>
 - **2016:** <https://www.nij.gov/Documents/NIJ-CSSI-FY-2016-Awards.pdf>
 - **2017:** <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/251559.pdf>
- The 2014 Comprehensive School Safety Initiative Report discusses the history, funding, and activities of the Comprehensive School Safety Initiative. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/247757.pdf>)

Preventing, Preparing for Critical Incidents in Schools, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This article discusses NIJ-funded research on school safety and how schools can better prepare for incidents of violence. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/225765.pdf>)

Keeping an Eye on School Security: The Iris Recognition Project in New Jersey Schools, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This NIJ Journal article discusses the Iris Recognition Project, a school safety initiative in New Jersey. (https://www.nij.gov/journals/254/pages/iris_recognition.aspx)

Appropriate and Effective Use of Security Technologies in U.S. Schools, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This document provides basic guidelines to law enforcement agencies and school administrators regarding security technology and school safety. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/school/178265.pdf>)

School Safety, Model Programs Guide, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This is a topic page for school safety programs. (<https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/Topic/Details/120>)

Safe and Secure, Guides to Creating Safer Schools, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- To assist schools in their safety efforts, the Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory (NWREL) developed a series of eight guidebooks intended to build a foundation of information that will assist schools and school districts in developing safe learning environments.
 - **Guide 1: Creating Schoolwide Prevention and Intervention Strategies** is intended to put the issue of schoolwide violence prevention in context for educators and outline an approach for choosing and creating effective prevention programs. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book1.pdf>)
 - **Guide 2: School Policies and Legal Issues Supporting Safe Schools** is a practical guide to the development and implementation of school policies that support safe schools. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book2.pdf>)

- **Guide 3: Implementing Ongoing Staff Development To Enhance Safe Schools** discusses the role of staff development within the context of school safety. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book3.pdf>)
- **Guide 4: Ensuring Quality School Facilities and Security Technologies** is intended to help educators and other members of the community understand the relationship between school safety and school facilities, including technology. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book4.pdf>)
- **Guide 5: Fostering School-Law Enforcement Partnerships** is a practical guide to the development and implementation of partnerships between schools and law enforcement agencies. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book5.pdf>)
- **Guide 6: Instituting School-Based Links With Mental Health and Social Service Agencies** discusses how schools can improve their capacity to serve all students by linking with mental health and social service agencies. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book6.pdf>)
- **Guide 7: Fostering School, Family, and Community Involvement** provides an overview of the nature and scope of collaboration, explores barriers to effectively working together, and discusses the processes of establishing and sustaining the work. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book7.pdf>)
- **Guide 8: Acquiring and Utilizing Resources To Enhance and Sustain a Safe Learning Environment** provides practical information on a spectrum of resources that concerned individuals and organizations can use in the quest to create safe schools. (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/book8.pdf>)

Additional OJJDP Resources, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- **Police Foundation resources on school safety** (<https://www.policefoundation.org/school-safety-and-violence-prevention-resources/>)
- **International Association of Chiefs of Police Prevention and School Safety Resources** (<http://www.theiacp.org/Prevention-And-Response-To-School-Violence>)
- **Combating Fear and Restoring Safety in Schools** (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/167888.pdf>)
- **Creating Safe and Drug-Free Schools: An Action Guide** (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/safescho.pdf>)
- **Creating Schoolwide Prevention and Intervention Strategies (Revised)** (<http://safeschools.info/docman/download/280-creating-schoolwide-prevention-and-intervention-strategies>)
- **Fostering School, Family, and Community Involvement (Revised)** (<http://smhp.psych.ucla.edu/publications/44%20guide%207%20fostering%20school%20family%20and%20community%20involvement.pdf>)
- **Promising Practices for Safe and Effective Schools Videoconference** (<http://www.juvenile.net.org/jitap/archives/safeneffctv/index.html>)
- **School Resource Officer Training Program** (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/fs200105.pdf>)
- **School Safety & Youth Violence: A Legal Primer** (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/grants/198396.pdf>)
- **School Safety by Management and Design Videoconference** (<https://www.juvenile.net.org/jitap/schoolsafety/index.html>)
- **School Safety: Annual Report, 2000** (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/193163.pdf>)
- **Stand Up and Start a School Crime Watch!** (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/94601.pdf>)
- **School Safety Special Feature** (<https://www.ncjrs.gov/schoolsafety/>)

Crisis Communications Quick Reference Guide, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This brochure is tailored to chiefs, sheriffs, command staff, and public information officers who handle crisis communications in response to an active shooter, mass casualty, or other law enforcement incidents. It provides checklists for the pre-event, the onset of the incident, and updating the media (pre-press conference and second and subsequent press conferences). Also included are 10 tips to improve communications (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/as-study-quick-reference-guide-updated1.pdf/view>)

Privacy Considerations

Privacy Technical Assistance Center (PTAC), U.S. Department of Education.

- PTAC is a “one-stop” resource for education stakeholders to learn about data privacy, confidentiality, and security practices related to student-level data systems and other uses of student data. (<https://studentprivacy.ed.gov>)

Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act: A Guide for First Responders and Law Enforcement,

Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This guide defines the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), delineates the rights afforded eligible parents and students, and discusses the types of information schools may provide to law enforcement agencies. It also discusses some relevant exceptions to FERPA’s general consent rule that permit the nonconsensual disclosure of personally identifiable information from education records to law enforcement agencies. (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/ferpa-guide.pdf/vie>)

Information Sharing in Criminal Justice – Mental Health Collaborations: Working with HIPAA and Other Privacy

Laws, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Understanding the legal framework of information sharing is the crucial first step for jurisdictions seeking to design and implement effective criminal justice-mental health collaborations. This guide introduces how federal and state laws are likely to influence criminal justice and mental health practitioners’ ability to share information. (https://www.bja.gov/Publications/CSG_CJMH_Info_Sharing.pdf)

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule: A Guide for Law Enforcement,

Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This guide provides a summary of relevant HIPAA provisions. It defines the HIPAA privacy rule, identifies who is and it not required to comply with the rule, and describes the circumstances in which a HIPAA-covered entity may disclose protected health information to law enforcement agencies. (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/hipaa-guide.pdf/view>)

HIPAA for Professionals, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The following is a series of questions with corresponding information on the HHS website. (<https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/index.html>)
 - [Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule apply to an elementary or secondary school?](#)
 - [Does FERPA or HIPAA apply to elementary or secondary school student health records maintained by a health care provider that is not employed by a school?](#)
 - [Are there circumstances in which the HIPAA Privacy Rule might apply to an elementary or secondary school?](#)
 - [Where the HIPAA Privacy Rule applies, does it allow a health care provider to disclose protected health information \(PHI\) about a troubled teen to the parents of the teen?](#)
 - [Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule allow a health care provider to disclose protected health information \(PHI\) about a student to a school nurse or physician?](#)
 - [Does FERPA or HIPAA apply to records on students at health clinics run by postsecondary institutions?](#)
 - [Does FERPA or HIPAA apply to records on students who are patients at a university hospital?](#)
 - [Where the HIPAA Privacy Rule applies, does it permit a health care provider to disclose protected health information \(PHI\) about a patient to law enforcement, family members, or others if the provider believes the patient presents a serious danger to self or others?](#)
 - [Are the health records of an individual who is both a student and an employee of a university at which the person receives health care subject to the privacy provisions of FERPA or those of HIPAA?](#)

Respond and Recover

Active Shooter Preparedness and Response

Active Shooter Preparedness, U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

- DHS provides a variety of active shooter preparedness resources for private citizens, human resources, security professionals, active shooter workshop participants, and first responders. (<https://www.dhs.gov/active-shooter-preparedness>)

Active Shooter: How to Respond, U.S. Department of Homeland Security (October 2008).

- This guide informs employers how to respond to active shooter emergencies at their workplace, including how to respond when an active shooter is in the vicinity, how to respond when law enforcement arrives, how to train staff for an active shooter situation, and how to recognize potential workplace violence. (https://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/active_shooter_booklet.pdf)

Planning and Response to an Active Shooter: An Interagency Security Committee Policy and Best Practices Guide, Interagency Security Committee^{*} (chaired by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) (November 2015).

- This guide provides a consolidated overview of the federal government’s approach to active shooter preparedness for non-military federal facilities. Many of the policies and procedures discussed in this guide can be applied to schools. (<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/isc-planning-response-active-shooter-guide-non-fouo-nov-2015-508.pdf>)

Preparing for Active Shooter Situations (PASS) Program, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This program provides funding for first responders to attend the Active Attack Integrated Response (AAIR) Course, a two-day in-person training designed to improve coordinated response during active attack incidents. (<https://cops.usdoj.gov/training>)

Active Shooter Event Quick Reference Guide, Office of Partner Engagement, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This pocket guide discusses the three options—Run, Hide, Fight—that can make a difference during an active shooter incident. (https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/active-shooter-event-quick-reference-guide_2015.pdf/view)

A Study of the Pre-Attack Behaviors of Active Shooters in the U.S., Behavioral Analysis Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Understanding the prevention of active shootings often relies upon the recognition of worrisome pre-attack behaviors, the BAU released this study in 2018. Using law enforcement records (vs. open source) as the primary source of information, this study thoroughly examined 63 active shooters, including nine who attacked K-12 schools. Key findings included insights into the active shooters’ mental health, concerning behaviors displayed before their attacks, and specific stressors they experienced. This study provides the most current and detailed exploration of observable pre-attack behaviors to date. (<https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/pre-attack-behaviors-of-active-shooters-in-us-2000-2013.pdf/view>)

Preparing for Mass Casualty Incidents: A Guide for Schools, Higher Education, and Houses of Worship, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA).

- Provided by FEMA’s Emergency Management Institute, this online course provides leading practices and resources to assist elementary and secondary schools, institutions of higher education, and houses of worship in developing emergency plans for preparing for, responding to, and recovering from mass casualty incidents. (<https://training.fema.gov/is/courseoverview.aspx?code=IS-360>)

* The Interagency Security Committee’s primary members include: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Agriculture, U.S. Department of Commerce, U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Department of Education, U.S. Department of Energy, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, U.S. Department of the Interior, U.S. Department of Justice, U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Transportation, U.S. Department of the Treasury, U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, U.S. General Services Administration, U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and the U.S. Marshals Service.

Disaster Technical Assistance Center Supplemental Research Bulletin Mass Violence and Behavioral Health, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (September 2017).

- This bulletin focuses on how mass violence affects the behavioral health of adult and young survivors or witnesses of a mass violence incident. Public health, behavioral health, and emergency management professionals can use this bulletin to improve their disaster behavioral health preparedness plans. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/sites/default/files/dtac/srb-mass-violence-behavioral-health.pdf>)

Active Shooter Resources, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Investigative Assistance Act for Violent Crimes Act of 2012 delegated responsibility to the FBI to provide federal assistance during active shooter incidents and mass killings in public places. The FBI has teamed with the Texas State University Advanced Law Enforcement Rapid Response Training program, which trains law enforcement and first responders on national standards for response protocol. The FBI's Office for Victim Assistance also provides a variety of support services for victims, family members, first responders, and investigative teams. (<https://www.fbi.gov/about/partnerships/office-of-partner-engagement/active-shooter-resources>)

Recovery

REMS fact sheets, Office of Safe and Healthy Students, U.S. Department of Education and Emergency Management for Schools Technical Assistance Center (2017).

- The **Recovery for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet** describes “recovery” and the role it plays in school preparedness. This fact sheet contains examples of recovery activities, steps for integrating recovery into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. (https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Recovery_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf)
- The **Response for Schools and School Districts Fact Sheet** describes “response” and the role it plays in school preparedness. This fact sheet contains examples of response activities, steps for integrating response into emergency planning, and key resources for schools and school districts. (https://rems.ed.gov/Docs/Response_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf)

Project School Emergency Response to Violence (SERV), U.S. Department of Education.

- This program funds short-term and long-term education-related services for school districts and institutions of higher education (IHEs) to help them recover from a violent or traumatic event in which the learning environment has been disrupted. (<https://www2.ed.gov/programs/dvppserv/index.html>)

Mass Violence Toolkit, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Helping Victims of Mass Violence and Terrorism Toolkit leverages expertise from partner agencies, subject matter experts, and lessons learned from past incidents to provide communities with a holistic approach to victim assistance in cases of criminal mass violence and domestic terrorism from planning through long-term recovery. The Toolkit includes checklists, templates and other resources to help communities through these processes. (<https://ovc.gov/pubs/mvt-toolkit/index.html>)

Vicarious Trauma Toolkit, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The Vicarious Trauma Toolkit is an online collection of resources and tools to support victim-serving organizations—victim services, law enforcement, first responders—to mitigate the impact and consequences of vicarious trauma. The Toolkit provides an Organizational Assessment that enables organizations to assess their current response and then set a path forward using nearly 500 items—policies, practices and program descriptions, research literature, links to websites and podcasts, and videos and testimonials from each discipline. (<https://vtt.ovc.ojp.gov/>)

Schools/Education Community, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice

- This page contains DOJ and DOJ-sponsored publications relevant to students and others who are victims of crime. (<https://ovc.ncjrs.gov/Publications.aspx?TopicID=91>)

Through Our Eyes: Children, Violence, and Trauma, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- The sixth video in this series focuses on Interventions in Schools. (<https://ovc.gov/pubs/ThroughOurEyes/>)

Supporting Children Living with Grief and Trauma: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This training session was designed with victim service providers, mental health professionals, and law enforcement in mind. (<https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspSupportingChildren.cfm>)

Expert Q&A: Addressing the Impact of Trauma When a Mass Violence Incident Occurs, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Incidents of mass violence and terrorism present unique challenges to the communities in which they occur, requiring a coordinated, cross-sector approach among federal, state, local, and tribal governments; private entities; and nonprofit organizations to drive an effective response. This training session addresses how to create and maintain partnerships, address resource gaps, develop victim assistance protocols, and use the protocols after an incident of mass violence or terrorism. (<https://www.ovcttac.gov/expert-qa/?tab=2>)

VAT Online: Terrorism and Mass Violence, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Terrorism and mass violence are of concern to the public at large because events seem to be random, and perpetrators generally have a definitive plan and their own logic behind their attacks. This training module defines terrorism and mass violence, describes the effects on victims and survivors, identifies potential issues arising from these types of events, identifies responders to mass violence incidents and where you should develop a partnership prior to an event, identifies potential needs of victims and communities after a terrorism and mass violence event, and identifies resources for victims and communities. (https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspOnline_VATOnline.cfm?tab=1#crimes)

Mass Violence and Terrorism Web Training Series, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This web training series highlights the importance of communities, states, and regions planning a response to incidents of mass violence and terrorism using the OVC resource, Helping Victims of Mass Violence & Terrorism: Planning, Response, Recovery, and Resources Toolkit. The first webinar in this series provides a detailed overview of how to use the Toolkit. Subsequent web trainings delve deeper into sections of the Toolkit. (<https://www.ovcttac.gov/views/TrainingMaterials/dspWebinars.cfm#massviolence>)

American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP): Medical Home for Children and Adolescents Exposed to Violence, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Developed through a grant from OVC, this section of the AAP web site provides pediatricians and all medical home teams with the resources they need to modify practice operations to more effectively identify, treat, and refer children and youth who have been exposed to or victimized by violence. (<https://www.aap.org/en-us/advocacy-and-policy/aap-health-initiatives/resilience/Pages/Resilience-Project.aspx>)

ChildVictimWeb, Office for Victims of Crime, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- Funded by OVC, ChildVictimWeb is a free online training resource designed for professionals from all disciplines who work with children who have experienced or witnessed serious violence. This course describes the prevalence and characteristics of different forms of victimization often experienced in childhood, their psychological, behavioral, social, and health consequences, and implications for practice. Assessment strategies, an evidence-based approach to treatment planning, trauma-informed case management skills, and information about evidence-supported treatments are presented. (<http://cv.musc.edu/>)

Enhancing Police Responses to Children Exposed to Violence: A Toolkit for Law Enforcement, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This toolkit may be helpful to law enforcement officers addressing school shootings. (<http://www.theiacp.org/children-exposed-to-violence>)

Gun Violence and Youth, Model Programs Guide, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This research literature review on gun violence and youth focuses on intentional gun violence involving youths ages 10 to 24, including school violence/school shootings. (<https://www.ojjdp.gov/mpg/litreviews/gun-violence-and-youth.pdf>)

Child and Youth Victimization Known to Police, School, and Medical Authorities, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This paper presents the survey results from the National Survey of Children’s Exposure to Violence (NatSCEV) regarding authorities’ knowledge of victimization incidents involving children and youth, particularly police, school, and medical authorities. (<https://www.ojjdp.gov/pubs/235394.pdf>)

Supporting Young People in the Wake of Violence and Trauma, Office for Juvenile Justice and Delinquency, Office of Justice Programs, U.S. Department of Justice.

- This guide provides mentors with recommendations and resources to help them support youth who have faced experiences with violence or trauma. (<http://www.nationalmentoringresourcecenter.org/index.php/component/k2/item/418-supporting-young-people-in-the-wake-of-violence-and-trauma.html>)

Trauma Resilience Resources, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This page provides information on agencies, foundations, and other resources that collect data on trauma and resilience. (<https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/trauma-resilience-resources>)

Coping with Traumatic Events: Resources for Children, Parents, Educators, and Other Professionals, Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- This page offers online resources designed to assist parents, educators, and other professionals in helping children cope with traumatic events. (Includes a number of resources from the National Child Traumatic Stress Network and a resource related to traumatic stress after mass violence, terror, or disaster.) (<https://www.samhsa.gov/capt/tools-learning-resources/coping-traumatic-events-resources>)

The National Child Traumatic Stress Network (NCTSN), Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

- The NCTSN and its various centers have developed and implemented a range of clinical treatments, mental health interventions, and other trauma-informed service approaches as a means of promoting the Network’s mission of raising the standard of care for traumatized youth and families. (<https://www.nctsn.org/treatments-and-practices/treatments-that-work/interventions>)

U.S. Department of the Interior, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Office of Justice Services.

- This office supports tribal justice systems and provides victim assistance on Indian reservations. (<https://www.bia.gov/bia/ojs>)

Appendix B: Compilation of Past Findings and Recommendations from Key School Safety Reports

To better understand past federal and state after-action and related school safety and school violence reports, the Commission identified 10 key reports from the period 2001 to 2018. The Commission reviewed the reports and identified actions taken in response. The information has been compiled into a document titled: *Compilation of Past Findings and Recommendations from Key School Safety Reports* and may be found at <https://www2.ed.gov/documents/school-safety/key-school-safety-reports.pdf>.

School Security After Sandy Hook: Ensuring Safety Within A Budget



Newtown First Selectman Pat Llodra recently questioned whether having armed guards at schools was an appropriate policy at a school security conference in Hartford. (Richard Messina / Hartford Courant)

By **JENNY WILSON**

MAY 4, 2013

An armed officer at the door of every school — an idea some see as an essential response to the horrific Newtown tragedy — is proving to be a complicated and costly proposition as towns across Connecticut consider how best to ensure their students' safety.

Even in Newtown, where officials decided to hire school resource officers for their elementary schools, some are questioning whether the policy is appropriate.

"I am concerned that our focus on making our schools safe from the outside through the use of police officers and security guards is communicating to those inside that we are in danger, that the only way that we are safe in the school is to be protected by a person with a gun," Newtown First Selectman Pat Llodra told a school security conference in **Hartford** recently.

In the months since the Dec. 14 massacre, municipal and school officials throughout the state — forced to consider if their schools are equipped to respond to a shooting — have debated various measures to improve safety. Proposals range from adding panic buttons to arming guards, the latter drawing controversy for fiscal and philosophical reasons.

Newtown leaders remain committed to placing police officers at all elementary schools, pressing forward with a plan that has required them to cut spending elsewhere after voters rejected the town budget last month. Other towns, including North Branford and **Enfield**, voted to add armed officers after Newtown.

"There's definitely a stronger interest [in using armed officers], driven by both people wanting their schools to be safer and, in general, police departments wanting to have that as an option," said Caleb Lopez, the school resource officer at Timothy Edwards Middle School in South Windsor.

Dozens of high schools and middle schools in Connecticut already have full-time school resource officers.

"But finances are still the issue," said Lopez, who is president of the Connecticut School Resources Officers Association. "If you want a school resource officer in a school that means you have one patrol officer who is no longer on patrol."

Municipalities Weigh Costs

After initially considering adding four police officers to cover schools, at a cost of \$372,340 annually, **Rocky Hill** school officials scrapped the proposal, at least for the time being. The board created instead a fund of \$1.27 million to pay for school safety upgrades, the specifics of which will be determined after an outside security firm completes an assessment and makes recommendations. The board will hold a meeting Monday to discuss its comprehensive school security plan.

Simsbury and Danbury also hired consultants to conduct similar security audits, and a Manchester task force has proposed \$400,000 in school security upgrades that include installing surveillance cameras and electronic locking devices.

"We all have the same goal in mind and a common objective to keep kids safe. How we do that and spend taxpayers money is still being discussed," said Raffaella Calciano-Coler, chairwoman of the Rocky Hill Board of Education.

That discussion was the focus of a school security conference in Hartford last week hosted by the Capitol Region Education Council, which operates 19 regional schools. The event drew nearly 500 people, including educators, members of law enforcement, security experts and town officials.

CREC spokeswoman Aura Alvarado said the council does not promote a policy of armed officers.

"You put [an armed officer] in schools full time, you're talking at least \$65 to \$100 an hour," Alvarado said. "You know, will that make kids feel safe? Each town has to make their own decision."

According to the National Association of School Resource Officers, a single resource officer costs about \$80,000 annually in salary and training costs.

North Branford developed its own model for hiring armed guards after finding the cost of school resource officers to be prohibitive. Less than two weeks after the Dec. 14 massacre, the town's school board voted to hire retired law enforcement officers who have specific experience responding to "active shooter" situations.

Schools Superintendent Scott Schoonmaker said the initiative costs around \$140,000 a year and allows him to employ three security guards for the price of one school resource officer. He pays the new guards — all retired state employees receiving pensions — \$20 an hour, without overtime.

"We ran an ad and had 55 applicants and hired seven security officers," Schoonmaker said.

The town is still completing the licensing process with the state so the guards can carry sidearms, the same procedure any private security company must undergo. But Schoonmaker said he was "fairly close to securing that final piece."

Schoonmaker said this was the "most cost effective way to ensure the safety of our children and our staff."

Retrofitting buildings to improve security is important, he said, but so is a guard with a gun.

"Putting a lot of money into infrastructure on the surface will help. But if a person wants to get into a building and create havoc he's going to find a way to do so," Schoonmaker said.

A similar initiative in Enfield to put armed security officers in all public schools was approved by officials, but they have yet to pass a budget that includes the \$650,000 required to pay for the first year. The Enfield school board and town council approved the measure amid controversy: Many residents were opposed, but Superintendent Jeffrey Schumann described it as "an insurance policy against disaster."

"What happened in Newtown will change the way we operate the school system," Schumann said.

While municipalities have focused primarily on school safety after Newtown, the **General Assembly's** response to the tragedy largely emphasized an overhaul of gun laws. To help districts with security concerns, a bill Gov. Dannel P. Malloy signed into law last month authorized a \$15 million grant program to partially reimburse towns for upgrades to school security infrastructure. More money may be approved by legislators when the state budget is approved in June.

Panic Buttons, Not Police Officers

While towns wait for assistance from the state, many have made their own investments in infrastructure upgrades, which tend to be more affordable and less controversial.

Glastonbury has installed locks on every classroom door and has plans for a card-swipe entry system, an intercom system and panic buttons. The town also plans to install bulletproof glass at "sensitive locations"

around the district's nine school buildings, according to Board of Education chairwoman Susan Karp.

"We've done the physical improvements that are critical to securing the buildings. ... We are dealing with the security guard issue and there are different feelings on that matter between board members," Karp said. "Over the next few months, we are going to continually look at that issue of spending \$315,000 on security guards. We need to find out what will work best for our schools."

In **Newington**, town leaders decided against armed guards, reasoning that in order to truly insure against a tragedy like the shooting in Newtown, officers would need assault rifles and tactical gear.

"Officer Friendly is one thing. But when you have a police officer in SWAT gear with an assault rifle, that changes things," Newington Superintendent William Collins said.

John DiNardi, a security guard at Bristow Middle School in **West Hartford** and a former police officer, said that although he would feel more comfortable in an active-shooter situation if he were armed, he wasn't sure that was the right way to address security feelings.

He described not being armed as "kind of a naked feeling." But, DiNardi said: "You can't be consumed with it because a big part of the job is [the] developmental relationship with the kids."

School administrators in West Hartford agree.

"Would an armed guard here keep our students safer than the police?" said Tom Moore, an assistant superintendent. "The police response would be less than three minutes. Philosophically, the question is, how do we keep ... a welcoming atmosphere while being safe?"

Instead, West Hartford is pursuing the installation of panic buttons and keycard access systems in all schools. The town also included \$77,000 in its budget to hire security officers for the elementary schools.

Berlin, Southington, Canton and Bloomfield, among others, also have invested in school upgrades or signaled that they plan to do so in the next fiscal year.

Avon has a pending budget proposal for \$240,000 worth of alarms, surveillance equipment and improved door locks, the district already has a plan to secure the main entrance to the high school.

Before Dec. 14, people could enter and leave Avon High School freely. But the town — like many municipalities across the state — reconsidered security measures after the **Sandy Hook Elementary School** shooting. Now, visitors are required to check in at the front door.

Courant staff writers Ken Byron, Vanessa de la Torre, Amanda Falcone, Steve Goode, Jesse Leavenworth, William Leukhardt, Peter Marteka, Nicholas Rondinone, Don Stacom and Julie Stagis, along with correspondents Dave Drury and Christopher Hoffman, contributed to this story.

This article is related to: [Elementary Schools](#), [Enfield](#), [West Hartford](#), [Newington](#), [Rocky Hill](#), [Hartford](#), [Sandy Hook Elementary School](#)

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The Impact of School Resource Officer Interaction on Students Feelings About School and School Police

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Abstract

School resource officer (SRO) programs that place sworn law enforcement officers at schools are a popular violence prevention strategy. Despite widespread implementation, little is known about the impact of interacting with these officers on students' attitudes about SROs and feelings of school connectedness. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the impact of SRO interaction on the attitudes and feelings of 1,956 middle and high school students at 12 schools in one school district. Multivariate analyses showed that more SRO interactions increased students' positive attitudes about SROs yet decreased school connectedness. Overall, the results suggested a complex relationship between SRO interactions, students' attitudes, and experiences with school violence. The implications of these results and strategies for how officers can contribute to a positive school environment are discussed.

Keywords

juvenile attitudes toward police, school connectedness, school resource officers, school safety, school violence

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Introduction

The purpose of the present study was to examine the impact of interacting with school resource officers (SROs) on middle and high school students' feelings about school police and their sense of school connectedness. School violence prevention programs like SROs have experienced rapid implementation and expansion in the past 15 years. Yet, despite the high costs and all-encompassing nature of many of these programs, current research about them is inadequate. Evaluations on their effectiveness are limited, often lack methodological rigor (Gottfredson, 2001; Greene, 2005), and frequently yield mixed results (B. Brown, 2005). Further investigation likewise is needed to fully understand key factors like students' reactions to the various programs or the impact of these strategies on students' sense of school connectedness. This latter factor is especially important given that better school connectedness has been linked to reductions in violent and delinquent behavior, truancy, substance abuse, and risky sexual activity (McNeely, Nonnemaker, & Blum, 2002; Stewart, 2003; Thomas & Smith, 2004; Whitlock, 2006).

School Connectedness and Bonding

Also called school bonding, school connectedness is a multidimensional construct that typically involves such things as students' caring about and investment in school and sense of attachment to school. It also involves concepts such as students' feelings of belongingness at school and within peer groups, their trust and liking of teachers and school staff, and their belief that school rules are fair and consistent. Several studies have documented the relationship between greater school connectedness and less school violence. As a matter of fact, the benefits associated with greater attachment to school have led many to identify increased school connectedness and development of a positive school environment as critical for violence prevention (e.g., Eisenbraun, 2007; Gottfredson, 2001; Greene, 2005). Karcher (2002), for example, found that students who committed violent acts were likely to feel disconnected from teachers while Valois, MacDonald, Bretous, Fischer, and Drane (2002) observed that less attachment and commitment to school predicted later violent behavior among adolescents. When analyzing data collected from more than 10,000 students, Stewart (2003) found that more school attachment, school commitment, and belief in school rules contributed to less school misbehavior. G. D. Gottfredson, Gottfredson, Payne, and Gottfredson (2005) similarly discovered that schools wherein students perceived rules to be fair and clear had less student delinquency and victimization. Furthermore, Thomas and Smith (2004) discovered that many adolescents who perpetrate

violence at school reported feeling lonely, isolated, and disliking school. Many adolescent perpetrators of school shootings likewise felt less attachment to their schools, teachers, and peers (Wike & Fraser, 2009).

Practically, the relevance of school connectedness to violence makes sense given that students spend so much time at school each day. It is a primary location for adolescent socialization and peer interaction. Moreover, from a social control theoretical perspective (e.g., Hirschi, 1969), school is viewed as a primary conventional institution through which youth can form social connections and develop a commitment to lawfulness and moral order. As Welsh (2003) and Loukas, Suzuki, and Horton (2006) described, students who possess strong interpersonal skills and are successful at school will be rewarded. These students thus will feel more attached to school, develop stronger social connections, become involved in school activities, and be more committed to meeting conventional social expectations. Conversely, students lacking these skills and accomplishments will feel excluded, alienated, and disconnected at school. These students are less likely to engage in conventional school and social activities or adhere to conventional school rules.

For all of these reasons, Greene (2005) and Skiba et al. (2004) note the importance of assessing school connection in combination with factors like students' perceptions of safety to fully understand adolescent violence and assess violence prevention interventions. While such research is limited, Wike and Fraser (2009) described that some methods intended to make schools safer seem to enhance feelings of connectedness, including peer mediation and social skills building programs. Nonetheless, other studies have found that some strategies like metal detectors and security guards might in reality lower students' sense of school connectedness and thus actually contribute to higher levels of school violence and disorder (Eisenbraun, 2007; Greene, 2005; Hyman & Perone, 1998; Juvonen, 2001; Mayer & Leone, 1999). Juvonen (2001) noted that some schools have decreased their use of physical surveillance tactics like metal detectors and locker searches because they appear to raise students' fears and anxieties. For these reasons, it is critically important to consider students' feelings and reactions related to all school safety strategies. Despite their intended outcomes, those methods that in reality increase students' fear and discomfort while negatively impacting the school environment may instead yield dangerous unintended outcomes that must be identified and thoroughly addressed.

SROs

One particular school safety program with the potential to affect students and their attitudes are SROs, or law enforcement officers assigned to work at a

school or schools. While such programs have existed since the mid-1900s, the number of SROs has increased rapidly since shootings like those in Littleton, Colorado, and Jonesboro, Arkansas, raised public fears about lethal violence and safety needs at schools. SROs (sometimes called school police officers or school liaison officers) are charged with maintaining law and order and are expected to be visible and central figures at their schools. They also are responsible for patrolling school buildings and grounds, investigating delinquent complaints, and assisting with student discipline. This emphasis on visible and active patrolling reflects the routine activity theory of crime prevention since such strategies are expected to reduce students' opportunities for misbehavior or delinquency (Felson, 1998). SROs also are charged with educating students and staff about safety and violence prevention and mentoring students about proper and respectful behavior (Finn, Shively, McDevitt, Lassiter, & Rich, 2005; Lawrence, 2007; Rich & Finn, 2001). These officers usually are armed and in uniform and have received extensive training in topics related to school-based law enforcement like legal issues specific to schools and adolescent development. As Rich and Finn (2001) noted, based on this level of training plus the expectation that SROs perform functions beyond discipline and crime prevention, SROs are different than law enforcement officers utilized at some schools who focus on law enforcement only.

Given the comprehensiveness of their duties and the expectation that they be prominent figures at schools, it is reasonable to expect that SROs will have some impact on school environments and will influence students' perceptions of school. Because most research in this area has explored the effect of SRO contact on students' perceptions of the police in general, more research is needed to clarify whether their impact on the school environment is positive or negative and the extent to which contact influences students' perceptions of SROs specifically. Juvonen (2001) has argued that the presence of SROs will heighten students' fears of violence and thus adversely affect the school environment; yet, in a study of 230 high school students, B. Brown (2005) found that most students felt school police officers helped keep schools safer. These students, however, generally did not believe there should be more police in schools. Brown also concluded that school police officers and other security strategies had little effect on the occurrence of drugs and weapons at schools. On the other hand, Theriot (2009) found that middle schools and high schools with an SRO had fewer arrests for weapons possession and assault charges yet significantly more arrests for disorderly conduct charges than schools without an SRO.

In a study done by Goggins, Newman, Waechter, and Williams (1994), students and school staff felt that police at schools increased safety and

reduced drug problems and gang activity although some students did perceive the officers to be unnecessarily aggressive at times. Among 271 students at four schools in Missouri, Jackson (2002) concluded that the presence of SROs did not change students' perceptions of the police in general or offending. In a study of 230 students in Brownsville, Texas, B. Brown and Benedict (2005) found that most students had favorable views of school police officers, though the percentage of students with a positive perception was lower than the percentage reported in other research using adult samples. Hopkins (1994) found that students differentiated between school police officers and typical patrol officers outside of school. In particular, they perceived that school police exercised less power and authoritative tactics when dealing with youth than their counterparts on the streets. Finally, Hopkins, Hewstone, and Hantzi (1992) discovered that students started with marginally positive views of the police but that this decreased over the course of a school year. These students likewise judged their school police officer more positively than police officers outside of school yet direct contact with school police did not change their judgments and perceptions.

Juvenile Attitudes toward the Police

Furthermore, research about juvenile attitudes toward police suggests that the insertion of police officers at schools might be a challenging and potentially negative experience for many students. Numerous studies have documented that adolescents tend to be more critical of police than adults and that many youth hold negative or indifferent views of law enforcement officers (e.g., B. Brown, 2006; Taylor, Turner, Esbensen, & Winfree, 2001). Though several studies have found that positive interactions with the police often yield more favorable views while negative interactions lead to more negative evaluations (e.g., B. Brown & Benedict, 2002; Fagan & Tyler, 2005; Hurst & Frank, 2000), Borrero (2001) and B. Brown and Benedict (2002) noted several difficulties associated with defining and differentiating positive from negative interactions, including adolescents' reluctance to report negative experiences, the lack of objective methods for defining positive versus negative interactions, and the strong influence of preconceived beliefs about the police on how interactions are interpreted by citizens. Hurst and Frank (2000) also found that juveniles living in urban areas, those perceiving more crime in their community, adolescents who experienced more crime victimization, and females held more negative views of the police. Conversely, however, Taylor et al. (2001) found that females held more positive views than males. There is similar disagreement in the extant literature about the role of race or ethnicity to influence juveniles' attitudes about the police. While several

studies have found that ethnic minority youth hold less positive views of the police than White juveniles (e.g., Borrero, 2001; B. Brown & Benedict, 2002; Hagan, Shedd, & Payne, 2005; Hurst & Frank, 2000; Hurst, Frank, & Browning, 2000; Taylor et al., 2001), other research has found no differences in perceptions by race or ethnicity (e.g., B. Brown & Benedict, 2005).

When such research is extended to schools, one implication might be that SROs will upset students, negatively impact the school environment, and lessen students' sense of school connectedness. Yet, this relationship between SRO interaction and student's feelings and attitudes about school has not been adequately studied in the published literature. In one of the few studies to approach this topic, Flexon, Lurigio, and Greenleaf (2009) found that students who reported feeling more committed to school and more attached to teachers on two survey questions were more likely to feel that the police cared about their neighborhood, did the best they can, and treated most people fairly. These youths also were more likely to believe that they could rely on the police. Nevertheless, this study did not focus on school police specifically or assess the effect of police interaction on school connectedness. The present study therefore seeks to fill these gaps by addressing the following two research questions:

Research Question 1: Does interaction with an SRO positively or negatively influence middle and high school students' feelings about school resource officers?

Research Question 2: Does interaction with an SRO impact students' sense of school connectedness?

Such analysis is necessary to better understand the impact of SROs on the school environment as well as their effectiveness to reduce school crime and violence.

Method

Sample and Data Collection

To answer the research questions, 2,015 students enrolled at 5 high schools and 7 middle schools in 1 school district in the Southeastern United States voluntarily completed a comprehensive survey about their experiences with school violence, their feelings of safety at school, and their perceptions of school and the police. The district enrolled approximately 53,000 students, including 29,000 middle and high school students. The mean number of students at each of the 5 high schools was 1,439 while the mean at each of the

7 middle schools was 874. The majority of students district-wide were Caucasian (81%) with smaller percentages of African American (15%) and Hispanic (2%) students. Though students were not surveyed about their receipt of free or reduced lunch in the present study, approximately 60% of students at the 12 schools studied here participated in the free or reduced school lunch program.

These 12 schools were selected from among the district's 14 middle schools and 12 high schools because each was patrolled by a full-time SRO. Students at these schools therefore were best-suited to provide data addressing this study's research questions. The SRO program was implemented by one city police department within the school district's borders. Officers thus were assigned based on a school's geographic location within the city's limits and not based on any school's level of need, history of violence, or community demographics. One SRO was present daily at each school and the officers were expected to provide law enforcement, education, and mentoring services to students, faculty and staff. The officers received extensive training in subjects like working with juveniles and being a positive role model, adolescent development, investigating child abuse, public speaking, instructional techniques and classroom management, counseling, and emergency management. The remaining middle and high schools in the school district received minimal and irregular police patrol from the county sheriff's department. Deputies employed by this department received less training in school-based policing, often were assigned to more than 1 school, and were expected to focus on law enforcement activities only.

In coordination with the school district's chief of school security and principals at each school, arrangements were made for surveys to be distributed in multiple classrooms across all grade levels with the purpose of generating a sample that is representative of the student body at each school. Given the difficulties associated with conducting research and surveying students in schools reported by other researchers (e.g., B. Brown & Benedict, 2005; Cornell & Loper, 1998; Garcia, 2003) in combinations with fiscal constraints that precluded attempting to survey all students, it was decided that this type of planning and sampling would yield a larger cross-section of students at each school. Approximately 175 surveys were given to each school and data were collected by teachers in classrooms during a 2-day period in April 2006. No principals, SROs, school administrators, or any other classroom visitors were present during data collection since this might inhibit students' honesty when responding. Approximately 2,010 surveys were completed and returned. Using validity screening procedures described by Cornell and Loper (1998), surveys with incomplete or missing data on specific variables were excluded. These variables are school attended, grade level, gender, and

age. In addition, surveys were excluded if the student indicated the highest level of victimization on all seven types of school violence listed in the instrument (Cornell & Loper, 1998; Rosenblatt & Furlong, 1997). The final sample therefore includes surveys from 1,126 middle school students and 830 high school students ($n = 1,956$).

Measures

The survey instrument included 60 questions asking about students' feelings about school (10 questions), perceptions of school safety and police in general (12 questions), school violence that they have experienced during the school year (7 questions), school violence that they have witnessed during the school year (11 questions), contact with the SRO at their school (2 questions), and feelings about the SRO (10 questions). The survey also included 8 demographic questions. The key question of interest to this study asked students, "During this school year, how many times have you interacted with the police officer at your school (including things like talking to him or her, asking for or getting help from the police officer, and getting in trouble)?" There were five response options: *none*, *1-2 times*, *3-4 times*, *5-6 times*, and *7 or more times*. Given that a small number of students indicated interacting with an SRO five to six times and seven or more times, the latter two categories were collapsed to produce four categories: *no interaction*, *1-2 interactions*, *3-4 interactions*, and *5 or more interactions*. Moreover, given the problems associated with trying to define and differentiate positive and negative interactions described earlier, the question intentionally asked about general interactions with the SRO.

To properly address the impact of interacting with an SRO on students' feelings and attitudes, two dependent variables were created and analyzed. Both are continuous measures and were created from survey questions answered using a 5-point scale (1 = *strongly disagree*, 3 = *neutral*, 5 = *strongly agree*).¹ First, a 10-item scale was created to measure student's attitudes about SROs. Similar to the scale created by Hurst and Frank (2000) to measure the general attitudes of juveniles toward the police, students were asked whether they liked having the officer at school, felt safer with the officer at school, and whether the officer was helpful to students needing help. Students also indicated their agreement that the SRO treated all students fairly, generally does a good job, makes them feel better about police at school, has a good relationship with students, and that most students at school liked the officer. Finally, students were asked whether they felt the officer did a good job of stopping violence at school as well as the sale or use of drugs and alcohol at school. Responses to all 10 items were summed to create the

“Attitudes about SROs” scale wherein scores ranged from 10 to 50 with higher scores indicating more positive feelings about the SRO at their school. The scale has very strong internal consistency (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .89$).

For the second dependent variable, feelings of school connectedness were measured using 10 questions modeled after similar studies of school environment and school bonding (e.g., Goodenow, 1993; Skiba et al., 2004). Accordingly, students were asked about the fairness of school rules, student and teacher work ethic, school pride, their sense of belonging at school, if they like school, if students are learning a lot and enjoy learning at their school, and their willingness to confide in school faculty and staff about problems. These 10 items were summed to a single scale with scores ranging from 10 to 50 (higher scores = more positive feelings about school). This scale has strong internal consistency (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .79$).

Data Analysis

To investigate the impact of interacting with an SRO on these two dependent variables, a series of multivariate linear regression models were calculated.² These models were designed to provide both predictive and explanatory information about the relationship between interacting with an SRO and the dependent variables (Licht, 1995). As a result, the models include independent variables that may have a more causal relationship with the outcome variables as well as independent variables that cannot be linked causally but may have a co-occurring or theoretical relationship with the two outcome variables.

For both dependent variables (attitudes about SROs and school connectedness), independent variables were entered in three blocks. The first block included only the SRO interaction variables (students with no SRO interaction served as the reference category in all blocks). The second and third blocks then attempted to understand the unique influence of interacting with an SRO on the dependent variables after controlling for other factors that have been linked to feelings about police and school. Specifically, the second block added several demographic and descriptive characteristics, including age in years and gender (coded as male = 1). In addition, three variables relating to students’ ethnicity were included (Caucasian students served as the reference category). These were African American (coded as 1, not African American = 0), Hispanic (coded as 1) and other ethnic minority (coded as 1). This latter variable included 66 students who identified as Asian American and all students who marked “other ethnicity” on the survey. The final variable in this block was a measure of students’ attitudes toward the police in general (students indicated their like for the police on a 5-point scale wherein 1 = *strongly disagree*, 3 = *neutral*, 5 = *strongly agree*).

The third block consisted of eight school-related variables. These included school level (coded as high school = 1, middle school = 0) and number of years at current school. Since SROs had been utilized at the schools for several years prior to this study, they would have been a fixture at the school for as long as the students had been attending. Therefore, given that Hopkins et al. (1992) found that students' attitudes toward school police became more negative over the course of a year, it was hypothesized here that students' attitudes might vary depending on their length of time at the school. Booth and Sheehan (2008) found that students' happiness in school is most influenced by their peers and social network. A third variable therefore was included in this block to identify those students who said they had two or more good friends at school (coded as 1, less than two good friends = 0).

Because Hurst and Frank (2000) found that an increase in the number of crime victimizations experienced by juveniles was related to less positive views of the police, two variables were included that measure the scope and intensity of violence that students have experienced at school. The survey asked how often students had experienced seven different types of school violence (teased by other students, had a physical fight, been in an argument, been bullied, been physically harmed by a dating partner, teased based on race, religion or skin color, and threatened with physical violence). Responses were given on a 6-point scale (1 = *never*, 2 = *once or twice*, 3 = *about once a month*, 4 = *2-3 times a month*, 5 = *about once a week*, 6 = *several times weekly*). The first of these variables is a measure of the total types of violence a student has experienced. Positive responses to any of the seven violence questions (regardless of frequency) were summed to generate a victimization score with values ranging from 0 to 7 (Cronbach's $\alpha = .69$). The second of these variables measures the intensity or frequency of violence experienced by students. This variable is a sum of a student's responses to each of the seven violence questions. Scores range from 7 to 40 with higher scores representing more types of violence experienced and with more frequency (Cronbach's $\alpha = .76$). Similar variables have been significant in previous studies of school violence (e.g., Theriot, Dulmus, Sowers, & Johnson, 2005). For the seventh variable in this block, students were asked if they felt safe at school overall (1 = *strongly disagree*, 3 = *neutral*, 5 = *strongly agree*).

Finally, the third block added the other dependent variable as an independent variable. Specifically, for the regression models about students' attitudes to SROs, the school connectedness scale was added as an independent variable in the third block. Conversely, the "Attitudes about SROs" scale was added an independent variable in the regression models about school connectedness. These additions were done to explore possible relationships that might exist among these two key variables. For all analyses, cases with

missing values on any of the independent or dependent variables were excluded listwise. Furthermore, all continuous independent and dependent variables were tested for normality and all yielded skewness and kurtosis values within an acceptable range to be included in the statistical analyses (George & Mallery, 2001).

Results

Results from this study are presented on three tables. The first table (Table 1) shows demographic and descriptive characteristics for the total sample and for each of the four SRO interaction categories. Overall, 944 students (48% of the total sample) reported having at least one interaction with the SRO during the school year, including 207 students who reported five or more interactions. In addition, 566 students (29%) said they had attended a class or presentation given by the SRO. This table also shows that the total sample is predominantly Caucasian ($n = 1,266$; 65%) and female ($n = 1,013$; 52%). The vast majority of students said they had two or more good friends at school ($n = 1,744$; 89%).

A preliminary comparison of mean scores on the two victimization measures and two dependent variables was done using analysis of variance (ANOVA) tests with a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. These tests provided preliminary evidence of differences across SRO interaction groups. As shown on Table 1, students with no SRO interaction experienced significantly less types of school violence than students in each of the other categories, $F(3, 1922) = 21.5, p < .001$. Students who indicated no interaction with an SRO also reported experiencing less intense or less frequent school violence than students recounting at least three interactions with an officer. Students with five or more interactions also reported more intense experiences with violence than students with one or two interactions only, $F(3, 1924) = 19.6, p < .001$. Those students with five or more interactions also had more positive attitudes about the SRO than students with no or 1-2 interactions with an SRO, $F(3, 1908) = 5.7, p = .001$. These ANOVA comparisons showed no significant differences in students' level of school connectedness.

The regression models shown in Table 2 highlight several variables that are associated with students' attitudes about the SRO. While having five or more interactions with an SRO is a significant factor in all three models, all SRO interaction variables are significant in the full model (model 3). As this model shows, any level of interaction with an officer is associated with more positive attitudes. Students who attended a class led by an SRO also have more positive attitudes. Furthermore, students with higher levels of school

Table 1. Demographic and Descriptive Characteristics.

	Total sample	No interaction with SRO	Interacted with SRO 1-2 times	Interacted with SRO 3-4 times	Interacted with SRO 5 or more times
	M ± SD or frequency (%) ^a	M ± SD or frequency (%)	M ± SD or frequency (%)	M ± SD or frequency (%)	M ± SD or frequency (%)
<i>n</i>	1,956 ^b	1,012	536	201	207
Age in years	14.3 ± 2.0	14.1 ± 2.0	14.4 ± 2.0	14.6 ± 2.0	14.8 ± 2.2
Male	943 (48.2)	469 (46.3)	264 (49.3)	115 (57.5)	95 (45.9)
Caucasian	1,266 (64.7)	622 (61.5)	375 (70.0)	123 (61.2)	146 (70.5)
African American	516 (26.4)	283 (28.0)	121 (22.3)	65 (32.3)	47 (22.7)
Hispanic	48 (2.4)	32 (3.2)	12 (2.2)	1 (0.5)	3 (1.4)
Other ethnic minority	126 (6.4)	75 (7.4)	28 (5.2)	12 (6.0)	11 (5.3)
Number of years at current school	2.1 ± 1.0	2.0 ± 1.0	2.1 ± 1.0	2.4 ± 1.0	2.5 ± 1.0
Two or more good friends at school (n = 1,873)	1,744 (89.2)	894 (88.3)	484 (90.3)	182 (90.5)	184 (88.9)
Attended class led by SRO (n = 1,949)	566 (28.9)	259 (25.6)	155 (28.9)	74 (36.8)	78 (37.7)
Like police generally (n = 1,953)	3.2 ± 1.2	3.3 ± 1.2	3.2 ± 1.2	3.2 ± 1.3	3.3 ± 1.4
Feel safe at school overall	3.5 ± 1.0	3.5 ± 1.0	3.4 ± 1.0	3.4 ± 1.0	3.6 ± 1.0
Total types of school violence experienced (n = 1,926) ^c	2.6 ± 1.7	2.3 ± 1.7 ^{A,B,C}	2.8 ± 1.7 ^A	3.0 ± 1.8 ^B	3.2 ± 1.8 ^C
Intensity of school violence experienced (n = 1,928) ^c	12.8 ± 5.8	12.1 ± 5.6 ^{A,B}	12.9 ± 5.6 ^C	14.1 ± 6.0 ^A	15.2 ± 6.9 ^{B,C}
Attitudes about SROs scale (n = 1,912) ^c	33.7 ± 8.1	33.3 ± 7.9 ^A	33.5 ± 7.8 ^B	34.1 ± 8.6	35.8 ± 9.2 ^{A,B}
School connectedness scale (n = 1,909) ^c	33.2 ± 6.5	33.7 ± 6.4	32.8 ± 6.2	32.6 ± 6.9	32.4 ± 7.0

Note. Means in a row sharing a subscript are significantly different ($p < .05$) after a Bonferroni adjustment for multiple comparisons. SRO = school resource officer.

^aPercentages represent percent of column total.

^bThe sample size for those variables with fewer than 1,956 responses is noted with the variable name.

^cMeans compared using analysis of variance (ANOVA) procedures.

Table 2. Regression Equations for Students' Attitudes About School Resource Officers (N = 1,767).

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	B	Beta
Interacted with SRO 1-2 times	0.016	.001	0.547	.030	0.657*	.036
Interacted with SRO 3-4 times	0.549	.021	1.30**	.049	1.35***	.051
Interacted with SRO 5 or more times	2.25***	.089	2.49***	.094	2.81***	.107
Age in years	—	—	-0.355***	-.089	-0.132	-.033
Male	—	—	-0.637*	-.039	-0.360	-.022
African American	—	—	-0.320	-0.17	-0.194	-0.10
Hispanic	—	—	-0.193	-.004	0.831	.015
Other ethnic minority	—	—	-0.290	-.009	-0.096	-.003
Like police generally	—	—	4.22***	.638	3.34***	.503
High school student	—	—	—	—	-0.527	-.032
Number of years at current school	—	—	—	—	-0.120	-0.015
Two or more good friends at school	—	—	—	—	-0.208	-.006
Attended class led by SRO	—	—	—	—	1.52***	.086
Total types of school violence experienced	—	—	—	—	-0.321*	-.068
Intensity of school violence experienced	—	—	—	—	0.051	.036
Feel safe at school overall	—	—	—	—	0.722***	.090
School connectedness scale	—	—	—	—	0.307***	.244
Adjusted R ²	.006	—	.449	—	.529	—
F	4.69	—	173.55	—	125.2	—
Significance	.003	—	<.001	—	<.001	—

Note. Dependent variable = attitudes about school resource officer scale (scores ranged from 10 to 50; higher scores equal more positive feelings about the SRO at their school). SRO = school resource officer.

* $p \leq .05$. ** $p \leq .01$. *** $p \leq .001$.

connectedness, better feelings about the police in general, and a greater sense of safety all feel more positively about the SRO at their school. In contrast, however, students who have experienced more types of school violence reported more negative attitudes about the SRO.

Without controlling for any other independent variables, results from the first model presented on Table 3 show that any level of interaction with an SRO predicts significantly lower levels of school connectedness. In the second model, however, only one of the three SRO interaction variables is significant and two are significant in the third model. In this model, students who had one or two interactions with an officer and students with five or more interactions have less school connectedness than other students. Furthermore, in the full model, males, students who have been at the school for more years, and students who have experienced more intense violence all also have lower school connectedness scores. Conversely, students with two or more good friends at school, students who have experienced more total types of violence, students with more positive attitudes about SROs and police in general, and students who feel safer at school have a greater sense of school connectedness than their respective counterparts.

Discussion

The data revealed several interesting results regarding the impact of interacting with a SRO on a student's attitudes and feelings. Specific to the study's two primary research questions, among those students who have interacted with an SRO, there is evidence that such interactions positively influence students' attitudes about SROs yet are associated with lower levels school connectedness. This influence appears especially acute for students who reported the most SRO interactions during the school year. For these students with five or more interactions, they had more positive attitudes about SROs and lower levels of school connectedness on average when compared to students with less or no SRO interaction.

Such results suggest a complex relationship between students, officers, and students' feelings and perceptions. The finding that any number of SRO interactions contributed to more positive feelings about SROs suggests that students generally do not view SROs as a disruptive or negative presence at school. To the contrary, attitudes toward SROs appeared to rise as the number of interactions increased. Given that the measure of attitudes toward SROs included statements about officers' fairness, helpfulness, and competence, the results here suggest that as the number of interactions grows so too does a student's belief that the SRO is fair, helpful, and competent to stop violence and improve safety at school. The finding that more positive attitudes toward

Table 3. Regression Equations for Students' Feelings of School Connectedness (N = 1,767).

Variables	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	B	Beta	b	Beta	b	Beta
Interacted with SRO 1-2 times	-0.914*	-0.63	-0.560	-0.38	-0.617*	-0.43
Interacted with SRO 3-4 times	-1.18*	-0.56	-0.639	-0.30	-0.592	-0.28
Interacted with SRO 5 or more times	-1.47**	-0.70	-1.17**	-0.55	-1.41***	-0.67
Age in years	—	—	-0.230***	-0.72	-0.072	-0.23
Male	—	—	-0.893***	-0.69	-0.725**	-0.56
African American	—	—	0.264	.018	0.287	.020
Hispanic	—	—	-0.383	-0.09	0.182	.004
Other ethnic minority	—	—	0.257	.010	0.515	.019
Like police generally	—	—	2.39***	.450	0.925***	.175
High school student	—	—	—	—	-0.362	-0.28
Number of years at current school	—	—	—	—	-0.402*	-0.64
Two or more good friends at school	—	—	—	—	1.07*	.041
Attended class led by SRO	—	—	—	—	-0.189	-0.13
Total types of school violence experienced	—	—	—	—	0.260*	.069
Intensity of school violence experienced	—	—	—	—	-0.184***	-.165
Feel safe at school overall	—	—	—	—	2.00***	.313
Attitudes about SROs scale	—	—	—	—	0.230***	.288
Adjusted R ²	.006	—	.228	—	.451	—
F	4.61	—	63.54	—	84.37	—
Significance	.003	—	<.001	—	<.001	—

Note. Dependent variable = school connectedness scale (scores ranged from 10 to 50; higher scores equal more positive feelings about school). SRO = school resource officer.
 *p ≤ .05. **p ≤ .01. ***p ≤ .001.

SROs were related to positive feelings about police in general, better school connectedness and a greater sense of safety likewise support that SROs might make important and positive contributions to the school environment.

On the other hand, the results of this study also show that students with more SRO interactions had lower school connectedness. Given that students with more SRO interaction also feel more positively about SROs, one possible explanation for these mixed findings is that the presence and activities of SROs at school might draw more attention to school crime, generate worry or fear about violence among students, and contribute to their feeling less connected and comfortable at school. For example, in community-based research, Dukes and Hughes (2004) found that citizens often perceive an increased police presence has indicative of disorder and therefore become more fearful of crime. Nevertheless, students' past experiences as victims of school violence were controlled for in the regression equations so it is unclear what role—if any—fear of victimization has on students' school connectedness. More research is needed to investigate this possible phenomenon but, if true for students at school, one implication is that SROs may need to make greater effort to alleviate students' fears about school crime and violence, particularly following high-visibility actions that may have numerous student witnesses (e.g., removing a student from the classroom for disciplinary reasons or making an arrest).

Alternatively, this study's key findings that more SRO interactions are related to better attitudes about SROs and feeling safer at school yet lower levels of school connectedness may be explained by student's experiences observing SROs discipline classmates or make arrests. Specifically, Goggins et al. (1994) found that students felt safer with police officers at school and perceived reductions in drug and gang problems. Theriot (2009) likewise found that schools with SROs had fewer arrests for assault and weapons charges. Students' increased feelings of safety in the present study therefore might result from their perceptions that SROs are effective to protect them from serious crimes like weapons or gang violence at school. On the other hand, given the high number of arrests for disorderly conduct charges at schools with an SRO reported by Theriot, students who have witnessed other students be arrested for less serious offenses may feel less connected at school if they have recurrent fear or stress about making minor disturbances that may result in their own arrest. At many schools, SROs are so involved in handling disciplinary matters that some authors have speculated about the *criminalization* of student behavior, wherein students are arrested and introduced to the juvenile justice system for relatively minor behaviors that historically have been handled by school principals and teachers (Dohrn, 2002; Hirschfield, 2008; Lawrence, 2007). While more

research is needed to fully investigate possible criminalization, students' fears of things like being arrested, going to a detention facility, and having a criminal record may contribute to them feeling less positive and attached to school.

Lower levels of school connectedness also were related to more intense experiences with school violence in this study. This link between lower levels of school connectedness and more involvement with violence has been documented in other studies (e.g., Karcher, 2002; Stewart, 2003). Furthermore, while Hurst and Frank (2000) concluded that more crime victimizations were related to more negative attitudes toward police in general, this study did not find that intensity of school violence contributed to more negative feelings about SROs. This might reflect the finding that students with five or more interactions reported experiencing more intense violence than students with none or 1-2 SRO interactions only (see Table 1). Some of these interactions therefore might be the officer intervening to stop violence or these students might be interacting with the officers as a strategy to avoid further victimization. In these scenarios, students might view the officer as a protective force at school. The findings that these students had more positive attitudes about SROs also promote this hypothesis.

Strategies for SROs and School Connectedness

Overall, the various findings support the complex relationship that exists between the dependent variables in this study. Although the cross-sectional nature of this study did not permit determinations about causation and prediction for all independent variables, the data did show that more SRO interactions were associated with lower levels of school connectedness. In addressing these results, the increased research attention paid to school connectedness in recent years has identified several strategies or activities that contribute to students feeling more attached and bonded to school. Several of these strategies may be beneficial to SROs seeking to increase students' sense of school connectedness and reduce their anxieties about school violence or being arrested.

In other studies, authors regularly highlight the importance of helping students develop appropriate conflict resolution and social skills, creating open lines of communication among school personnel and students, and involving multiple stakeholders in school decision-making and policy-setting (Astor, Meyer, Benbenishty, Marachi, & Rosemond, 2005; Eisenbraun, 2007; Gottfredson, 2001; Whitlock, 2006; Wike & Fraser, 2009). Eisenbraun (2007) said that schools should develop school-based violence prevention teams that consist of school faculty, administrators, and other professionals

like school social workers and school counselors as well as student representatives. This team then can lead the school's efforts to implement effective classroom management and violence prevention programs while also serving as a liaison between school personnel and parents and community members. As a daily fixture at schools, resource officers should be considered a key stakeholder and therefore included as members of these teams and involved in setting school policies. Moreover, school principals and administrators have identified open and regular communication with the SRO at their school as critical for building a successful relationship (Finn et al., 2005; May, Fessel, & Means, 2004). This communication is especially important regarding who (principal or SRO) is in charge of discipline at the school and who makes the decision to arrest a student (Finn et al., 2005). To alleviate students' fear of crime and victimization, SROs also should consider regular reporting of school crime and violence statistics to students and parents as well as providing open forums for students, parents, and school staff to meet with the SRO and share their concerns, questions, or ideas about school safety.

Next, the possibility that SROs' actions like making an arrest may lead students to feel fearful and disconnected from school suggests a need for further training of SROs and school staff. Additional training in adolescent development as well as training focused on effective classroom management strategies and the development of collaborative partnerships between SROs and teachers may be particularly beneficial. For example, when approaching a disruptive student, SROs, teachers and principals should have a clear plan about how to effectively handle the student as well as a clear articulation of teachers' and administrators' expectations from the SRO intervention. An arrest should be the least preferred outcome in this situation and done only in agreement with the teacher and school principal.

Finally, research suggests that SROs can make important contributions to improve a school's physical environment. These improvements can lead to reduced violence and a greater sense of school connectedness in students (Astor et al., 2005; Eisenbraun, 2007) and include adjusting student traffic patterns in school hallways, better adult supervision of students before and after school and between classes, and better monitoring of places like bathrooms and parking lots that traditionally lack adult oversight. Thus, by being a visible presence in hallways and other locations that are more conducive to student misconduct, SROs may deter violence, improve student safety, increase opportunities for meaningful interactions with students, and facilitate better reporting of crime or violence (Finn, 2006). SROs likewise should explore opportunities to interact with students outside of the traditional school day. For example, Rabois and Haaga

(2002) found that minority youth who played on basketball teams with police officers developed more positive attitudes toward these officers. Such recreational activities may further students' positive attitudes toward SROs while also increasing their sense of school connectedness since promoting student participation in extracurricular and recreational activities also has been identified as an effective way to improve the school climate (Wike & Fraser, 2009).

Limitations and Future Research

As stated, the present study's cross-sectional design limited conclusions about causality and instead identified several theoretical and explanatory connections in the data. To clarify the causal relationships between the various variables analyzed here, there is a need for longitudinal studies that collect data at multiple time points during the school year or across multiple years. Such studies will allow for observations of changes across time as well as possible patterns and benefits that might exist regarding when students do or should interact with an SRO during the year. For example, new students at a school might benefit from SRO interactions more at the beginning of the year as they transition to the new school, learn school rules and expectations, and make social connections. Longitudinal studies also should seek to identify the relationships between changes in feelings of school connectedness, the number of delinquent or disruptive incidents at school, and academic performance for students as the frequency of SRO interaction increases or decreases.

Another limitation of this study is the reliance on self-reported data from students. Given that juveniles generally possess more negative attitudes about the police than adults (B. Brown & Benedict, 2005), B. Brown (2006) suggested combining student self-report surveys with official crime data to evaluate the effectiveness of school police officers. Along the same lines, future research should survey teachers and school administrators. It is hypothesized that they will have different perceptions of SROs since they might view the officers as colleagues or allies in a way that is different from how students perceive the officers (Juvonen, 2001). Extant research also has shown that police officers interact differently with juveniles than they do with adults (R. A. Brown, Novak, & Frank, 2009). This too might suggest that school faculty and staff will have perceptions and viewpoints about their SRO that differ from those held by students at their school. Surveys of students at schools without an SRO similarly would be helpful for providing comparative data about students' views of the police and feelings of safety at schools that do not have a consistent police presence.

Conclusion

This study found that interactions with a SRO had an impact on students' attitudes about SROs as well as their feelings of school connectedness. In understanding these findings, this study suggested several possible explanations for the impact that SROs have on students and their schools and identified important areas for future research. Given that SROs and school police programs continue to be popular school violence prevention strategies, it is critically important to investigate their influence on students' attitudes and the school environment. Such investigations have the potential to enhance schools and juvenile-police relations as well as improve outcomes for students and their long-term educational goals.

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Notes

1. Please contact the author for more information about the individual items used to calculate the "Attitudes about SROs" and school connectedness scales.
2. Since students are nested within their classroom and school, multilevel modeling (i.e., hierarchical linear modeling [HLM]) is an appropriate and increasingly popular approach to analyzing student- and school-level data. Such analysis was considered here, yet the number of schools in the sample ($n = 12$) limited the number of school-level variables that could be included in a multilevel model. Moreover, calculation of the intra-class correlation (ICC) for each dependent variable suggested that HLM was not necessary with these data. Guo (2005) and Heinrich and Lynn (2001) recommended using HLM when the ICC is greater than .25. The ICC calculated for each dependent variable was as follows: attitudes about SRO scale = .11 and school connectedness scale = .07.

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ENFIELD COMMUNITY

Enfield School Board Decides To Pull Armed Guards From Public Schools



By MIKAELA PORTER

MAY 12, 2015 | 11:39 PM



Armed security guard, Kevin Hart, a 21-year veteran with the Hartford Police Department, stationed as an armed guard at an Enfield school. (STEPHEN DUNN / Hartford Courant)

ENFIELD — The board of education voted Tuesday night to stop stationing armed guards inside the public schools after the academic year ends in June.

The board voted 5-3 to end a memorandum of understanding with the town that would have continued the program for another two years. The town council had voted 6-5 on April 20 to continue the program.

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Board members Tom Sirard, Stacy Thurston and Vincent Grady voted in favor of the guards, while members Peter Jonaitis, Raymond Peabody, Lori Unghire, Timothy Neville and Tina LeBlanc voted against. Board member David Wawer did not attend the meeting.

The town agreed to post armed guards in the schools in September 2013 in reaction

TOPICS

and six educators were killed.

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Sirard said he favored the guards because he didn't want to put teachers in the position to step between an intruder and their students. He pointed out that police school resource officers at the middle schools and high schools carry sidearms.

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"The only place we don't see an armed presence in an advertised 'no gun zone' is our elementary schools," Sirard said. "We see it in courthouses, middle schools, high schools, but not elementary schools."

Unghire said her decision was "difficult" but made after doing research, speaking to residents, police officers, current and former board of education members, town officials and police officers from other places, including Florida and Alaska.


"Fires have taken more lives, but it doesn't mean that we put fire trucks at all our schools," Unghire said.

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Neville said he wants to discuss school security measures further but wasn't "comfortable signing off on the program."

"It's difficult seeing where we're going without any specificity to 'hardening' and future plans," Neville said, referring to security measures that make it more difficult for intruders to enter schools.

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Few residents were at the meeting when the vote was taken on the guards. Resident Elizabeth Davis was the only member of the public to speak before the vote. She said she opposed the program and that the armed guards are "a false sense of security."

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The board had not planned to vote on the guards Tuesday, but the issue came to a vote after some parliamentary maneuvers.

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When the town council voted to continue the program, it also agreed to extend the program to three private schools: St. Bernard School, St. Martha School and Enfield Montessori School. Town Manager Matthew Coppler said Tuesday that the Montessori school and St. Bernard have signed the town's memorandum of understanding.

Ann Sarpu, principal of St. Martha School, said that she plans to sign the agreement so the program continues at her school.

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Coppler said the anticipated cost of the program has decreased since he presented his budget on March 16. Originally, it was projected the program would cost

his budget on March 10. Originally, it was projected the program would cost \$782,800. Coppler said the program is now expected to cost \$745,406. Coppler said the reason for the decrease was a decision to keep the guards' wages at the same rate, instead of increasing them.

The town council has not yet voted on the 2015-16 budget.

Armed guards were posted in all 12 public schools and the three private schools in September 2013. Members of the council and school board and public safety officials formed a school security committee and met in January 2013 to discuss school security after the Sandy Hook shootings.

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The school security committee pitched the armed guards program to the town council and the board of education, which ultimately put a two-year program in place. The program had a sunset clause that called for it to be revisited, evaluated and voted on again after the first two years.

The school security committee hired a school security consultant, Michael Dorn, to evaluate the program and make suggestions for improvements. Dorn compiled a report on the program that gave it a glowing review.

The school security committee also held a series of meetings in January and February for residents to comment on the program. Residents expressed mixed opinions.

MIKAELA PORTER



Mikaela Porter has been a Hartford Courant reporter since August 2013. She has written about Enfield and South Windsor news, currently covering breaking news, school related happenings and town events in West Hartford. She is from Hopewell Junction, N.Y. and has a degree in writing and mass communications from Assumption College. She loves her cross-eyed cat Finn

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
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I. INTRODUCTION AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Children are far more likely to be arrested at school today than they were a generation ago. The use of school-based arrests¹ as a means of addressing even minor, non-violent disciplinary infractions raises serious concerns for educators, parents, and the wider community. While there is no question that guaranteeing the safety of our public schools is of the utmost importance, we must never come to view arresting students at school as just another approach to discipline.

Instead, every time a school-based arrest occurs, we must ask: Was this a rational, proportional, and evenhanded response to misbehavior? And was it really necessary? Or was there another way? At the same time, we must examine closely the relationship between school-based arrests and the use of school resource officers, or SROs, sworn law enforcement personnel stationed permanently in public schools. Plainly, SROs can help make schools safer. But their presence also may encourage a criminal justice response to misconduct better addressed by school administrators.

The American Civil Liberties Union, along with several other civil rights and civil liberties organizations, has become increasingly concerned over the last several years about the national trend of criminalizing, rather than educating, our nation's children, through increased reliance on zero-tolerance school discipline, school-based arrests, disciplinary alternative schools, and secure detention. The ACLU seeks to reverse this trend, commonly known as the “school-to-prison pipeline.”

To this end, during the past eighteen months, the ACLU and its Connecticut affiliate have investigated two factors that may contribute to the school-to-prison pipeline – school-based arrests and SRO programs – in three towns in the Hartford, Connecticut area: Hartford, East Hartford, and West Hartford.² We filed public records requests with the police department and school district in each town, seeking information about SRO programs, as well as records describing the rate and nature of school-based arrests. We also filed public records requests seeking data on school-based arrests, as well as other disciplinary data, from Connecticut's State Department of Education (“SDE”). Finally, we conducted 27 interviews with SROs, principals, teachers, probation officers, juvenile defenders, social workers, and other stakeholders.

As described more fully below, our investigation revealed structural problems likely to diminish SRO program performance, as well as troubling school-based arrest practices in all three districts.

The remainder of Section I of this report summarizes our findings and recommendations. The next section, Section II, sketches the history of SROs in the state of Connecticut. Section III describes the roles SROs currently play in the three Hartford-area school districts we studied, as well as current efforts to define program objectives, provide SROs with relevant training, and monitor and evaluate performance. Section IV offers an analysis of arrest practices. Section V closes the report with recommendations for school administrators, police departments, and legislators.

This report is intended as a starting point, not an end, for discussions about the role of SROs and the use of school-based arrest in Hartford-area schools. Its goal is to inform the public about school-based arrests, while proposing measures to help ensure that school safety practices currently in use in the Hartford area are efficacious, rational, cost-effective, free of bias, and subject to regular evaluation and reform. We look forward to a fruitful conversation.

a. Findings: SRO Programs

Our examination of SRO programs revealed a variety of concerns. In order to function effectively, SRO programs must include the following elements: clearly defined objectives that are well understood by all stakeholders; adequate training requirements; and periodic outcome-based monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that permit program administrators and the public to gauge SRO programs' performance accurately. Evidence from the school districts we studied raises questions about whether these minimum criteria are being met. Our findings were as follows:

- There is a need to clarify the objectives of SRO programs in the school districts we studied. SROs in Hartford and West Hartford are not subject to formal written policies or agreements clearly describing their duties. In East Hartford, a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) defines the relationship between the school district and the police department, but awareness of its requirements among individual SROs appears limited.

We must never come to view arresting students at school as just another approach to discipline. Instead, we must ask: Was this arrest a rational, proportional, and evenhanded response to misbehavior? And was it really necessary? Or was there another way?

- SRO training requirements in the three districts we surveyed are uneven. Neither Hartford nor West Hartford requires special training for SROs – though it does appear that some SROs are receiving relevant training. East Hartford, meanwhile, does impose a specific requirement for SROs, but it is unclear whether that requirement has been enforced.
- In all three districts, at the local level, data collection and reporting on the subject of school-based arrests – a critical element of any effort to monitor and evaluate SRO program performance – are inadequate. In fact, none of the local police departments or school districts in the three districts we studied maintains school-based arrest data in an accessible form.

b. Recommendations: SRO Programs

Based on these findings, we offer the following recommendations aimed at improving the performance of SRO programs in the three towns:

i. Clarify Program Objectives

- Every SRO program should have in place formal written policies describing the objectives of the program and the rules that will govern its operation. These policies should be publicly available.
- Where school districts and local police departments operate SRO programs in partnership, they should have in place publicly available MOUs or other formal agreements clearly establishing their mutual duties.

ii. Ensure Adequate Training

- The substance of the policies and agreements governing each SRO program should be made known to all stakeholders, including SROs themselves, and this knowledge should be refreshed on a regular basis.
- The State of Connecticut should establish minimum standardized training requirements for SROs, including, but not limited to, training in counseling,

mediation, child and adolescent psychology, cultural competence, and applicable legal principles.

- Local compliance with state SRO training requirements should be a precondition for receipt of law enforcement grants.

iii. Monitor and Evaluate Performance

- Each school district should annually assess the success of its SRO program, with particular attention to the rate and nature of school-based arrests, and publish the results of that assessment.
- The State of Connecticut should support local efforts by promulgating a detailed set of best practices for SRO program monitoring and evaluation, including a metric local districts could use in measuring the success of their SRO programs, and by providing local officials with technical assistance.

c. Findings: School-Based Arrests

Gathering data on school-based arrests was difficult. As mentioned above, local agencies in the three towns we studied do not maintain such data in an accessible form. Meanwhile, SDE does collect and maintain such data, but has not prioritized ensuring the accuracy of that data through error detection and correction, as it does with data on suspensions and expulsions. Furthermore, SDE has not used its data on school-based arrests to inform the public. Indeed, when we requested such data, SDE responded that a state law, C.G.S.A. § 10-10a(b), permits it to deny members of the public access to *any* of the discipline and school-based arrest data it maintains, even though student privacy concerns could be addressed through redaction.

SRO programs must include the following elements: clearly defined objectives that are well understood by all stakeholders; adequate training requirements; and periodic outcome-based monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that permit program administrators and the public to gauge SRO programs' performance accurately.

In the end, after the ACLU appealed to the Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, SDE agreed to release a portion of the requested information. The data it provided offer valuable insights into the rate and nature of school-based arrests in the three towns we studied. Those data also give cause for concern. One dismaying aspect of the school-to-prison pipeline is its disproportionate impact on students of color. Across the nation, such students are far more likely than their white peers to be suspended, expelled, or arrested, even when engaging in exactly the same conduct.³ In the two suburban school districts we studied, the same pattern emerges. Students of color are arrested at a rate far out of proportion to their numbers, and students of color committing certain common disciplinary infractions are more likely to be arrested than are white students committing the same offenses. School-based arrest likewise has a significant impact on very young students in the towns we studied. More specifically, our findings on the subject of school-based arrest were as follows:

- The per capita rate of school-based arrest in East Hartford, at just over 17 arrests per 1000 students during the 2006-07 school year, is the highest among the three districts. That rate also rose by nearly a third between the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years.
- In West Hartford, the per capita rate of school-based arrest was considerably lower – just over 5 arrests per 1000 students in 2006-07. But over the two years for which data were available, the likelihood that a disciplinary incident would result in a school-based arrest was higher in West Hartford than in the other two districts. During the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years, 4.9 percent of incidents resulted in arrest in West Hartford, as compared to 3.3 percent in East Hartford and 0.6 percent in Hartford.
- Hartford reports the lowest rate of school-based arrest, at around 4 arrests per 1000 students in 2006-07, but its high suspension rate likely increases the number of students arrested off campus. The same year, Hartford imposed 9,194 suspensions on a student population totaling 22,319, or approximately 412 suspensions per 1000 students. Moreover, as explained further below, discrepancies between Hartford's reported arrest totals and contemporaneous media accounts suggest that Hartford school officials may have understated their arrest totals.
- In West Hartford and East Hartford, students of color are arrested at school at a rate far out of proportion to their numbers. In 2006-07, for example, African American and Hispanic students together accounted for 69 percent of East Hartford's student population, but experienced 85 percent of its school-based

arrests. Likewise, the same year, in West Hartford, African American and Hispanic students accounted for 24 percent of the population, but experienced 63 percent of arrests.

- In West Hartford and East Hartford, students of color committing certain common disciplinary infractions are more likely to be arrested than are white students committing the very same offenses. For example, over the two years for which

In the two suburban school districts we studied, students of color are arrested at a rate far out of proportion to their numbers, and students of color committing certain common disciplinary infractions are more likely to be arrested than are white students committing the same offenses.

data are available, African American students involved in physical altercations at school in West Hartford were about twice as likely to be arrested as similarly situated white students. And during the same time period, in East Hartford, both African American and Hispanic students involved in disciplinary incidents involving drugs, alcohol, or tobacco were ten times more likely to be arrested than were similarly situated white students.

arrested at disproportionately high rates in the school districts we studied, SDE has refused to release data that could indicate whether this is so.

- Although there is reason to fear that students with disabilities are

- In all three school districts, very young students are being arrested at school. For example, in Hartford, during the two years for which data are available, 86 primary-grade students experienced school-based arrest. A majority of these were seventh or eighth graders, but 25 were in grades four through six, and 13 were in grade three or below.

d. Recommendations: School-Based Arrests

With regard to school-based arrests, we offer the following recommendations:

i. Reduce Incidence and Minimize Impacts

- School officials and other local authorities should expand preventive measures aimed at reducing the incidence of misconduct that otherwise might result in school-based arrest, e.g., positive behavioral interventions and support (“PBIS”) programs, mentoring, mental health services, substance abuse prevention, educational supports, and assistance with employment. The state of Connecticut should expand its support for such measures through funding and technical support, as well as by requiring their implementation in school districts where arrest rates exceed acceptable levels.
- Where misconduct does occur, school districts and police departments should employ interventions that attack the root causes of misbehavior, e.g., mediation, substance abuse counseling, and mental health services.
- Prevention and intervention strategies should be implemented with special attention to the two types of offenses that give rise to the greatest number of school-based arrests: those involving physical force (fights, assaults, and other physical altercations); and those involving illicit substances (drugs, alcohol, or tobacco).
- Whenever possible, SROs should impose lesser sanctions, such as ticketing, rather than arresting students.
- SROs must arrest students only as a *last resort* – only where arrest is absolutely necessary to protect school safety or for the initiation of juvenile justice proceedings.
- Where there is no alternative to school-based arrest, maximum use should be made of diversion programs, e.g., juvenile review boards.

ii. Reduce Impact on Vulnerable Populations

- Where school-based arrests disproportionately impact students of color or students with disabilities, school districts and local police departments must take concrete steps to determine the cause and to reduce those disparities.
- School districts and local police departments must also take concrete steps to reduce the impact of school-based arrests on very young students.
- The State of Connecticut should establish a coordinating body to oversee efforts to reduce disparities in the impact of school-based arrest. This body should collect detailed information on school-based arrest; should develop and implement strategies to address disparities, including measurable objectives; and should evaluate the progress of local and state agencies toward achieving those objectives.

iii. Improve Data Collection and Transparency

- Each school district should maintain its own database containing detailed information about school-based arrests.
- SDE should continue its existing efforts to collect data about school-based arrests, and should devote the necessary resources to ensure the accuracy of those data.
- SDE should continue producing publicly available annual reports on school discipline, and should expand its reporting to include information about school-based arrests. At a minimum, each school district's annual report should include the overall absolute and per capita rate of school-based arrest, as well as absolute and per capita rates of school-based arrest for each racial subgroup, students with low English proficiency, students with disabilities, and primary-grade students. These reports also should include data on the offenses for which arrests were made. Data about any subgroup should be redacted only if the number of students in that subgroup is so small that disclosure would permit the identification of individual students.

- Except where disclosure would permit the identification of individual students, the information in SDE's database of disciplinary data should be publicly available. The Connecticut Legislature should amend C.G.S.A. § 10-10a(b) to clarify that although the entire database is not, itself, a public record, the data it contains are not subject to a blanket exemption from Connecticut's public records statute. Even if the statute is not amended, SDE should not invoke it to justify a wholesale denial to the public of access to the data it collects.
- Whenever a student is arrested at school, law enforcement or court staff should report to the school district about the disposition of that student's case. School districts should then report this data to SDE.

II. SCHOOL-BASED POLICING IN THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

The presence of SROs in Connecticut schools is a relatively new development. Although the idea of a “school resource officer” – a sworn law enforcement officer stationed at a public school – is said to be half a century old,⁴ most Connecticut towns did not have SROs until the late 1990s.⁵ In many communities, police officers have long worked in schools on an occasional basis, teaching classes and conducting other forms of outreach.⁶ And a few towns hired SROs prior to the late 1990s, including Hartford, where police officers have served full-time in public schools since 1994.⁷ But as recently as 1999, there were only about fifty SROs statewide.⁸

The end of the 1990s brought a dramatic increase in the number of SROs. In part, the increase was driven by the fears of parents and educators in the wake of school shootings in Arkansas, Colorado, and elsewhere.⁹ Even though important indicators of school safety were actually improving in those years,¹⁰ many communities were genuinely fearful,¹¹ and adopted a “better safe than sorry” approach. In the words of a Plainfield selectman: “[T]hese tragedies prompted me to [support a new SRO program] I don’t want to look back and say we made a mistake You start second-guessing about public safety, and you are making a mistake.”¹²

Local public safety concerns provided communities with a further incentive to hire SROs. Efforts to establish an SRO program in Vernon gained momentum in 1998 following bomb threats and an outbreak of graffiti.¹³ In Norwalk, public support for SROs grew in 2006 after a series of crimes in the community, some of which involved local teenagers.¹⁴ And in 2007, Newington considered a proposal to hire new SROs after five high school students were arrested and charged with felonies.¹⁵ Thus the roll of Connecticut communities with SROs has continued to grow, year after year.¹⁶

Federal initiatives have encouraged and supported SRO hiring, as well. In 1998, immediately following the Columbine disaster, President Bill Clinton ordered the release of \$70 million in federal funding for school-based police officers.¹⁷ The U.S. Justice Department’s COPS in Schools (CIS) grant program, created the same year¹⁸ to help local communities pay for new SROs,¹⁹ provided more than \$9 million over the next 5 years to assist 39 Connecticut towns in hiring 74 school resource officers.²⁰ Hartford alone received \$625,000 in two CIS grants in 2000 and 2001.²¹ Federal grants also supported the hiring of scores of new Connecticut state troopers, permitting the integration of about 120 troopers into schools as SROs.²²

Even though important indicators of school safety were actually improving, many communities were genuinely fearful, and adopted a “better safe than sorry” approach.

Although some efforts to hire SROs were motivated by fears about school violence, preventing violent incidents has seldom been the sole aim of new programs. Stamford’s SRO program was designed to “encourage trust and positive relationships between police and young people.”²³ At an Enfield middle school, the SRO “fulfill[ed] a multifaceted role, such as assisting staff during medical emergencies, offering parents information about their rights in regard to discipline and teaching students how to resolve conflicts without physical violence,” and was described by

the school’s vice-principal as “an integral part of our social structure.”²⁴ Likewise, in East Hartford, SROs were encouraged “to be involved in staff development activities, to serve as instructors on occasion, to participate in school clubs.”²⁵

Some proposals to create new SRO programs have sparked controversy, raising concerns about the impact of SRO hiring on town budgets,²⁶ or the effect of armed officers in the school context,²⁷ particularly where SROs were proposed for elementary or middle schools.²⁸ During a 2002 controversy over SROs in East Hartford, then-mayor Timothy Larson cited numerous problems with the city’s SRO program, criticizing school authorities for failing to use the SRO program properly, claiming that SROs had become “de facto security guards,” and arguing that SROs should not be “a front-line security presence” in the schools.²⁹

But in many towns, SRO programs have enjoyed enthusiastic support among parents concerned about security,³⁰ as well as among teachers and administrators, who often have welcomed the arrival of SROs³¹ and, in the rare case where SRO programs have been terminated, have lamented their departure.³² Proposals to establish or retain SRO programs also have won vigorous backing from the editorial boards of some Connecticut newspapers. In one typical statement, the *Courant* lauded the decision, mentioned above, to hire state troopers to serve as SROs, declaring: “Only good can come of the troopers’ role as friends of and advisers to students at a time of widespread nervousness about violence in schools.”³³

Some proposals to create new SRO programs have sparked controversy. But in many towns, SRO programs enjoy enthusiastic support.

Once in place, SRO programs have tended to remain. The federal CIS grant program, which has helped pay for many of Connecticut’s new SRO programs, helped ensure those pro-

grams' stability by requiring local governments to retain their SROs for at least one full funding cycle after their three-year federal grants expired.³⁴ More importantly, Connecticut's SRO programs have enjoyed considerable – and continuing – public support. Educators are often heard to express appreciation for SROs' efforts, as described above, or for the continuity SRO programs create, in contrast to the old approach, under which police officers appeared in schools only occasionally or in emergencies.³⁵ Connecticut newspapers regularly offer glowing assessments of SRO programs, including profiles of SROs helping troubled children,³⁶ and report from time to time on SROs' successes in averting or stopping crimes,

as when, in February 2007, a New Britain SRO averted a planned bombing by a troubled student.³⁷ Likewise, in some communities, public officials have credited SRO programs where overall rates of misconduct or crime – even outside the school context – have declined.³⁸

The presence of SROs may increase the likelihood that students will be arrested for misconduct that otherwise would be addressed as a discipline issue.

Still, objective measures of the success of Connecticut's SRO programs can be difficult to come by. In 2002, when Windsor Locks considered hiring an SRO pursuant to a CIS grant, the *Courant* sensibly advised: "During the next four

years, the police department should record in detail the kind and number of incidents its officer handles at the school. When the time comes for the town to assume the full cost, there will be plenty of evidence to judge the program's effectiveness."³⁹ But some towns' efforts to monitor and evaluate their SRO programs appear to have been unsatisfactory. In 2001, as the town of Southington explored hiring a community resource officer for its middle schools, one school board member bemoaned the lack of useful information about the performance of the town's SRO, stationed at the high school: "We need a good analysis of what's happened at the high school for the last three to four years. . . . All we hear are rumors and gossip; we don't have any solid information."⁴⁰

Meanwhile, some towns have struggled with the challenges SRO programs present. For example, the presence of SROs may increase the likelihood that students will be arrested for misconduct that otherwise would be addressed as a discipline issue – as arguably occurred in November 2007, when two Greenwich high school students who had set off a firecracker were arrested and charged with a felony.⁴¹ Misbehaving students also may face other severe consequences when SROs intervene. In May 2008, when a Greenwich high school student "bec[ame] verbally abusive and confrontational, kicking a chair that hit a chair in which another student was sitting," an SRO shocked him three times with a Taser.⁴² In other cases, rather than deterring misbehavior or defusing volatile students, SROs may simply raise

the stakes. In May 2007, for example, when a Stratford SRO confronted a 15-year-old student who was disrupting class, the student – described as “not a student who ordinarily gets into trouble” – “swung at [the SRO] with his right arm,” after which he was arrested, transported to a detention facility, and charged with five different offenses, including assault on a police officer.⁴³ Finally, where SROs act improperly, students may suffer physical and emotional harm. In one well-publicized example, a Stamford SRO was charged with molesting two boys; in 2004, after a mistrial, he accepted probation.⁴⁴

From the late 1990s onward, an increasing number of Connecticut communities have made police officers a permanent presence in their schools by establishing SRO programs. Today, such programs remain popular, and it is clear that they have made valuable contributions. Still, uncertainty exists about how well they are really performing on the whole. Are they accomplishing the myriad purposes for which they were created? Do they represent the safest and most cost-effective means of doing so? How can existing problems be addressed, and SROs’ performance improved? By providing basic information about SRO programs in three Hartford-area school districts, this report seeks to assist Connecticut communities as they grapple with these vital questions.

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III. SROS IN THREE HARTFORD-AREA SCHOOL DISTRICTS

There is no question that guaranteeing the safety of our public schools is of the utmost importance. Nor is there any doubt that SROs can help make schools safer by mediating disputes and by deterring or halting misconduct. With rare exceptions, however, school safety should be the province of school administrators, not police officers. The constant presence of police officers in school may weaken this principle, making it more likely that minor disciplinary infractions will meet with a criminal justice response. Moreover, in order for SRO programs to succeed, three program elements are critical: 1) a clearly defined role for SROs that is well understood by all stakeholders; 2) adequate training to prepare SROs to fulfill the role set for them; and 3) periodic outcome-based monitoring and evaluation mechanisms that permit program administrators and the public to gauge SRO programs' performance accurately. Recent interviews with educators, SROs, and others in Hartford, West Hartford, and East Hartford raise questions about whether these minimum criteria are being met.

a. A Clearly Defined Role

An essential element of any SRO program is a clear statement of the role SROs are meant to play and the objectives they are meant to achieve. Some communities accomplish this by means of a memorandum of understanding (“MOU”), or other formal written agreement, between the school board and the police department, in which the mutual responsibilities of SROs and educators are spelled out. The federal CIS grant program required communities that sought funding for SRO programs to include such MOUs in their grant applications.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, according to one federally-funded study of SRO programs: “One [of]

There is no doubt that SROs can help make schools safer. With rare exceptions, however, school safety should be the province of school administrators, not police officers.

the most frequent and destructive mistakes many SRO programs make is to fail to define the SROs' roles and responsibilities in detail before – or even after – the officers take up their posts in the schools. When programs fail to do this, problems are often rampant at the beginning of the program – and often persist for months and even years.”⁴⁶ Nor is it sufficient merely to agree on a definition of the SRO's role, since “[a]dministrators – and SROs – may forget that [such] an agreement even exists.”⁴⁷ Instead, “programs need to take steps to keep the [agreement] ‘alive,’”

helping ensure that both SROs and school administrators remain informed about their roles and responsibilities.⁴⁸ In each of the three districts we studied, SROs play a variety of roles. But cause for concern exists about how clearly these roles are defined, and how well they are understood by stakeholders.

An essential element of any SRO program is a clear statement of the role SROs are meant to play and the objectives they are meant to achieve.

Hartford's schools are patrolled not only by SROs – sworn, uniformed law enforcement officers who carry firearms and are employed by the police department – but also by “special police officers,” or SPOs, who are more akin to security guards and are employed by the school district. While the rights and duties of SPOs are outlined in a collective bargaining agreement between their union and the school board, no MOU or other comparable document exists for SROs.⁴⁹ It

is clear that Hartford's SROs perform a complex role; the principal at one Hartford school described SROs' duties as “multi-faceted,” including improving student-police rapport, deterring delinquency, and even teaching classes on civics or other related subjects.⁵⁰ Less clear is whether all stakeholders understand this role in the same way. One SRO described his job as essentially the same as it would be in a non-school setting, explaining that his role was to “maintain control” and establish a “command presence.”⁵¹

In West Hartford, as well, the schools are patrolled both by SROs, sworn officers employed by the police department, and by other security personnel employed by the school district. The duties of West Hartford's SROs duties are diverse, encompassing not just law enforcement, but also mediation, building rapport with students, and teaching classes on subjects as diverse as drunk driving, date rape, and the law of search and seizure.⁵² As in Hartford, however, no written guidelines specifically define the SROs' role.⁵³

As in the other towns, East Hartford's schools are patrolled by SROs, who are paid by the police department and within its chain of command,⁵⁴ as well as by security guards.⁵⁵ But East Hartford's SRO program is governed by an MOU between the police department and the school board. Further guidance appears in an operations plan outlining basic programmatic elements, e.g., duty stations.⁵⁶ Adopted in 2006⁵⁷ – several years after SROs began patrolling East Hartford's schools – the MOU observes that an SRO “is, first, a police officer whose primary duty is enforcement of the law,” but also directs SROs to “coordinate and communicate” with principals and their designees, to “work with the principal and school personnel in his/her assigned school as a staff member,” and to “adhere to the principal's scope of authority in the school.”⁵⁸ Like SROs elsewhere, those in East Hartford are

expected to carry out a diverse range of duties, including law enforcement, counseling, mediation, and teaching.⁵⁹ According to the operations plan, the program employs a “two point approach,” addressing student misconduct both through law enforcement and through “social channeling,” or referrals to social service providers.⁶⁰ Meanwhile, the MOU outlines three goals: (1) to “[h]elp maintain a safe and secure environment that will be conducive to learning”; (2) to “[p]romote positive attitudes regarding the police role in society and to inform students of their rights and responsibilities as lawful citizens”; and (3) to “[e]stablish a liaison with school personnel in a cooperative effort to prevent disruptive or violent behaviors.”⁶¹ The existence of the MOU clearly is a positive step for East Hartford’s SRO program. Still, some doubt exists about whether individual SROs are familiar with its contents; one explained that although he thought such an agreement existed, it had never been signed, and was not in force.⁶²

b. Adequate Training

Another difficulty Connecticut’s new SRO programs have presented is that of training. Educators and law enforcement officials alike are motivated to ensure that every SRO is, in the words of a New Britain principal, “the right fit, intellectually, personally and in terms of his attitude toward the kids.”⁶³ But temperament alone is not enough. SROs also must have training in the wide variety of competencies their positions require: counseling, mentoring, basic classroom teaching, child and adolescent psychology, cultural competence, applicable legal principles, problem-solving, and mediation, just to name a few.⁶⁴ Proper training yields substantial benefits; in 2006, Bridgeport’s school security director credited the city’s SRO training efforts with helping cut its school-based arrest rate in half.⁶⁵ Conversely, as one federally-funded report concluded, “without proper training, SROs can make serious mistakes related to their relationships with students, school administrators, and parents that at best cause short-term crises and at worst jeopardize the entire program in the school.”⁶⁶

Federal programs like CIS have helped to shape local communities’ approach to training. But the training obligations the CIS program imposed were not as rigorous as they might have been. Although the program did require each community receiving a grant to send its SROs and one school administrator to a three-day training program,⁶⁷ it imposed no additional requirements, and forbade grant recipients from using program funds to pay for further training.⁶⁸ It also permitted grant recipients to delay fulfilling the training requirement until the end of the grant period,⁶⁹ even though “any delay in training can be a serious problem because SROs then have to learn their jobs by ‘sinking or swimming’ with the possible consequences of providing ineffective services and making serious mistakes on the job.”⁷⁰ Meanwhile, communities that did not participate in the CIS program have been subject only to such training requirements as they have imposed on themselves.

As with the problem of defining the SRO's role, efforts to implement appropriate training in the three towns we studied appear to have been uneven. Hartford does not impose any special training requirements on its SROs, over and above those imposed on regular police

Temperament alone is not enough. SROs also must have training in a wide variety of competencies, including counseling, mentoring, teaching, child and adolescent psychology, cultural competence, legal principles, problem-solving, and mediation.

officers. Nor does Hartford's Police Academy provide specialized SRO training, though such training is available via the Police Officer Standards & Training Council ("POST") in Meriden. West Hartford, likewise, does not impose a special training requirement on SROs.⁷¹ However, one West Hartford SRO reported having received over 100 hours of relevant training, including 36 hours of training on the role of police officers as liaisons between police departments, courts, and the schools, sponsored by the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention; and 40 hours of POST training on school violence, gangs, drug abuse, and other topics.⁷² Finally, East Hartford imposes a formal requirement that SROs undergo 40 hours of train-

ing with the National Association of School Resource Officers (NASRO).⁷³ Again, however, it is unclear how consistently this policy is implemented, since an SRO at one East Hartford school reported receiving only five hours of training.⁷⁴

c. Periodic Monitoring and Evaluation

Some mechanism for monitoring and evaluation is an indispensable element of any SRO program, since "without a formal assessment, it is very difficult to know whether the program needs improvement, and if so, what specific changes are needed."⁷⁵ Outcome-based monitoring is especially useful: "Holding SROs accountable for *results/outcomes* (e.g., reducing school-based crime and disorder problems) rather than *activities performed* (e.g., number of classroom presentations) leads to more effective policing and a reduction in school crime and disorder problems."⁷⁶ In particular, those administering SRO programs need to know how often SROs are imposing the severest sanction at their disposal: school-based arrest. They need to know which students are arrested, on what basis, with what procedural protections, and with what result. Ordinary members of the public likewise are entitled to know how well the officers who police their children's schools, and whose salaries their tax dollars pay, are performing.

Here, too, the CIS grant program has helped shape some Connecticut communities' approaches to monitoring and evaluation. Unfortunately, while the CIS program required grant recipients to provide the Justice Department with periodic reporting on programmatic elements, including "force demographics, baseline sworn force levels, and community policing activities in and around primary and secondary schools," as well as financial status and hiring,⁷⁷ it did not expressly require reporting on outcomes. Nor did it require that any of these reports be made public. And its requirements applied only in those towns that received CIS grants, and there only during the three-year grant period.

In the districts we studied, current efforts to monitor SRO performance – and in particular school-based arrests – are inadequate. State law requires law enforcement authorities to provide written notice to school officials whenever students are arrested for Class A misdemeanors or felonies.⁷⁸ But it does not require school officials to monitor arrests, or even to keep the reports they receive. Similarly, each time a significant disciplinary incident occurs at school, including one that leads to a school-based arrest, the school district must prepare an incident report, called an ED166, and submit it online to the State Department of Education (SDE), but there is no requirement that districts maintain these records themselves.⁷⁹ In the absence of such requirements, neither school officials nor law enforcement authorities in the districts we studied maintain school-based arrest data in an accessible or usable form. At the state level, SDE does maintain a database containing all the data local school districts have provided via the ED166 form – but it has not used that data to inform the public about school-based arrests.

In Hartford, the police department maintains records of all arrests, including arrests of students at school, but it does not isolate school-based arrest data, and thus cannot easily track the rate or nature of those arrests. School officials in Hartford do not monitor this information, either. They do prepare "unusual incident reports" when students engage in certain types of misconduct, some of which may result in arrest, but these reports do not constitute an accurate record of school-based arrests, since an arrest may occur without generating an unusual incident report. Nor is there any centralized collection point for these reports.⁸⁰

In West Hartford, the situation is similar. The police department does not track school-based arrests specifically. In response to the ACLU's request for school-based arrest data, the department responded that the request "d[id] not coincide with the categories in which we store the information."⁸¹ The police department agreed to task staff with culling the necessary information from the larger body of arrest reports – but school-based arrest data were by no means readily available for evaluation or other purposes. Nor do school officials in West Hartford maintain such data. They do temporarily maintain the arrest reports they receive from law enforcement authorities pursuant to state law. But at the end of each school

year, they shred all such records⁸² – protecting student privacy, but also rendering themselves unable to say whether the rate or nature of school-based arrests changes from one year to the next.

In East Hartford, the MOU that governs the SRO program imposes specific reporting obligations, requiring SROs to prepare investigative reports, arrest reports, juvenile referrals, and monthly activity reports, and to submit all those documents to their supervisors at the police department.⁸³ However, as in the other two districts, neither the police department nor the school district specifically tracks school-based arrests.

Nor does it appear that local and state officials tasked with adjudicating youthful offenders keep track of how many students are arrested at school, and for what. Superior Court staff maintain no specific records of this type.⁸⁴ A 2006 strategic plan for improving juvenile justice prepared by the Child Welfare League for the Department of Children and Families and the Court Support Services Division of the state judicial branch offered insights into the need for better monitoring: “Several of the most pressing problems in the juvenile justice system relate to certain populations that are not served adequately or as successfully as necessary. To design the most appropriate and effective services for all children and youth, agencies must better understand the scope of and trends in various populations.”⁸⁵ As they seek

Those administering SRO programs need to know which students are arrested, on what basis, with what procedural protections, and with what result. Members of the public likewise are entitled to know how well the officers who police their children’s schools, and whose salaries they pay, are performing.

to improve their information-gathering and analytical efforts, state and local administrators should bear in mind the special problem of school-based arrests.

Perhaps the best-informed public officials on the subject of school-based arrests are those at SDE, which maintains the database of ED166 reports mentioned above, and even uses that data to produce annual reports on school discipline in each Connecticut school district, as well as for the state as a whole.⁸⁶ But SDE’s reporting falls short in basic respects. For example, while the annual reports indicate the number of students in each racial subgroup who are found to have engaged in certain broad categories of misconduct, it offers

no indication about the punishments students from the various groups received. The annual reports say nothing about students with disabilities. And on the topic of school-based arrests, they are silent.

Even when directly requested to release information about school-based arrests to the public, SDE has resisted. Responding to an ACLU public records request on this subject, SDE invoked a state statute, C.G.S.A. § 10-10a(b), which states that the ED166 database itself is not a “public record” under Connecticut’s Freedom of Information law.⁸⁷ Under this statute, SDE maintained, it was empowered to refuse to release *any* of the information the database contains. It also cited privacy concerns, even though such concerns could have been addressed through redaction. In the end, in order to settle ACLU’s appeal of its decision to the Connecticut Freedom of Information Commission, SDE offered to release data *either* about the race of arrested students *or* about the gender and disability status of those students. Because the ACLU chose the former option, this report describes certain racial disparities, but says nothing about how school-based arrest in the three districts affects male or female students in particular, or students with disabilities.

Finally, SDE itself has expressed concerns about the reliability of its school-based arrest data. Because school district personnel sometimes make mistakes in completing the ED166 form, SDE “cleans up” the data it receives, seeking out and correcting errors. Its work on this difficult task has been more intensive in some areas than in others, with the most common disciplinary sanctions – suspension and expulsion – receiving more attention than rarer phenomena like school-based arrests. For this reason, even while providing information about school-based arrests, SDE cautioned against overreliance on its accuracy. Still, SDE’s school-based arrest data give no indication of wholesale inaccuracy. They are also by far the best data available on this critically important subject. Indeed, given the inadequacy of local efforts to collect and maintain school-based arrest data, there simply is no other source.

IV. SCHOOL-BASED ARRESTS – AN ANALYSIS OF THE DATA

Each time a student is arrested at school, an institution that was designed to prepare young people for fulfilling and productive lives instead has delivered one into the juvenile justice system. Each time, educators and community members should ask: Was this arrest truly a last resort? Or could it have been avoided? Was it a rational, proportional, and evenhanded response to misconduct? And was it carried out without regard to race, gender, or disability? Recent SDE data on the subject of school-based arrest in Hartford, East Hartford, and West Hartford raise serious concerns about the answers to these questions. Some notable findings:

- East Hartford's per capita rate of school-based arrest, at just over 17 arrests per 1000 students in 2006-07, is the highest among the three districts. That rate also rose by nearly a third between 2005-06 and 2006-07.
- In West Hartford, the per capita rate of arrest in was considerably lower – just over 5 arrests per 1000 students in 2006-07. But over the two years for which data were available, the likelihood that a disciplinary incident would result in a school-based arrest was higher than in the other two districts. During the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years, 4.9 percent of incidents resulted in arrest in West Hartford, as compared to 3.3 percent in East Hartford and 0.6 percent in Hartford.
- Hartford reports the lowest rate of school-based arrest, at around 4 arrests per 1000 students in 2006-07, but its high suspension rate – in that year, 412 suspensions for every 1000 students – likely increases the number of students arrested off campus. Moreover, as explained further below, discrepancies between Hartford's reported arrest totals and contemporaneous media accounts suggest that Hartford school officials may have understated their arrest totals.
- In West Hartford and East Hartford, students of color are arrested at school at a rate far out of proportion to their numbers. In 2006-07, African American and Hispanic students together accounted for 69 percent of the student population in East Hartford, but experienced 85 percent of school-based arrests. Likewise, the same year, in West Hartford, African American and Hispanic students accounted for 24 percent of the population, but experienced 63 percent of arrests.
- Moreover, in both West Hartford and East Hartford, students of color committing certain common disciplinary infractions are more likely to be arrested than

Each time a student is arrested at school, an institution designed to prepare young people for fulfilling and productive lives instead has delivered one into the juvenile justice system.


are white students committing the same offenses. For example, over the two years for which data are available, African American students involved in physical altercations at school in West Hartford were twice as likely to be arrested as similarly situated white students. And during the same time period in East Hartford, both African American and Hispanic students involved in disciplinary incidents involving drugs, alcohol, or tobacco were ten times more likely to be arrested than were similarly situated white students.



- Although there is reason to fear that students with disabilities are arrested at disproportionately high rates in the school districts we studied, the state of Connecticut refuses to release data that could indicate whether this is so.

- In all three school districts, very young students are being arrested at school. In Hartford, for example, during the two years for which data are available, 86 primary-grade students experienced school-based arrest. A majority of these were seventh or eighth graders, but 25 were in grades four through six, and 13 were in grade three or below.

a. Demographics

Rates of school-based arrest in these three Hartford-area school districts are best viewed against the backdrop of the three districts' widely divergent demographics. Hartford's school system is by far the largest, with more students than the other two districts combined. Hartford's schools are attended almost entirely by students of color, while a large majority of West Hartford's students are white, and East Hartford is divided more evenly among African American, Hispanic, and white students. Each school district also has a relatively small Asian American population, in 2006-07 ranging from 1 percent in Hartford to just under 10 percent in West Hartford, and even smaller numbers of Native American students, of whom, in 2006-07, there were just over 100 in the three districts combined.






Hartford is also the least affluent of the three districts, with more than two thirds of its students eligible for free or reduced-price meals. In East Hartford the figure is roughly half. West Hartford is substantially wealthier: Only about one seventh of its students are eligible. The differences between the three districts' economic profiles also are reflected in the decisions SDE has made in assigning them to District Reference Groups (DRGs). SDE describes the

DRG system as “a classification of districts whose students’ families are similar in education, income, occupation, and need, and that have roughly similar enrollment.” Each DRG has a letter designation, with “A” denoting the most affluent districts, and “I” denoting the school districts of Connecticut’s largest cities, which serve the state’s poorest families. Thus Hartford’s designation is “I,” while West Hartford’s is “B” and East Hartford’s is “H.”

The three districts’ racial makeup has not changed dramatically over the past three years. Still, demographic shifts are underway. In West Hartford, students of color still constitute a minority, but increased in number between the 2004-05 and 2006-07 school years. In Hartford, the number of Hispanic students dropped slightly, while the other subgroups grew. And in East Hartford, the opposite occurred: the number of Hispanic students increased, while the other subgroups shrank.



b. The Data

As explained above, the ACLU filed public records requests with SDE seeking disciplinary and school-based arrest data from Hartford, East Hartford, and West Hartford for the 2004–05, 2005–06, and 2006–07 school years. The data SDE provided in response offer rich insights into the administration of discipline in these districts, particularly with respect to the impact of school-based arrests on students of color. Again, unfortunately, SDE declined to release any data that would permit an analysis of the role disability and gender might play in school-based arrests. Therefore, although this report contains an analysis of the relationship between race and school-based arrest, it contains no such analysis for disability or gender, or for the relationship between race and these two categories.

One other limitation of the data: Until 2005–06, the ED166 form did not require school districts to report school-based arrests. Thus no data on arrest rates are available for any earlier year. However, the ED166 form for 2004–05 *did* ask whether each school disciplinary incident was reported to the police. The resulting police report data are not the same as arrest data, since not every incident that is reported to the police results in arrest. However, the number of police reports does at least provide an upper bound for the number of school-based arrests. Thus, in some of the tables that follow, the two types of data appear side by side. Nevertheless, it is important to bear in mind the difference between them.


In the suburban districts, students of color are arrested at a rate far out of proportion to their numbers. Moreover, students of color committing certain common disciplinary infractions are more likely to be arrested than are white students committing the same offenses.

c. School-Based Arrests


Available data indicate that there is reason to be concerned about school-based arrests in each of the three Hartford-area school districts we examined. They suggest a need to control absolute and per capita rates of arrest, especially in East Hartford. They likewise indicate a continuing need to monitor the rate at which disciplinary incidents result in arrest, especially in West Hartford. And they point out the importance of accurate data collection, especially in light of concerns about Hartford's arrest reporting.

Because the ED166 data describe all disciplinary incidents, not just those that resulted in school-based arrests, it is possible to view school-based arrest rates in the context of all infractions. In all three districts, the total number of incident reports made via the ED166 form increased sharply between 2004-05 and 2005-06. This appears to have resulted from a change in the reporting protocol, rather than from a spike in misbehavior. In 2005-06, the state expanded its reporting requirements, which previously had covered only 17 offenses, including, e.g., fighting and vandalism, to include 53 incident types. The list grew again in 2006-07, to include 88 much more narrowly defined incident types, ranging from arson and stabbing to “pulling out chair from beneath individual.”

Over all three years, Hartford reported the greatest number of students involved in disciplinary incidents, both in absolute terms and relative to its student population. Between 2005-06 and 2006-07, the number of students for whom incident reports were filed dropped slightly in the two suburban districts, while rising in Hartford. The table below displays per capita ED166 reporting rates as incident reports per 1000 students.⁸⁸




Rates of school-based arrest in the three districts display different trends. In Hartford, like the number of incident reports, the number of arrests increased slightly between 2005-06 and 2006-07, from 82 to 95. But in West Hartford, the decline in the number of arrests, from 121 to 52, was much steeper than the decline in the incident reporting rate. And in East Hartford, even as the number of incident reports fell, the number of school-based arrests rose, from 102 to 132.




i. East Hartford: A High and Rising School-Based Arrest Rate

An examination of per capita rates of school-based arrest, displayed below as arrests per 1000 students, likewise indicates improvements in West Hartford and consistency in Hartford. But the data raise concerns about East Hartford, which not only had the highest per capita school-based arrest rate during the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years, but in the latter year reported a 32 percent increase in arrests per capita.




ii. West Hartford: An Elevated Likelihood of Arrest

West Hartford, by contrast, reported declining absolute and per capita rates of school-based arrest. Moreover, the likelihood that an ED166-reported disciplinary infraction would result in arrest decreased sharply in West Hartford between the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years. However, over the two years for which data were available, the ratio of incident reports to arrests was still higher than in West Hartford than in either of the other districts.



iii. *Hartford: Out-of-School Suspensions, Questionable Reporting*

At first glance, the data suggest that Hartford is relying less heavily than the suburban districts on school-based arrests as a means of maintaining order. But Hartford’s arrest rates must be viewed in the context of its overall disciplinary approach. While students in Hartford may indeed be less likely to be arrested, they are much more likely to be suspended.



In 2006-07, for example, while reporting a comparatively low 95 school-based arrests, Hartford imposed 9,194 out-of-school suspensions – on a student population of just over 22,000, or approximately 412 suspensions per 1000 students. In fact, Hartford’s rate of suspension that year was the second-highest rate in the state, after Bridgeport.⁸⁹ Rather than deterring misbehavior, or redirecting students who otherwise might be arrested, this approach may simply push students onto the street, where arrest is more likely.⁹⁰ In 2007, according to the Hartford Police Department, its officers arrested 2,135 young people under the age of 18.⁹¹ Available data do not indicate how many of these were school-day arrests of students who had received one of the thousands of out-of-school suspensions the Hartford school district imposed that year.

It also appears possible that Hartford school officials have understated the number of school-based arrests occurring in their schools. According to the city’s ED166 filings, during the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years, there were 177 arrests at the three Hartford high schools, or about 89 arrests per year. But the Hartford Police Department reports that

between September 2005 and April 2008, at those same three schools, its officers made 396 arrests of people under the age of 18 – for a yearly average of 132.⁹² The ED166 total refers only to true school-based arrests – that is, arrests occurring during the school day or at school functions – while the latter total includes all arrests of minors occurring at the addresses where the three high schools are located. Still, the discrepancy is troubling.

Another sign that the problem may be one of reporting: In a May 2006 *New York Times* article, an SRO at Hartford Public High School stated that there had been 150 felony arrests that year at his school *alone*. The same article cited a report by an SRO at Bulkeley High School that there had been 11 felony arrests that year in his building.⁹³ The total number of arrests reported by the Hartford school district via the ED166 form that year was 82. Thus, if these two officers are to be believed, the number of felony arrests at their two schools was about *double* the number of felony and misdemeanor arrests reported by Hartford school officials as having occurred at all forty of Hartford's schools put together.

d. Racial Disparities

Arrest of a student at school is a serious sanction, to be deployed only when necessary, and only with the greatest respect for its consequences. There is no excuse for school-based arrest practices that impact students differently depending on race. But arrest data from the Hartford-area school districts we studied suggest that such practices may indeed be in use.


Because African American and Hispanic students make up the vast majority of the student population in Hartford itself, it is not surprising that most of the students arrested at school in Hartford during the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years were members of those groups. More surprising, and deeply troubling, are the data from the two suburban school districts, where the numbers of white, African American, Hispanic, and Asian American students are more balanced. In those districts, students of color are arrested at rates far out of proportion to their actual numbers. Moreover, the ED166 data indicate that students of color who commit certain common infractions

There is no excuse for school-based arrest practices that impact students differently depending on race.


– for example, incidents involving the use of physical force, like fights, or incidents involving drugs – are more likely to be arrested than are white students committing the very same offenses.

i. Disproportionate Impact on Students of Color


Especially in the suburban districts, school-based arrest practices impact students of color disproportionately. In West Hartford, during the 2005-06 and 2006-07 school years, African American, Hispanic, and white students were arrested in approximately equal numbers – even though white students far outnumbered African American and Hispanic students there. And in East Hartford, African American and Hispanic students were arrested in much greater numbers than were white students, even though white, African American, and Hispanic students comprised roughly equal portions of the student population.



With few exceptions, across all three districts and in both years for which school-based arrest data are available, students of color were arrested at rates disproportionate to their representation in the student population. For example, in 2006-07, in East Hartford, African American and Hispanic students together accounted for 69 percent of the overall student population, but 85 percent of school-based arrests. In the same year, in West Hartford, African American and Hispanic students together accounted for 24 percent of the population, but 63 percent of arrests. The following table displays the differential between each group's share of the student population and its share of arrests.



Also instructive are direct comparisons of the rates at which different student groups experienced arrest. For example, in West Hartford, in 2005-06, for every 1000 Hispanic students in the student population, there were 30 arrests of Hispanic students, and for every 1000 African American students, there were 43 arrests of African American students. By contrast, for every 1000 white students, there were only 5 arrests. Thus the rate of arrest among Hispanic students was 6 times higher, and that among African American students was more than 8 times higher, than the corresponding rate for white students. The next year, even as the overall rate of school-based arrest declined, similar disparities prevailed. In East Hartford, meanwhile, in both 2005-06 and 2006-07, the rates of arrest among African American and Hispanic students, per 1000 students, were roughly double the corresponding figures for white students.




ii. Effects and Causes

That large numbers of students of color are arrested at school is cause for grave concern, both for communities of color and for the community at large, given the powerful negative impacts arrest and prosecution almost invariably have on a young person's life: psychological and emotional trauma; educational disruption and increased risk of dropping out;⁹⁴ diminished employment prospects;⁹⁵ and of course the threat of incarceration, with its concomitant emotional and physical dangers. Research on the impact of juvenile arrests suggests that arresting students at school actually *increases* the likelihood that those students will commit future offenses, as well as increasing the likelihood that they will be arrested and incarcerated as adults.⁹⁶ Thus, for some students, being arrested at school means being thrust directly into the school-to-prison pipeline.

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
But why are so many students of color arrested at school? In fact, racial disparities like these appear in jurisdictions nationwide.⁹⁷ And they are not ascribable simply to differences in student behavior, since they persist even when comparisons are made between students who have committed the exact same offenses.⁹⁸ Rather, research on this subject indicates that in some communities, such disparities result from conscious or unconscious race-based decision-making.⁹⁹ Available data do not permit strong conclusions about the causes of racially disparate rates of school-based arrest in the Hartford-area school districts we studied. But the existence of these research findings in other jurisdictions where such disparities exist raises serious concerns.

At first glance, one may be encouraged to note that in the districts we studied, during the two school years for which school-based arrest data are available, when a student was involved in a disciplinary incident resulting in an ED166 report, the race of that student appeared to have little bearing on whether that incident led ultimately to an arrest. In both West Hartford and East Hartford, the rates at which disciplinary incidents led to arrest were higher for African American and Hispanic students than for white students, but the differences were slight.¹⁰⁰




ii. Incidents Involving Physical Force

Unfortunately, far more dramatic disparities appear when one examines the categories of disciplinary incidents that account for the majority of the school-based arrests in the districts we studied, such as those incidents that involved the use of physical force against another person. The following table displays two-year totals, across all three districts, for the ten incident types that most often resulted in school-based arrests.



Taken together, incidents in which a student used physical force against another person – in the parlance of the ED166, this broad category includes “fighting/altercation/physical aggression,” “physical altercation,” and “battery/assault” – produced far more school-based arrests than any other type of incident. In Hartford and East Hartford, the likelihood that such an incident would produce an arrest did not appear to depend heavily or at all on the race of the offender. But the same cannot be said of West Hartford. There, both Hispanic and African American students involved in incidents of this type were more likely to be arrested than were white students committing the same offense. In fact, the rate at which African American students committing such offenses were arrested (32 arrests among 140 offenses, or an arrest rate of about 23 percent) was more than *double* the comparable rate for white students (18 arrests among 160 offenses, or an arrest rate of about 11 percent).




Disparities in the rate at which students are arrested for this type of incident are troubling not only because they account for such a large percentage of school-based arrests, but also because they may exemplify a broader trend, observed in other school districts, toward over-punishing students of color for offenses whose definition is largely subjective. No clear objective definition exists for the terms “fight,” “physical aggression,” or “physical altercation,” so the determination that a student has engaged in such conduct may require educators to exercise considerable discretion. But research suggests that educators view certain behaviors more harshly when observed in students of color than when observed in white students (e.g., a white student who talks back is cited for “insubordination,” while an African American student engaging in the same conduct is found to have engaged in “threatening”).¹⁰¹

Hispanic and African American students involved in physical altercations were more likely to be arrested than were white students committing the same offense.


iv. Drug/Alcohol/Tobacco Offenses

Even more striking disparities appear when one considers the incident type that led to the second greatest number of arrests: incidents involving drugs, alcohol, or tobacco. In both suburban districts, African American and Hispanic students involved in such incidents were much more likely to be arrested than were similarly situated white students. In West Hartford, again, the arrest rate was much higher among African American students (4 arrests among 14 offenses, or about 27 percent) and Hispanic students (5 arrests among 16 offenses, or about 31 percent) than among white students (8 arrests among 82 offenses, or about 10 percent). The disparities were even starker in East Hartford, where the arrest rates for African American students (15 arrests among 40 offenses, or about 38 percent) and Hispanic students (8 arrests among 24 offenses, or about 33 percent) were *10 times higher* than the rate for white students (1 arrest among 29 offenses, or about 3 percent).

African American and Hispanic students committing offenses involving drugs, alcohol, or tobacco were much more likely to be arrested than were similarly situated white students.



Of course, the heading “drugs/alcohol/tobacco” sweeps in a variety of offenses, everything from possessing a cigarette to selling illegal drugs. If some students are punished less severely than others for offenses coded as “drugs/alcohol/tobacco,” perhaps it is because the offenses they are committing are less serious. Ruling out this possibility requires narrowing the category of offenses under consideration – in other words, considering only students who have engaged in the very same behavior. Even if one takes this approach, setting aside all offenses involving tobacco or alcohol, as well as all offenses involving the sale or attempted sale of illegal drugs, and examining only those incidents that involved illegal drug possession or use, racial disparities persist. On this analysis, the number of school-based arrests in West Hartford is too small to represent meaningfully here. But East Hartford’s arrest totals continue to suggest a problem.



In East Hartford, during the two-year period for which data are available, the arrest rate among Hispanic students (5 arrests among 11 offenders, or about 45 percent) was five times higher, and the rate among African American students (12 arrests among 18 offenders, or 67 percent) was *eight times higher*, than the corresponding rate among white students (1 arrest among 13 offenders, or about 8 percent).

e. Disparities Based on Disability

Another student subgroup that often is disproportionately impacted by harsh school disciplinary tactics is students with disabilities.¹⁰² In 2006–07, students with disabilities were suspended at more than twice the rate among regular education students.¹⁰³ SDE itself has acknowledged that in 2004–05, nearly 12 percent of special education students statewide were suspended or expelled, while for general education students, the figure was just under 6 percent.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, the same year, special education students received out-of-school suspensions at a higher rate than general education students in all three of the Hartford-area school districts we studied.¹⁰⁵


Unfortunately, as explained above, SDE declined to provide the ACLU with any information about how school-based arrest practices are affecting students with disabilities. Thus, although experience suggests it is likely that students with disabilities are arrested at school at a rate out of proportion to their representation in the overall student population, it is impossible to know for sure. SDE has offered no plausible rationale for its secrecy on this point. Privacy concerns were not in issue, since the ACLU sought no individually identifiable information. Particularly with regard to special education students, an especially vulnerable population who are at risk of being punished for the very behaviors that manifest their exceptionalities, information about the manner in which Hartford-area schools are imposing the severe sanction of school-based arrest should be readily available to the public.

f. Youthful Offenders


A final concern arising is the frequency with which very young students are the subject of school-based arrests. The ED166 data SDE provided do not indicate the age of the students arrested, only their grade level. Nevertheless, arrest rates for primary-grade students, and in particular for those in elementary school, indicate clearly that even very young students are being arrested in each of the three school districts we studied. As discussed above, the consequences of school-based arrest are often dire. The imposition of this sanction, in the three Hartford-area districts we studied, as a means of controlling and/or punishing the behavior of students as young as first and second grade, and even kindergarten, is difficult to comprehend.

Not surprisingly, the absolute rate of school-based arrest over two years was highest in Hartford, the largest of the three districts, where 86 primary-grade students were arrested during the 2005–06 and 2006–07 school years. Hartford's absolute arrest rate also nearly doubled in 2006–07. But the highest per capita arrest rate for primary-grade students, over


two years, was in East Hartford, where among a student population only about a third the size of Hartford's, 58 primary-grade students were arrested. Arrest rates in both East Hartford and West Hartford declined from 2005-06 to 2006-07.



Although most of the primary-grade students arrested in the three districts were in seventh or eighth grade, students in lower grades were arrested as well. The focus on junior high school was least evident in Hartford.



As with overall rates of school-based arrest, school-based arrest rates for primary-grade students were greatest among students of color. In West Hartford, where students of color are far outnumbered by white students, most of the primary grade students who were arrested were African American or Hispanic. And in East Hartford, despite more balanced demographics, only a very small minority of the primary grade students who were arrested were white. Youth, then, is no shield: the disparate impact of school-based arrest on students of color in Hartford-area schools extends even to the very youngest students.



The ED166 data do not permit detailed examinations of individual cases. But they do offer troubling glimpses. One wonders: What kind of threat did a Hispanic fifth grader in East Hartford make, during the 2006-07 school year, that required school officials to have him arrested? What could possibly have justified the arrest of two Hispanic fourth graders in West Hartford, in 2005-06, for “insubordination”? Or the arrest of two African American second graders in Hartford, the following year, one of whom was accused only of theft? Even more startling is the case of the African American first grader in Hartford who was arrested in 2006-07 for “leaving school grounds.” And perhaps most troubling of all: the decision to impose the sanction of arrest, for battery, during the 2006-07 school year, on a Hispanic kindergartner.

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

Our goal, in preparing this report, and in offering these recommendations, has been a simple one: by improving the performance of SRO programs, and by reducing the impact of school-based arrests, to help ensure that Connecticut's public schools are safe, happy, and healthy places of learning for all the state's children. Based upon the foregoing analysis, the ACLU offers the following recommendations to Connecticut policymakers, educators, and law enforcement authorities.

a. School Resource Officer Programs

i. Clarify Program Objectives

- Every SRO program should have in place formal written policies describing the objectives of the program and the rules that will govern its operation. These policies should be publicly available.
- Where school districts and local police departments operate SRO programs in partnership, they should have in place publicly available MOUs or other formal agreements clearly establishing their mutual duties.

ii. Ensure Adequate Training

- The substance of the policies and agreements governing each SRO program should be made known to all stakeholders, including SROs themselves, and this knowledge should be refreshed on a regular basis.
- The State of Connecticut should establish minimum standardized training requirements for SROs, including but not limited to training in counseling, mediation, child and adolescent psychology, cultural competence, and applicable legal principles.
- Local compliance with state SRO training requirements should be a precondition for receipt of law enforcement grants.

iii. Monitor and Evaluate Performance

- Each school district should annually assess the success of its SRO program, with particular attention to the rate and nature of school-based arrests, and publish the results of that assessment.
- The State of Connecticut should support local efforts by promulgating a detailed set of best practices for SRO program monitoring and evaluation, including a metric local districts could use in measuring the success of their SRO programs,¹⁰⁶ and by providing local officials with technical assistance.

b. School-Based Arrests*i. Reduce Incidence and Minimize Impacts*

- School officials and other local authorities should expand preventive measures aimed at reducing the incidence of misconduct that otherwise might result in school-based arrest, e.g., positive behavioral interventions and support (“PBIS”) programs, mentoring, mental health services, substance abuse prevention, educational supports, and assistance with employment.¹⁰⁷ The state of Connecticut should expand its support for such measures through funding and technical support, as well as by requiring their implementation in school districts where arrest rates exceed acceptable levels.¹⁰⁷
- Where misconduct does occur, school districts and police departments should employ interventions that attack the root causes of misbehavior, e.g., mediation, substance abuse counseling, and mental health services.¹⁰⁸
- Prevention and intervention strategies should be implemented with special attention to the two types of offenses that give rise to the greatest number of school-based arrests: those involving physical force (fights, assaults, and other physical altercations); and those involving illicit substances (drugs, alcohol, or tobacco).
- Whenever possible, SROs should impose lesser sanctions, such as ticketing, rather than arresting students.

- SROs must arrest students only as a *last resort* – only where arrest is absolutely necessary to protect school safety or for the initiation of juvenile justice proceedings.
- Where there is no alternative to school-based arrest, maximum use should be made of diversion programs,¹⁰⁹ e.g., juvenile review boards.

ii. Reduce Impacts on Vulnerable Populations

- Where school-based arrests disproportionately impact students of color, or students with disabilities, school districts and local police departments must take concrete steps to determine the cause and to reduce those disparities.
- School districts and local police departments must also take concrete steps to reduce the impact of school-based arrests on very young students.
- The State of Connecticut should establish a coordinating body to oversee efforts to reduce disparities in the impact of school-based arrest. This body should collect detailed information on school-based arrest; should develop and implement strategies to address disparities, including measurable objectives; and should evaluate the progress of local and state agencies toward achieving those objectives.

iii. Improve Data Collection and Transparency

- Each school district should maintain its own database containing detailed information about school-based arrests.
- SDE should continue its existing efforts to collect data about disciplinary incidents and school-based arrests using the ED166 form, and should devote the necessary resources to ensure the accuracy of its school-based arrest data.
- SDE should continue producing publicly available annual reports on school discipline, and should expand its reporting to include information about school-based arrests. At a minimum, each school district's annual report should include the overall absolute and per capita rate of school-based arrest, as well as absolute and per capita rates of school-based arrest for each racial subgroup, students with low English proficiency, students with disabilities, and primary-grade students.

These reports also should include data on the offenses for which arrests were made. Data about any subgroup should be redacted only if the number of students in that subgroup is so small that disclosure would permit the identification of individual students.

- Except where disclosure would permit the identification of individual students, the information in SDE's database of ED166 reports should be publicly available. The Connecticut Legislature should amend C.G.S.A. § 10-10a(b) to clarify that although the entire database is not, itself, a public record, the data it contains is not subject to a blanket exemption from Connecticut's public records statute. Even if the statute is not amended, SDE should not invoke it to justify a wholesale denial to the public of access to the ED166 data it collects.
- Whenever a student is arrested at school, law enforcement or court staff should report to the school district about the disposition of that student's case. School districts should report this data to SDE, and it should be included in the ED166 database.

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ENDNOTES

¹ Throughout this report, the term “school-based arrests” is used to describe arrests of public school students that occur on school grounds during the school day, on school grounds during other school-sponsored events (e.g., dances, athletic contests) or at school-sponsored events that take place off-campus.

² The ACLU also has partnered with the Yale Law School Human Rights Clinic to examine the operation of the school-to-prison pipeline in New Haven from an international human rights perspective. That analysis is the subject of a companion report.

³ See Russell J. Skiba, *Zero Tolerance, Zero Evidence: An Analysis of School Disciplinary Practice* (Indiana Education Policy Center), August 2000, at 11-12, available at <http://www.indiana.edu/~safeschl/ztze.pdf>; *No More Children Left Behind Bars: A Briefing on Youth Gang Violence and Juvenile Crime Prevention* (Charles Hamilton Houston Institute for Race and Justice), March 6, 2008, at 14, available at <http://chhi.podconsulting.com/assets/documents/publications/NO%20MORE%20CHILDREN%20LEFT%20BEHIND.pdf>

⁴ Cathy Girouard, *Fact Sheet #5: School Resource Officer Training Program* (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention), March 2001. Girouard explains that the SRO idea “evolved during the 1950’s in Flint, [Michigan], where community policing had been implemented and police officers had become involved in schools. The concept flourished during the 1960’s and 1970’s (predominantly in Florida), then languished in the 1980’s, and did not gain momentum nationwide until the mid-1990’s.”

⁵ Ann-Marie Adams, *Officer Walks a New Beat: Stephen Novak Serves as School Resource Officer at Illing School*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 2, 2000.

⁶ See James J. Strillacci, *Town Talk: Police in School*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 10, 1994 (“The students and staff of West Hartford schools . . . are accustomed to the presence of police in their schools. Community Relations officers address classes from kindergarten through 12th grade on such topics as ‘stranger danger,’ child abuse, gangs, drug and alcohol resistance, and date rape.”); Robin Stansbury & Cynde Rodriguez, *Schools Learning Threat Response: Student Violence Has Educators Focused on Security Measures*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, May 27, 1998 (describing regular school visits by “outreach officers”).

⁷ Liz Halloran, *Police Assigned to City High Schools: Role of Officers May Go Beyond Security*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 19, 1994. This was not the first time Hartford had stationed police officers in its schools. The city had implemented and then discontinued a similar program two decades earlier. *Id.* SROs first appeared in East Hartford’s schools in 2001. Jim Farrell, *Officers Take School Beat in Stride: Duties Range Beyond Law Enforcement*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 3, 2001. The town disbanded the SRO program for lack of funding in 2006, but reinstated it later the same year. Dan Uhlinger, *Resource Officer Agreement Debated*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, June 16, 2006; Dan Uhlinger, *Town Bolsters Youth Effort*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 4, 2006. West Hartford began its SRO program in 1998. *Schools Learning Threat Response*, *supra*.

⁸ Tracy Gordon Fox, *State Police Reach Out to Schools*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, July 25, 1999; Christine Dempsey, *School Officers Meet Amid Heightened Expectations*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, May 8, 1999.

⁹ See, e.g., Michael Kolber, *Police Officer to Be Assigned to Schools*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 18, 2000 (“Especially since the 1999 school shooting in Littleton, Colo., police have been increasing their visibility in schools.”); *Editorial: State Troopers in Schools*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 19, 1999 (“School resource officers represent a growing trend across the nation. In part, they are a preventive response to the shootings at Columbine High School and other instances when students turned violent.”).

¹⁰ Rick Green, *Fewer Firearms Showing Up in Schools, But Wary State Educators Still Preparing for Worst*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 11, 1999. Indeed, from 1992 to 2004, the rate of serious, violent victimization was lower at school than elsewhere every single year. *Press Release: Serious Violent Crime at School Continues to Fall* (U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics), December 3, 2006, available at <http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/press/iscs06pr.htm>.

¹¹ See *1999 Annual Report on School Safety* (U.S. Departments of Education and Justice), at iv, available at <http://www.ed.gov/PDFDocs/InterimAR.pdf> (“[N]otwithstanding the disturbing reports of violence in our schools, they are becoming even safer. But the fears of students, teachers and parents are real.”).

¹² David Lightman & Cynde Rodriguez, *Federal Funds to Boost Security in Schools*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, April 24, 1999. Likewise, for some in the town of Colchester, where town officials debated an SRO proposal a week after the shootings at Columbine, the tragedy left little room for debate. Said one school board member: “We just have to. The more presence we have in terms of partnerships with the police and the kids feeling safer – anytime we can do something like that, I think we have to.” Tracy Gordon Fox, *Making Security a Top Priority: Boards Propose Assigning Police Officer to Schools*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 26, 1999.

¹³ Lisa Goldberg, *Grant to Hire School Officer Is Still Within Town’s Grasp*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 24, 1999.

¹⁴ John Nickerson, *Police Expected at City High Schools*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), Oct. 5, 2006.

¹⁵ Vanessa de la Torre, *School Officers: Cost Is Concern: Plan Was Response to Recent Arrests*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 25, 2007.

¹⁶ See, e.g., Michael Kolber, *Police Officer to Be Assigned to Schools*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 18, 2000 (Rocky Hill); Tracy Gordon Fox, *Trooper Gets School Assignment*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 7, 2001 (Colchester); Paul Marks, *Cafeteria Conflicts Dwindle as Officer Goes on Watch*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 29, 2002 (Windsor Locks); Larry Smith, *Police Preparing for Changes*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 12, 2004 (East Windsor); John Nickerson, *Police Expected at City High Schools*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), Oct. 5, 2006 (Norwalk); Vanessa de la Torre, *Schools to Be Officer’s Beat*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 25, 2007 (Berlin); Kate Ramunni, *Derby High School Gets Police Officer*, CONNECTICUT POST (Bridgeport), Apr. 9, 2008 (Derby).

¹⁷ *Federal Funds to Boost Security in Schools*, *supra*.

¹⁸ *COPS History* (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services), available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=44>.

¹⁹ *Ensuring School Safety* (U.S. Department of Justice Office of Community Oriented Policing Services), available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/Default.asp?Item=106>.

²⁰ *Connecticut by Program: Accepted COPS Grants* (U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services), Sept. 21, 2004, available at http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/pdf/Cong_Conf_Calls/Grants_by_Agency/CTga.pdf.

²¹ *Id.*

²² *Trooper Gets School Assignment*, *supra*; *State Police Reach Out to Schools*, *supra*.

²³ *Editorial: The Struggle to Get Police Into Schools*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), May 14, 2001.

²⁴ Diane Weaver Dunne, *Policeman Connects with Schoolchildren: Middle School Resource Officer Forms a Special Bond with Area Youngsters*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 11, 1999. In some communities, in fact, crimefighting appeared to be a secondary goal; the schools superintendent in Windsor Locks, “[w]hile allowing that some urban high schools have stationed police in the corridors to prevent fights and guard against weapons,” explained that “the purpose of having an officer at Windsor Locks High is more to deter tardiness, cutting of classes and disrespectful behavior.” Paul Marks, *Police Officer Added at High School: Goal Is to Set “Behavioral Expectations” for Students*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Dec. 31, 2001.

²⁵ *Officers Take School Beat in Stride*, *supra*.

²⁶ See, e.g., Larry Smith, *Board Tables Request for Funds: Schools Seeking to Keep Officer*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 18, 2004 (describing East Windsor resident’s concern that the town would cut more important municipal programs in order to fund an SRO program).

²² See, e.g., Keach Hagey, *Security Plan Fuels Division at GHS*, GREENWICH TIME, Feb. 19, 2006 (describing difference of opinion among parents over stationing “armed officers,” either as SROs or as youth officers, in Greenwich schools). The plan to place SROs in Greenwich gave rise to a lively debate; one parent who opposed the plan went so far as to write his own detailed research report on the topic. See Sean B. Goldrick, *The School Resource Officer Program: A Report on the Use of Armed Police Officers on High School Campuses in Affluent Suburban Connecticut Communities* (on file with authors).

²³ See, e.g., Vanessa de la Torre, *Board Rejects Plan for Officers: Town Council Had Approved Funding*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 27, 2007 (describing objections to placing SROs in Newington middle schools); Tobin A. Coleman, *School Officer Plan Gets OK*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), May 22, 2001 (describing opposition to placing SROs in Stamford elementary schools).

²⁴ Jim Farrell & Christine Dempsey, *School Security Concerns: Police May Take Officers Out of the Middle and High Schools*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, June 24, 2002. In the end, Mayor Larson gave the SRO program his support. *Editorial: Keeping School Officers*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, July 31, 2002.

³⁰ See, e.g., Martin Cassidy, *Parents Want Cops at School*, GREENWICH TIME, Mar. 27, 2007 (citing PTA president’s assertion that “most parents said they feel a police presence has made a positive difference”); Dan Uhlinger, *Residents Display Mixed Budget Priorities: At Hearing, Many Urge Spending Cuts, Many Say Schools Need More*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 9, 2006 (citing parent’s view that “taking out the [SROs] would only be a detriment to students and the school”).

³¹ See, e.g., Paul Marks, *Officer Well-Received in First Week: High School Position Tried Out Last Year*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 14, 2003 (describing enthusiasm among school administrators about Windsor Locks SRO’s early efforts); *Policeman Connects with Schoolchildren*, *supra* (quoting school administrator’s description of new Enfield SRO as “a genuine asset”).

³² See, e.g., Daniela Altimari, *Schools to Lose Resource Officer: State Police Say Redeployment of Trooper Is Temporary Measure*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 30, 2008 (quoting Region 10 superintendent’s observation that he was “disappointed and scared for the safety and well-being of the children”); Chris Gosier, *Elementary School Resource Officers Pulled in Police Staffing Squeeze: Principals Regret “Tremendous Loss”*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), Nov. 19, 2006; Zach Lowe, *Five Schools Will Lose Police Officers*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), Apr. 7, 2005 (noting principal was “furious” upon hearing her school would lose its SRO).

³³ *Editorial: State Troopers in Schools*, *supra*. See also *Editorial: Approve School Officers*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Apr. 21, 2004 (supporting adoption of SRO programs in East Windsor and Suffield); *Editorial: Keep Police in*

Schools, THE HARTFORD COURANT, July 1, 2002 (urging retention of East Hartford SRO program); *Editorial: Invest in Resource Officers*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 24, 2000 (supporting SRO proposals in Ellington, Stafford, and Somers).

³⁴ *COPS in Schools Grant Owner's Manual* (U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services), Sept. 2003, at 8, available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e08032040.pdf>.

³⁵ See, e.g., *Officers Take School Beat in Stride*, *supra* (noting that under the old approach, although “[p]olice have been at the middle school through the years,” “their mission has been ill-defined, their presence sometimes sporadic,” and that introducing SROs “means that there will be no such inconsistency for the next few years.”). The federal CIS grant program helped encourage this continuity by requiring that the SROs it funded spend a minimum of 75 percent of their time in the schools they served. *COPS in Schools Grant Owner's Manual*, *supra*, at 9.

³⁶ See, e.g., Matt Burgard, *Trooper Devoted to Youth Program: He Sees Himself in Those He Now Helps*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, May 28, 2001; James O’Keefe, *Resource Officer Aims to Guide Young Lives*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), May 6, 2001 (“[SRO] Paul DeRiu said the most rewarding part of his job is being able to make a difference in children’s lives.”); Josh Kovne, *New Approach to School Violence*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, May 7, 1999 (“[SRO] Frances Watson has sometimes found herself to be the only steady influence in a troubled student’s life.”).

³⁷ Vanessa de la Torre, *Teen Guilty in Bomb Case*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, November 16, 2007. See also Vanessa de la Torre, *Seven Students Charged in Drug Case*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 26, 2008 (Berlin SRO assisted in investigation that led to drug arrests); Zach Lowe, *Police Find Knives on 2 Boys After Fight in School*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), Mar. 19, 2005 (Stamford SRO disarmed two students after fight); James O’Keefe, *5 Juveniles Arrested in Attempted Robbery*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), July 12, 2001 (Stamford SRO pursued would-be robbers).

³⁸ Daniela Altimari, *Student Problems Decline: Fewer Disciplinary Actions at MHS*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, July 15, 2006 (crediting appointment of Middletown SRO with reductions in suspension and expulsion rates); Paul Marks, *Cafeteria Conflicts Dwindle as Officer Goes on Watch*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Mar. 29, 2002 (crediting Windsor Locks SRO with a drop in “lunch-hour rowdiness”); Christine Dempsey, *Statistics Reveal Significant Decline in Serious Crime*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Feb. 27, 2002 (crediting East Hartford SRO program, among other initiatives, for drop in crime citywide); Carolyn Moreau, *Police Officer Welcomed at School*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, June 12, 1998 (crediting Southington SRO with a drop in the number of thefts at school).

³⁹ *Editorial: Grant Offers Opportunity*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 13, 2002.

⁴⁰ Kimberly W. Moy, *Board Studying Role of Police in School*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, July 13, 2001.

⁴¹ Martin Cassidy, *2 GHS Students Charged in Prank, Face Expulsion*, GREENWICH TIME, Nov. 10, 2007.

⁴² Robin Watson, *Taser Used 3 Times on Student in Greenwich*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), May 17, 2008.

⁴³ Richard Weizel, *Teen Faces Charge He Assaulted Cop*, CONNECTICUT POST (Bridgeport), May 18, 2007.

⁴⁴ Eve Sullivan, *Police Officer Gets Probation, Quits City Force: Was Charged with Molesting Students*, THE ADVOCATE (Stamford), May 25, 2004.

⁴⁵ 68 Fed. Reg. 20,030 (Apr. 23, 2003).

⁴⁶ Peter Finn, et al., *Comparison of Program Activities and Lessons Learned Among 19 School Resource Officer (SRO) Programs*, Feb. 28, 2005, at 23, available at http://www.ncdjjdp.org/cpsv/pdf_files/SRO_Natl_Survey.pdf.

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 33.

⁴⁸ *Id.*

⁴⁹ Interview with Hartford SRO, Dec. 5, 2007; Interview with Hartford SRO, Nov. 7, 2007.

⁵⁰ Interview with Hartford SRO, Dec. 4, 2007.

⁵¹ Interview with Hartford SRO, Nov. 27, 2007.

⁵² Interview with West Hartford SRO, Nov. 7, 2007; Interview with West Hartford high school principal, Nov. 20, 2007.

⁵³ Email from Kimberly Boneham, Assistant Corporation Council, Town of West Hartford, to Jamie Dycus, Liman Fellow, ACLU, Aug. 27, 2008.

⁵⁴ *East Hartford Police Department School Resource Officers' Program Agreement for the 2006-2007 School Year* (East Hartford Police Department), October 17, 2006, at 3, 5 [hereinafter "Program Agreement"].

⁵⁵ Interview with East Hartford SRO, Nov. 30, 2007.

⁵⁶ *East Hartford Police Department School Resource Officer Program Operations Plan* (East Hartford Police Department), 2006-07 [hereinafter "Operations Plan"].

⁵⁷ The MOU was adopted as a condition of reinstating the SRO program following a brief hiatus that resulted from budgetary pressures. *Panels Close to Agreement on Officers, supra*.

⁵⁸ Program Agreement at 5, 9.

⁵⁹ *Id.*

⁶⁰ Operations Plan at 1.

⁶¹ Program Agreement at 3.

⁶² Interview with East Hartford SRO, Nov. 28, 2007.

⁶³ Cynde Rodriguez, *Working a Different Kind of Beat: Officer's Impact Felt at NBHS*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, June 21, 1998.

⁶⁴ *See Finn, supra*, at 48.

⁶⁵ Katie Melone & Fulvio Cativo, *Police Role in School Discipline Still Evolving*, THE HARTFORD COURANT, July 2, 2006.

⁶⁶ See Finn, *supra*, at 50.

⁶⁷ *Fact Sheet: The COPS Commitment to School Safety* (U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services), Aug. 10, 2005, available at <http://www.cops.usdoj.gov/files/RIC/Publications/e09042494.PDF>.

⁶⁸ *COPS in Schools Grant Owner's Manual, supra*, at 5.

⁶⁹ *Id.* at 12.

⁷⁰ See Finn, *supra*, at 47 (explaining the importance of various forms of SRO training).

⁷¹ Interview with Detective Jeff Glaude, West Hartford Police Department, Jan. 11, 2008.

⁷² Email from Kimberly Boneham, Assistant Corporation Council, Town of West Hartford, to Jamie Dycus, Liman Fellow, ACLU, July 18, 2008.

⁷³ Program Agreement at 9.

⁷⁴ Interview with East Hartford SRO, Nov. 30, 2007.

⁷⁵ See Finn, *supra*, at 98 (explaining why program evaluation is essential).

⁷⁶ Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., *SRO Performance Evaluation: A Guide to Getting Results* (U.S. Department of Justice Community Oriented Policing Services), 2005, at 1, available at <http://www.copsinschools.org/Downloads/SROGuide.pdf>.

⁷⁷ *COPS in Schools Grant Owner's Manual, supra*, at 37.

⁷⁸ Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-233h.

⁷⁹ Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 10-10a. The requirement also applies to incidents that occur off-campus at school-sponsored events. In some cases, Connecticut schools file ED166 reports where students are disciplined for incidents that occur off-campus and *not* during school-sponsored events – e.g., where school officials learn that a student has assaulted another student on a Saturday night, and suspend him the following Monday. But such cases are rare.

⁸⁰ Telephone conversation with Milly Agosto, Labor Relations Specialist, Hartford Board of Education, Mar. 6, 2008.

⁸¹ Letter from James Strillacci, Chief of Police, West Hartford Police Department, to Deborah Noble, Legal Administrator, ACLU of Connecticut, Feb. 29, 2008.

⁸² Telephone conversation with Kimberly Boneham, Assistant Corporation Council, Town of West Hartford, Mar. 6, 2008.

⁸³ *Program Agreement* at 5-6.

⁸⁴ Interview with Geoffrey L. Scales, Juvenile Probation Supervisor, Court Services Support Division, State of Connecticut, Aug. 7, 2007.

⁸⁵ *The Connecticut Juvenile Justice Strategic Plan: Building Toward a Better Future* (Child Welfare League for Department of Children and Families and Court Support Services Division), Aug. 2006, at 10, available at http://www.ct.gov/dcf/lib/dcf/juvenile_services/pdf/strategic_plan.pdf.

⁸⁶ The reports, along with additional information about ED166 reporting, are available online at <http://www.csde.state.ct.us/public/cedar/cedar/discipline/0607.htm>.

⁸⁷ The General Assembly passed C.G.S.A. § 10-10a “instructing the Department of Education to develop and implement a state-wide public school information system (PSIS)” which “effectively changed Connecticut’s education data collection” and consolidated the number of SDE data collection forms required for reporting. Thomas S. Sergi, Circular Letter C-11 (Connecticut State Department of Education), August 26, 2003, available at <http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/pdf/circ/circ03-04/c11.pdf>. C.G.S.A. § 10-10a(b) exempts this database from being considered a public record “for the purposes of section 1-210 [the state’s freedom of information statute].”

⁸⁸ Note that this table does not describe the number of incidents, but rather the number of incident reports. School officials are instructed to file a separate ED166 form for each student involved in a disciplinary incident. Thus a single incident may generate several reports.

⁸⁹ Taby Ali & Alexandra Dufresne, Connecticut Voices for Children, *Missing Out: Suspending Students from Connecticut Schools*, August 2008, at 18, available at <http://www.ctkidslink.org/publications/edu08missingout.pdf>.

⁹⁰ See American Academy of Pediatrics, Committee on School Health, *Policy Statement: Out-of-School Suspension and Expulsion*, PEDIATRICS, Vol. 112 (Nov. 2003), at 1206, available at <http://pediatrics.aappublications.org/cgi/content/full/112/5/1206> (“Without the services of trained professionals (such as pediatricians, mental health professionals, and school counselors) and without a parent at home during the day, students with out-of-school suspensions and expulsions are far more likely to commit crimes.”); *Missing Out*, supra, at 4 (“Suspensions may increase the risk of involvement in the juvenile justice system, as children and youth who are sent home from school often remain unsupervised when their parents work.”).

⁹¹ Facsimile from Detective Ursula Wiebusch, Hartford Police Department, to Jamie Dycus, Liman Fellow, ACLU, Apr. 4, 2008.

⁹² Letter from Daryl K. Roberts, Chief of Police, Hartford Police Department, to Jamie Dycus, Liman Fellow, ACLU, Apr. 15, 2008.

⁹³ Abigail Sullivan Moore, *#E@!!!? Persists in Schools Despite Fines*, NEW YORK TIMES, May 14, 2006.

⁹⁴ See Tara M. Brown, *Lost and Turned Out: Academic, Social and Emotional Experiences of Students Excluded From School*, URBAN EDUCATION, Vol. 42, September 2007, at 466 (explaining that excluding students from school caused them “to fall behind in their schoolwork, to fail classes, and to be kept back”).

⁹⁵ See Jeff Grogger, *Arrests, Persistent Youth Joblessness, and Black/White Employment Differentials*, REVIEW OF ECONOMICS & STATISTICS, vol. 74, February 1992, at 105-106 (finding that past arrests affect current employment probabilities in the youth labor market); Spencer De Li, *Social Control, Delinquency, and Youth Status Achievement: A Developmental Approach*, SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES, vol. 42, 1999, at 316 (finding that conviction at an early age tends to increase unemployment).

⁹⁶ See Terence P. Thornberry, David Huizinga & Rolf Loeber, *The Causes and Correlates Studies: Findings and Policy Implications*, JUVENILE JUSTICE JOURNAL, vol. 9, No. 1, September 2004, available at

<http://www.ncjrs.gov/html/ojjdp/203555/jj2.html> (observing that “in general, arrest has little impact on subsequent delinquent behavior, and when it does have an impact, it is most likely an increase in future delinquent behavior. . . . In addition, those who are arrested and incarcerated as juveniles are substantially more likely to be incarcerated as adults.”) (citations omitted); Johanna Wald & Daniel Losen, *Defining and Redirecting a School-To-Prison Pipeline*, May 16, 2003, at 3 (“The single largest predictor of subsequent arrest among adolescent females is having been suspended, expelled or held back during the middle school years.”).

⁹⁷ See C. Puzzanchera & B. Adams, *National Disproportionate Minority Contact Databook* (National Center for Juvenile Justice for the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention), 2008, available at <http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/dmcd/b/> (documenting disproportionate rate of arrest among young people of color); *And Justice for Some: Differential Treatment of Youth of Color in the Justice System* (National Council on Crime and Delinquency) January 2007, at 1, available at http://www.nccd-crc.org/nccd/pubs/2007jan_justice_for_some.pdf (noting that in 2004, “African American youth were disproportionately arrested in 26 of 29 offense categories documented by the FBI”); *Education on Lockdown: The Schoolhouse to Jailhouse Track* (Advancement Project) March 24, 2005, at 18, available at <http://www.advancementproject.org/reports/EOLzerotol.pdf> (noting that in 2002, “Black youths made up 16% of the juvenile population but were 43% of juvenile arrests, while White youths were 78% of the juvenile population but 55% of juvenile arrests”).

⁹⁸ See *No More Children Left Behind Bars*, *supra*, at 14 (observing that “Black youths with no prior criminal records were six times, and Latino youths three times, more likely to be incarcerated than whites for the same offenses.”).

⁹⁹ See *id.* (“There is also growing evidence that racial bias—even implicit, unacknowledged, or unconscious—plays a large role in decisions and judgments made routinely by powerful actors within the criminal justice system.”).

¹⁰⁰ Note that the absence of a bar for white students in Hartford does not indicate that no such students were involved in disciplinary incidents. Rather, it reflects the fact that although white students were involved in 575 disciplinary incidents in Hartford’s public schools during the two-year period, not a single white student was arrested at school in Hartford during that time. Also, although this table does not include Asian American students, because the number of incidents involving those students was very small, some of those students were arrested at school. In fact, the ratio of arrests to incidents was higher for Asian American students than for any other group.

¹⁰¹ See Russell Skiba, *et al.*, *Are Zero Tolerance Policies Effective in Schools? An Evidentiary Review and Recommendations* (American Psychological Association Zero Tolerance Task Force), February 1, 2006, at 6 (“African American students may be disciplined more severely for less serious and more subjective reasons. Emerging professional opinion and qualitative research findings suggest that the disproportionate discipline of students of color may be due to lack of teacher preparation in classroom management or cultural competence.”); *Sherpell v. Humnoke Sch. Dist. No. 5 of Lonoke County*, 619 F.Supp. 670, 677 (E.D. Ark. 1985) (concluding that the subjective elements of a school’s discipline code were pretextual and designed to mask racial bias); *Hawkins v. Coleman*, 376 F.Supp. 1330, 1336 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (noting that cultural differences lead white teachers to perceive conduct by non-white students as hostile or disruptive).

¹⁰² See Pam Stehnjem, *Issue Brief: Youth With Disabilities in the Juvenile Justice System: Prevention and Intervention Strategies* (National Center on Education and Transition) February 2005, available at http://www.edjj.org/Publications/NCSETIssueBrief_4.1.pdf (noting that “[i]n 2000, the Office of Special Education Programs (OSEP) reported the prevalence of disabilities among schoolage children in the United States as 9%, compared with a conservative estimate of 32% within the juvenile justice system.”).

¹⁰³ *Missing Out*, *supra*, at 16.

¹⁰⁴ Powerpoint presentation: *Examining Connecticut's Disciplinary Offense Data* (Connecticut State Department of Education), available at <http://www.sde.ct.gov/sde/lib/sde/PowerPointPresentations/DEPS/FMconference.ppt>.

¹⁰⁵ *Id.*

¹⁰⁶ The Connecticut Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee has provided some guidance on monitoring and evaluation, see *Children, Youth, and the Police: Recommended Policies and Procedures* (Connecticut Juvenile Justice Advisory Committee), 2006, at 19-20, 84, available at <http://www.ct.gov/opm/lib/opm/CJPPD/CjJJyd/JjydPublications/ChildrenYouthPoliceManual2006.doc>, but a more robust model, together with technical assistance to help local officials implement it, is needed.

¹⁰⁷ For a discussion of the need for educational and vocational supports, see *Final Report* (Connecticut Juvenile Jurisdiction Planning and Implementation Committee) February 12, 2007, at 13, available at <http://www.campaigntoyouthjustice.org/Downloads/StateReportsArticles/CTJuvenileJurisdiction.PDF> [hereinafter *JJPIC Final Report*].

¹⁰⁸ The availability of appropriate mental health services is an especially important element of any strategy for assisting youth at risk of involvement with the juvenile justice system, given that between 65 and 70 percent of youth in the juvenile justice system have a diagnosable mental disorder. Kathleen R. Skowrya & Joseph J. Cocozza, *Blueprint for Change: A Comprehensive Model for the Identification and Treatment of Youth with Mental Health Needs in Contact with the Juvenile Justice System* (National Center for Mental Health and Juvenile Justice) January 2006, at 1, available at <http://www.ncmhjj.com/Blueprint/pdfs/Blueprint.pdf>.

¹⁰⁹ For a discussion of the importance of diversion, see *JJPIC Final Report*, *supra*, at 7-8.



School Resource Officers

By: Andrew Bolger, Legislative Fellow

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Issue

This report identifies towns in Connecticut utilizing school resource officers in their public schools and the associated costs for those officers.

Summary

School resource officers (SROs) are sworn police officers who typically perform a number of community policing roles to make schools safer for students and staff, including community liaison, mentor, role model, and law enforcement officer. They also may assist in the development of school policies that concern criminal activity and school safety, as well as teach classes in substance abuse awareness, gang resistance, and crime prevention.

The Office of Legislative Research, with the assistance of the Connecticut Association of Public School Superintendents, surveyed and researched 113 public school districts in Connecticut to learn whether SROs are utilized in their elementary, middle, or high schools. Of the 113 districts, 70 were found to be utilizing SROs in some manner. SROs in Connecticut are primarily assigned to middle and high schools but often visit elementary schools in their district. Financial cost per SRO varies between municipalities and is sometimes unknown to the district. Generally SROs are funded by the board of education or provided by local police departments through memoranda of understanding (MOU) with the school district. OLR Report [2014-R-0103](#) details the use of MOUs between police departments and school districts in Connecticut.

SRO Survey Results

Table 1 details which districts utilize SROs, the number of SROs in each district and their school assignments, the financial cost to the district (if any) per SRO, and the method of funding.

Table 1: School Resource Officers in Connecticut*

District Name	Number of SROs In The District	SRO Assignments	Yearly Financial Cost to the District (per SRO)	Funding Method
ACES	2	Educational Center for the Arts	\$25,000	School District (Regional Education Service Center Budget)
Ansonia	1	Ansonia High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Berlin	2	Berlin High School, McGee Middle School	N/A	Local Police Department
Bethel	5	Bethel Middle School, Bethel High School, R.M.T. Johnson School, Anna H. Rockwell School, Frank A. Berry School	N/A	Local Police Department
Bloomfield	2	Carmen Arace Middle School, Bloomfield High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Bristol	3	Bristol Eastern High School, Bristol Central High school, Chippens Hill Middle School	N/A	Local Police Department
Brookfield	2	Whisconier Middle School, Brookfield High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Cheshire	1	Cheshire High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Clinton	1	The Morgan School	N/A	Local Police Department
Colchester	1	Bacon Academy	\$83,803	School District
Cromwell	2	Cromwell High School, Cromwell Middle School	N/A	Local Police Department
Danbury	3	Broad View Middle School, Rogers Park Middle School, West Side Middle School Academy, and Danbury High School	\$100,000	School District (Town Budget)
Darien	1	Darien High School	N/A	Local Police Department
East Hartford	4	East Hartford Middle School and East Hartford High School	N/A	Local Police Department
East Windsor	1	East Windsor Public Schools	N/A	Local Police Department
Easton	1	Redding Elementary School	N/A	Local Police Department
Ellington	2	Ellington Public Schools	\$75,000	School District (Town Budget)

Table 1 (continued)

District Name	Number of SROs In The District	SRO Assignments	Yearly Financial Cost to the District (per SRO)	Funding Method
Enfield	3	Enfield High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Farmington	3	East Farms Elementary, Noah Wallace Elementary, Union School, West District Elementary, West Woods Upper Elementary School, Irving A. Robbins Middle School, and Farmington High School	\$86,286	School District (Fund Transfer from Town of Farmington)
Glastonbury	2	Smith Middle School and Glastonbury High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Griswold	2	Griswold Public Schools	\$36,000	School District (Town Budget)
Groton	1	Robert E. Fitch High School	\$71,000 of which \$59,000 is district	Shared between School District and Local Police Department
Guilford	1	Guilford High School	\$80,000 of which \$40,000 is district	Shared between School District and Local Police Department
Madison	2	Madison Public Schools	\$73,000	Shared between School District and Local Police Department
Manchester	5	Manchester High School, Bentley and Manchester Regional Academy, Illing Middle School, and two alternative schools	\$60,000	Shared between School District and Local Police Department
Meriden	5	Meriden Public Schools	N/A	Local Police Department
Middletown	2	Middletown High School	\$100,000	Local Police Department
Milford	4	Milford Senior High School, Milford Central Academy, Milford Elementary School	\$40,000	School District (Town Budget)
Monroe	4	Stepney Elementary School, Monroe Elementary School, Fawn Hollow Elementary, Jockey Hollow Middle School, and Masuk High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Naugatuck	1	Naugatuck High School	N/A	Local Police Department

Table 1 (continued)

District Name	Number of SROs In The District	SRO Assignments	Yearly Financial Cost to the District (per SRO)	Funding Method
New Britain	2	New Britain High School	\$114,000	School District (Town Budget)
New Canaan	2	New Canaan High School, Saxe Middle School	N/A	Local Police Department
New Fairfield	1	New Fairfield Public Schools	N/A	Local Police Department
New London	1	New London High School	N/A	Local Police Department
New Haven	12	New Haven Middle and High Schools	N/A	Local Police Department
New Milford	2	New Milford Public Schools	\$100,000	School District (Town Budget)
Newington	1	Newington High School	\$109,000	Shared between School District and Local Police Department
Newtown	2	Newton Middle School and Newton High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Norwalk	3	Nathan Hale Middle School, Ponus Ridge Middle School, Roton Middle School, West Rocks Middle School, Brien McMahon High School, Center for Global Studies, Norwalk Pathways Academy, and Norwalk High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Old Saybrook	3	Kathleen E. Goodwin School, Old Say Brook Middle School, and Old Saybrook High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Oxford	1	Oxford High School	Unknown	School District (Town Budget)
Redding	1	Redding Elementary School and John Read Middle School	N/A	Local Police Department
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 05	1	Amity Regional High School	\$90,000	Regional School Board
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 07	1	Northwestern Regional High School	\$54,000	Regional School Board
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 09**	1	Joel Barlow High School	N/A	Local Police Department
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 10	1	Lewis S. Mills High School	N/A	Local Police Department

Table 1 (continued)

District Name	Number of SROs In The District	SRO Assignments	Yearly Financial Cost to the District (per SRO)	Funding Method
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 12	1	Booth Free School, Burnham School, Washington Primary School, Shepaug Valley School	\$52,008	Regional School Board
REGIONAL SCHOOL DISTRICT 15	1	Pomperaug High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Rocky Hill	3	Rocky Hill High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Seymour	1	Seymour High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Shelton	2	Shelton High School and Intermediate School	N/A	Local Police Department
Simsbury	2	Simsbury High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Somers	1	Somers High School	Unknown	School District (Town Budget)
South Windsor	2	Timothy Edwards Middle School	Unknown	School District (Town Budget)
Southington	1	Southington High School	Unknown	School District (Town Budget)
Sprague	1	Sayles Elementary School (On Call)	N/A	Resident State Trooper
Stamford	2	Stamford High School and West Hill High School	\$200,000	School District (Town Budget)
Stratford	1	Frank Scott Bunnell High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Suffield	1	Suffield High School, Suffield Middle School, McAlister Intermediate School, and A. Ward Spaulding School	\$64,000	School District (Town Budget)
Tolland	2	Tolland High School	\$40,000	School District (Town Budget)
Torrington	1	Torrington High School	\$30,000	School District (Town Budget)
Vernon	1	Vernon-Rockville High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Waterford	2	Waterford High School and Clark Lane Middle School	\$17,500	School District (Town Budget)
Watertown	1	Watertown High School and Swift Middle School	N/A	Local Police Department

Table 1 (continued)

District Name	Number of SROs In The District	SRO Assignments	Yearly Financial Cost to the District (per SRO)	Funding Method
West Hartford	6	West Hartford Public Schools	N/A	Local Police Department
West Haven	5	West Haven Public Schools	\$70,000	School District (Town Budget)
Wilton	2	Wilton Public Schools	\$90,000	School District (Town Budget)
Windham	1	Windham High School	N/A	Local Police Department
Windsor	2	Windsor Public Schools	Unknown	School District (Town Budget)
Wolcott	1	Wolcott High School	N/A	Local Police Department

*Table 1 information is current through the date of publication. Annual school district and municipal budgets often cause SRO employment to fluctuate.

** SRO will be present in regional high school beginning April 1, 2018.

AB:bs